# Mayfield v. Gilliam

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · June 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11063769

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11063769

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing an exception to the general rule that verbal harassment does not amount to a constitutional deprivation where prison guard engaged in a “wanton act of cruelty” by subjecting a prisoner to death threats and racial epithets at gunpoint.
- concluding that officer’s use of racial slur and threat to knock prisoner’s teeth out was not actionable
- concluding that a physical attack that followed a lunch-line quarrel played out so quickly that it was finished before a prison guard reasonably could have intervened

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

WILLIAM T. MAYFIELD PLAINTIFF
#659228

V. NO. 4:23-cv-01214-ERE

WADE GILLIAM, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

I. Overview

On December 26, 2024, pro se plaintiff William T. Mayfield filed this lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officers at the Saline County Detention Center
(“Detention Center”) failed to protect him from an inmate attack on November 26,
2023 (“November 26 incident”). Doc. 2. Defendants are Captain/Jail Administrator
Wade Gilliam and Deputy/Correctional Officers Shakara King, Mollie Blain, and
Noah Alvarez.2 Mr. Mayfield sues each Defendant in his or her individual and
official capacities and seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

1 The parties consented in writing to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all
proceedings in this case including but not limited to entry of final judgment. Doc. 54.
2 The Clerk is instructed to update the docket sheet to reflect the full names of Defendants
Blain and Alvarez – Mollie Blain and Noah Alvarez. Docs. 79-2; 79-4.
Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting brief,
and statement of facts. Docs. 77, 78, 79. Mr. Mayfield has responded (Doc. 81), and

Defendants’ motion is now ripe for review.
For reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 77) is granted.

II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party
bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the nonmoving party must
come forward with specific facts demonstrating a material dispute for trial. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).
A party is entitled to summary judgment if -- but only if -- the evidence shows that

there is no genuine dispute about any fact important to the outcome of the case. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 2017).
Even when the parties dispute exactly what happened, summary judgment

may still be appropriate. First, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Doe v. Dardanelle Sch. Dist., 928 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir.

2019) (omitting citation). Second, while the court must construe all evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of
the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. Background

A. Mr. Mayfield’s Version of Events3
During his January 21, 2025 deposition, Mr. Mayfield recounted that on
November 26, 2023, a muscular inmate known as Mohawk “beat [his] ass bad.” Doc.

79-5 at 7, 15. A related jail incident report identifies “Mohawk” as Keston Damarius
Muldrew. Doc. 79-1.
Mr. Mayfield testified that for a month before the November 26 incident, he
told “them,” in person and through the Detention Center kiosk system, that he felt

threatened in his pod and requested to be transferred. Doc. 79-5 at 7. However, Mr.
Mayfield could not recall a specific instance before the November 26 incident when

3 These facts are taken from Mr. Mayfield’s deposition testimony. Doc. 79-5.
he reported to any one of the named Defendants that he felt threatened or wanted to
move from his pod.

Mr. Mayfield stated that before the November 26 incident, he sent a kiosk
message to Lieutenant Burrus (a non-party) after inmate Muldrew had repeatedly
threatened to steal his commissary items. Id. at 39-40. Detention Center records

confirm that on October 17, 2023, Mr. Mayfield posted a message on the kiosk
system to Lieutenant Burrus stating that he was “scared to death” in his pod and was
not safe. Doc. 79-1 at 78. However, in a follow-up posted two days later, he reported
that he had “made some friends” and was “good in here now.” Id. at 77. And on

October 27, Mr. Mayfield posted that his October 17 grievance was “resolved.” Id.
Mr. Mayfield explained that other inmates made him withdraw his October
17 kiosk grievance to Lieutenant Burrus. He stated that “they” extorted him and stole

his “stuff” and knew about his kiosk message because they “would get on [his]
tablet.” Doc. 79-5 at 40. Importantly, however, Mr. Mayfield specifically conceded
that no named Defendant knew about his October 17 kiosk message to Lieutenant
Burrus. Id. at 43 (“They didn’t know nothing about the kiosk.”). In addition, he

stated: “I’m only accusing them of not stopping [the fight] and pulling me out.” Id.
at 43-44.
Later in his deposition, Mr. Mayfield stated that he wrote Defendant Gilliam
a letter “because [he]wanted something to be done.” Id. at 46. However, he provided

no details regarding the content or timing of his letter to Defendant Gillam.
Mr. Mayfield stated that the day of the incident, he and inmate Muldrew were
in the chow hall waiting in line for a food tray. Id. at 20-21. Mr. Mayfield believed

that inmate Muldrew was planning to steal his tray and told him, “You ain’t getting
my tray.” Id. at 21. Mr. Mayfield and inmate Muldrew then engaged in a verbal
argument, which Mr. Mayfield estimated lasted “probably a minute.” Id. at 22.
Mr. Mayfield recalled that each Defendant was present in the chow hall,

watching and laughing as he and inmate Muldrew argued. Id. at 23. He initially
stated that Defendants King, Alverez, and Blain were just “standing” in the doorway
and “didn’t even come in” but then recalled that King, Alverez, and Blain stood in

the doorway serving food with Defendant Gilliam. Id. at 24. When asked whether
he was sure that Defendant Gillam, a jail captain and administrator, was serving food
to inmates, Mr. Mayfield responded, “What I remember, yeah.” Doc. 79-5 at 24. He
stated, “I was a little disillusioned, but I know he was there.” Id. at 47. Later in his

deposition, however, Mr. Mayfield acknowledged that Defendant Gillam was not
present during the physical altercation and “came up afterwards.” Id. at 49.
Mr. Mayfield recounted that his one-minute squabble with inmate Muldrew

turned physical—that inmate Muldrew suddenly began hitting him, and he attempted
to block the blows by raising his arms. Id. He stated that inmate Muldrew “wailed
on me[,]” “smoked my ass[,]” and “walked me all the way across the floor . . . from

wall to wall.” Doc. 79-5 at 26-27. Mr. Mayfield stated that he could not recall how
may “licks” he took because he blacked out.4 Id. at 26.
Mr. Mayfield estimated that the physical part of the altercation lasted “a good

30 seconds,” and he opined that Defendants should have used a taser to stop inmate
Muldrew. Id. at 22, 28, 45, 47.
Mr. Mayfield initially testified that he heard “guards” say, “Fuck that white
boy, beat his ass.” Id. at 16. Later in his testimony, when asked to name the guards

who made those statements, he recalled only that Defendant King said, “beat him
up.” Id. at 27. When asked how he knew Defendant King was the person he heard
say “beat him up,” Mr. Mayfield explained, “I know her voice. [She] was the only

black lady working there.” Id.
Mr. Mayfield stated that he heard an “all call” for officer assistance only “after
the dude done beat me up.” Id. at 27. It is undisputed that after the incident,
Detention Center officials transported Mr. Mayfield to the Saline County Memorial

Hospital, where medical staff made no diagnosis. Id. at 29. Mr. Mayfield complains

4 At one point during his deposition, Mr. Mayfield inexplicably stated, “They were holding
my head and they got me down on the ground. They brought me all the way across the pod and
everything.” Doc. 79-5 at 16 (emphasis added). When asked whether he was stating that more than
one person attacked him, he responded, “You’re right. I did say there was only one guy.” Id.
that he suffered swelling and continues to have ringing in his ears as a result of the
incident. Id. at 30, 32.

B. Defendants’ Version of Events5
Each Defendant has submitted an affidavit regarding the November 26
incident. Defendant Gillam states that he was not present during the incident (Doc.

79-1 at 2), which agrees with Mr. Mayfield’s ultimate testimony Defendant Gillam
“came up afterwards.”
Consistent with Mr. Mayfield’s testimony and the related jail incident report,
Defendants Alvarez and Blain state that on November 26, 2023, at approximately

4:50 p.m., they were serving “chow” in H pod when inmate Muldrew and Mr.
Mayfield began arguing. Defendants Alvarez and Blain both state that when the
inmates began to “get into each other’s faces,” Defendant Blain told them to

separate. Docs. 79-2 at 1; 79-3 at 1. Both Defendants recall that inmate Muldrew
initially began to walk away, but Mr. Mayfield said something, which caused inmate
Muldrew to turn and walk back toward Mr. Mayfield. Id. According to Defendants
Blain and Alverez, both inmates began swinging at the other, Defendant Blain “then”

advised Defendant Alverez to call for an “all available,” and “when both detainees

5 These facts are taken from Defendant Gilliam’s jail file and each Defendants’ affidavit.
Docs. 79-1; 79-2; 79-3; 79-4.
ended the fight and separated . . . , they were . . . escorted out of H pod after gathering
their belongings.” Docs. 79-2 at 2; 79-3 at 1-2.

Defendants Alvarez and Blain state that the “entire event” lasted
approximately 45-60 seconds. Id. This is consistent with Mr. Mayfield’s testimony
that his verbal argument with inmate Muldrew lasted a minute, and the physical

altercation lasted 30 seconds.
Defendant King states that on November 26 at approximately 4:50 p.m., she
was assigned to the booking desk when she heard Defendant Alvarez call for an “all
available.” Doc. 79-4 at 1. Defendant King states that she did not leave her assigned

station in booking, where Mr. Mayfield was escorted after his altercation with inmate
Muldrew. Id.
Each Defendant testified that he or she was unaware of any request by Mr.

Mayfield to be assigned to a different pod. Docs. 79-1 at 2; 79-2 at 2; 79-3 at 2; 79-
4 at 1.
IV. Discussion
A. Individual-Capacity Claims

Mr. Mayfield claims that each Defendant: (1) failed to protect him by moving
him to another pod before the November 26 incident; and (2) failed to take any action
to stop the November 26 incident once it began.
The Eighth Amendment6 “requires prison officials to take reasonable
measures to guarantee inmate safety by protecting them from attacks by other

prisoners.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “Yet a constitutional claim does not lie every
time one inmate attacks another. Rather, prison officials violate the Eighth

Amendment only when they exhibit a ‘deliberate or callous indifference’ to an
inmate’s safety.” Id. To prevail on a failure-to-protect claim, an inmate must show:
“(1) an objective component, [that] there was a substantial risk of harm to the inmate,
and (2) a subjective component, [that] the prison official was deliberately indifferent

to that risk.” Id. (cleaned up). An official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she
actually knows of the substantial risk of harm and fails to take reasonable measures
in response. Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “Negligence on the part of the prison official is
insufficient to satisfy the subjective component. The official must recklessly
disregard a known, excessive risk of serious harm to the inmate. Norman v.
Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097, 1104 (8th Cir. 2009).7

6 At the time of the November 26 incident, Mr. Mayfield was detained for a parole violation
on a prior conviction. Doc. 79-5 at 12. Accordingly, his claims are analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners.
7 An unpublished decision in McCrary v. Baldwin, 500 Fed. Appx. 551, 551–52 (8th Cir.
2013) incorrectly indicates that Norman was overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009). However, the Eighth Circuit has noted: “The Supreme Court decided
Pearson in January 2009, nearly ten months before we decided Norman. Consequently, Pearson
Each Defendant asserts qualified immunity, which protects government
officials from personal liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person [in their positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). At the summary judgment stage, a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity unless: “(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right
was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Howard v. Kansas City Police
Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). “District courts may address these two

questions in any order but may not deny qualified immunity without answering both
questions in the plaintiff’s favor.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).

Finally, in deciding the question of qualified immunity, I cannot treat
Defendants as “one unified group,” but must consider each Defendant’s conduct to
determine whether evidence against that “individual officer [is] sufficient to
overcome qualified immunity.” Manning v. Cotton, 862 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir.

2017) (quoting Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013)).

could not have overruled Norman.” Walls v. Tadman, 762 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2014).
1. Failure to Prevent the Attack

Mr. Mayfield argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
safety by failing to move him to another pod before the November 26 incident.
However, he specifically testified that he did not notify Defendants King, Blain, or
Alvarez about problems he was having with inmate Muldrew before the November

26 incident. Although Mr. Mayfield requested assistance from non-party Lieutenant
Burrus, he acknowledged that Defendants were not aware of his kiosk message to
her. Doc. 79-5 at 43.
In addition, although Mr. Mayfield testified that he wrote a letter to Defendant

Gilliam about problems he was having in his pod, he failed to explain: (1) the date
of the letter; (2) specific information he included the letter; or (3) whether Defendant
Gilliam actually received any such letter.

Because Mr. Mayfield has failed to provide any evidence that a single
Defendant had specific knowledge that inmate Muldrew posed a threat to his safety
before the November 26 incident, no reasonable juror could conclude that a named
Defendant was subjectively aware that inmate Muldrew posed a danger to Mr.

Mayfield and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to move
him to another pod. As a result, each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on
this claim.
2. Failure to Act Once the Attack Began

Prison officials have no duty to physically intervene in a prison fight if it doing
so would cause them serious injury or worsen the situation, Arnold v. Jones, 891
F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1989), and they are only required to “take reasonable
measures to abate substantial risks of harm, of which [they] were aware.” Blades v.

Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 803 (2002) (quoting Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 491 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
For example, in Cohrs v. Norris, 210 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth
Circuit denied qualified immunity to a prison guard who, from the safety of his

control booth, did nothing and watched for twenty-five minutes while an inmate was
beaten by several other inmates. Similarly, in Martinez v. Norris, 751 Fed. Appx.
959 (8th Cir. 2019), the court affirmed denial of qualified immunity where facts

showed that in the course of fifteen minutes, an inmate attacked several fellow
inmates in full view of guards, who did nothing. Conversely, the Eighth Circuit has
affirmed the grant of qualified immunity in cases involving a surprise inmate attack,
where prison guards had insufficient time to intervene. Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d

999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[B]y the time Daniels knew something was wrong, the
fight was already over. Therefore . . . Daniels would not have been able to intervene
in time to rescue Tucker.”); see also Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1047–48

(8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a physical attack that followed a lunch-line quarrel
played out so quickly that it was finished before a prison guard reasonably could
have intervened).

a. Defendant Gilliam

Although Mr. Mayfield initially testified that Defendant Gilliam was present
during the November 26 incident, he later clarified that Defendant Gilliam arrived
after the altercation ended. Doc. 79-5 at 49. No reasonable factfinder could conclude
that Defendant Gilliam, who was not present at the time of the attack, demonstrated
deliberate indifference to Mr. Mayfield’s safety by failing to intervene. Defendant
Gilliam is clearly entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

b. Defendants Blain and Alvarez
It is undisputed that during the verbal argument between Mr. Mayfield and
inmate Muldrew, which preceded the physical confrontation, Defendant Blain

directed them to separate, and Mr. Muldrew began walking away but then turned
and walked back toward Mr. Mayfield after Mr. Mayfield said something to him.8
According to Mr. Mayfield, inmate Muldrew then suddenly began beating him, and

8 Docs. 79, ¶ 10 (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts); 79-2, ¶ 3 (Blain Aff.); 79-3. ¶ 3 (Alvarez Aff.).
Although instructed to do so (Doc. 80 at 3), Mr. Mayfield failed to submit a statement of facts
pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. Thus, all uncontroverted, material facts set forth in Defendants’
statement of facts are deemed admitted.
In his response in opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Mayfield states that he read in a
report that Defendant King told him and inmate Muldrew to separate. Doc. 81 at 2 (emphasis
added). He states: “That is a lie. The only thing Deputy King had ever said was, “Fuck that white
boy” and “[b]eat his ass.” Id. Mr. Mayfield fails to controvert Defendants’ statement of facts and
affidavit testimony that Defendant Blain directed he and inmate Muldrew to separate.
“walked him all the way across the floor . . . from wall to wall.” Doc. 79-5 at 27.
Mr. Mayfield could not say how may “licks” he took because he blacked out. Id. at

26. I credit Mr. Mayfield’s testimony that after 30 seconds or so, inmate Muldrew
stopped the attack. Doc. 79-5 at 25 (“The only reason he stopped is because, I guess,
he thought I was dead or something. I was on the ground.”).

It is undisputed that after the physical altercation began, Defendant Blain told
Defendant Alverez to call for officer assistance. Mr. Mayfield agrees that someone
called for assistance but contends that they “called after the dude done beat me up.”
Doc. 79-5 at 28.

It is unclear how Mr. Mayfield, who was on the ground and rendered
unconscious from the attack, could recall when Defendant Alvarez called for
assistance. Although I am obliged at the summary judgment stage to credit all

evidence that favors Mr. Mayfield, I am not required to select and credit only those
portions of his deposition testimony that weigh in his favor while ignoring
inconsistencies. Elsewhere in his testimony, Mr. Mayfield indicated that Defendant
Alvarez called for assistance while the 30-second physical altercation was in

progress. Specifically, he stated: “Instead of calling for help, they should have just
pulled out a taser and shot the dude, you know.” Id. In sum, Mr. Mayfield offers no
congruent account regarding when the call for help occurred or evidence that
Defendant Blain or Alvarez purposely waited until after inmate Muldrew stopped
hitting him to call for officer assistance.

By Mr. Mayfield’s own account, the physical attack lasted only 30 seconds,
and there is no evidence that a call for assistance could have been made sooner or
that additional officers could have arrived and stopped the altercation before inmate

Muldrew voluntarily stopped the attack. Nor is there evidence that Defendants could
have abated harm to Mr. Mayfield by employing a taser.
The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, fail to show that
actions taken by Defendant Blain and Alvarez, even if arguably negligent, amounted

to deliberate indifference. Both Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified
immunity on claims that they demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to take
reasonable action once the attack began.

c. Defendant King
As with Defendants Blain and Alvarez, given the suddenness and brevity of
the November 26 incident, and the undisputed call for additional officers, no
reasonable fact finder could conclude that inaction on Defendant King’s part

amounted to deliberate indifference.9

9 Defendant King states that she was not present in H pod; she was stationed at the booking
desk when the November 26 incident occurred. Doc. 79-4 at 1. For the purpose of summary
judgment review, I accept Mr. Mayfield’s testimony that Defendant King was present in H pod at
the time, serving food to inmates.
Mr. Mayfield’s allegations against Defendant King are somewhat different
from those against the other Defendants. In addition to alleging that she failed to act

once the altercation began, he alleges that she stated, “beat his ass.” However, he
does not contend that Defendant King’s alleged utterance incited or caused the
attack, which he acknowledges happened suddenly on the heels of his verbal

argument with inmate Muldrew. Nor does Mr. Mayfield assert that Defendant
King’s words exacerbated his injuries, and I cannot speculate that such is the case.
Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 558 (8th Cir 2008) (citation omitted) (“As with
any summary judgment motion, while we are required to make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we do not resort to speculation.”).
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, Defendant King’s
alleged words, while despicable, did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.

See Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
officer’s use of racial slur and threat to knock prisoner’s teeth out was not
actionable); but see Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99–100 (8th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing an exception to the general rule that verbal harassment does not amount

to a constitutional deprivation where prison guard engaged in a “wanton act of
cruelty” by subjecting a prisoner to death threats and racial epithets at gunpoint.)
The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Mayfield, fail to demonstrate that
Defendant King subjected him to a constitutional violation, and she is therefore
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
B. Official-Capacity Claims
Mr. Mayfield’s official-capacity claims are functionally claims against Saline
County. Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018). Saline County
cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of county employees, and

can face liability only when its own policies, customs, or practices cause a
constitutional deprivation. /d., 902 F.3d at 801-02. Here, Mr. Mayfield fails to present
any evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that a Saline County
policy, practice, or custom caused his injury. As a result, Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Mayfield’s official capacity claims.
Vv. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77) is GRANTED.
2. Pursuant to the Judgment entered with this Order, Mr. Mayfield’s
claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
3. The Clerk is instructed to close this case.
Dated 2 June 2025. .
AMMEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11063769. Public record. Not legal advice.