# Bobby Shed v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11062213

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** May 30, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

USCA11 Case: 23-13746 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/30/2025 Page: 1 of 17

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13746
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

BOBBY SHED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
CAMILLE BLAKE,
Attorney, in her official capacity,
DEBORAH MCCARTHY,
Ms., in her official capacity,
MOEZ LIMAYEM,
Dean, in his official capacity,
JAQUELINE RECK,
Associate Dean, in her official capacity, et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

Defendants-Appellees,

DWAYNE SMITH,
Provost, in his official capacity, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-01327-KKM-TGW
____________________

Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bobby Shed, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
orders (1) dismissing, in part, his pro se employment discrimination
and retaliation claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (2) granting judgment
on the pleadings, in part, and (3) taxing the costs of his deposition
against him. First, he argues that the district court erred in dismiss-
ing his Title VII retaliation claim in Count II. Second, he asserts
that the district court erred in dismissing his Title VII discrimina-
tion claim in Count IV. Third, he maintains that the district court
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 3

erred in granting judgment on the pleadings on his Equal Protec-
tion Clause retaliation claim in favor of Murat Munkin. Fourth, he
contends that the district court abused its discretion in taxing the
cost of his deposition against him.
I
A
Mr. Shed was admitted as a Ph.D. student to the University
of South Florida (“USF”) in 2017. During his Ph.D. program, Mr.
Shed participated in a research fellowship program as a graduate
assistant, where he was awarded more than $180,000.00 in grants,
fellowships, and work contract awards from USF. Mr. Shed identi-
fies as a Black, American, gay, male with disabilities.
Between August 10, 2018, and March 6, 2020, Mr. Shed filed
three separate internal complaints with USF’s Office of Diversity
Inclusion and Equal Opportunity alleging racial discrimination.
The first complaint was filed on August 10, 2018, and was a “for-
mal, written, good faith complaint” about the USF Police’s “racial
treatment” of Mr. Shed, “which he perceived to be incommensu-
rate with the treatment of similarly situated individuals.” Mr. Shed,
however, does not explain what “racial treatment” he experienced
at the hands of the USF Police.1

1 Mr. Shed argues on appeal that had his motion to amend and file excess pages

been granted, he would have provided audio recordings and transcripts be-
tween him and a university official detailing how “his initial complaint was
based on being stopped and harassed by USF Police based on his race” and that
this complaint was “submitted after non-Black Finance Ph.D. students stated
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

Mr. Shed’s second complaint, filed on September 1, 2019,
was another “race-based complaint . . . document[ing] that USF Po-
lice issued citations to Black people” at a higher rate than their rep-
resentation on campus and in the “surrounding Hillsborough
County” community. Mr. Shed’s last complaint, filed on March 6,
2020, was a “formal, written, good-faith Whistleblower Report and
Grievance complaint” related to his allegations about Professor
Munkin’s behavior in class.
Mr. Shed alleged that these internal complaints were not
timely reviewed and that adverse actions were taken against him
in response to filing his complaints, including being denied his dis-
ability accommodations, having his funding withheld, and being
dismissed from USF’s academic programs.
Mr. Shed also alleged that Professor Munkin retaliated
against him after he filed his complaints and the two discussed the
data that formed the basis of these complaints. Mr. Shed alleged
that Mr. Munkin knew of the content of these internal complaints
because Mr. Shed sent Mr. Munkin the data and because Mr. Mun-
kin commented to Mr. Shed about the race-based complaints. Mr.
Shed alleged that Mr. Munkin retaliated by denying Mr. Shed pre-
viously granted accommodations, such as giving him a cumulative

they were never stopped when they go to their offices at night.” But he only
attached his Fifth Amended Complaint to his motion to amend and file excess
pages and stated that supplemental exhibits would follow. Such exhibits were
never filed. Mr. Shed instead now refers this Court to filings that predate his
Fifth Amended Complaint to supply this information.
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 5

rather than non-cumulative final, denying Mr. Shed extended time
on quizzes, and denying Mr. Shed the opportunity to reschedule
quizzes.
B
Mr. Shed brought suit against USF, the Board of Trustees,
and several members of the USF staff in their individual and official
capacities, including Camille Blake, Joanne Adamchak, Deborah
McCarthy, Moez Limayem, Jacquelin Reck, Jianping Qi, Ninon
Sutton, Scott Besley, and Mr. Munkin (collectively the defendants).
Mr. Shed later moved to amend his complaint and for leave to file
additional pages. His motion included his proposed amended com-
plaint and noted that “supplemental exhibits” would be forthcom-
ing. The district court granted the motion and directed Mr. Shed
to file the attachment as his Fifth Amended Complaint.
Mr. Shed’s Fifth Amended Complaint raised claims for retal-
iation and discrimination pursuant to various state and federal
laws. Relevant to this appeal, Mr. Shed brought a retaliation claim
pursuant to Title VII against USF (Count II), a retaliation claim pur-
suant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Mr. Munkin (Count III), and a racial discrimination claim pursuant
to Title VII against USF (Count IV).2

2 On appeal, Mr. Shed does not address Counts I, V, VI, VII, or VIII, and there-

fore they are abandoned. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

The defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Shed’s Fifth Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion as
to all claims, except for Count III against Mr. Munkin in his indi-
vidual capacity.
As to Count II, the district court ruled that Mr. Shed’s retal-
iation claim against USF failed because his complaints about how
the USF Police treated private individuals were not related to an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
As to Count III, the district court concluded that Mr. Shed
lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against Mr. Munkin in his
official capacity because USF was immune from suits for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the district court did not dismiss
Count III in its entirety because the defendants failed to challenge
Mr. Shed’s claims against Mr. Munkin in his individual capacity.
As to Count IV, the district court explained that Mr. Shed’s
racial discrimination claim against USF failed because his allega-
tions of USF ineffectively handling his internal complaints due to
his race was not an adverse employment action.
Mr. Munkin subsequently moved for judgement on the
pleadings for the remaining retaliation claim against him in his in-
dividual capacity. The district court granted the motion. It ruled
that Mr. Shed’s claim failed because the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not include a cause of action for
general retaliation. The district court further held that, even if Mr.
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 7

Shed’s claim was plausible, Mr. Munkin would be entitled to qual-
ified immunity.
After judgment was entered, the defendants submitted a
proposed bill of costs totaling $2,227.34 that included the costs of
fees for service of summons and subpoena, fees for printed or elec-
tronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the
case, and fees and disbursements for printing. Mr. Shed objected
to the entirety of the proposed bill of costs and argued, in relevant
part, that there was no evidence that the deposition included in the
bill was necessary for the case, that he was never provided with the
deposition transcript, and that the deposition was not used in any
of the filings. The district court awarded $29.34 in costs associated
with the service of the subpoena and $2,013.00 in costs associated
with Mr. Shed’s deposition. The district court found that the de-
fendants’ request for fees for the deposition was proper because the
deposition was necessary and taken within the course of discovery.
It also found that the deposition’s costs were sufficiently supported
by the invoice submitted as documentation of costs.
II
We first address Mr. Shed’s challenge to the district court’s
grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss his Fifth Amended
Complaint.
A
We review a district court’s order granting a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim de novo. See EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938
F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019). Pro se pleadings are held to a less
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be
liberally construed. See Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168
(11th Cir. 2014). However, a court may not “serve as de facto coun-
sel for a party,” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order
to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The com-
plaint must include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level” and must contain “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements[,]” are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The
district court (and we) must “take the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff[ ].” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2010).
Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned, and ar-
guments raised for the first time on appeal in a civil action are
waived. See Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330–31. Additionally, an
appellant generally may not raise new arguments for the first time
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 9

in a reply brief. See Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir.
2003) (per curiam).
B
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee because he has opposed any practice made
unlawful, or because he has made a charge or participated in a re-
lated proceeding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “To that end, em-
ployers cannot retaliate against employees who have complained
about—that is, opposed—discrimination based on [certain] . . . pro-
tected characteristics.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322,
1339 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). By its own terms, and as evidenced by the intent of Congress,
Title VII is limited to “protect[ing] employees from their employ-
ers’ unlawful actions.” Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S.
170, 178 (2011). See also Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 809 F. App’x
574, 579 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Only ‘employees’ may
bring a Title VII suit.”); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163
F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We can assume that Con-
gress . . . meant to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs under Title
VII.”).3

3 Though the district court did not address whether Mr. Shed was an employee

for purposes of Title VII, we assume that Mr. Shed sufficiently alleged that he
was employed by USF as a research assistant. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
See also Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (con-
cluding that a graduate student who was employed as a graduate research as-
sistant was an employee of the university under the economic realities test).
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

To properly allege his race-based retaliation claim, Mr. Shed
must allege that “he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he
suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal re-
lation between the two events.” Goldmsith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513
F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). To establish that he engaged in
statutorily protected expression, Mr. Shed “must show that [he]
had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged
in unlawful employment practices.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp.,
291 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted). However, Title VII does not protect against
retaliation resulting from complaints about non-employment re-
lated practices. See Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 538–39 (7th
Cir. 2021) (“Title VII is not a general bad acts statute . . . [r]ather,
the conduct it prohibits is specially set forth.”) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Bonds
v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 384 (4th Cir. 2011). 4
We agree with the district court that Mr. Shed failed to
properly allege a claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII

4 In a Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit, the complaint need not

allege a prima facie case under the framework announced in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which is “an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. Rather, the complaint
“must contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Swierkiewicz was cited with approval in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70, so it is
still good law in the Title VII context. And although Swierkiewicz involved the
discrimination context, we see no reason why this principle would not apply
with equal force to a retaliation claim.
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 11

against USF. In Count II, he alleged that USF retaliated against him
by decreasing his funding and removing him from his graduate pro-
gram after he complained about the USF Police’s alleged discrimi-
nation against Black people. But he failed to allege “that [he] had a
good faith, reasonable belief that [his] employer was engaged in
unlawful employment practices,” because USF Police’s treatment
of private individuals is not an employment practice. See Edwards
v. Ambient Healthcare of Ga., Inc., 674 F. App’x 926, 930 (11th Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (“[T]he driver’s alleged actions toward non-em-
ployee patients of Ambient and their caregivers (while reprehensi-
ble) is not an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Motel 6
Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting
that employees’ retaliation claim based on opposition to unlawful
discrimination against motel customers “could not proceed under
the familiar Title VII retaliation statute” because the plaintiffs did
not allege that they were discriminated against for “opposing an
unlawful employment practice.”) (emphasis removed).
Though we liberally construe Mr. Shed’s pleadings, we can-
not “serve as de facto counsel for a party,” or “rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell, 760 F.3d
at 1168–69. Accordingly, we affirm as to the retaliation claim.
C
Title VII precludes employers from discriminating against
an employee “because of” his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To state
a claim for race discrimination in violation of Title VII, a complaint
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

need only provide sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly sug-
gest that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action due
to intentional racial discrimination.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace
Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015). See also McCarthy v.
City of Cordele, 111 F.4th 1141, 1147 (11th Cir. 2024) (applying
Swierkiewicz and Iqbal to conclude that the plaintiff’s allegations
“nudged [his] race-discrimination claims across the line from con-
ceivable to plausible.”) (citation and internal quotation marks re-
moved). To sufficiently allege a Title VII discrimination claim, an
employee “must show some harm respecting an identifiable term
or condition of employment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri,
601 U.S. 346, 354–55 (2024). The adverse employment action “must
have left [him] worse off, but need not have left [him] significantly
so.” Id. Under “the proper Title VII standard,” a plaintiff need not
demonstrate that the adverse employment action “caused ‘signifi-
cant’ harm.” Id. at 360.
The district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Shed’s Title
VII claim in Count IV because he failed to allege the required ele-
ments of a Title VII discrimination claim. In Count IV, Mr. Shed
alleged that USF discriminated against him by failing to handle his
internal complaints in a timely and proper manner. Yet he failed
to allege that USF’s failure to handle his internal complaints re-
sulted in an adverse employment action—e.g., termination from
the Ph.D program. Moreover, USF’s alleged failure to timely ad-
dress Mr. Shed’s internal complaints did not result in a change in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. See Everson
v. Coca-Cola, 241 F. App’x 652, 653 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 13

(holding that “failure to respond to [plaintiff’s] internal complaints”
was not the “type[ ] of action[ ] that would have any ‘material’ af-
fect on [plaintiff’s] employment.”).
Because Mr. Shed failed to allege an adverse employment
action resulting from USF’s alleged failure to timely address his in-
ternal complaints, he failed to plead a plausible claim of employ-
ment discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm as to this claim.
III
We next address Mr. Shed’s challenge to the district court’s
grant of Mr. Munkin’s motion for judgement on the pleadings.
A
We review an order granting a motion for judgment on the
pleadings de novo. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335
(11th Cir. 2014). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where
there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Cannon v. City of
W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). “In determin-
ing whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we
accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving party’s
pleading,” and then view “those facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.” Id.
B
Under our prior-panel precedent rule, a prior panel’s holding
is binding unless it has been overruled or abrogated by the Su-
preme Court or by our Court sitting en banc. See Sabal Trail
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., 59 F.4th 1158,
1164 (11th Cir. 2023). We have previously held that “[t]he right to
be free from retaliation is clearly established as a [F]irst [A]mend-
ment right and as a statutory right under Title VII; but no clearly
established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free
from retaliation.” Ratliff v. DeKalb Cnty., 62 F.3d 338, 340 (11th Cir.
1995) (emphasis removed). “A pure or generic retaliation
claim . . . simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (per cu-
riam).
The district court did not err in granting judgment on the
pleadings on Mr. Shed’s retaliation claim against Mr. Munkin in his
individual capacity. Even accepting as true all the facts Mr. Shed
alleges, his claim that Mr. Munkin retaliated against him in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause is not cognizable because “no
clearly established right exists under the equal protection clause to
be free from retaliation.” Ratliff, 62 F.3d at 340 (emphasis re-
moved). Therefore, Mr. Munkin was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. To the extent that Mr. Shed asks us to reconsider
our precedent, we are bound to it by our prior-panel precedent
rule. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, 59 F.4th at 1164.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this claim.
IV
We conclude by addressing Mr. Shed’s challenge to the dis-
trict court’s grant of the defendants’ bill of costs.
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 15

A
We review a district court’s decision regarding costs for
abuse of discretion. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Under the abuse-of-discretion standard,
we will only reverse when the district court “made a clear error of
judgment” or “applied the wrong legal standard.” Rance v.
Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004)
(en banc)).
Taxable costs include, among other things, court reporter
and transcript fees necessarily obtained for use in the case, fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses, and fees for copies of pa-
pers necessarily obtained for use in the case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(2)–(4). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). “The presumption
is in favor of awarding costs.” Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus.
Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Costs may be taxed for the costs of depositions. See 28
U.S.C. § 1920(2) (“A judge . . . may tax as costs . . . [f]ees for printed
or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use
in the case . . . .”). See also EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620
(11th Cir. 2000). We have therefore held that “[a] district court
may tax costs associated with the depositions submitted by the par-
ties in support of their summary judgment motions.” W&O, Inc.,
213 F.3d at 621 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Even where a deposition is not used by the prevailing party at sum-
mary judgment, the party challenging the cost award must show
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-13746

that the “depositions were not related to an issue in the case when
the depositions were taken.” Id. at 622. However, costs are not
recoverable “where the deposition costs were merely incurred for
convenience, to aid in thorough preparation, or for purposes of in-
vestigation only.” Id. at 620 (alteration removed) (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
We have noted that “[f]acial challenges to the legal suffi-
ciency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a claim for relief, should . . . be resolved before dis-
covery begins.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353,
1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted). This is so because “[s]uch
a dispute always presents a purely legal question; there are no is-
sues of fact because the allegations contained in the pleading are
presumed to be true. Therefore, neither the parties nor the court
have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion.”
Id. (citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
the defendants the costs of Mr. Shed’s deposition. The district
court was permitted to award costs for the deposition even though
the deposition was not later used because Mr. Shed’s deposition
was related to the issues of the case, namely his allegations of retal-
iation. The district court was also permitted to award costs for the
deposition even though it took place before it ruled on the motion
to dismiss because it took place during an agreed upon discovery
period ordered by the district court, there was a long period of time
between the filing of the original complaint and the operative
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23-13746 Opinion of the Court 17

complaint, and neither party moved to stay discovery pending res-
olution of the motion to dismiss. Although the defendants’ sub-
mission of the costs of the deposition does not detail how the
amount was calculated, it is clear the cost was for one deposition.
It was therefore reasonable for the district court to find that suffi-
cient documentation existed.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this claim.
V
We affirm the district court on all issues raised.
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11062213. Public record. Not legal advice.