# MURPHY v. TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, INC.

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · May 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11061658

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11061658

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “if and only if” the court finds plaintiff has satisfied the purposeful availment prong, does the court need to consider the remaining prongs of the specific jurisdiction test
- finding that the preponderance of the evidence standard was correctly applied as “full discovery had been conducted and the relevant evidence on jurisdiction had been presented to the court”
- holding the plaintiff to a preponderance of the evidence standard because the parties had engaged in jurisdictional discovery
- finding that unless when weighing the factors this Court finds the balance of hardships is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

)
ADRIAN MURPHY, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) 1:22CV971
v. )
)
TITLEMAX OF VIRGINIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
Adrian Murphy, et al. (“Plaintiffs”)1 brought this action pursuant to the North Carolina
Consumer Finance Act, the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
North Carolina’s usury statutes against TitleMax of Virginia, Inc., TitleMax of South Carolina,
Inc., TMX Finance of Virginia, Inc., and TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. (“Defendants”). (See ECF
No. 2 ¶¶ 22, 28, 41.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue. (ECF No. 36.) For the reasons stated
herein, Defendants’ motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this action are, or were, residents of North Carolina who allegedly entered
into car title loan transactions with Defendants. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants charged interest rates on their car title loans that exceed the rate allowed by the
North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1, 53-164 to -191. (Id. ¶¶

1While Plaintiffs in this action exceeds several hundred individuals as outlined in the Complaint, (ECF
22, 28.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failure to disclose that the loan was unlawful
constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices within the meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-
180(g) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1. (Id. ¶ 41.)
This action began in state court and Defendants removed it to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) On November 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their

Complaint with this Court. (See ECF No. 2.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that this
Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants “in that at all times relevant to the events and
transactions alleged herein, Defendants, via the internet, cellular telephone and/or other media
and communication methods solicited, marketed, advertised, offered, accepted, discussed,
negotiated, facilitated, collected on, threatened enforcement of, and/or foreclosed upon
automobile title loans with Plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

In Defendants’ answer, they assert a lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense, and
subsequently Defendants jointly filed the instant Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of personal
jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 6 at 6; 36 at 1.) On October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Jurisdictional Discovery to “provide a full record [in] response to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.” (ECF No. 48 at 1.) This motion was granted in part, and the parties conducted
jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 57 at 2–3.)

In the instant motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction because Defendants do not “maintain contacts with North Carolina in connection
with any [of] Plaintiffs’ claims.” (ECF No. 37 at 3.) Defendants alternatively argue for this
Court to transfer venue to the district court where each of the designated Plaintiffs’ “title loan
was executed[,] and the loan funds were conveyed.” (Id. at 17.) The Court will address each

argument in turn.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
Here, the parties are in dispute regarding the burden of proof Plaintiffs must satisfy to
show that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs must show personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and Plaintiffs
counter that they need only make a prima facie showing. (ECF Nos. 57 at 1; 63 at 7; 69 at 1.)

In a challenge to personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction. Grayson v. Anderson,
816 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit
has stated that the plaintiff's burden of proof “varies according to the posture of [the] case
and the evidence that has been presented to the court.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268.

Where the court decides a pretrial personal jurisdiction question without conducting
an evidentiary hearing — “reviewing only the parties’ motion papers, affidavits attached to the
motion, supporting legal memoranda, and the allegations in the complaint”— “a plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction” to overcome a jurisdictional
challenge. Id. Where, however, the parties have engaged in discovery on the issue of personal
jurisdiction and have submitted evidence beyond the pleadings, the court “must hold the

plaintiff to its burden of proving facts, by a preponderance of the evidence, that demonstrate
the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id.; see also, e.g., AARP v. Am. Family
Prepaid Legal Corp., 604 F.Supp.2d 785, 797 (M.D.N.C. Feb 25, 2009) (holding the plaintiff to
a preponderance of the evidence standard because the parties had engaged in jurisdictional
discovery).
Here, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery, (ECF No. 57
at 2–3), and jurisdictional discovery was conducted. As the Court will look to evidence outside
of the pleadings in resolving the issue of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs are required to
establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Grayson, 816 F.3d at
269 (finding that the preponderance of the evidence standard was correctly applied as “full

discovery had been conducted and the relevant evidence on jurisdiction had been presented
to the court”).
A “preponderance of the evidence . . . simply requires the trier of fact to believe that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Concrete Pipe and Prods. of
California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). “[I]f a court requires the plaintiff to establish

facts supporting personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence prior to trial, it must
conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268 (internal quotations omitted).
However, evidentiary hearings do not require live testimony. Id. Evidentiary hearings require
that both parties are given a fair opportunity to present relevant jurisdictional evidence and
their legal arguments. Id.; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Receiver for Rex Ventures Grp., LLC.,
730 F. App’x 133, 136 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

This Court does not find an evidentiary hearing necessary in this case as the parties
were permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery that included submitting requests for
productions, taking depositions, and obtaining documentation relating to the loans. (ECF No.
57 at 2–3.) Additionally, the parties have extensively briefed the issue of personal jurisdiction.
(See ECF Nos. 37; 63; 69.) Thus, both sides have had a fair opportunity to present

jurisdictional evidence and their legal arguments. See Grayson, 816 F.3d at 268. As the Court
has now determined that Plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence, it will now address whether they have met their burden.
B. Discussion
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority
to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,

283 (2014) (citation omitted). A federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only if “(1) such jurisdiction is authorized by the long-arm statute of
the state in which the district court sits; and (2) application of the relevant long-arm statute is
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Universal Leather,
LLC. V. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Regarding the first prong, North Carolina’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction

over “nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.”
Christian Sci. Bd. Of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). The two-prong test, therefore, “merges into [a] single question,”
allowing the court to proceed directly to the constitutional analysis. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d
at 558–59, 559. Therefore, the question the Court must now determine is whether asserting
personal jurisdiction over Defendants is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., id.
Under the Due Process Clause, two paths permit a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.
Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559. General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert jurisdiction
over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.” Walden, 571
U.S. at 283 n.6. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction
is the individual’s domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924
(2011) (citation omitted). “[F]or a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. at 924. The Supreme Court has “not
foreclose[d] the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum
other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014).
This Court finds that it lacks general jurisdiction over Defendants. In their Complaint,
Plaintiffs state that Defendants are “foreign corporations organized and existing under the
laws of a state other than North Carolina.” (ECF No. 2 ¶ 3.) Defendants are not incorporated
in North Carolina, nor do they have their principal place of business here. (See id. ¶¶ 2, 3.)

Therefore, Defendants are not fairly regarded to be at home in North Carolina. See Goodyear,
564 U.S. at 924. The Court will now turn to whether there is specific jurisdiction over
Defendants. See Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559.
The second path to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant is specific
jurisdiction, which “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy.’” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n.6. (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S.

at 919). Courts employ a three-prong test to determine whether the exercise of specific
jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559.
Courts consider “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims [arose]
out of those activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally
reasonable.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong
Rubber Co., Ltd., 682 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2012)).
The first prong, purposeful availment, is grounded in the concept of minimum contacts
and contemplates whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate
are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1989)). To satisfy
the minimum contacts requirement for specific jurisdiction, “the contacts [must] proximately
result from actions by the defendant [itself] that create a substantial connection with the forum
State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted).
Relevant to the analysis is the quality and nature of the defendant's connections, rather
than the number of contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d

at 301. The relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation “must arise
out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at
284 (quoting Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475). The defendant cannot “be haled into a jurisdiction
solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . or of the ‘unilateral
activity of another party or a third person.’” Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 417 (1984)) (additional citation omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has noted that this analysis is “flexible” and involves a case-by-case
consideration of several factors. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 560 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 302). Those factors include, but are not limited to,
evaluating: “(1) whether the defendant maintains offices or agents in the forum state; (2)

whether the defendant owns property in the forum state; (3) whether the defendant reached
into the forum state to solicit or initiate business; (4) whether the defendant deliberately
engaged in significant or long-term business activities in the forum state; (5) whether the
parties contractually agreed that the law of the forum state would govern disputes; (6) whether
the defendant made in-person contact with the resident of the forum in the forum state
regarding the business relationship; (7) the nature, quality and extent of the parties'

communications about the business being transacted; and (8) whether the performance of
contractual duties was to occur within the forum.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
With respect to the first and second factors it is undisputed that Defendants do not
maintain an office or place of business in North Carolina, nor do Defendants own property
in North Carolina. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 2, 3.) However, the third factor applies here as this Court

finds that Defendants have reached into the forum state to solicit or initiate business. Plaintiffs
submitted dozens of declarations that state how Plaintiffs first learned about Defendants.
Many Plaintiffs indicate that they learned about Defendants by hearing about them on the
radio while in North Carolina. (ECF Nos. 64-3 ¶ 3; 64-9 ¶ 3; 67-7 ¶ 3; 67-11 ¶ 3; 67-12 ¶ 3.)
Others state that they learned about Defendants on the internet while they were in North
Carolina. (ECF Nos. 64-7 ¶ 3; 67-9 ¶ 3; 65-9 ¶ 3; 65-12 ¶ 3; 65-15 ¶ 3; 65-16 ¶ 3; 67-6 ¶ 3.)

Or they heard about Defendants from a television advertisement in North Carolina. (ECF
Nos. 64-8 ¶ 3; 65-14 ¶ 3; 67-1 ¶ 3; 67-18 ¶ 3.)
While Defendants submit a declaration of a TMX Finance employee that states,
“[Defendants] never personally solicited, while physically present in North Carolina, any of
the named plaintiffs in the actions,” this does not contradict Plaintiffs’ assertions that they

were solicited via radio, television, and the internet. (ECF No. 37-2 ¶ 35.) Defendants
advertising to Plaintiffs manifests a general intent to do business with North Carolina
residents. Bassett v. Strickland’s Auto & Truck Repairs, Inc., 1:17CV590, 2018 WL 3542868, at *4
(M.D.N.C. July 23, 2018) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality op.); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 295 (1980).

This Court also finds that Defendants deliberately engaged in significant or long-term
business activities in the forum state, the fourth factor. Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs
assertion that Defendants recorded liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles. Defendants instead argue that the recording of a vehicle lien in North Carolina is a
“de minimis interaction” as it requires “nothing more than filing a form.” (ECF No. 37 at 11
(citations omitted).)

A defendant “creat[ing] continuing obligations between [it]self and residents of the
forum” may give rise to specific jurisdiction. Purdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185, 190
(4th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
While recordation of the liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles may
not by itself be enough to assert personal jurisdiction, in recording the lien and entering into
the loan agreements with Plaintiffs, Defendants created continued obligations between

themselves and residents of North Carolina. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (upholding the
assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who “have purposefully reach[ed] out beyond their
State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that envisioned
continuing and wide-reaching contacts in the forum state.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
Here, Defendants advertised to North Carolina customers, entered into lien
agreements with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, and accepted continuing
payments from Plaintiffs residing in North Carolina. The Court finds that Defendants have
made sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to support personal jurisdiction over
them by this Court. See Leake v. AutoMoney, Inc., 877 S.E.2d 22, 30, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022)

(finding personal jurisdiction where Defendant called potential North Carolina borrowers,
offered loans over the phone to North Carolina residents, directed North Carolina residents
to travel out of state, accepted payments from North Carolina, sent collection letters into
North Carolina, and recorded liens with the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles).
As the Court has determined that Defendants have purposefully availed itself of the
privileges of conducting business in North Carolina, it will now move to the remaining factors

in the specific jurisdiction inquiry. See Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273,
278 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that “if and only if” the court finds plaintiff has satisfied the
purposeful availment prong, does the court need to consider the remaining prongs of the
specific jurisdiction test).
The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test asks whether Plaintiffs’ claims arose
out of Defendants’ activities in the state. Id. at 278–79 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’

claims allege that Defendants charged interest rates exceeding the maximum amount allowable
under state law, that Defendants failed to “properly and legally record liens,” and that
Defendants failed to disclose unlawful loans. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 21–46.) These claims arise out
of Defendants contacts with the state as Defendants contacts all relate to entering into loan
agreements with Plaintiffs.
The third and final prong of the specific jurisdiction test, that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction be constitutionally reasonable, has also been proven by Plaintiffs. Consulting Eng’rs,
561 F.3d at 279. This prong permits a court to consider additional factors related to the
appropriateness of the forum. These factors include: “(1) the burden on the defendant of
litigating in the forum; (2) the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the

plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the shared interest of the
states in obtaining efficient resolution of disputes; and (5) the interests of the states in
furthering substantive social policies.” Id.
The Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally reasonable
as the forum is appropriate. First, Defendants do not have a significant burden if they were
to litigate in this forum, and Defendants do not argue that there is one. (See ECF No. 37.)

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims arise under the consumer protection laws of North Carolina
giving this forum a large interest in adjudicating the dispute. (See ECF No. 2.)
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proving that
this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants by a preponderance of the evidence.
Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss is denied.
III. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Defendants moved in the alternative to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
(See ECF No. 37 at 17.) Defendants argue that this action should be transferred to the
“appropriate district court encompassing the TitleMax location where that Plaintiff’s title loan
was executed and the loan funds were conveyed.” (Id.) Defendants submitted charts outlining
the district court they believe each Plaintiff’s case should be transferred. (ECF No. 37-2 at 8–
18.) They move for the actions to be transferred to several district courts located throughout
Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia. (Id.) Plaintiffs counter that piecemealing their actions
and transferring the matter to different districts “does not serve efficiency or justice.” (ECF
No. 63 at 19.) This Court agrees with Plaintiffs.
The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states in relevant part: “[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In this
Circuit, a four-factor standard governs § 1404(a) motions. Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l
Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015). Courts consider “(1) the
weight accorded to plaintiff's choice of venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3)
convenience of the parties; and (4) the interest of justice” (hereinafter “the Pipefitters factors”).
Id. “Ultimately, the party seeking transfer has the burden of persuasion.” Davis v. Stadion

Money Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:19CV119, 2019 WL 7037426, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Regarding the first element, this Court affords substantial weight to the Plaintiffs’
choice of venue. Pipefitters, 791 F.3d at 444 (citation omitted); see also Speed Trac Tech., Inc. v.
Estes Express Lines, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2008) (citing In re Carefirst
of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 260 (4th Cir. 2002)). This is especially true when plaintiff’s chosen

forum is the plaintiff’s home or has a significant relationship with the cause of action. See
Campbell v. Apex Imaging Servs., Inc., Nos. 1:12CV1366, 1:12CV1365, 2013 WL 4039390, at *3
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2013) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s choice, however, receives less weight
if the suit is filed in a foreign forum or the cause of action bears little relation to the chosen
forum. Speed Trac Techs., 567 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (citations omitted).
Defendants argue that since “none of the conduct complained of occurred in the forum
and the forum has no connection with the cause of action,” Plaintiffs’ choice of forum should
be given little weight. (ECF No. 37 at 18.) However, the cause of action does bear relation
to the chosen forum as Plaintiffs, at the time these allegations occurred, resided in North
Carolina, were solicited to enter into loan agreements from North Carolina, and paid

Defendants from North Carolina. Defendants’ argument that the “content of the loan
agreements” occurred entirely outside this forum is unpersuasive. (Id.)
The second and third Pipefitters factors require this Court to consider the convenience
of this District for the witnesses and parties. See Pipefitters, Inc., 791 F.3d at 444 (citations
omitted). “[E]ven though a defendant may be inconvenienced by litigating an action in a
plaintiff's home district, a transfer is not appropriate where it would likely only serve to shift

the balance of inconvenience from the plaintiff to the defendant.” comScore, Inc. v. Integral Ad
Sci., Inc., 924 F.Supp.2d 677, 687 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted).
Defendants do not provide sufficient factual evidence to show that they will suffer
inconvenience by litigating in this District, nor do they show why splitting up this case
throughout several different states would be more convenient for Plaintiffs. Defendants argue

that since “no Defendant is located within North Carolina . . . there is no evidence, physical
premises, or witnesses within the forum.” (ECF No. 37 at 18.) This Court does not find this
argument persuasive. Additionally, access to tangible evidence and witnesses, is less of a
barrier today for litigation because of modern technology. See Wyandotte Nation v. Salazar, 825
F.Supp.2d 261, 271 (D.D.C. 2011). Further, a transfer of venue would heavily burden
Plaintiffs given that Plaintiffs would possibly need to find counsel to represent them in the
other districts.
Finally, for the fourth Pipefitters factor, the interest of justice, weighs heavily against
Defendants. See Pipefitters, Inc., 791 F.3d at 444 (citations omitted). In examining this factor,
this Court considers “the pendency of a related action, the court's familiarity with the

applicable law, docket conditions,” and other factors related to systemic integrity and judicial
economy. Menk v. MITRE Corp., 713 F.Supp.3d 113, 139 (D. Md. 2024) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citations omitted).
The interest of judicial economy is a significant factor in this case as many Plaintiffs
have filed suits against Defendants in this District and this Court is very familiar with the case.
Additionally judicial efficiency would be affected if the Court were to split these Plaintiffs

amongst several different states and several different district courts as Defendants suggest.
Plaintiffs have filed almost identical Complaints, and the risk of inconsistent judgments arises
from trying these cases separately. See, e.g., Bluestone Innovations, LLC v. LG Elecs., Inc., 940
F.Supp.2d 310, 320 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013).
In weighing the factors, the Court finds that the balance of hardships would be borne
by Plaintiffs’ if the case were transferred to separate districts. See, e.g., Collins v. Straight, Inc.,

748 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that unless when weighing the factors this Court
finds the balance of hardships is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of
forum should not be disturbed) (citation omitted). Therefore, this Court finds that
Defendants have not met its burden to prove that transfer of venue is warranted here, and
Defendants motion in the alternative to transfer venue is denied.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No.
36), is DENIED.
This, the 29th day of May 2025.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
Senior United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11061658. Public record. Not legal advice.