# STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HARLAN V. FERGUSON

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · May 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11060311

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 28, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Matthew J. Wilson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11060311

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “confinement to a hospital bed is insufficient alone to constitute custody”
- concluding that the hospitalized defendant was not in custody when an officer questioned him while obtaining a sample of defendant’s blood pursuant to a search warrant
- holding that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compulsory self-incrimination is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment

## Opinion text

05/28/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
February 25, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HARLAN V. FERGUSON, ALIAS HARLEY T.
MARTIN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
No. 108894 Bobby R. McGee, Judge 1
___________________________________

No. E2019-02224-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, Harlan V. Ferguson, alias Harley T. Martin, of
two counts of vehicular homicide, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly
weapon, driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, and failure to drive within a
single lane of traffic. The trial court merged the vehicular homicide and DUI convictions
into one vehicular homicide conviction and imposed an effective ten-year sentence with
one year to be served in confinement followed by probation. While Defendant’s direct
appeal was pending in this court, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which
he alleged that newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment. The
trial court denied the petition, and this court consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal of his
convictions and his appeal from the denial of coram nobis relief. On appeal, Defendant
challenges (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements to law
enforcement; (2) the State’s failure to establish the chain of custody of Defendant’s blood
samples; (3) the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss due to the destruction of
evidence; (4) the trial court’s admission of lay testimony regarding the cause of the
victim’s injuries; (5) the trial court’s admission of Defendant’s medical records; (6) the
trial court’s exclusion of defense evidence; (7) the trial court’s failure to issue a missing
witness instruction; (8) the State’s comments during closing arguments; (9) the State’s
failure to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and
(10) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis.
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief. Upon
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

1
Judge McGee presided over the trial, sentencing hearing, and hearing on Defendant’s motion for
new trial. Judge McGee subsequently retired, and Judge Ryan M. Spitzer presided over Defendant’s coram
nobis proceedings by interchange.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed.

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER,
J., and W. MARK WARD, SP. J., joined.

Eric Lutton, District Public Defender; Jonathan Harwell (on appeal and at coram nobis
hearing), Halle Hammond (on appeal), Christy Murray (at trial and coram nobis hearing),
and Kathryn Fraser and Carter Pack (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the
appellant, Harlan V. Ferguson, alias Harley T. Martin.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Heather
Good, Joe Welker, and Greg Eshbaugh, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

During the evening hours of February 3, 2016, officers with the Knox County
Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”) attempted to stop a 2012 Kia Soul that was traveling at a high
rate of speed. Before officers could catch up to the vehicle, it ran off the road and struck
a tree. The occupants of the vehicle were Defendant and the victim, Sarah Howe, both of
whom sustained multiple injuries from the crash. The victim died from her injuries. On
August 30, 2016, Defendant was charged by presentment with vehicular homicide,
vehicular homicide by intoxication, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly
weapon, DUI per se, DUI of an “intoxicant,” DUI of marijuana, DUI of an “intoxicant”
and marijuana, and the failure to drive within a single lane of traffic.

A. Trial

Defendant’s trial commenced in September 2019. During opening statements, the
State asserted that Defendant was driving under the influence and in a reckless manner,
resulting in the crash and the victim’s death. Defense counsel argued that Defendant was
not the driver and that the victim was not “fleeing from the police” but “was fleeing from
a perceived threat . . . that was generated by two officers who conducted a dangerous
pursuit on a dark, country road in unmarked vehicles.” Defense counsel also contended
that the subsequent investigation by law enforcement was inadequate.

-2-
Benjamin Sumner, Defendant’s former employer, testified that after he and
Defendant worked on February 3, 2016, they went to Mr. Sumner’s home to repair
Defendant’s Jeep but determined that they needed to order a part. They then decided to
“hang out” and drink alcohol. They began drinking between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m., and
Defendant was drinking Jack Daniel’s whiskey “out of a bottle with a chaser.” The victim
arrived between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. in her green 2012 Kia Soul. They continued to drink,
and Mr. Sumner said that he and Defendant drank whiskey and that the victim had
“[m]aybe a couple of swigs” of whiskey. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Mr. Sumner
smelled marijuana outside of his house near his driveway, but he did not see Defendant
smoking marijuana.

Mr. Sumner testified that Defendant and the victim left in the victim’s Kia at
approximately 7:00 p.m. Mr. Sumner initially testified that Defendant was driving and
that the victim was sitting in the passenger’s seat. However, on cross-examination, Mr.
Sumner acknowledged that he based his testimony that Defendant was driving on a news
article or other information that Mr. Sumner received following the crash. Mr. Sumner
agreed that he was in the bathroom when Defendant and the victim left, that he had no
personal knowledge of who drove the vehicle, and that after using the bathroom, he
walked outside and saw the taillights of the vehicle as Defendant and the victim were
leaving.

On February 4, 2016, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Defendant called Mr. Sumner
and stated that he and the victim had sustained extensive injuries from an accident and
that the victim had died. Mr. Sumner testified that when he visited Defendant at the
hospital later that evening, Defendant stated that he “ran from the police” and “gave them
hell” and that Defendant “thought it was funny.” Mr. Sumner stated that although
Defendant did not specifically say that he was driving the vehicle, Defendant’s statements
“surely impl[y] to me that [Defendant] was driving.” Mr. Sumner acknowledged that
Defendant provided conflicting statements regarding the crash and did not appear to be
“in a straight state of mind.” Mr. Sumner stated that he spoke to Defendant following his
release from the hospital and that Defendant expressed remorse and guilt. Defendant told
Mr. Sumner, “I really screwed up. I don’t know why I did it, how it happened[.] . . . I
made a mistake and I’ve got to live with this the rest of my life.”

Danny Hickey, who lived in the area where the crash occurred, testified that while
he was on his neighbor’s front porch, he saw a vehicle go by “really fast,” followed by a
white sports utility vehicle (“SUV”) and a black Ford F-150 truck, both of which had
flashing blue lights underneath the vehicles. Mr. Hickey said that he did not hear the crash
but saw a vehicle on fire and heard people yelling for help. He ran toward the crash site,
where he observed that the vehicle had run off the road, “jumped” a driveway, struck a
mailbox, and continued through a field until it struck a tree. The SUV and the truck, both
-3-
of which were unmarked police vehicles, were parked in the road, and the blue emergency
lights under both vehicles were flashing.

Mr. Hickey stated that he reached the wrecked vehicle at the same time as two
officers who were wearing suits and ties. Mr. Hickey determined that the men were
officers within “[j]ust a few seconds.” He testified that the vehicle was on fire and that
Defendant, who he identified as the driver, was attempting to exit the vehicle on the
driver’s side. The lower half of Defendant’s body was inside the vehicle, and Defendant
was attempting to crawl out of the vehicle. Mr. Hickey did not see Defendant struggling
with an airbag. Mr. Hickey and one of the officers picked up Defendant and moved him
away from the vehicle.

Mr. Hickey testified that he walked around to the other side of the vehicle, where
he saw the victim lying on the ground next to the passenger’s side door. The victim’s eyes
were closed, and she was not making any noise. Mr. Hickey stated that the passenger’s
side door was shut and that the window was rolled up. He never saw the passenger’s side
door open while at the scene. Mr. Hickey stated that Chief David Henderson was the only
officer to whom he spoke at the scene regarding his observations and that law enforcement
officers never came to his home to obtain a statement from him.

KCSO Chief David Henderson testified that in February 2016, he was head of the
task force in the narcotics unit and assisted in traffic control when needed. He had a
police-issued, white Chevrolet Tahoe, which was unmarked and had multiple blue lights.
On February 3, 2016, at approximately 7:25 p.m., Chief Henderson was driving home and
speaking to Captain David Amburn on their cell phones regarding police pursuit of a
suspect in the area on an unrelated case when an SUV passed Chief Henderson’s SUV
traveling eastbound on Emory Road at a high rate of speed and in an area of the roadway
with a double yellow line. Chief Henderson stated that the vehicle was green and that he
believed it to be a Kia Soul, but he also acknowledged that he initially was unable to
identify the make and model of the vehicle. As the Kia passed him, he turned on his blue
lights, hoping that the Kia would slow down. When the Kia failed to do so, Chief
Henderson turned off his blue lights and “continued on to the house” in the same direction
in which the Kia was traveling.

Chief Henderson suggested to Captain Amburn that he go toward the area where
the Kia was traveling. Chief Henderson and Captain Amburn continued conversing on
their cell phones while Chief Henderson followed the Kia from a distance. Chief
Henderson explained that they communicated over their cell phones rather than over the
radio because the channel was “cleared” for those officers who were involved in the
pursuit of the other suspect in the area. Chief Henderson saw Captain Amburn’s truck
with its blue lights activated at the intersection of Brown Gap Road, Emory Road, and
-4-
Crippen Road, and Chief Henderson also reactivated the blue lights on his SUV. Captain
Amburn told Chief Henderson, “Oh, crap, he almost hit me and ran in the ditch and went
around me.” The Kia continued down Brown Gap Road.

Chief Henderson testified that Captain Amburn had positioned his truck in such a
way that Chief Henderson could not drive around it. Captain Amburn turned his truck
around in a driveway while Chief Henderson waited, and Captain Amburn, followed by
Chief Henderson, drove down the path that they believed the Kia was traveling. Chief
Henderson stated that the blue lights were activated on his SUV and Captain Amburn’s
truck, that KCSO policy requires officers to activate the blue lights on their vehicles when
engaged in a pursuit, and that he did not decide to engage in a pursuit of the Kia until the
Kia reached Brown Gap Road. Captain Amburn notified the dispatcher of the way the
Kia was being driven. Other traffic was in the area during the pursuit, and Chief
Henderson testified that although he was initially pursuing the Kia due to a traffic
violation, “when he put the public in danger, that takes it up a notch.” Chief Henderson
noted that the driver of the Kia was evading police, which is a felony, and Chief Henderson
was concerned for the safety of the officers who were investigating an unrelated incident
in the area. Chief Henderson acknowledged that according to KCSO policy, an officer
may not engage in a high-speed pursuit in an unmarked police vehicle unless the suspect
is involved in a serious felony and presents an “immediate and direct threat” to life or
property. Chief Henderson did not consider terminating the pursuit, and he “suppose[d]”
it was his responsibility to determine whether the pursuit should be discontinued. Once
Chief Henderson began following Captain Amburn, he did not see the Kia again until after
it had struck a tree.

The Kia was on fire, and its front was damaged. Chief Henderson and Captain
Amburn approached the driver’s side of the Kia, where the driver, who Chief Henderson
identified as Defendant, was struggling with the airbags and attempting to exit the Kia.
Chief Henderson “assumed” Defendant was the driver since he was attempting to exit the
driver’s side of the Kia. A neighbor also assisted them with the Kia’s occupants.
Defendant’s right leg was “mangled,” and Chief Henderson smelled alcohol when helping
to remove Defendant from the Kia. Chief Henderson also assisted with moving the victim,
who was found lying outside of the Kia. Both Defendant and the victim were transported
to a hospital.

Chief Henderson stated that he was the highest-ranking officer at the scene but that
Officer Steve Lane was placed in charge of the scene and the investigation once Officer
Lane arrived. Chief Henderson did not recall providing a formal statement or completing
any reports related to the crash. Chief Henderson and Captain Amburn discussed whether
their following the Kia could be classified as a “pursuit” given that they did not catch up

-5-
to the Kia until after it had struck a tree. Captain Amburn completed a post-pursuit report
“just to err on caution.”

Chief Henderson testified that the Kia was transported to an impound lot and that
he released the Kia to an insurance company five days after the crash. He explained that
the victim’s father requested that the Kia be released due to an outstanding debt on the
Kia. After consulting with an attorney, Chief Henderson released the Kia to the insurance
company, and the Kia was subsequently sold to an automobile parts and salvage business.
Chief Henderson did not consult with a prosecutor or the lead investigator prior to
releasing the Kia. He acknowledged that vehicles may be stored by law enforcement for
an extended period. He did not ensure that photographs were taken of the Kia during the
daytime before releasing it and did not consult anyone to determine whether the Kia had
been examined for mechanical failure. He denied releasing the Kia to hide or destroy
evidence.

Captain Amburn, a twenty-eight-year veteran of the KCSO and a lieutenant in
February 2016, testified that on the evening of February 3, 2016, numerous patrol units
were pursuing a suspect who had fled to a wooded area near the area where the crash later
occurred. Captain Amburn headed to the area in a police-issued, unmarked Ford F-150
truck to assist. The truck had emergency lights on the right side, in the grill, in the
taillights, under the tailgate, in the cab, and on the back of the cab.

Captain Amburn testified that Chief Henderson called him on his cell phone and
that while they were talking, a vehicle passed Chief Henderson at a high rate of speed.
Chief Henderson told Captain Amburn that a vehicle passed him and a group of other
vehicles at a high rate of speed on a road with a double yellow line. Captain Amburn
proceeded to the area where the vehicle was headed while continuing to talk to Chief
Henderson. Captain Amburn reached the intersection of Emory Road, Crippen Road, and
Brown Gap Road and saw a vehicle, which he later identified as a Kia, approaching the
intersection from Emory Road at a high rate of speed. Captain Amburn activated all the
blue lights on his unmarked truck and pulled into the middle of the intersection. He
observed Chief Henderson’s SUV with its blue lights activated behind the vehicle.
Captain Amburn testified that the Kia “centered up” over the double yellow line in the
road while continuing to proceed at a high rate of speed. Captain Amburn told Chief
Henderson, “Oh, crap, I think he’s going to ram me.” Captain Amburn stated that “[a]t
the last second,” the Kia “turned hard left” and went “partially in the ditch” and around
his truck. The Kia sounded to Captain Amburn as if it “bottomed out” in the ditch, but
Captain Amburn did not look in the ditch to see if the Kia lost any parts. The Kia then
continued eastbound on Brown Gap Road toward Bell Road at a high rate of speed.

-6-
Captain Amburn testified that Chief Henderson was unable to drive his large SUV
around Captain Amburn’s truck. Captain Amburn backed up in a driveway while Chief
Henderson waited, and Captain Amburn, followed by Chief Henderson, proceeded down
Brown Gap Road toward Bell Road. Captain Amburn lost sight of the Kia but believed
the Kia was headed toward an area where officers were searching for a suspect in an
unrelated case. He announced over the radio that a vehicle was fleeing toward the area
where the officers were located. Once Captain Amburn reached Bell Road, he believed
he saw the “unusual taillights” of the Kia at the end of a straightaway, and he continued
following that direction.

When Captain Amburn approached the intersection of Bell Road and Emory Road,
he saw the Kia and another car stopped at a stop sign. The Kia was on the wrong side of
the road next to the other car, and the Kia and the other car were facing the same direction.
The driver of the Kia attempted to cross the intersection through oncoming traffic. Captain
Amburn stated that before he reached the intersection, the Kia “pushed its way through”
traffic and “shot to the left and then immediately straight across Bell Road.” By the time
Captain Amburn crossed the intersection, the Kia had traveled around a bend in the road,
and due to the number of curves in the road, Captain Amburn was unable to maintain sight
of the Kia. Captain Amburn drove over a hill and saw a Jeep partially off the road and in
the grass and the taillights of the Kia up ahead. He stated that based on his experience,
the Jeep appeared to have been forced off the road. Captain Amburn was not able to get
close enough to the Kia to determine the number of occupants or the tag number.

Captain Amburn continued following the same path as the Kia. He saw what
appeared to be dust in the air as he was driving toward a bend in the road. While driving
around the bend, his headlights illuminated a field where he saw pieces of a mailbox and
other debris on the ground and a set of tire marks through a muddy field leading to the
Kia, which had struck a group of trees. Captain Amburn testified that when a vehicle
brakes or loses traction, the wheels “get[] out of track,” resulting in “four sets of [tire]
marks or some derivative to it” but that the Kia left two tire tracks in the field leading to
the trees that were “perfect” and “straight.” Captain Amburn noted that the Kia had
rotated almost ninety degrees upon striking the trees and was smoking.

Captain Amburn testified that he and Chief Henderson approached the driver’s side
where the driver, who Captain Amburn identified as Defendant, was trying to exit the Kia
on that side. Captain Amburn and Chief Henderson yelled for Defendant to put his hands
up because they did not know whether he was armed. Defendant was struggling with the
front and side airbags as he attempted to exit the Kia. Captain Amburn testified that the
crash was so severe that portions of the interior on the driver’s side were pushed inward.
The firewall was crushed, the steering column had rotated upward, and the pedals and
“everything else” underneath the driver’s feet had been forced upward. Defendant’s feet
-7-
were wedged under a portion of the driver’s side interior that had been crushed. Captain
Amburn stated that Defendant sustained leg injuries that were consistent with the portions
of the Kia’s interior on the driver’s side being forced down on his legs on impact.

Captain Amburn stated that he looked inside the Kia and saw that the passenger
door was open and the front passenger seat was tilted back. While Mr. Hickey and Chief
Henderson assisted Defendant, Captain Amburn ran around the Kia and found the victim
lying next to the rear tire on the passenger’s side. The victim was conscious, and she was
lying on her back with her feet toward the rear bumper. Captain Amburn asked the victim
where she was injured, and the victim moaned and put her hand on her stomach. Captain
Amburn testified that he observed “a red line across her stomach and up toward her chest
that looked consistent with a seat belt.” He stated that based on the numerous car accident
investigations in which he had been involved during his twenty-eight years in law
enforcement, the red mark on the victim was “consistent with a seat belt and the danger
there is I’ve seen people die from spleen injuries and everything.” He noted that the red
mark was on the victim’s right side, which was the same side in which a seat belt wraps
across a front passenger. He also noted that the passenger seat was reclined, which could
explain why the red mark was higher on the victim’s body. Captain Amburn
acknowledged that he did not see the victim’s injuries at the hospital or during the autopsy
and that he did not review her medical records or autopsy photographs.

Once the fire in the Kia began to intensify, Mr. Hicks and Chief Henderson moved
Defendant, who sustained severe leg injuries, away from the Kia, and they then assisted
Captain Amburn in moving the victim. The victim was subsequently transported via
helicopter to a hospital. Captain Amburn also saw car seats in the back seat of the Kia
and attempted to open the back doors to ensure that no one else was inside. He noted that
the rear bumper was ripped off the Kia because of the crash and that after the Kia was
fully engulfed in flames, only the rear quarter panels and the hatchback area remained.

According to the post-pursuit form completed by Captain Amburn, the pursuit
ended at 7:35 p.m., which he stated was likely the time that he called for an ambulance.
At 4:30 or 5:00 a.m., Captain Amburn went to the hospital to obtain blood samples from
Defendant pursuit to a search warrant (“the legal draw”). Captain Amburn stated that he
and an evidence technician, Trina Gregory, entered Defendant’s room where Defendant
was sitting up in his bed. When Captain Amburn and Officer Gregory reached the door
sill, Defendant looked up at Captain Amburn and immediately said, “I’ve screwed up.”
Officer Gregory was wearing a uniform, and Captain Amburn had his badge and a gun
and was wearing a law enforcement-issued shirt. Captain Amburn stated that as a result,
“it was quite evident who we were.” He informed Defendant that he had a search warrant
to obtain a blood sample. Captain Amburn asked two relatives in the room with Defendant
to step outside.
-8-
Captain Amburn described Defendant as “very talkative.” Defendant said he had
“really screwed up,” and Captain Amburn responded that he believed Defendant had made
bad choices but that they “were going to work through this.” Defendant told Captain
Amburn that he would like to apologize to the two officers from whom he had fled, and
Captain Amburn stated that Defendant did not owe them an apology but that he probably
owed the victim’s family an apology. Defendant asked Captain Amburn whether the
victim had passed away, and Captain Amburn confirmed that she had. Defendant told
Captain Amburn that the victim was his girlfriend, that they had planned to marry, and
that the victim had children. Defendant talked about his relationship with the victim and
about how “he was really messed up” and said that “he didn’t really sober up enough until
around 1:30 in the morning to figure out what had happened” and that “he knew he was
going to jail for what he did.” Captain Amburn testified that Defendant never said the
victim was driving and that Defendant stated that he had “insisted” on driving. 2

Captain Amburn testified that he did not “say very much to [Defendant], did not
ask him hardly anything at all.” Captain Amburn stated that he “pretty much just nodded
and listened to what he had to say.” Defendant told him that “[y]ou and I both know I
shouldn’t have been driving.” When Captain Amburn explained the process of obtaining
his blood sample and what would be done with the sample, Defendant stated that they
“won’t find any drugs, just alcohol.” Captain Amburn stated that Defendant’s statements
implied that Defendant was the driver.

Captain Amburn testified that Defendant was “very lucid” and did not appear to
have any issues understanding what was occurring. Captain Amburn was unaware of the
medication that had been administered to Defendant until Officer Gregory requested a list
of his medications for the purposes of testing his blood. Captain Amburn learned that
Defendant had been administered fentanyl, Versed, and propofol at the hospital. Captain
Amburn did not advise Defendant of his Miranda rights and did not record Defendant’s
statements or make contemporaneous notes about the statements. Captain Amburn later
summarized Defendant’s statements in a memorandum. When Defendant made the
statements to Captain Amburn, Defendant was not under arrest or otherwise restrained
and was not told that he would be arrested. Officers were not stationed outside
Defendant’s hospital room, and Captain Amburn did not speak to hospital security.
Captain Amburn did not know when Defendant was formally charged with the offenses.

2
Captain Amburn testified that Defendant told him that the victim “had begged him not to drive,
but that he insisted.” Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection as to what the
victim had stated.
-9-
Captain Amburn stated that it was decided that because so much time had passed
between the crash and the blood draw from Defendant pursuant to the search warrant, the
results of testing would not accurately reflect Defendant’s alcohol or drug levels at the
time of the crash. Captain Amburn procured a search warrant to obtain Defendant’s blood
samples drawn by hospital personnel as part of the hospital’s normal admittance
procedures (“the medical draw”). Captain Amburn and an evidence technician executed
the search warrant at the hospital laboratory. An employee with the laboratory provided
Defendant’s blood samples, and the evidence technician took possession of them. Captain
Amburn did not know the identity of hospital personnel who drew Defendant’s blood from
the medical draw, the tests that hospital personnel ran using the blood, where the blood
was stored in the hospital, or who had handled the blood before hospital personnel gave
the samples to law enforcement.

Captain Amburn testified that although he completed a post-pursuit form, he
questioned whether he and Chief Henderson engaged in a pursuit “due to the fact of how
far he got away from us and how little we saw him.” Captain Amburn stated that “it was
not your typical pursuit, being within five car lengths behind somebody.” He did not
consider terminating the pursuit, and he stated that he would have done so had he believed
it was too dangerous to continue. He said that crime scene officers were tasked with
securing any evidence at the scene and that the supervisor of the unit that investigated the
crash was responsible for deciding whether to complete an accident reconstruction.
Captain Amburn recalled discussing what occurred with another officer at the scene.

Dr. Christopher Lochmuller, the Chief Deputy Medical Examiner for Knox and
Anderson Counties and an expert in forensic pathology, performed the victim’s autopsy
and testified that the victim’s death was the result of multiple blunt force injuries. The
victim’s spleen, liver, and small intestine were torn, her colon was damaged, and three
ribs on her right side and two ribs on her left side were broken.

Dr. Lochmuller received information that the victim had been involved in a single-
vehicle accident and that while the vehicle was being pursued by law enforcement, the
vehicle ran off the roadway, rolled, and struck a tree. Dr. Lochmuller testified that the
information that he received regarding the circumstances of the crash changed over time,
explaining that he was told that the victim “was ejected, then they said that she wasn’t
ejected, that she was the driver, wasn’t the driver.” He stated that an investigator with the
medical examiner’s office obtained information from various sources that the victim was
believed to be the driver of the vehicle. However, other information obtained by the
investigator and other medical records listed the victim as a passenger who had been
“restrained.”

- 10 -
The victim had bruising on the right side of her neck and jaw line, under her chin,
and on both sides of her chest. She had two small abrasions on her back and an abrasion
on her abdomen that was eight inches long and one-half inch wide. The abrasion was
predominantly on the right side of her abdomen and came “just above her belly button, a
little bit to the left.” Dr. Lochmuller testified that he could not conclude definitively that
the abrasion was caused by a seat belt and that he could not reach a conclusion on whether
the victim was a passenger or the driver based on the anatomic findings. He noted that
the victim’s medical records from the emergency room reflected that hospital personnel
indicated on a sketch what they believed to be a mark caused by a seat belt on the victim’s
body. However, Dr. Lochmuller explained that the long abrasion on the right side of the
victim’s abdomen was higher than he expected it would be had it been caused by a seat
belt and that the victim’s injuries on her face, jawline, and neck were unusual locations
for a seat belt to leave a mark. He stated that had the victim’s seat been leaned back, the
seat belt could have left a mark that high on the victim’s body, but he could not “say that’s
what it is.”

The State, without objection by the defense, showed Dr. Lochmuller one page of
Defendant’s medical records, which Dr. Lochmuller identified as stating, “BAC 135,
EtOH positive.” Dr. Lochmuller explained that “EtOH” stands for ethanol alcohol, which
is contained in beer, wine, and liquor. This one page was entered as an exhibit at trial
without objection by the defense. In response to questioning by the defense, Dr.
Lochmuller testified that fentanyl is a synthetic pain killer that is “very potent,” that
propofol is a sedative used to render a patient unconscious, and that Versed is a “fast-
acting” benzodiazepine or sedative.

KCSO Detective Steve Lane, who was a patrol officer with the traffic division in
February 2016, testified that he was called to the scene. By the time he arrived, both
Defendant and the victim had been transported to the hospital, and other officers had
photographed and otherwise preserved the scene. Detective Lane noted that there were
several officers at the scene, each of whom had a different task. He stated that a lead
investigator was not called to the scene and that the senior ranking officer at the scene was
in charge. Detective Lane spoke to Captain Amburn, Chief Henderson, and a witness at
the scene, but he did not record his interactions with them or otherwise take formal
statements from them. Detective Lane completed a report and a diagram of the scene,
which was entered into evidence. He explained that an accident reconstruction was not
completed because KCSO policy did not provide for an accident reconstruction in single-
vehicle accidents when no fatalities occurred at the time of the crash. Detective Lane did
not inspect the Kia at the scene and did not collect any evidence from the Kia. He was
aware that vehicles have a “black box” that stores information, but he did not have the
black box removed from the Kia. He was unaware of whether any photographs were taken
of the Kia during the daytime.
- 11 -
On cross-examination, Detective Lane testified that he did not know whether car
keys were found at the scene or on Defendant or the victim. He identified a patient
property list that was part of Defendant’s medical records, and he acknowledged that the
list did not include any keys as being found on Defendant. Defendant requested that the
page from Defendant’s medical records be admitted into evidence, and the trial court
granted the State’s request to admit Defendant’s entire medical records under “the rule of
completeness.” Detective Lane identified a patient property list that was part of the
victim’s medical records, which noted that “keys” were found on the victim.

KCSO Officer Sandy Campbell with the forensic unit testified that she was
assigned to photograph the scene of the crash. She noted that the Kia had struck a mailbox
before striking a tree, that the Kia’s rear bumper was located near the tree line, and that
most of the debris that had broken off the Kia had fallen “forward” and was located on the
other side of the tree line. Officer Campbell stated that although the Kia was no longer
on fire by the time that she arrived at the scene, the Kia was still very hot and was smoking.
As a result, it was “uncomfortable” to approach the Kia until more time had passed, and
she was unable to inspect the Kia’s airbags and doors due to the heat. She photographed
the Kia while it was dark outside, and she did not take any photographs of the Kia during
the daytime. She did not have a mechanic examine the Kia for a mechanical failure,
explaining that such tasks were not within the purview of the forensic unit.

According to Knox County Emergency Communication, a pipe with residue was
recovered from Defendant at the hospital. Officer Campbell went to the hospital and
retrieved a “purple pinch hitter” that contained “some green leafy substance” from a
member of the hospital’s security team. Officer Campbell explained that a “pinch hitter”
is a pipe that is traditionally used to smoke marijuana.

KCSO Detective Preston Huddleston testified that on February 3, 2016, he was
dispatched to the emergency room to seek Defendant’s consent to obtain his blood.
Detective Huddleston arrived around midnight on February 4 and spoke to Defendant,
who “was alert, not really saying much but he was aware of his situation.” Detective
Huddleston asked Defendant to consent to a blood draw, but Defendant refused to consent
and refused to sign the implied consent form.

KCSO Officer Deidra Bules with the forensic unit testified that on February 4,
2016, she accompanied Captain Amburn to the hospital laboratory to collect four vials of
Defendant’s blood from the medical draw pursuant to a search warrant. Officer Bules
believed the vials were labeled and sealed. At 5:33 p.m., Officer Bules received the vials
from a technician at the hospital’s laboratory. She transported the vials from the medical
draw to the KCSO forensic laboratory, stored them in a refrigerator in a secure area, and
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documented the items on a property receipt. She noted that the refrigerator was located
behind a door that required a thumb print and a key card to access and that removal of any
evidence from the refrigerator was required to be documented. According to the property
receipt, the vials from the medical draw were removed from the refrigerator on February
19, 2016, at 8:10 a.m. and transported to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”).
According to the TBI request form, the vials from the medical draw were transported to
the TBI by Tom Finch, KCSO’s fingerprint expert who also makes “all the TBI runs.”

On cross-examination, Officer Bules testified that she did not know who drew
Defendant’s blood at the hospital during the medical draw or whether hospital personnel
tested the blood samples, added anything to the blood samples, properly stored the blood
samples, or followed proper procedures in handling the blood samples. She did not know
how long it took to transport the vials from the hospital to the KCSO forensic laboratory.
She acknowledged that she could not vouch for the integrity of the blood samples from
the medical draw.

Special Agent Michael Tiller, a forensic scientist in the toxicology department at
the TBI’s regional crime laboratory in Knoxville and an expert in the field of toxicology,
testified that he conducted toxicology testing on Defendant’s blood samples from the
medical draw. The results showed the presence of an inactive metabolite of marijuana.
Special Agent Tiller stated that the results indicated that Defendant had used marijuana
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of the blood draw. Special Agent Tiller
acknowledged that an inactive metabolite alone will not result in impairment, that he could
not determine whether the metabolite was from hemp or marijuana, and that at the time of
the blood testing, the TBI did not have the ability to test for active THC.

According to the TBI’s internal chain of custody documents, the TBI received the
four tubes of Defendant’s blood from Tom Finch on February 19, 2016, at 10:45 a.m.
Documents indicated that the tubes had hospital labels with the name “Harlen Ferguson”
and February 3, 2016, at 20:38, indicating when the blood was drawn. Special Agent
Tiller testified that once samples are brought to the TBI laboratory, they are checked in
by an evidence technician, assigned a unique laboratory number and stored in a
refrigerator inside a vault until they are tested. The samples were first tested for alcohol
by Special Agent Jonathan Thompson, and Special Agent Tiller then conducted a
toxicology analysis.

Special Agent Tiller testified that in addition to Defendant’s blood samples from
the medical draw, the TBI also received Defendant’s blood samples from the legal draw,
which were contained in tubes supplied by the TBI. He stated that compounds are pre-
added to the tubes supplied by the TBI to officers in blood draw kits to help preserve the
blood and prevent it from coagulating. Special Agent Tiller said blood that has clotted
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into “a solid blob” can be difficult to extract from the tube and that such clotting can affect
the test results. He noted “rare instances” where bacteria are introduced in the blood
sample, and he explained that bacteria could feed on glucose and produce alcohol and that
the TBI tubes contain a compound that prevents such bacterial growth. Although he
acknowledged that “something could be introduced” into a blood sample whenever the
top of a tube is removed, “you would need also the right conditions for things to grow, so
again not being refrigerated, kept in hot places[,] and not stored properly.” He stated that
while refrigerating blood samples was “ideal,” the samples would be “okay” if they were
at room temperature “for a little while” with no preservatives in them but that “[y]ou
wouldn’t want them at like super high temperatures.”

Special Agent Tiller tested blood samples in two of the four tubes from the medical
draw. He stated that a DNA test was not performed on the samples and that the samples
were “presumed” to be Defendant’s blood because his name was on the tubes and the form
submitted by the officer to the TBI. Special Agent Tiller stated that the tubes were likely
not vacuum sealed when the TBI received them because the hospital would have tested
some of Defendant’s blood from the samples for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment.
To Special Agent Tiller’s knowledge, the samples from the medical draw did not contain
any compounds or preservatives. He did not note any issues with clotting or bacterial
growth in the blood samples from the medical draw in the case file or his report, and he
testified that he would have noted such issues had he observed them.

Special Agent Tiller testified that all the whole blood from the medical draw was
used in alcohol and toxicology testing by the TBI. He stated that most laboratories likely
would have been unable to test the small amount of serum or plasma that may have
remained from the sample. He acknowledged that the defense may have been able to
obtain independent testing of the sample if they located a laboratory that could test the
small amount of remaining serum or plasma.

Special Agent Tiller testified that he did not test Defendant’s blood samples from
the legal draw. When asked whether he had a scientific basis for failing to do so, he
explained that TBI analysts generally test blood samples collected closer to the time in
which the incident occurred. He stated that because the legal draw occurred several hours
after the crash, the blood samples from the legal draw “would not have as [much] relevant
data associated with them” as the blood samples from the medical draw. Special Agent
Tiller acknowledged that the test results of Defendant’s blood samples from the legal draw
could have shown any medication given to him at the hospital. The alcohol/toxicology
request form for Defendant’s blood samples from the legal draw stated that tests for
fentanyl, propofol, and Versed should be excluded. Special Agent Tiller testified that
fentanyl and propofol are narcotic analgesics and that propofol can be used for anesthesia
and can cause “sedation or stupor” in large doses. He stated that Versed is a central
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nervous system depressant that hospital personnel can use to calm a patient or to help in
intubating a patient and that a larger dose of Versed can cause memory loss or render the
patient “in a state of stupor or extreme impairment.” He also stated that a combination of
Versed, propofol, and fentanyl in amounts within the therapeutic range could calm a
patient and relieve a patient’s pain and that a combination of the medication in high doses
could sedate the patient. Special Agent Tiller identified a page from Defendant’s medical
records from February 4, 2016, at 3:47 a.m., which stated that Defendant was “[a]lert and
oriented. In obvious pain. Able to answer questions appropriately.”

Special Agent Jonathan Thompson, a forensic scientist at the TBI’s regional crime
laboratory in Knoxville and an expert in the field of toxicology, testified that he conducted
alcohol testing on Defendant’s blood samples from the medical draw. He stated that the
results of testing showed .180 grams percent of ethyl alcohol in Defendant’s blood. The
blood sample was tested twice for alcohol, and the final reported result reflected the
average amount obtained from the two tests.

Special Agent Thompson tested Defendant’s blood sample from the medical draw
that was collected on February 3, 2016, rather than Defendant’s blood sample from the
legal draw that was collected on February 4. Special Agent Thompson explained that
because alcohol metabolizes in a person’s body over time, it is generally preferred to test
a person’s blood sample drawn closer to the incident to obtain a more accurate
representation of the person’s alcohol level at the time of the incident. He stated that there
was a “good possibility” that the alcohol from Defendant’s blood sample from the legal
draw taken approximately nine hours after the crash would have metabolized. He
acknowledged that someone with the TBI directed him not to test the blood sample from
the legal draw, but he stated that the determination of which sample to test is within the
forensic scientist’s discretion. He explained, “Usually we test the earlier sample because
like I said[,] it is a better representation of what occurred during the incident.”

Special Agent Thompson did not know who accessed Defendant’s blood samples
from the medical draw at the hospital or the conditions in which the samples were stored
at the hospital. He tested one tube of Defendant’s blood from the medical draw and stated
that to his knowledge, the tube did not contain any preservatives. He assumed that the
tube had been opened previously and that some of the blood had been used for testing at
the hospital. He acknowledged that any ethyl alcohol that had been converted to gas could
have escaped when the tube was opened. He also acknowledged that microbials could
enter the tube when opened and that the microbials could feed on the glucose in the blood
and produce alcohol. He stated that because the TBI received and tested the samples so
quickly, “it’s unlikely that fermentation could occur and it was not in the appropriate
conditions meaning it needed sufficient amount of heat and a sufficient amount of
microorganisms and enough [of a] food source in the blood sample to actually produce
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enough ethanol.” Special Agent Thompson did not test for the presence of bacteria or
fungi in the samples and did not determine whether the sample had fermented. To ensure
that the testing instrument did not produce a result that was based on contamination of the
blood samples at the hospital, he ran a series of certified standards at the beginning of the
alcohol analysis and at every tenth position, and he testified that “all of [his] standards
met in the acceptable criteria.” He also conducted negative testing based on those
standards and did not observe anything “abnormal” in the blood sample.

Finally, in addition to presenting Defendant’s entire medical records as an exhibit,
the State introduced individual pages from the medical records as exhibits. One hospital
record provided, “Patient admits to EtOH tonight. Patient states he was running from the
police and had an accident. Patient states air bags did deploy. Patient states he was not
wearing his seat belt. Patient was drug out of vehicle by rescue.” Hospital records noted
that Defendant had abrasions to his face and chest, and the discharge summary stated that
Defendant sustained an injury to his right knee and fractures and other injuries to his pelvis
and right leg. A note in the records from February 4, 2016, at 4:37 a.m. stated, “The
patient was alert and oriented, in obvious pain, able to answer questions appropriately.”
A case management note entered on February 8, 2016, regarding a meeting with
Defendant stated that “patient was [the] driver in [a] motor vehicle crash in which his
fiancée with whom he lived was killed.” On this evidence, the State rested its case in
chief.

The defense presented the testimony of Margaret Massengill, a forensic technician
with the TBI’s toxicology division at the crime laboratory in Knoxville. Ms. Massengill
testified that in February 2016, she spoke to an assistant district attorney regarding
Defendant’s blood samples from the medical draw and the legal draw and that “we did
agree to only test the samples” from the medical draw. Ms. Massengill stated that “[t]here
never came a need” to test the samples from the legal draw “based on the conversation
that I had.” She noted that the samples selected for testing were those taken closer in time
to the incident and that the samples from the legal draw would have been tested if the
samples from medical draw did not include an adequate volume of blood for testing.

On September 1, 2016, Ms. Massengill destroyed Defendant’s blood samples from
the legal draw and the remaining samples from the medical draw. She stated that the
policy of the TBI laboratory in Knoxville is to destroy blood samples after approximately
six months. She explained that the laboratory receives 400 to 700 blood samples each
month and that the destruction policy is due to “a storage issue.” She stated that the district
attorney could have requested that the blood samples be preserved for a longer period but
did not do so. She did not receive a request from the defense to preserve the samples or
have them tested by another laboratory before their destruction. More than one year after

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the samples were destroyed, a member of the defense team contacted her regarding the
availability of the samples.

The jury convicted Defendant of vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide by
intoxication, evading arrest, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, DUI per se,
DUI of an “intoxicant,” and the failure to drive within a single lane of traffic. The jury
acquitted Defendant of the charges of DUI of marijuana and DUI of an intoxicant and
marijuana. During a sentencing hearing on November 7, 2019, the trial court merged the
two vehicular homicide convictions and merged the DUI convictions into each other and
into the vehicular homicide conviction. The trial court imposed an effective ten-year
sentence, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation.

B. Motion for New Trial Proceedings

Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial in which he raised twenty-one issues.
Defendant alleged that the State improperly failed to disclose information regarding an
internal affairs investigation that concluded on August 20, 2019, and that resulted in
Captain Amburn’s receiving a verbal reprimand for his failure to disclose his knowledge
of an incident of police misconduct, which occurred in April 2019, and led to two other
officers being demoted and suspended for two days without pay. Defendant asserted that
defense counsel made repeated inquiries into Captain Amburn’s personnel file and that
defense counsel only learned of the investigation through local media coverage on
September 6, 2019, the same day that the jury returned its verdict against Defendant.
Defendant attached to his motion for few trial two news articles published on September
6 and October 1, 2019, regarding the incident.

During the December 12, 2019 hearing on the motion for new trial, Defendant
entered the written summary of the internal affairs interview of Captain Amburn as an
exhibit. According to the summary, the incident involved an altercation between two
officers, one of whom was trying to keep the other officer from driving a police-issued
vehicle while intoxicated. At the time, Captain Amburn was the supervisor over the
narcotics fleet vehicles, including the vehicle at issue. A KCSO employee contacted him
to locate an extra key to allow someone else to drive the vehicle. Captain Amburn
believed the employee called him again later and reported that an extra key had been
located. He was aware that because of the altercation, one of the officers was injured and
a citizen’s vehicle was damaged. Captain Amburn explained that he did not report the
incident because both he and the intoxicated officer had applied for a chief position, and
Captain Amburn did not want to appear as if he was deliberately attempting to make the
officer “look bad.”

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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new
trial, concluding that he was not entitled to relief on any of the issues raised. The court
found that the incident involving Captain Amburn in 2019 was unrelated to the incident
involving Defendant in 2016 and that “there’s simply no materiality or probative value
about what happened in 2019 as it might relate to what happened in 2016.” The court
entered an order denying Defendant’s motion for new trial, and Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal.
C. Coram Nobis Proceedings

On June 30, 2020, while the direct appeal was pending, Defendant filed a petition
for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that newly discovered evidence may have resulted
in a different judgment. Defendant asserted that on April 17, 2020, news reports emerged
that Chief Henderson was under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), that FBI agents searched Chief Henderson’s home pursuant to a search warrant
on April 9, 2020, and that Chief Henderson retired from the KCSO shortly thereafter.
Defendant further asserted that the news reports indicated that Chief Henderson was
removed from his narcotics unit duties in January 2019 and was “effectively sidelined
from police work altogether” in October 2019. Defendant attached two news articles as
exhibits to the petition.

Defendant asserted that he sought information regarding Chief Henderson and
Captain Amburn prior to trial through a discovery motion and public records requests.
Defendant attached the public records requests and the prosecutor’s email in response to
the defense’s request for information from the officers’ files. Defendant also attached an
affidavit from trial counsel, stating that at the time of trial, she was unaware that Chief
Henderson was under federal investigation or that he had been subject to any internal
discipline or reduction in responsibilities due to suspicion of wrongdoing.

Defendant argued in his petition and accompanying memorandum that evidence
that Chief Henderson was under federal investigation “may have led to a different
outcome” had such evidence been presented at trial. Defendant asserted that had evidence
of the federal investigation against Chief Henderson been presented at trial, it would have
been difficult for the jury to have accepted Chief Henderson’s testimony, that “there is a
strong possibility” that the jury would have believed the defense’s challenges to the
“professionalism, motivation, and honesty of the officers,” and that such evidence “would
have at least raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of one or more jurors.” Defendant
also asserted that evidence of the federal investigation should be considered along with
evidence of Captain Amburn’s reprimand for failing to report police misconduct.

The appellate record does not include a written response by the State to Defendant’s
petition. Defendant subsequently filed a motion in this court, requesting that this court
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stay his direct appeal proceedings pending resolution of his coram nobis petition, and this
court entered an order granting Defendant’s motion.

On February 16, 2022, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Chief
Henderson with conspiracy to commit federal program fraud. The indictment, a copy of
which Defendant filed in the trial court, alleged that from 2011 until approximately 2018,
Chief Henderson and other unindicted co-conspirators conspired to commit theft of
federal program funds by using the cash fund and credit card from the KCSO narcotics
unit to purchase items for the personal use of themselves and others and by directing
subordinate officers to perform construction projects of a personal nature during official
work hours.

On July 18, 2022, Defendant filed an “Additional Claim in Support of Petition for
Writ of Error Coram Nobis,” in which he alleged that additional newly discovered
evidence may have affected the result of his trial had it been presented. Defendant alleged
that in April 1997, Chief Henderson and other officers engaged in a high-speed pursuit of
Jeremy Justice, during which the officers were in an unmarked vehicle, did not activate
the blue lights or siren, and were dressed in plain clothes rather than uniforms. Mr. Justice
subsequently was acquitted of charges of resisting arrest, evading arrest, and reckless
driving that resulted from the high-speed pursuit. Mr. Justice sued Knox County due to
injuries that he sustained during his arrest and received a settlement of $380,000.
Defendant asserted that defense counsel was unaware of the information at the time of
trial and first learned of the information in May 2022, when Mr. Justice’s counsel reached
out to defense counsel upon learning of Defendant’s allegations in his coram nobis
petition. The appellate record does not include a written response by the State.

During a June 9, 2023 hearing, the trial court dismissed Defendant’s claim of coram
nobis relief with respect to the 1997 incident, finding that Defendant was not reasonably
diligent in seeking the evidence and that Defendant could have discovered the evidence
through “some simple, well-directed questions in discovery.” The court also found that
the 1997 incident “is of very little relevance to the ultimate coram nobis issue.” The court
allowed Defendant to present evidence to support his claim for coram nobis relief based
on the federal indictment against Chief Henderson. The parties stipulated that the factual
allegations in the indictment were to be accepted as true for the purposes of the hearing.

During the hearing, Captain Amburn testified regarding the April 2019 incident
that led to his receiving a verbal reprimand. He stated that he did not officially report the
incident involving the altercation between two officers but said that when questioned
during the investigation into the incident, he acknowledged knowing about the incident.
He explained that at the time, he and one of the officers involved were vying for the same

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promotion and that he did not want it to appear as if he was attempting to “smear” the
officer’s character.

Captain Amburn testified that he was “shocked at a lot of the allegations” against
Chief Henderson in the federal indictment. Captain Amburn stated that he was never
offered use of the narcotics funds to make personal purchases and that he did not engage
in any construction projects while on duty. He was aware of some of the underlying
conduct listed in the indictment, such as the purchase of Apple products using narcotics
funds, which can be a valid use of the funds. However, he was unaware of any underlying
illegal activity related to such conduct, such as the allegations that the Apple products
purchased with narcotics funds were for personal use. He stated that had he been aware
of any illegal activity, he would have reported it.

Captain Amburn testified that he was unaware that Chief Henderson was engaging
in illegal activity or was under investigation at the time of Defendant’s crash. Captain
Amburn denied that he engaged in “untoward” behavior during the crash and resulting
investigation or that Chief Henderson instructed him to do so. Captain Amburn
maintained that he testified truthfully at trial. He stated that he was not the lead
investigative officer of the crash but that he was “the primary person as far as where I was
in position at the time of the accident.” He recalled testifying at trial that he did not believe
it was proper for him to be the lead investigative officer because he was a witness to the
crash. Captain Amburn acknowledged preparing two search warrants, but he did not know
whether Chief Henderson instructed him to do so or whether “I just inferred what I needed
to do.” Captain Amburn recalled that the decision to obtain a search warrant for
Defendant’s blood samples from the medical draw resulted from a consultation of KCSO’s
in-house legal counsel.

Detective Lane testified that he believed Chief Henderson, as the highest-ranking
officer at the scene of Defendant’s crash, was in charge while at the scene. Detective Lane
stated that neither Chief Henderson nor Captain Amburn directed him on what steps to
take in conducting his investigation. Detective Lane also stated that his portion of the
investigation was complete once he filed his report. He assumed that the narcotics unit
oversaw the investigation since members of the unit were at the scene.

Detective Lane testified that in February 2016, he was unaware of Chief
Henderson’s engaging in any conduct that resulted in the federal indictment. Detective
Lane stated that at the time of trial, he did not know why Chief Henderson had been
transferred to administrative duty. Detective Lane said he testified truthfully at trial.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made findings denying Defendant’s
petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The court found that the federal indictment against
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Chief Henderson was “credible new evidence,” that the parties stipulated to the allegations
included in the indictment, and that the defense was without fault in failing to discover the
evidence prior to trial. In examining whether the evidence may have affected the
judgment, the court found Captain Amburn to be “particularly credible, both based on
having looked at his trial testimony and listening to his testimony here today.” The court
categorized the newly discovered evidence as impeachment evidence and stated that even
if the jury disregarded Chief Henderson’s entire testimony based on this impeachment
evidence, Captain Amburn was an “intervening, reliable witness,” who testified regarding
his observations of the Kia both before and after the crash and Defendant’s conduct. The
court also stated that the impeachment evidence did not “spill[ ] over on to [Captain]
Amburn because [Captain] Amburn was fully credible today and was clear and adamant
about having never been asked to do anything untoward in the investigation by Chief
Henderson.” The court concluded that in light of Captain Amburn’s testimony at trial and
the other evidence establishing Defendant’s guilt, there was no reasonable basis to believe
that “the outcome would have been different” had the newly discovered evidence been
presented at trial.

On July 12, 2023, the court entered an order denying Defendant’s petition for writ
of error coram nobis in which the court repeated its findings from the evidentiary hearing.
The court noted that it had misspoken during the hearing in stating that there was no
reasonable basis to believe that the outcome “would have been different” and clarified that
its finding was that there was no reasonable basis to believe that the outcome “may have
been different” had the newly discovered evidence been presented at trial. Defendant filed
a timely notice of appeal of the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.

II. Analysis

This court consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal and his appeal of the denial of
coram nobis relief. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; (2) the State’s failure
to establish the chain of custody for Defendant’s blood samples; (3) the trial court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss due to the destruction of evidence; (4) the trial court’s admission
of lay testimony regarding the cause of the victim’s injuries; (5) the trial court’s admission
of Defendant’s medical records; (6) the trial court’s exclusion of defense evidence; (7) the
trial court’s failure to issue a missing witness instruction; (8) the State’s comments during
closing arguments; (9) the State’s failure to disclose evidence; and (10) the trial court’s
denial of Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Defendant also argues that
the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief.

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A. Denial of Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statements

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
statements to Captain Amburn while at the hospital. He maintains that he made the
statements during a custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights in
accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He also argues that the effect
of injuries sustained in the crash and the medication administered to him at the hospital
rendered his statements involuntary. Finally, he asserts that the erroneous admission of
his statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that
Defendant was not in custody when he made the statements, that he did not make the
statements in response to an interrogation by Captain Amburn, and that his statements
were otherwise voluntary.

1. Suppression Hearing

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to Captain
Amburn while at the hospital. Defendant asserted that he made the statements during an
improper custodial interrogation and that Captain Amburn failed to advise him of his
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant argued that his
statements, therefore, were taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination under
the federal and state constitutions. He also asserted that the effects of the medication
administered to him at the hospital, “augmented by the injuries he suffered from the
accident, overbore [his] will to make his statements involuntary,” and, thus, his statements
were taken in violation of his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions.

The trial court held a series of hearings prior to trial addressing Defendant’s motion
to suppress his statements, as well as other motions filed by Defendant. During the
suppression hearing, Captain Amburn offered testimony regarding the circumstances
leading to the crash that was generally consistent with his trial testimony. Defendant was
transported by ambulance from the scene of the crash to the University of Tennessee
Medical Center. During the early morning hours of February 4, 2016, Detective
Huddleston requested Defendant’s consent to obtain a sample of his blood. At 12:19 a.m.,
Defendant refused consent for a blood sample and refused to sign the implied consent
form. Detective Huddleston noted that Defendant was not cooperative or talkative at that
time.

At 5:00 or 5:30 a.m. on February 4, 2016, Captain Amburn and an evidence
technician went to the hospital to obtain a blood sample from Defendant pursuant to a
search warrant. Captain Amburn testified that when he arrived, no officers were stationed
outside or inside Defendant’s hospital room, and Defendant was not handcuffed. To
Captain Amburn’s knowledge, the KCSO had not requested that hospital security place a
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“hold” on Defendant, and Captain Amburn did not have a warrant for Defendant’s arrest.
Captain Amburn acknowledged that he believed Defendant was the driver, that Defendant
was listed as a “suspect” in the search warrant, and that, subject to the execution of the
search warrant, nothing prevented Defendant from leaving the hospital other than his
injuries.

Captain Amburn stated that Defendant’s hospital room had sliding glass doors, one
of which was open. Defendant was sitting up in his hospital bed, and two female relatives
were in the room with him. Captain Amburn was dressed in plain clothes, and the
evidence technician was wearing a “full uniform.” Captain Amburn testified that as soon
as he and the evidence technician came to the threshold of the door, Defendant said, “I
really screwed up, didn’t I?” Captain Amburn responded, “[Y]es, sir, I’m afraid you made
some bad choices tonight. And, you know, we’re just going to have to work through this.”
Although Captain Amburn believed Defendant knew he and the evidence technician were
law enforcement officers, Captain Amburn introduced himself and the evidence
technician and explained to Defendant that he had a search warrant to obtain a blood
sample. Defendant stated that they would find alcohol but not drugs in his blood. Captain
Amburn explained that he asked the two family members to wait outside to avoid making
any statements in front of them that would embarrass Defendant. Captain Amburn
testified that he did not record his conversation with Defendant because he had not
intended on asking Defendant any incriminating questions and because Defendant was not
in custody.

Captain Amburn testified that Defendant was “very polite and very talkative” and
that he appeared as if he “wanted to get something off his chest.” Defendant stated that
he wanted to apologize to the two officers from whom he had fled. Captain Amburn said
Defendant did not make the statement in response to an interrogation. As Defendant
continued discussing the events, Captain Amburn asked Defendant why he was driving in
such a manner, and Defendant responded that he “wanted to go home.”

Captain Amburn stated that within four or five minutes of his arrival, Defendant
asked him whether the victim was alive, and Captain Amburn informed him that he had
just learned of the victim’s death. Defendant discussed the victim with Captain Amburn
and stated that he and the victim were planning to marry. Captain Amburn asked
Defendant whether he and the victim had any children because he had observed car seats
in the vehicle, and Defendant stated that the victim had children. Defendant told Captain
Amburn that the victim had not wanted him to drive but that he had “insisted” and that he
knew he was going to jail. At one point, Defendant said, “I really F’d up. I didn’t realize
what was going on [till] about 1:30. I didn’t sober up [till] after 1:30 to figure out what
was going on.” Defendant also told Captain Amburn that “you and I both know I shouldn’t
have been driving that car.”
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Captain Amburn described Defendant as “very cooperative and very talkative.”
Captain Amburn stated that Defendant was otherwise “very calm and collected” and that
Defendant “was very matter of fact, very apologetic and . . . almost seemed resolved that
he already realized what was coming down the path and that he had accepted responsibility
for it.” Captain Amburn stated that Defendant became “a little choked up” when
discussing the victim and became “agitated” when discussing his missing wallet. Captain
Amburn told Defendant that he assumed officers took his wallet to check his identification
for purposes of preparing the necessary reports. Captain Amburn assured Defendant that
he would locate his wallet and return it to him, and Captain Amburn testified that he later
located Defendant’s wallet and returned it to him in his hospital room. Captain Amburn
was aware that Defendant had “serious breakage to his lower extremities,” and when
Captain Amburn returned Defendant’s wallet to him, Defendant stated that he had
undergone multiple surgeries and would be hospitalized for a period.

Captain Amburn affirmed that Defendant did not appear “out of it,” did not lapse
in and out of consciousness, and did not appear to have any difficulty understanding his
questions. Captain Amburn said the evidence technician asked about Defendant’s
medications and listed in the toxicology request form that Defendant had been given
fentanyl, propofol, and Versed. Captain Amburn was not familiar with Versed but
acknowledged that fentanyl and propofol were narcotics. He did not seek to determine
when those medications had been administered to Defendant prior to speaking to him.
Captain Amburn testified that Defendant “was very lucid in his conversation” and did not
appear to be incapacitated because of any medication. Captain Amburn explained, “I
didn’t detect any of the things that, in my professional experience, would lead me to
believe that he was heavily—heavily medicated. He had no slurred speech; he was
articulate in what he was saying; he wasn’t searching for his words.” Captain Amburn
acknowledged that Defendant would “wince” when he moved due to his injuries.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made oral findings and denied in
part Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to Captain Amburn. The court found
that Defendant “immediately engaged in conversation” with Captain Amburn, that “[a]t
first[,] the officer wasn’t asking him any questions,” and that Defendant’s statements
“were spontaneous and not the result of any kind of interrogation.” The court suppressed
Defendant’s statement that he had wanted to go home in response to Captain Amburn’s
question regarding why Defendant had been driving in such a manner. The court found
that Captain Amburn had asked “a question that was under circumstances in which the
officer had to know that the focus of the investigation was narrowing to [Defendant] and
he should have Mirandized him before asking any questions and he did not do that.”

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2. Standard of Review

This court is bound by a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing unless
the evidence preponderates against such findings. State v. McKinney, 669 S.W.3d 753,
764 (Tenn. 2023); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). “Questions of
credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of
conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom,
928 S.W.2d at 23. “The prevailing party ‘is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of
the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.’” McKinney, 669 S.W.3d at 764
(quoting State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010); Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23).
This court may consider the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial
in evaluating the trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress. McKinney, 669
S.W.3d at 764; State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). This court reviews
“a trial court’s application of law to the facts under a de novo standard of review with no
presumption of correctness.” McKinney, 669 S.W.3d at 764 (citing State v. Echols, 382
S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)).

3. Failure to Advise Defendant of His Miranda Rights

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no person .
. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const.
amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against compulsory self-incrimination is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment). Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution
provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself.” “[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.” Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 478. Prior to any questioning by law enforcement, the individual must be warned that

he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. These rights may be knowingly and intelligently waived. Id. “But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” Id.

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Miranda warnings are required only “when a suspect is (1) in custody and (2)
subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent.” State v. Moran, 621 S.W.3d 249,
257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020) (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tenn. 2001)). “In
the absence of either, Miranda requirements are not necessitated.” Id. (citing Walton, 41
S.W.3d at 83). This court has recognized that “the defendant bears the initial burden of
proving custody for the purposes of Miranda before the burden shifts to the State to prove
voluntariness of the statement.” Id. at 258.

A person is “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda if there has been “a
‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 251 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2003). Our supreme court has recognized that “in determining whether an individual is
‘in custody’ and entitled to Miranda warnings, the relevant inquiry is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider
himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal
arrest.” State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tenn. 1996); see State v. Lowe, 552
S.W.3d 842, 867 (Tenn. 2018). This test is an objective assessment from the suspect’s
viewpoint, and “the unarticulated, subjective view of law enforcement officials that the
individual being questioned is or is not a suspect does not bear upon the question.”
Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 852. Factors relevant in making an objective assessment of
whether a person was in custody at the time of questioning include:

the time and location of the interrogation; the duration and character of the
questioning; the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; the suspect’s
method of transportation to the place of questioning; the number of police
officers present; any limitation on movement or other form of restraint
imposed on the suspect during the interrogation; any interactions between
the officer and the suspect, including the words spoken by the officer to the
suspect, and the suspect’s verbal or nonverbal responses; the extent to which
the suspect is confronted with the law enforcement officer’s suspicions of
guilt or evidence of guilt; and finally, the extent to which the suspect is made
aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the
interview at will.

Id. at 855. These factors are not exclusive, and the inquiry is “very fact specific.” Id.

The State contends that the evidence failed to establish that Defendant was in
custody when he made the statements to Captain Amburn. The State argues that “[s]imply
because Defendant was confined to a hospital bed and unable to freely move about due to
his injuries does not mean that he was in custody for the purposes of Miranda” and that
- 26 -
“a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would not consider himself or herself
deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Defendant
responds that the trial court “implicitly found” in ruling on the motion to suppress that he
was in custody when he made the statements and that the trial court’s ruling is supported
by the evidence.

The trial court did not specifically address the issue of custody in ruling on
Defendant’s suppression motion. Our supreme court has recognized that when a trial court
failed to set forth its findings of fact in ruling on a suppression motion, “we will decide
on our own where the preponderance of the evidence lies.” State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515,
521 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 457 n.5 (Tenn. 2001); Ganzevoort
v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997)); see also State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d
791, 816 (Tenn. 2014) (deciding “where the preponderance of the evidence lies” when the
trial court failed to make specific findings of fact as to defendant’s oral motion to suppress
challenging the voluntariness of his confession); State v. Meeks, No. M2007-01600-CCA-
R3-CD, 2008 WL 2152493, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 2008) (“Because the trial
court made no findings on the record concerning the custodial nature of the defendant’s
interview, we must determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.”). However,
the trial court made findings that relate to some of the relevant factors in determining
custody, such as the character of the questioning, the interactions between Captain
Amburn and Defendant, and the extent to which Defendant was confronted with Captain
Amburn’s suspicions of guilt or evidence of guilt. See Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 855.
Furthermore, evidence of other relevant factors, such as the location where Defendant
made the statements, his method of transportation to the location, the number of officers
present, and the restraints imposed on Defendant, were presented primarily through the
testimony of Captain Amburn, and the evidence related to these factors is largely
undisputed. Thus, we conclude that the record is sufficient to allow us to address the issue
of custody. State v. Cooper, 912 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (addressing
whether the defendant’s statements were the result of custodial interrogation despite the
trial court’s failure to make findings of fact when the officer was the only witness who
testified at the suppression hearing and “the evidence is not in dispute”).

Courts from other jurisdictions have declined to find that a hospitalized defendant
questioned by police officers was in custody for purposes of Miranda when the
defendant’s “restraints” at the hospital were due to medical treatment rather than police
conduct and absent any other police conduct that would lead a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position to consider himself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree
associated with a formal arrest. See e.g., United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629 (4th
Cir. 2007) (differentiating between “police-imposed restraint” and restrictions “incident
to [the defendant’s] background circumstances” and concluding that the hospitalized
defendant was not in custody when the limitations on his freedom were the result of
- 27 -
medical treatment from his injuries); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.
1985) (rejecting the hospitalized defendant’s claim that he was in custody when
questioned by police but the police were not involved in his hospitalization did nothing to
extend the hospitalization); State v. Thomas, 843 So.2d 834, 839-40 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002) (holding that a hospitalized defendant who caused an accident that resulted in a
fatality was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when the only restraint on his freedom
of movement was due to his medical condition and treatment, he had been issued a citation
for DUI but no hold had been placed on him, and he was not charged with homicide before
or during his hospital stay); People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d 43, 50 (Col. 1988) (noting that
“confinement to a hospital bed is insufficient alone to constitute custody”) (citation
omitted); State v. Garrison, 323 A.3d 279, 289-96 (Conn. 2024) (concluding that the
hospitalized defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda based on the totality
of the circumstances); People v. Vasquez, 913 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Ill. App. 2009) (recognizing
that “physical incapacity resulting from forces outside the control of law enforcement
officials does not, in our view, amount to custody”); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 686
S.W.3d 230, 241 (Ky. 2024) (noting that “the restraint giving rise to ‘custody’ must be
restraint instigated by the police, and for that reason the majority rule is that confinement
to a hospital bed does not, by itself, amount to ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes”) (citation
omitted).

“This is not to say that an individual would never be ‘in custody’ when held for
medical treatment in a hospital.” Martin, 781 F.2d at 673. Rather, “[i]f the police took a
criminal suspect to the hospital from the scene of a crime, monitored the patient’s stay,
stationed themselves outside the door, arranged an extended treatment schedule with the
doctors, or some combination of these, law enforcement restraint amounting to custody
could result.” Id.; see Mayberry v. State, 600 S.E.2d 703, 705 (Ga. App. 2004)
(concluding that a defendant who was questioned by police while at the hospital was in
custody for purposes of Miranda when he was initially surrounded by police cars at the
scene and the police handcuffed him to a gurney and accompanied him in the ambulance
and later handcuffed him to the stretcher at the hospital and restrained his legs); State v.
Grant, 939 A.2d 93, 101-03 (Me. 2008) (holding that a hospitalized defendant was in
custody when officers tased him, forcibly removed him from his truck, handcuffed him,
accompanied him to the hospital, maintained a constant presence outside his hospital
room, interrogated him multiple times, made him aware that they would return when he
refused to answer their questions, and made it clear that they were tracking his medical
condition with hospital staff).

In the present case, Defendant was not arrested or handcuffed at the scene; he was
transported to the hospital by ambulance; and the proof does not establish that an officer
accompanied Defendant to the hospital. Detective Huddleston went to the hospital more
than four hours after the crash and asked Defendant to submit a blood draw. Defendant
- 28 -
refused to consent, and Detective Huddleston promptly left. Approximately five hours
later, Captain Amburn and an evidence technician went to the hospital to execute a search
warrant for a blood draw from Defendant. The KCSO had not placed a hold on Defendant;
no officers were stationed inside or outside of Defendant’s hospital room; and Defendant
was not handcuffed. Defendant’s freedom of movement was restrained by his injuries and
the resulting necessary medical treatment, and this restraint was for medical purposes by
medical personnel rather than investigative purposes by law enforcement.

Defendant was not threatened in any way or coerced to make any statements to
Captain Amburn. The trial court found that Defendant “immediately engaged” in
conversation with Captain Amburn and gave “spontaneous” statements that were “not the
result of any kind of interrogation.” Captain Amburn explained to Defendant that he was
there to obtain a blood sample pursuant to a search warrant, and Captain Amburn never
told Defendant that he was under arrest. The trial court found that Captain Amburn asked
only one question that elicited an incriminating response. Defendant made statements
acknowledging that he had “screwed up” before Captain Amburn indicated to Defendant
that he was a suspect. Although Captain Amburn asked Defendant’s relatives to leave the
room, he explained that he did so to limit Defendant’s embarrassment. There is no
evidence that the interaction between Captain Amburn and Defendant extended beyond
the reasonable amount of time necessary to obtain a sample of Defendant’s blood. Captain
Amburn did not arrest Defendant at the hospital, and Defendant was not arrested until
several months later.

Under our supreme court’s precedent and the persuasive authority cited above, we
cannot conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in
Defendant’s position would have “consider[ed] himself or herself deprived of freedom of
movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 852; see
State v. Fridley, 93 N.E.3d 10, 20-22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that the
hospitalized defendant was not in custody when an officer questioned him while obtaining
a sample of defendant’s blood pursuant to a search warrant). Defendant failed to establish
that he was in custody when he made the statements to Captain Amburn. Thus,
Defendant’s statements were not taken in violation of Miranda and his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

4. Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements

Defendant asserts that the combination of the injuries that he sustained in the crash
and the medication that he received at the hospital rendered his statements to Captain
Amburn involuntary. The State responds that the evidence established that Defendant’s
statements were voluntary. We agree with the State.

- 29 -
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article
I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution require that a confession be voluntary before it
is admitted at trial. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000); State v.
Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.
1996). “The test of voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of
voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment.” Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455. The voluntariness
test is distinct from Miranda. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434-35; State v. McKinney, 669
S.W.3d 753, 767 (Tenn. 2023). “Miranda asks whether a suspect received certain
warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, while the essential inquiry
under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the
confession a product of coercion.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013)
(citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35; Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455).

The due process voluntariness test requires consideration of “the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession, ‘both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434).
Relevant factors include:

[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the
extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before
he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of
his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing
him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused
was injured[,] intoxicated[,] or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the
statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep[,] or medical
attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the
suspect was threatened with abuse.

Id. (quoting State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn. 1996)) (alteration in
original).

“The ingestion of drugs and alcohol does not in and of itself render any subsequent
confession involuntary.” State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 805 (Tenn. 2000) (appendix);
see State v. Bell, 690 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (providing that
“intoxication or mental unsoundness is not alone sufficient to bar the introduction of
statements made by an accused if the evidence also shows the accused was capable of
understanding his rights”). A confession should be suppressed “‘when an accused’s
faculties are so impaired that the confession cannot be considered the product of a free
mind and rational intellect.’” Morris, 24 S.W.3d at 805 (quoting State v. Robinson, 622
- 30 -
S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)); see State v. Williams, No. W2018-00797-CCA-
R3-CD, 2019 WL 1452931, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019). The test is
“whether, at the time of the statement, the accused was capable of making a narrative of
past events or of stating his own participation in the crime.” Morris, 24 S.W.3d at 805
(citations omitted); see Williams, 2019 WL 1452931, at *11.

The States argues that “Defendant failed to show that he was so intoxicated or
impaired by his medications that his statements could not be considered the product of a
free mind and rational intellect.” However, as Defendant notes in his reply brief, the State
has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the
evidence. See State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 693, 695 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Sanders,
452 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tenn. 2014)). The parties also note that the trial court failed to
make specific findings on the issue of voluntariness. However, neither party argues that
a remand for additional findings by the trial court is necessary, and we have recognized
that in such situations, we may decide where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See
Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 816; Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 521.

The proof did not demonstrate that Defendant’s facilities were so impaired that his
confession cannot be considered the product of a free mind and rational intellect. The
only witness who testified regarding Defendant’s condition when he made the statements
was Captain Amburn, who stated that Defendant “was very lucid in his conversation” and
did not appear to be incapacitated because of any medication. Captain Amburn testified,
“I didn’t detect any of the things that, in my professional experience, would leave me to
believe that he was heavily—heavily medicated. He had no slurred speech; he was
articulate in what he was saying; he wasn’t searching for his words.” The trial court found
that Defendant “immediately engaged in conversation” with Captain Amburn and offered
statements that were “spontaneous and not the result of any kind of interrogation.”
Defendant admitted that he was the driver, that he had been drinking alcohol, and that he
had fled from law enforcement. While Captain Amburn acknowledged that Defendant
“wince[d]” when he moved due to his injuries, the evidence does not demonstrate that his
injuries otherwise affected the voluntariness of his statements. Although Dr. Lochmuller
and Special Agent Tiller testified at trial regarding fentanyl, propofol, and Versed, their
testimony was limited to the general effects of the medication based on the dosage
administered and not those effects actually experienced by Defendant. Rather, the
evidence established that Defendant’s statements were voluntary, and the proof does not
preponderate against the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. See
Morris, 24 S.W.3d at 805-06 (concluding that the defendant’s statements were voluntary
when the officer testified that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of
cocaine and provided a narrative of the events and when expert testimony was limited to
the general effects of cocaine intoxication and not those effects that the defendant actually
experienced).
- 31 -
B. Chain of Custody of Blood Sample

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the blood
sample from the medical draw and the TBI’s analysis of the sample and asserts that the
State failed to establish a valid chain of custody. He maintains that the State failed to
present evidence regarding the drawing of the blood, the handling and preservation of the
sample until seized by law enforcement, and the storage of the sample after it was seized
by law enforcement and before it was transported to the TBI. The State responds that the
trial court acted within its discretion by admitting the results of the TBI’s testing of the
blood sample from the medical draw after the State established an unbroken chain of
custody. We agree with the State.

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to exclude evidence regarding the TBI’s
analysis of the blood sample from the medical draw, asserting that the State could not
establish a sufficient chain of custody, and the State filed a response in opposition. The
trial court denied the motion prior to trial, noting the State’s responsibility to establish
chain of custody at trial. Defendant renewed his objection at trial, and the trial court
denied Defendant’s motion, finding that “there’s absolutely no reason to doubt the
integrity of the blood from the period of time it was in the hospital” and that Officer Bules
“did describe every step of the chain from the beginning until it got to [the] TBI.”

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901 requires that physical evidence be authenticated
prior to its admission, and authentication requires evidence sufficient “to support a finding
by the trier of fact that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Tenn. R. Evid.
901(a). “[I]t is ‘well-established that as a condition precedent to the introduction of
tangible evidence, a witness must be able to identify the evidence or establish an unbroken
chain of custody.’” State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 296 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting State v.
Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 760 (Tenn. 2000)). This rule “is designed to insure ‘that there has
been no tampering, loss, substitution, or mistake with respect to the evidence.’” Id.
(quoting Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760).

Although each link in the chain of custody “should be sufficiently established,” the
State need not prove the identity of tangible evidence “beyond all possible doubt” or
“establish facts which exclude every possibility of tampering.” Id. (citing Scott, 33
S.W.3d at 760). “An item is not necessarily precluded from admission as evidence if the
State fails to call all of the witnesses who handled the item.” Id. “[W]hen the facts and
circumstances that surround tangible evidence reasonably establish the identity and
integrity of the evidence, the trial court should admit the item into evidence.” Id. This
court reviews the trial court’s ruling regarding whether the chain of custody has been
sufficiently established for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 295.
- 32 -
The challenged blood sample in this case was not taken for the sole purpose of
forensic testing by the TBI in the investigation of a criminal offense. See State v. Singh,
684 S.W.3d 774, 784 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023) (describing evidence sufficient to establish
proper chain of custody of a blood sample taken for purposes of forensic analysis by the
TBI in DUI cases). Rather, the blood sample was taken by hospital staff for the purposes
of diagnosis and treatment of injuries that Defendant sustained from the crash. The
hospital conducted various testing on the blood sample in preparation for Defendant’s
surgery, including a blood alcohol test, before the blood sample was provided to law
enforcement pursuant to a search warrant and transported to the TBI for forensic testing.
Defendant’s medical records reflecting the results of the blood alcohol testing by the
hospital were entered as an exhibit at trial without objection prior to and separate from the
admission of his entire medical records.

We note that when hospital staff obtain blood samples from a patient for purposes
of diagnosis and treatment and test those samples to determine the patient’s blood alcohol
level, the medical records documenting the testing and the results are admissible under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Tennessee Rule of Evidence
803(6). See State v. Goldston, 29 S.W.3d 537, 540-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); see also
State v. Asbury, No. E2008-01641-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1741365, at *9 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Apr. 30, 2010); State v. Warlick, No. M2005-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL
1439648, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2007). “Hospital records kept daily for
medical purposes and not prepared for the purpose of litigation are typically deemed
reliable,” Goldston, 29 S.W.3d at 542, and “the trustworthiness of the medical record is
presumed,” Warlick, 2007 WL 1439648, at *6. The State is not required to present
additional witnesses regarding the drawing and storing of the blood sample to admit the
medical records. See Asbury, 2010 WL 1741365, at *9 (rejecting the defendant’s claim
that medical records reflecting the results of blood alcohol testing conducted by the
hospital for medical purposes lack sufficient trustworthiness to satisfy Rule 803(6) due to
the State’s failure to present testimony regarding how and why the tests were conducted).

Because the State need not establish the chain of custody of blood samples taken
at a hospital for medical purposes to admit medical records reflecting the results of blood
alcohol testing conducted by hospital personnel due to the reliability of the records, we
question the necessity of requiring the State to establish the chain of custody of blood
samples while in the hospital’s custody prior to their transfer to the custody of law
enforcement for forensic analysis by the TBI. As noted by the State in its brief, the
hospital had a “vested interest in ensuring that the blood labeled with Defendant’s name
belonged to Defendant” because the hospital drew the blood for the purpose of conducting
testing and screening in advance of Defendant’s major surgery. The crucial life and death
decisions by hospital personnel are dependent upon the proper obtaining, handling, and
- 33 -
preserving of blood samples. Under such circumstances, we conclude the presentation of
evidence to establish the chain of custody of blood samples while under the custody and
care of the hospital was not necessary to preclude the possibility of tampering, loss,
substitution, or mistake.

Regardless, even assuming the State is required to establish the integrity of the
blood samples while in the hospital’s custody, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence establishing the chain of custody of the blood samples. According to
Defendant’s medical records, he arrived at the emergency department on February 3,
2016, at 8:32 p.m. and was evaluated by a doctor, who ordered “Type & Screen for
possible transfusion.” Hospital personnel drew Defendant’s blood at 20:38 hours, or 8:38
p.m. Dr. Christy Lawson issued an order to screen Defendant’s blood, and following a
blood screen, hospital personnel noted that Defendant had a “BAC 135; EtOH positive.”
On February 4, at approximately 5:33 p.m., Captain Amburn and Officer Bules executed
a search warrant for Defendant’s medical blood samples. They went to the hospital’s
laboratory, provided a technician with a copy of the search warrant, and received four
vials of blood from the technician. The vials were labeled with the name, “Harlen
Ferguson,” the same spelling of Defendant’s name included in his medical records. The
label also included the date and time of February 3 at 8:38 p.m., the same date and time
of the drawing of Defendant’s blood that was listed in his medical records.

Officer Bules took possession of the blood samples, transported them to the
evidence room at the KCSO, and placed them in a refrigerator at the forensic laboratory.
The refrigerator was located behind a door that was only accessible with a thumbprint and
a key card. Any removal of evidence from the register had to be recorded in an evidence
log. According to the evidence log, the vials of Defendant’s blood remained in the
refrigerator until February 19, 2016, when Tom Finch, an employee with the KCSO,
removed the vials from the laboratory refrigerator and transported them to the TBI for
analysis.

Defendant characterizes the period between Officer Bules’s placing the vials of
blood in the refrigerator and Mr. Finch’s removing them from the refrigerator and
transporting them to the TBI as a “gap” in the chain of custody. Defendant relies on this
court’s opinion in State v. Gibson, when we held that the State failed to establish the chain
of custody of a blood sample when the deputy delivered the sample to an unidentified
person in the forensic department of the sheriff’s office and no one from the forensic
department testified regarding what he or she did with the sample after receiving it. State
v. Gibson, No. E2017-01567-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4811086, at *6-7 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Oct. 3, 2018). This court reasoned that “the State failed to offer any evidence about the
whereabouts and security of the Defendant’s blood sample from the time [the deputy] gave
it to the Forensic Department until it was received in the TBI Laboratory’s evidence drop
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box six days later.” Id. at *8. We noted that the State also failed to present any evidence
regarding “the sheriff’s department’s usual procedures for storing, securing, and
transporting evidence.” Id. In the present case, however, Officer Bules testified that she
stored Defendant’s blood samples in the forensic department’s refrigerator located in a
secured area in the KCSO. According to the evidence log, the vials remained inside the
refrigerator until Mr. Finch removed them and transported them to the TBI. The KCSO’s
waiting fifteen days to transport the vials to the TBI did not create a “gap” in the chain of
custody.

The State also presented sufficient evidence establishing the identity and integrity
of the blood samples. The blood vials were labeled with Defendant’s name as spelled in
his medical records and the same date and time listed in his medical records as when the
blood was drawn, evidencing that the vials contained Defendant’s blood. Defendant’s
medical records included the screens and tests that hospital personnel conducted using
Defendant’s blood samples and the results of the screens and tests. Captain Amburn and
Officer Bules went to the hospital laboratory to obtain the blood samples pursuant to a
search warrant and retrieved the vials from a technician in the laboratory, evidencing that
the vials had been stored in the hospital laboratory. Officer Bules then stored the vials in
the laboratory refrigerator in a secured area at the KCSO until the vials were transported
to the TBI for analysis.

Special Agents Tiller and Thompson testified extensively regarding the condition
of the blood samples when they received them and the dangers that result from
contaminating and failing to properly store the samples. Special Agent Tiller stated that
he did not note any issues with clotting or bacterial growth in the blood samples. Special
Agent Tiller likewise stated that he did not observe anything “abnormal” in the blood
samples and that he took precautions to ensure that the testing instrument did not produce
a result that was based on any contamination of the blood samples.

We conclude that this proof was sufficient to ensure that “‘there has been no
tampering, loss, substitution, or mistake’” with respect to the blood samples from the
medical draw. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 296 (quoting Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the TBI’s analysis of
Defendant’s blood samples from the medical draw.

Furthermore, we conclude that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless.
See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b) (“A final judgment from which relief is available and otherwise
appropriate shall not be set aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving a
substantial right more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice
to the judicial process.”); see also Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 298-99 (applying a harmless
error analysis under Rule 36(b) in determining the effect of the erroneous admission of
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evidence due to the State’s failure to establish a sufficient chain of custody). In addition
to the results of the TBI’s analysis of the blood samples, the State also presented
Defendant’s medical records, documenting the result of the hospital’s blood alcohol
testing of the blood samples as “BAC 135, EtOH positive.” This medical record was
entered as an exhibit without objection by Defendant prior to and apart from the entry of
the entire set of Defendant’s medical records. Other evidence of Defendant’s intoxication
that was presented at trial included Mr. Sumner’s testimony regarding Defendant’s alcohol
consumption prior to the crash, the reckless way Defendant drove the vehicle, and his
statements following the crash regarding his alcohol consumption and intoxication. In
light of the other evidence of Defendant’s intoxication presented at trial, we cannot
conclude that any error in the admission of the result of the TBI’s analysis of the blood
samples “more probably than not affected the judgment” or “result[ed] in prejudice to the
judicial process.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 3

C. Failure to Preserve Evidence

Defendant asserts the State failed to preserve his blood samples from the medical
draw and the legal draw and the vehicle involved in the crash in violation of State v.
Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and that the trial court, therefore, erred in denying
his motion to dismiss. Defendant argues that due to the destruction of the blood samples,
he was denied the opportunity to have the blood samples independently tested to
corroborate or contradict the results of the TBI’s analysis. He further argues that due to
the State’s failure to retain the vehicle involved in the crash, he was denied the opportunity
to inspect the vehicle. He maintains that the photographs of the vehicle taken by the
KCSO were an insufficient substitute because the photographs were of poor quality and
did not include “crucial aspects” of the vehicle, including the condition of the passenger
door and the vehicle’s interior. Finally, Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly
blamed him for failing to request access to the vehicle and the blood samples in a timely
manner when the evidence was destroyed prior to his arrest and the appointment of
counsel. The State responds that Defendant failed to establish that his trial was
fundamentally unfair without the evidence, and the State asserts that the trial court

3
Defendant argues in a footnote in his brief that because the State did not present the hospital
personnel who drew his blood and handled his blood samples as witnesses at trial, he was “thus convicted
on the basis of evidence introduced against him without any opportunity to confront the unknown people
who generated that evidence.” Defendant, however, has waived this issue by failing to cite any authority
to support his claim. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A) (requiring an appellant to support issues raised on
appeal with “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and
appropriate references to the record”); Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (providing that issues raised by an
appellant that “are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the
record will be treated as waived”).
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properly concluded that a jury instruction was the appropriate remedy for the missing
evidence.

1. Pretrial and Trial Proceedings

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the vehicular homicide charges
in the presentment due to the State’s failure to preserve the vehicle involved in the crash
in violation of Ferguson. Defendant alleged that the KCSO released the vehicle to the
insurance company shortly after the crash and that the vehicle was subsequently sold and
destroyed. He maintained that the State had a duty to preserve the evidence and that
defense access to view and inspect the vehicle and the event data recorder (“EDR”) or
“black box” was required under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. He further
maintained that inspection of the vehicle was necessary for preparation of the defense
regarding the issues relating to the nature and cause of the crash and the proximate cause
of the victim’s death. Defendant asserted that the evidence could not be recreated and that
no comparable substitute evidence existed. Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the
presentment due to the State’s failure to preserve the blood samples, asserting that the
blood samples contained material evidence that directly related to the elements of the
charged offense and that could provide evidence to impeach the TBI’s analysts who tested
the samples and that no comparable substitute evidence existed.

During a pretrial hearing, Captain Amburn testified regarding the vehicle’s
condition following the crash. He stated that the force of the impact was so great that the
engine was shoved against the firewall, moving the dashboard and the pedals and that the
steering column rotated to such a degree that the steering wheel was facing the vehicle’s
roof. Captain Amburn recalled looking inside the vehicle before it became fully engulfed
in flames and observing beer cans, but he did not collect the beer cans and was unaware
of whether an investigator later did so. He said that Defendant’s airbag was deployed on
the driver’s side and that he believed the victim’s airbag on the passenger’s side also had
deployed. Captain Amburn noted that the front passenger seat was “partially reclined.”
Captain Amburn did not inspect the vehicle after it was towed and explained, “There was
nothing left of it, basically.” The parties stipulated that at the request of the KCSO, the
vehicle was towed from the scene by Cedar Bluff Towing, that Chief Henderson released
all holds on the vehicle on February 8, 2016, and that the vehicle was claimed by Insurance
Auto Auctions on February 16, 2016.

Officer Campbell testified that she took approximately 161 photographs of the
scene on the night of the crash. She was unable to enter the vehicle because it was still
“very hot” due to the fire. She photographed the debris from the vehicle, the vehicle’s
exterior, and the vehicle’s interior to the extent that she could do so. She acknowledged
that the area was dark, and she did not recall whether there was any lighting in the area or
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whether the officers set up temporary lighting while investigating the crash. She did not
recall inspecting the vehicle’s windows, doors, or airbags, and she did not photograph the
vehicle once it was towed from the scene. She photographed the roadway but did not
otherwise document its condition.

At the pretrial hearing, Defendant presented the testimony of James Alan Parham,
a civil engineer who specializes in traffic accident reconstruction, and the trial court
accepted Mr. Parham as an expert in the field. Mr. Parham reviewed the accident report,
photographs of the scene, the transcript of the 911 call, the medical examiner’s report,
documents from Insurance Auto Auctions regarding the vehicle, chain of custody forms,
the search warrant affidavit, subpoenas, and “other legal documents.”

Mr. Parham noted that an accident reconstruction was not performed in the case.
He testified regarding the importance of maintaining and preserving evidence at the scene
of a vehicle crash. He stated that an investigator should have examined, documented, and
photographed the roadway alignment, the grade of the roadway, the cross slope, the
banking of the curve, the vehicle’s path as it left the roadway, ground conditions, the tree
that the vehicle struck, and the vehicle’s final resting position. Mr. Parham acknowledged
that investigators photographed the marks where the vehicle left the roadway, the
“furrows” or grooves in the ground made by the tires once the vehicle left the roadway,
and the path of the vehicle to the site of the crash. He did not see any measurements of
the marks and “furrows.”

Mr. Parham testified that law enforcement failed to preserve the vehicle, obtain the
EDR data from the vehicle, or conduct a detailed assessment of the vehicle. He stated that
this assessment should have included photographing and documenting the overall
dimensions of the vehicle, the damage to the vehicle, the seat belt latch plates to determine
whether the seat belts were used, any airbag deployment, the speedometer, the positions
of the seats, and the size, tread, depth, and conditions of the tires. Mr. Parham stated that
the photographs taken by officers were dark, that no photographs of the vehicle were taken
during the daylight hours, and that he did not “really see” any photographs of the vehicle’s
interior taken by law enforcement “other than just standing back a little bit and you can
kind of see in there.” He stated that officers failed to take detailed photographs of the
steering wheel, dash, airbags, or any remains of the seat belts. He also was unable to
determine whether the vehicle’s windows were up or down based on the evidence
provided by the State. He stated that had the State preserved the vehicle, he would have
been able to inspect the vehicle’s interior, including the steering wheel, dashboard,
airbags, and seat belts. He noted that it was not unusual for vehicles involved in crashes
to be preserved for long periods of time.

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Mr. Parham testified that the data from the vehicle’s EDR could have included the
vehicle’s speed, the position of the throttle, the accelerator and brake activity, any seat
belt usage, any activation of steering control, the degree to which the steering wheel was
turned, the engine RPMs, the crash pulse, and the direction of the force involved in the
crash. He concluded that based on his training and experience, EDR data was available
for 2010, 2011, and 2012 Kia Souls. He identified a document that noted the lack of tools
for downloading and accurately interpreting data from an EDR in Kia vehicles produced
prior to September 1, 2012. Mr. Parham stated that he had performed several accident
reconstructions where the vehicle had caught fire and that he had been able to obtain the
EDR and the recorded data from some, but not all, of the burned vehicles. He did not
know whether the data from the EDR in the vehicle survived the fire but believed “it’s got
a high probability it would have.”

Captain Amburn’s testimony regarding the collection of Defendant’s blood
samples from the legal draw and the medical draw pursuant to search warrants was
consistent with his trial testimony. The State also presented the testimony of the TBI
forensic scientists who received and analyzed the blood samples.

Ms. Margaret Massengill testified that the TBI received the blood samples taken
from both the medical draw and the legal draw. According to the submittal forms, the
medical draw occurred on February 3, 2016, at 8:38 p.m. and was received by the TBI on
February 19, and the legal draw occurred on February 4 at 4:16 a.m. and was received by
the TBI on March 1. Ms. Massengill testified that on February 8, she spoke to one of the
prosecutors regarding which of the samples to test and that they decided to test the samples
from the medical draw if the volume of blood was sufficient to allow such testing. If the
volume of blood from the medical draw was insufficient for testing, the TBI would then
test the blood from the legal draw. Ms. Massengill also testified that generally, the blood
sample taken closer in time to “the event in question” is the most “useful” sample to test
as it is a better representation of whether the person was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs at the time of the event.

The samples from the medical draw were in four tubes, the first of which had a
blue top and contained approximately one milliliter of blood, the second of which had a
purple top and contained approximately two milliliters of blood, the third of which had a
green top and contained less than one milliliter of blood, and the fourth of which was an
“SST tube” that separated the red cells from the serum and contained approximately one
milliliter of serum. Ms. Massengill used the serum from the “SST tube” to conduct
presumptive testing; Special Agent Thompson used the blood in the tube with the purple
top for an alcohol analysis; and due to the limited amount of blood available, Special
Agent Tiller used the blood from the tubes with the purple and blue tops for a drug
analysis. Ms. Massengill testified that the presumptive test required approximately 100
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microliters of serum, that the alcohol analysis required approximately 200 microliters of
blood, and that the drug analysis required a total of approximately two and one-half to
three and one-half milliliters of blood.

Ms. Massengill was unaware of who drew the blood from the medical draw, the
storage of the blood samples in the hospital, any preservatives added to the blood, and any
testing of the blood at the hospital. She testified regarding the risks associated with the
failure to include any preservatives or other additives, and she acknowledged that the tubes
of blood from the medical draw were not vacuum sealed. She stated that if any of the
analysts had questioned the integrity of the blood samples, they would have refused to test
them. The TBI did not conduct any DNA testing of the blood samples from the medical
draw to determine whether the blood belonged to Defendant. Ms. Massengill noted that
each of the tubes were labeled with Defendant’s name and were dated February 3, 2016,
at 8:38 p.m. and that the information on the labels matched the information on the form
requesting analysis that was submitted to the TBI.

The samples from the legal draw were in two ten-microliter, gray-topped tubes,
which were the standard tubes included in the blood-alcohol kit provided by the TBI to
law enforcement officers. The tubes were vacuum sealed and contained an anticoagulant
to prevent the blood from clotting and a preservative to stop the metabolic process. Ms.
Massengill acknowledged that any Versed and fentanyl in amounts larger than therapeutic
levels that were in the blood samples would have been detected in a drug analysis.

Ms. Massengill testified that the blood samples were destroyed on September 1,
2016, in accordance with TBI policy. She explained that the destru

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11060311. Public record. Not legal advice.