# Mullins v. International Brotherhood Teamsters > District Court, N.D. California · May 23, 2025 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059052 ## Case - **Court:** District Court, N.D. California - **Decided:** May 23, 2025 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059052 ## Opinion text 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 THOMSA NEAL MULLINS, et al., Case No. 23-cv-03939-EMC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO CERTIFY FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 10 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, et al., 11 Docket No. 96 Defendants. 12 13 14 Currently pending before the Court is the United Defendants and Union Defendants’ joint 15 motion to certify for an interlocutory appeal. Having considered the parties’ briefs as well as the 16 oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for certification. 17 The governing statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) provides as follows: 18 When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that 19 such order involves [1] a controlling question of law as to which [2] there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an 20 immediate appeal from the order may [3] materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in 21 such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an 22 appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That 23 application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a 24 judge thereof shall so order. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 26 Here, the United Defendants and the Union Defendants argue that an interlocutory appeal 27 is appropriate because this Court’s 12(b)(6) order, see Docket No. 91 (order), ruled in favor of 1 (“RLA”)). Specifically, the Court held that the RLA does provide a right to an individual to 2 individually grieve even if the union does not wish to pursue the grievance. Defendants contend 3 that this is a controlling question of law as to whether there is substantial ground for difference of 4 opinion and that an immediate appeal to address this issue will materially advance the ultimate 5 termination of the litigation. 6 The Court agrees with Defendants. First, the issue above is a controlling question of law. 7 See 19 Moore’s Fed. Prac. – Civ. § 203.31[2] (noting that one example of a controlling question of 8 law is “whether a claim exists as a matter of law”). Plaintiffs have failed to explain why the issue 9 is not purely legal in nature. 10 Second, there is clearly a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether the 11 RLA gives individuals the right to individually grieve. As this Court expressly recognized in two 12 of its orders, other courts have reached differing opinions on the issue. This includes circuit court 13 disagreement, and the Ninth Circuit has yet to express an opinion on the matter. See Docket No. 14 59 (Order at 26-27) (stating that “[c]ourts have reached different conclusions as to whether § 184 . 15 . . gives individual employees (and not just the union) the right to take a grievance to the 16 appropriate adjustment board”; citing both circuit and district court decisions, including decisions 17 from the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits which reached different conclusions); see also Docket No. 18 91 (Order at 25) (taking note of two recent district court cases – issued in January and February 19 2025 – that reached different conclusions). Even if there were just conflicting district court 20 decisions (and no opinion on the matter from the Ninth Circuit), that could still be enough to 21 demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion. See Parker v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 22 EDCV 21-1280 JGB (KKx), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111195, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2022) 23 (noting that the Ninth Circuit had not “definitively resolved” the issue and that “this Court's JMOP 24 Order reached a contrary conclusion from that of at least six other district court decisions within 25 the Ninth Circuit on the issue that Defendants seek to certify, further establishing that there exists 26 a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the issue”); see also Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 27 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that “identification of a sufficient number of conflicting 1 quotation marks omitted). 2 Finally, an interlocutory appeal would materially advance the litigation. Plaintiffs’ entire 3 lawsuit would be dismissed if the Ninth Circuit were to disagree with this Court on its ruling that 4 individuals have a right to individually grieve under the RLA. (This is because the Court has 5 already issued rulings dismissing all other claims brought by Plaintiffs. In other words, the RLA 6 statutory due process claim is the only claim that survived the 12(b)(6) challenge.) Plaintiffs 7 admit as much. 8 The Court therefore concludes that certification of an interlocutory appeal is appropriate. 9 It acknowledges, however, that Plaintiffs are correct that § 1292(b) provides for an interlocutory 10 appeal of “an order,” and not, e.g., an issue within that order. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court’s 11 12(b)(6) order addressed not only the RLA statutory due process claim but a number of other 12 claims brought by Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs could ask the Ninth Circuit to address the other 13 claims that this Court dismissed even though those claims do not involve controlling questions of 14 law. 15 Recognizing such – and the fact that the RLA statutory due process claim is the only claim 16 left in this case at this juncture – the Court asked the parties at the hearing on Defendants’ motion 17 whether it would be simpler just to proceed with a final judgment (i.e., a dismissal of all claims 18 except for the RLA statutory due process claim for which the Court would issue a declaration that 19 Plaintiffs “have the statutory right to access and complete the grievance process independently,” 20 Compl. ¶ 312) – after which the parties could then take a “regular” appeal. But there appear to be 21 several obstacles to proceeding in this fashion. For example, the Court’s ruling on the RLA 22 statutory due process claim was made in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, not a summary 23 judgment or even a Rule 12(c) motion. No answers have been filed yet. Also, Plaintiffs have 24 technically asserted not just individual claims but also class claims (including on the RLA 25 statutory due process claim) and no class certification proceeding has taken place yet. There may 26 also be contention as to the form of the final judgment and the specificity of any injunctive relief. 27 In short, to get to a final judgment in this case will still take some time but the litigation could be 1 statutory due process claim is not even viable as a legal matter. 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to certify for an 3 interlocutory appeal. The Court further STAYS proceedings in this case pending a decision from 4 || the Ninth Circuit as to whether it will accept the case for an interlocutory appeal. The parties are 5 ordered to file a status report within one week after the Ninth Circuit issues its decision on 6 || whether to accept the interlocutory appeal. 7 This order disposes of Docket No. 96. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 Dated: May 23, 2025 12 EDW. CHEN United States District Judge 15 16 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059052. Public record. Not legal advice.