# Gaines v. Emmons

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · May 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059029

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** May 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059029

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”
- explaining that an official capacity suit against a sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DANIEL GAINES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:24-CV-1511-RHH
)
)
JASON EMMONS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jason Emmons’ (“Emmons”) Motion to
Dismiss, filed November 19, 2024, and Defendants Thomas Duggan, Jr. (“Duggan”), Jalesia
Kuenzel (“Kuenzel”), Molly Jaskiewicz (“Jaskiewicz”), Drew Crews (“Crews”), and Lester
Stuckmeyer’s (“Stuckmeyer”) Motion to Dismiss, filed November 26, 2024. (ECF Nos. 10, 15).
Plaintiff Daniel Gaines filed responses to both motions. (ECF Nos. 14, 18). Emmons filed a reply,
to which Plaintiff filed a sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 17, 24). The motions are fully briefed and ready
for disposition. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motions are granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 4, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit pro se against Defendants in the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County, Missouri. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his or her
individual and official capacities for alleged wrongdoing during the prosecution of a municipal
ordinance violation.
On November 12, 2024, Duggan, Kuenzel, Jaskiewicz, Crews and Stuckmeyer removed
this matter to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). As noted above,
Defendants filed the instant Motions to Dismiss on November 19, 2024, and November 26, 2024.
(ECF Nos. 10, 15).
Plaintiff’s Petition (hereinafter “Complaint” or “Compl.”) alleges in pertinent part as
follows1:
On November 15, 2023 Emmons, then a prosecutor employed by the Jefferson County

Prosecutor’s Office, initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 13). Plaintiff
claims Emmons falsified the document outlining the criminal charges. (Id., ¶ 14, citing Plaintiff’s
Exh. A). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Emmons (1) stated the event at issue did not take place
at a school, despite possessing police reports that the incident took place in the parking lot of
Windsor High School, and (2) indicated Plaintiff was trespassing on private property, even though
a public school constitutes public property open and accessible to the public. (Id., ¶¶ 15, 16).
During Plaintiff’s arraignment Stuckmeyer, a Jefferson County Municipal Court Judge,
asked Plaintiff how he pled to the charges. (Compl., ¶¶ 7, 17). When Plaintiff requested
clarification on the charges, Stuckmeyer entered a plea of not guilty for Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 17).

Stuckmeyer then set the matter for a bench trial, even though Plaintiff stated he wanted a jury trial.
(Id., ¶¶ 18, 19). Plaintiff claims when he complained about the alleged violation Crews, a bailiff
employed by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, told Plaintiff to shut up. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 19).2
Plaintiff sent an email to Kuenzel, a Jefferson County prosecutor and Emmons’ supervisor,
informing her of the alleged fraud before the court. (Compl., ¶¶ 4, 21). Kuenzel did not respond
to the email, however. (Id., ¶ 21).

1 For purposes of this Order only, the allegations in the Complaint are taken as true. McShane
Constr. Co., LLC v. Gotham Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2017).
2 Plaintiff claims he informed Stuckmeyer and Emmons during the arraignment that the charges
were based on fraud, but Stuckmeyer allowed the matter to proceed. (Compl., ¶ 20).
During a hearing on June 26, 2024, Plaintiff was informed that Emmons was no longer
employed by the Jefferson County Prosecutor’s Office, and that Duggan, a Jefferson County
prosecutor, was taking over Plaintiff’s case.3 (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 22). Plaintiff again mentioned the
false information contained in the charging document, but both Stuckmeyer and Duggan ignored
him. (Id., ¶ 23). Plaintiff requested that he be assigned an attorney, but Stuckmeyer denied the

request because the prosecution was not seeking jail time. (Id., ¶ 26).
During a court hearing on August 21, 2024, Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Jim Drury (“Drury”).
(Compl., ¶ 28). Drury stated he would like to sit in on Plaintiff’s proceeding, to see how Plaintiff
handled himself as a pro se litigant. (Id.). Stuckmeyer instructed Crews to remove Drury from
the courtroom and close the courtroom to the public. (Id., ¶ 29). Stuckmeyer then proceeded to
deny Plaintiff’s two motions to vacate4, stating he did not have jurisdiction to address the motions.
(Id., ¶¶ 27, 31-32, citing Plaintiff’s Exh. D). Both Duggan and Jaskiewicz, Jefferson County
Municipal Court Administrator, informed Stuckmeyer that Plaintiff was recording the proceeding.
(Id., ¶¶ 5, 35).

Plaintiff informed Stuckmeyer that he would seek damages from his wrongful accusers.
(Compl., ¶ 36). Stuckmeyer responded that he lacked the authority to assess damages, and that
Plaintiff would have to seek redress in another way. (Id., ¶¶ 36-38). Duggan informed Plaintiff
that Plaintiff would only be allowed to bring up to the jury things directly related to the citation,
and Stuckmeyer “vehemently agreed.” (Id., ¶ 45).

3 Kuenzel was also Duggan’s supervisor. (Compl., ¶ 21).
4 Plaintiff states as follows with respect to the motions to vacate: “Prior to the last hearing Plaintiff
attended, Plaintiff filed two Motions to Vacate, or at least address, two void orders in place against
Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 74.06(b)(2) & (4) as both void orders deprive Plaintiff of Rights granted
to him by the US Constitution.” (Compl., ¶ 27).
As a result of the alleged “misconduct and blatant and malicious Deprivation of Rights”,
Plaintiff filed three motions: one seeking to disqualify Stuckmeyer, one to disqualify Duggan, and
one to transfer the case to the Circuit Court since Stuckmeyer, Duggan and Kuenzel all believed
the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to address all the issues. (Compl., ¶ 51). On the date set
for the hearing on the motions, Plaintiff was experiencing stomach issues. (Id., ¶ 52). Plaintiff

sought to appear via Zoom or telephone, but Jaskiewicz stated Plaintiff would need proof of a
medical issue, i.e., a doctor’s note, to miss the hearing. (Id., ¶¶ 52, 53). Stuckmeyer then held the
hearing, and denied Plaintiff’s motions after hearing objections from Duggan. (Id., ¶¶ 54-55, citing
Plaintiff’s Exh. F).
As noted above, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County on
October 4, 2024. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law against all Defendants (Count I); Fifth Amendment
Violations against all Defendants (Count II); Sixth Amendment Violations against Defendants
Stuckmeyer, Emmons, Duggan and Crews (Count III); Fourteenth Amendment Violations against

Defendants Stuckmeyer, Duggan and Kuenzel (Count IV); Abuse of Authority against Defendants
Stuckmeyer, Duggan, Kuenzel and Emmons (Count V); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Conspiracy to Interfere
with Civil Rights against all Defendants (Count VI); and Fraud Before the Court against all
Defendants (Count VII). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants Duggan, Kuenzel, Jaskiewicz, Crews and Stuckmeyer removed Plaintiff’s suit
to this Court on November 12, 2024, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1).
As noted above, Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss on November 19, and November 26,
2024. (ECF Nos. 10, 15).
II. Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In the
complaint, a plaintiff “must include sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential
Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted). This standard “simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].” Id.

at 556. This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
District courts must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “‘if the essence of an allegation is discernible,’” courts
should “‘construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.’” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone
v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts
that, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286
(8th Cir. 1980). District courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone, 364
F.3d at 914-15, or interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without
counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Court is “free to ignore legal
conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions
cast in the form of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir.
2002).

“‘[A]bsolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions were
within the scope of the immunity.’” Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13 (1976)). “Where an official’s challenged
actions are protected by absolute immunity, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Id.
(citation omitted).
III. Discussion
Defendant Emmons filed a motion to dismiss, and Defendants Duggan, Kuenzel,
Jaskiewicz, Crews, and Stuckmeyer collectively filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants have
overlapping arguments for immunity from suit based on their roles in Plaintiff’s prosecution.

A. Official Capacity Claims
Officials may be named in § 1983 lawsuits in either their official capacity, their personal
(or “individual”) capacity, or both. In this case, as noted above Plaintiff sues Defendants in both
their official and individual capacities. In an official capacity claim against an individual,
however, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865
F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official
capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172
F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that an official capacity suit against a sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit
against the County”); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating
that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues
only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating
that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for
which the official is an agent”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official

capacities are actually claims against Jefferson County.
A local governing body such as Jefferson County can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978). However, a municipality cannot be held liable merely because it employs a tortfeasor.
See A.H. v. St. Louis County, Mo., 891 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2018) (“In an action under § 1983,
a municipality ... cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory”). Rather, to prevail on this type
of claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the alleged conduct.
Kelly, 813 F.3d at 1075. Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1)
an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to
train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). See also Marsh v. Phelps County, 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018)
(recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory
of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”).
Upon review of the record, the Court finds Plaintiff has not identified any Jefferson County
policy or custom that allegedly caused him harm, nor has he stated Jefferson County failed to
properly train the individual Defendants. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims thus fail as a matter
of law.
B. Individual Capacity Claims
1. Defendants Emmons, Duggan, and Kuenzel
Defendants Emmons, Duggan and Kuenzel are or were, at times relevant to Plaintiff’s
claims, prosecutors for Jefferson County in the State of Missouri. Plaintiff alleges Emmons
falsified information on the charging document in the prosecution of an alleged ordinance violation
against Plaintiff. He alleges Duggan failed to rectify the false information when he took over the

prosecution. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Kuenzel ignored emails from Plaintiff, and failed to speak
up during a hearing she attended, thereby allowing the fraud to continue.
Defendants Emmons, Duggan and Kuenzel assert they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity from Plaintiff’s claims against them.
As stated above, “‘absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s
actions were within the scope of the immunity.’” Jordan v. Bell, No. 4:21CV1242 HEA, 2022
WL 4245440, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 15, 2022) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419). “It ‘protects
prosecutors against claims arising from their initiation of a prosecution and presenting a criminal
case insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.’” Id. (quoting Sample, 836 F.3d at 916 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
See also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 (prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil rights claims
based on actions taken while initiating a criminal prosecution and presenting the State’s case);
Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Absolute immunity covers
prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, the presentation
of the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial
process.”).
“In determining whether a prosecutor’s particular actions are entitled to absolute immunity,
the courts apply a functional approach, which looks to the nature of the function performed, not
the identity of the actor who performed it.” Jordan, 2022 WL 4245440, at *4 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Thus, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity in their review of and
decisions to charge a violation of the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).5
See also Lam v. Finn, No. 4:22-cv-1058-JAR, 2023 WL 2784929, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2023)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“The acts of preparing, signing, and filing a

criminal complaint constitute prosecutorial functions, as they are advocacy on behalf of the
government.”).
Upon consideration, the Court finds Defendants Emmons, Duggan and Kuenzel’s actions
were taken while initiating and pursuing a prosecution against Plaintiff. As such, said Defendants
are absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s claims against them.6 See Sample, 836 F.3d at 916;
Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff contends that the fraudulent (because falsified) charging document should remove
these Defendants’ immunity. There is no fraud exception to the absolute immunity enjoyed by
prosecutors for actions in this scope, however. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28; see also
Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor is immune

from suit even if he knowingly presents false, misleading, or perjured testimony); Jordan, 2022
WL 4245440, at *5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“Plaintiffs’ claims of
improper motive in [Defendant’s] performance of prosecutorial functions will also not defeat
immunity…Absolute immunity is not defeated by allegations of malice, vindictiveness, or self-

5 “[P]urely administrative or investigative actions that do not relate to the initiation of a prosecution
do not qualify for absolute immunity.” See Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 739 (8th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6 To the extent that Defendant Kuenzel merely supervised the others in bringing the case, and
failed to respond to Plaintiff’s emails, the conduct attributed to her—inaction—does not form the
basis of a claim.
interest. It applies even if the prosecutor’s steps to initiate a prosecution are patently improper.”).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Emmons, Duggan, and Kuenzel in their
individual capacities are dismissed.7
2. Defendant Stuckmeyer
At all relevant times, Defendant Stuckmeyer was a judge in the Jefferson County Municipal

Court where Plaintiff was prosecuted for a municipal ordinance violation. Plaintiff asserts
Stuckmeyer allowed the charge against Plaintiff to proceed, despite the fact that it was allegedly
based on fraud. Plaintiff further alleges that during his arraignment, Stuckmeyer entered a plea of
not guilty for Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s consent, and set the matter for a bench trial despite
Plaintiff’s desire for a jury trial. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Stuckmeyer denied Plaintiff’s request
for an attorney; removed a potential witness from the courtroom; conducting a closed hearing;
prevented Plaintiff from appearing remotely for a hearing; refused to answer Plaintiff’s legal
questions; and dismissed Plaintiff’s motions after stating he did not have authority to hear them.
Defendant Stuckmeyer asserts he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s

claims against him.
Judicial immunity provides judges with immunity from suit, allowing them to exercise the
authority with which they are vested, and to act upon their own convictions. See Hamilton v. City
of Hayti, Mo., 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020). See also Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431,
435 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their judicial
capacity.”). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,

7 With respect to Plaintiff’s § 1985 conspiracy claim, the Court notes that under Eighth Circuit
law, “‘a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil conspiracy charge when his alleged
participation in the conspiracy consists of otherwise immune acts.’” Woodworth, 891 F.3d at 1089
(quoting Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 580).
not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).8 This
immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Further, “a judge will not be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error…or was in excess of his authority.” Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead
Cty., 931 F.3d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However,

judicial immunity extends to neither “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s
judicial capacity”, nor “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12).
Upon consideration, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Stuckmeyer
arise out of actions taken entirely within his jurisdiction and in his judicial capacity. Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Stuckmeyer fail and are dismissed. See Jefferson v. Todd, No.
1:18-CV-70 ACL, 2018 WL 11247166, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 13, 2018) (“Plaintiffs complain of
actions taken by Judge Copeland as a judge presiding over a criminal case. Judge Copeland is
entitled to absolute immunity, and therefore plaintiffs’ claims against him will be dismissed.”).

3. Defendants Crews and Jaskiewicz
At all relevant times, Crews was a deputy sheriff for the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office.
He acted as bailiff in the Jefferson County Municipal Court where Plaintiff was prosecuted for a
municipal ordinance violation. Jaskiewicz was the administrator for the Jefferson County
Municipal Court, acting as clerk during the same prosecution. Plaintiff alleges Crews told Plaintiff
to “shut up” during a hearing, and further removed a witness from the courtroom during a later

8 “Judicial immunity protects the finality of judgments, discourages inappropriate collateral
attacks, and protects judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted
by disgruntled litigants.” Smith v. Finch, 324 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2018) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
hearing upon the instruction of Stuckmeyer. Plaintiff alleges Jaskiewicz informed Stuckmeyer
that Plaintiff was recording the proceedings during a hearing, and further informed Plaintiff of the
need to provide proof of a health issue to appear remotely for a hearing, before apparently stating
that a physician’s note would be required.
While neither Crews nor Jaskiewicz can assert the same immunity claims as the judge and

prosecutors, persons who perform quasi-judicial functions are entitled to absolute immunity for
certain actions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-16 (1978). See also Smith, 324
F.Supp.3d at 1020 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“Through the doctrine of
absolute quasi-judicial immunity, courts have extended the protections of judicial immunity to
individuals other than judges under some limited circumstances.”). As relevant here, acts which
may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity include those closely related to judicial functions, such
as carrying out the order of a judge. See Id.; see also Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 109 (8th
Cir. 1994) (affording absolute quasi-judicial immunity for bailiffs for actions ordered by a judge
and related to the judicial function).

Upon consideration, the Court finds Crews’ removal of an individual from the courtroom
at the order of Stuckmeyer falls squarely within this category of action, and thus is entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity. The Court finds the remainder of the complained-of conduct, i.e.,
Jaskiewicz’s informing the judge of Plaintiff’s recording activities and stating two different
requirements for appearing via teleconference, and Crews’ alleged statement to the Plaintiff to
“shut up” during a hearing, do not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Crews and Jaskiewicz fail and are
dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 10, 15) are
GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate Order of
Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions in this case (ECF Nos. 27,
28, 30, 31) are DENIED.

Dated this 23rd day of May, 2025.
LE zt fl
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11059029. Public record. Not legal advice.