# S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein

> North Carolina Business Court · April 2, 2018 · 2018 NCBC 26

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11058242

## Case

- **Court:** North Carolina Business Court
- **Decided:** April 2, 2018
- **Citations:** 2018 NCBC 26
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Gregory P. McGuire
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11058242

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff’s claim because “the declaratory judgment procedure is the only method by which Plaintiffs have recourse to protect their property interests”

## Opinion text

S&M Brands, Inc. v. Stein, 2018 NCBC 26.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
COUNTY OF WAKE 17 CVS 6894

S&M BRANDS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER AND OPINION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
JOSH STEIN, in his official capacity
as the Attorney General of the State
of North Carolina, and the STATE
OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”; ECF No. 43).

THE COURT, after considering the Motion, the briefs in support and in

opposition to the Motion, the supporting materials filed by the parties, the arguments

of counsel at the hearing, and other appropriate matters of record, concludes that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

Troutman Sanders LLP by Christopher G. Browning, Jr. and Bryan M. Haynes
for Plaintiff S&M Brands, Inc.

The North Carolina Department of Justice by Lauren M. Clemmons for
Defendants Josh Stein and the State of North Carolina.

McGuire, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Court does not make findings of fact on motions to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), but only recites those facts drawn from the Amended Complaint (ECF

No. 36) that are relevant to the Court’s determination of the motion.
A. The parties

2. Plaintiff S&M Brands, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is a Virginia corporation formed

in 1994 with its principal place of business in Keysville, Virginia. Plaintiff is in the

business of manufacturing tobacco products, including cigarettes. Plaintiff sells its

products primarily in the southeastern United States, including North Carolina.

3. Defendant Josh Stein is the Attorney General of the Defendant State of

North Carolina (“Attorney General”; collectively, Josh Stein and the State of North

Carolina are “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that at all times Stein acted under color

of State authority and sues Stein only in his official capacity. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 13–

14.)

B. The Master Settlement Agreement and the Qualifying Statute

4. In or around 1994, numerous states sued the four major tobacco

companies – Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard –

alleging that they had deceived the public about the dangers of smoking cigarettes

and had engaged in other unlawful conduct designed to mislead consumers. (Id. at

¶¶ 21–24.) The lawsuit made claims for, inter alia, antitrust, fraud, racketeering,

and conspiracy. (Id.)

5. On November 23, 1998, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and

five territories (the “Settling States”) settled the lawsuit with Philip Morris, R.J.

Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Four states (Florida,

Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas) had previously settled separately with Philip

Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, and Lorillard. (Id.)
6. Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and the

Settling States executed a Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”). (ECF No.

36.1) Under the terms of the MSA, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown &

Williamson, and Lorillard (in the MSA, the four signatory tobacco companies are for

some purposes referred to as the “Original Participating Manufacturers” and will

hereinafter in this order be referred to collectively as the “OPMs”) agreed to make

annual settlement payments to the Settling States in perpetuity. The settlement

payments are first made into a national escrow fund and are then distributed to the

Settling States according to each state’s “allocable share.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) The

settlement payments from the OPMs are linked to the OPMs’ respective shares of the

cigarette market; in other words, to the extent an OPM increases its market share in

a given year, its settlement payments increase. (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 33.) The revenues

generated from the OPMs’ sales, however, are not considered in determining the

payments. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that under this method, the OPMs are discouraged

from “trying to increase revenue by lowering prices” because increasing sales, and

market share, would cause higher settlement payments. (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff

alleges that the MSA payment scheme encourages the OPMs to raise prices as a

means of increasing revenue without increasing market share. (Id.)

7. In the MSA, the OPMs agreed to substantial restrictions on their

marketing, advertising, and lobbying activities. The OPMs also agreed to restrict

their trade association activities and to relinquish any challenges to state laws and

rules regarding tobacco. (Id. at ¶ 34.)
8. The MSA permits cigarette manufacturers who were not sued by the

Settling States to sign the MSA along with the OPMs. Manufacturers who signed

the MSA after the OPMs are known as “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers”

(“SPMs”). (ECF No. 36.1 at p. 16.) If an SPM signed the MSA within sixty days of

the MSA’s execution and had a market share of cigarette sales in 1997 or 1998, that

SPM had its market share “grandfathered” under the MSA and is only required to

make settlement payments to the extent that the SPM’s sales exceeded its 1998

market share or 125% of its 1997 market share in any given year. (Id. at pp. 78–80.)

If the SPM either signed the MSA more than sixty days after the MSA’s execution or

had no market share in 1997 or 1998, that SPM must make yearly payments based

on its market share for the year prior to the payment. (Id.)

9. Cigarette manufacturers who were not sued by the Settling States and

who did not join the MSA are called “Non-Participating Manufacturers” (“NPMs”).

(ECF No. 36.1 at p. 9.)

10. In order to prevent NPMs from having a competitive advantage over the

OPMs and SPMs (collectively, the “Participating Manufacturers” (“PMs”)), the MSA

required each Settling State to enact a “Qualifying Statute.” (ECF No. 36.1 at p. 65.)

The MSA defines a Qualifying Statute as a “statute, regulation, law and/or rule

(applicable everywhere the Settling State has authority to legislate) that effectively

and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the [PMs] experience vis-à-vis

[NPMs] within such Settling State as a result of [the MSA].” (Id.) The MSA included,

as an exhibit, a model Qualifying Statute that would satisfy terms of the MSA. (ECF
36.1, Ex. T.) North Carolina enacted a Qualifying Statute (the “NC Qualifying

Statute”) based on the model Qualifying Statute in July 1999. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-

290–294.2 (hereinafter, references to the North Carolina General Statutes shall be

referred to as “G.S.”).

11. The NC Qualifying Statute requires that NPMs pay a statutorily-

prescribed annual amount into a “Qualified escrow fund” (“Escrow Fund”). G.S. § 66-

291(a)(2). Each NPM establishes its own individual Escrow Fund. An NPM’s

payment is calculated based on a set amount paid for each cigarette sold in North

Carolina in the prior year. (Id.) The NPM receives any interest or appreciation on

the amounts held in its Escrow Fund. Otherwise, the amounts held in the Escrow

Fund can only be released: (1) to pay a judgment or settlement on certain claims by

the Settling State against the NPM; (2) to refund the NPM for any overpayments into

its Escrow Fund; or (3) to revert back to the NPM twenty-five years after the specific

funds were paid into the Escrow Fund. G.S. § 291(b). The Attorney General is

charged with administration of the Escrow Funds established by NPMs. (ECF No.

36 at ¶ 63.)

12. With regard to refunds for overpayments by a NPM into its Escrow

Fund, the NC Qualifying Statute provides as follows:

To the extent that a tobacco product manufacturer
establishes that the amount it was required to place into
escrow on account of units sold in the State in a particular
year was greater than the Master Settlement Agreement
payments, as determined pursuant to Section IX(i) of that
agreement, including after final determination of all
adjustments, that the manufacturer would have been
required to make on account of the units sold had it been a
participating manufacturer, the excess shall be released
from escrow and revert back to such tobacco product
manufacturer . . . .

G.S. § 66-291(b)(2). The reference to Section IX(i) of the MSA is to the provisions

regarding the payment obligations of SPMs. In other words, the NC Qualifying

Statute permits release of the amount paid into an Escrow Fund by an NPM to the

extent it exceeds what the NPM would have been required to pay for that year had it

signed onto the MSA and was an SPM.

13. One of the adjustments required in order to determine whether an NPM

has made an overpayment is the “NPM Adjustment.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 46–48.) The

MSA provides that if a Settling State fails to enact or fails to “diligently enforce” a

Qualifying Statute, the PMs’ payments to that Settling State may be reduced under

the NPM Adjustment. (Id.) Determinations of whether the Settling States “diligently

enforced” their Qualifying Statutes are made in national arbitration by a panel of

three retired Article III judges. (ECF No. 36.1 at p. 88.) The arbitration process can

take years to complete; for example, Defendants note in their brief that an NPM

adjustment determination for MSA payments for the sales year 2003 was not

finalized until 2013. (Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 44 at

p. 10.) The arbitration for sales year 2004 has not yet been completed.

C. Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain refunds of overpayments into its
Escrow Fund and the lawsuit

14. Plaintiff did not sign the MSA and is considered an NPM under the MSA

and the NC Qualifying Statute. Plaintiff established an Escrow Fund and has made

yearly payments into its Escrow Fund since the NC Qualifying Statute was enacted
in 1999. Plaintiff alleges it paid more into its Escrow Fund for the sales years 2005

through 2015 than it would have paid as an SPM and that it is entitled to a refund of

the overpayments pursuant to G.S. § 66-291(b)(2). (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 84, 114.)

15. On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Attorney General making

a Public Records Act request “[i]n order to determine [Plaintiff’s] overpayments into

escrow.” (Id. at ¶¶ 111–12.) Plaintiff’s request sought “records sufficient to show

each PM’s annual MSA payments since 2004 and records sufficient to show each PM’s

annual cigarette sales in North Carolina and throughout the United States.” (Id. at

¶ 112.) Plaintiff ultimately received documents in response to its request that were

heavily redacted and from which Plaintiff could not determine the PMs’ payments.

(Id. at ¶ 113.)

16. On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff requested that the Attorney General

authorize a release of Plaintiff’s alleged overpayments of funds paid into its Escrow

Fund for the sales years 2005 through 2015. (ECF No. 44, Ex. 1.) On May 25, 2017,

the Attorney General replied by letter informing Plaintiff that it already had received

the refund of its excess payment for the sales year 2005. (Id.) The letter also provided

as follows:

As to sales years 2006-2015, it is premature to consider any
escrow amounts being in excess of the PMs’ annual
payments to the State for several reasons. First, you state
that the Term Sheet settlement is a basis for your claim
that S&M Brands’ escrow deposit now exceeds the annual
payments of the PMs for those claimed years. However the
Term Sheet is simply that, terms upon which the parties
are to base a final NPM adjustment settlement. A final
NPM adjustment settlement is still in negotiation and is
yet to be finalized and executed by the parties to the Term
Sheet. The NPM adjustment settlement between the State
and the PMs is not yet final.

Secondly, North Carolina’s escrow statute allows for such
a release only upon final resolution of all adjustments,
including the NPM adjustment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §66-
291(b)(2). As you probably are aware, the 2004 Diligent
Enforcement arbitrations are now going on between the
PMs and the Settling States which did not join the Term
Sheet1 as well as New York which settled separately its
NPM adjustment claims with the PMs. Only sales year
2003 has been ‘nearly’ resolved with finality. New Mexico’s
appeal of its 2003 Diligent Enforcement Arbitration Award
is still not final. North Carolina is still at risk of claims
against it from Settling States participating in the 2004
Diligent Enforcement arbitrations as well as similar future
arbitrations for sales years 2005-2015 and beyond.

In addition, as to sales years 2013-2015, the MSA provides
for recalculation of amounts due from the PMs for up to
four years after the payment due date. Therefore the
determinations by the Independent Auditor of the PMs’
annual payment amounts for those years are not yet locked
and final.

Based on the above, North Carolina must decline at this
time S&M Brands’ request for authorization to release
escrow held for the benefit of this State.

(ECF No. 44, Ex. 2.)

17. Plaintiff alleges that “the State has ample information within its

possession and control to determine that S&M Brands has made excess escrow

payments that should be released” and the claim that it would be premature to

release Plaintiff’s excess escrow payments is “a ruse to justify the State’s continued

unlawful retention of [Plaintiff’s] property.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 119–20.) Plaintiff

1 In 2012, North Carolina and nineteen other Settling States settled an arbitration regarding

their NPM adjustment disputes for the sales years 2003 through 2012 by signing the “Term
Sheet.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 102–04; ECF No. 44, Ex. 7.)
further alleges that there is no administrative process in place under which it can

challenge the Attorney General’s failure to release the funds. (Id. at ¶¶ 122–26.)

D. Plaintiff’s claims

18. On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action. (ECF No.

1.) Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on September 29, 2017.

19. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it has made payments

into its Escrow Fund in excess of what it would have paid under Section IX(i) of the

MSA and that it is entitled to a refund of the overpayments. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 84–

92.) The Amended Complaint makes claims for: (1) a declaratory judgment that the

amount that is currently being held in its Escrow Fund is in excess of the amount

required under the NC Qualifying Statute, and that Plaintiff is entitled to a release

of the excess funds (Count I); (2) a declaratory judgment that the NC Qualifying

Statute violates N.C. Const. art. I, § 34 against monopolies (Count II); (3) a

declaratory judgment that the NC Qualifying Statute violates N.C. Const. art. I, § 32

against exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges (Count III); and (4) a

declaratory judgment that the NC Qualifying Statute violates N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 1

and 19 by depriving Plaintiff of the fruits of its labor (Count IV). (ECF No. 36 at

¶¶ 138–77.)

20. In support of its claims, Plaintiff further alleges that North Carolina has

taken steps to increase the burden and expense on the NPMs of complying with the

Qualifying Statute for the purpose of reducing NPMs’ sales. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 70–

83.) For example, Plaintiff claims North Carolina amended the NC Qualifying
Statute in 2005 to “dramatically decrease[]” refunds available to NPMs and “to reduce

the NPMs’ market share for the PMs’ benefit.” (Id. at ¶¶ 79–83.)

21. Plaintiff also alleges that while Plaintiff’s payments under the NC

Qualifying Statute have increased, the OPMs and some SPMs have benefitted from

reduced payment obligations to North Carolina resulting from a 2012 settlement of

diligent enforcement claims by several states regarding NPMs’ payments for 2003–

2012. (Id. at ¶¶ 102–09.) The Term Sheet did not resolve the arbitration disputes of

the remaining Settling States for those sales years.

22. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the effect of the MSA and the NC

Qualifying Statute has been to create an “output cartel,” or monopoly, for the PMs,

permitting them to increase cigarette prices and their revenues while making it

nearly impossible for Plaintiff and other NPMs to compete. (Id. at ¶¶ 127–37.)

23. On October 26, 2017, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims in the Amended Complaint. The Motion is

fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on the Motion on January 11, 2018. The

Motion is now ripe for resolution.

ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Declaratory judgment regarding the Escrow Fund

24. In the first count in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a

declaratory judgment “that the amount that is currently being held in escrow is in

excess of the amount required by [G.S.] § 66-291” (ECF No. 36 at ¶ 147), and “that

S&M Brands is entitled to a release of the excess funds being held in escrow.” (Id. at
p. 28.) In support of its claims, Plaintiff alleges “that under [G.S.] § 66-291(b)(2), the

Attorney General must authorize a release of funds in excess of those that an NPM

was required to place into escrow” and “[f]or each particular year from 2006 through

2016, the sums paid by S&M Brands . . . exceeded the amount that S&M Brands

would have made under MSA § IX(i). Accordingly, S&M Brands is entitled to the

release of a substantial sum from its escrow account for each of these years.” (Id. at

¶¶ 142 and 144.)

25. Defendants move to dismiss the first count under North Carolina Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) (hereinafter, “Rules”) on the grounds that

sovereign immunity makes them immune from suit,2 and under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim for release of funds is not yet ripe.

Subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial authority over

any case or controversy. Hardy v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 200 N.C. App. 403, 408,

2 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has declined to decide whether the defense of
sovereign immunity is grounded specifically in subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction. Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 327–28, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982).
The more recent appellate decisions have held that a defense of sovereign immunity raises
an issue of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Can Am South, LLC v. State, 234 N.C.
App. 119, 123–24, 759 S.E.2d 304, 307–08 (“[T]his Court has consistently held that: (1) the
defense of sovereign immunity presents a question of personal, not subject matter,
jurisdiction.”); Green v. Kearney, 203 N.C. App. 260, 265, 690 S.E.2d 755, 760 (2010) (“[T]he
general rule is that sovereign immunity presents a question of personal jurisdiction, not
subject matter jurisdiction. . . .”); but see Great American Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 171–
72, 118 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1961) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that “[t]his is an action
against the State of North Carolina to restrain or avoid the collection of a tax, and this court
is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the State of North Carolina not
having permitted itself to be sued in this manner. . . .” (emphasis added)); Dare County v.
N.C. Dep’t of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 611, 701 S.E.2d 368, 376 (2010) (“[T]he extent to which
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioners’ request for judicial review of
the consent order depends upon whether the General Assembly has enacted any statutory
provisions authorizing Petitioners to seek and obtain judicial review of the consent order.”
(emphasis added)).
683 S.E.2d 774, 778 (2009). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a trial court may consider and weigh

matters outside the pleadings.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 603, 556

S.E.2d 609, 617 (2001).

26. “Personal jurisdiction refers to the Court’s ability to assert judicial

power over the parties and bind them by its adjudication.” Adams, Kleemeier, Hagan,

Hannah & Fouts, PLLC v. Jacobs, 158 N.C. App. 376, 378, 581 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2003),

rev’d on other grounds, 357 N.C. 651, 88 S.E.2d 465 (2003). “[T]he plaintiff bears the

burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, grounds for exercising

personal jurisdiction over a defendant. As such, upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of making out a prima

facie case that jurisdiction exists.” Bauer v. Douglas Aquatics, Inc., 207 N.C. App. 65,

68, 698 S.E.2d 757, 761 (2010) (citations omitted).

27. Dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper “(1) when the

complaint on its face reveals that no law supports plaintiff’s claim; (2) when the

complaint reveals on its face the absence of fact sufficient to make a good claim; [or]

(3) when some fact disclosed in the complaint necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s

claim.” Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985). Otherwise,

“a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty

that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in

support of the claim.” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 103, 176 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1970)

(emphasis omitted). The Court construes the complaint liberally and accepts all
allegations as true. See Laster v. Francis, 199 N.C. App. 572, 577, 681 S.E.2d 858,

862 (2009). However, the Court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 174 N.C. App. 266,

274, 620 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2005) (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.

2002)). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “does not present the merits, but only whether

the merits may be reached.” Concrete Serv. Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C.

App. 678, 681, 340 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1986). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

the claims.” Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

1. Sovereign Immunity

28. “It is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of

sound public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless

it has consented by statute to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from

suit.” Can Am South, LLC v. State, 234 N.C. App. 119, 125, 759 S.E.2d 304, 309

(2014); see also Great American Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 173, 118 S.E.2d 792,

795 (1961) (“The State is immune from suit unless and until it has expressly

consented to be sued. It is for the General Assembly to determine when and under

what circumstances the State may be sued.”); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Powell, 217 N.C.

495, 499, 8 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1940) (“It is axiomatic that the sovereign cannot be sued

in its own courts or in any other without consent and permission.”). However, the

State can waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit by statute.
29. The “[w]aiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and

State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to

immunity, must be strictly construed.” Guthrie v. North Carolina State Ports

Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 537–38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983). “When statutory

provision has been made for an action against the State, the procedure prescribed by

statute must be followed, and the remedies thus afforded are exclusive. The right to

sue the State is a conditional right, and the terms prescribed by the Legislature are

conditions precedent to the institution of the action.” Great American Ins. Co., 254

N.C. at 173, 118 S.E.2d at 795.

30. Defendants argue that the NC Qualifying Statute lacks a “plain, clear

and unmistakable provision for suit against the State or the Attorney General”

expressly waiving sovereign immunity for Plaintiff’s claim. (ECF No. 44 at pp. 12–

13.) Defendants contend that absent express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity,

this court lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Defendants. (Id.)

Plaintiff counters that under North Carolina law, sovereign immunity does not bar a

declaratory judgment action against the State if the action is one seeking to vindicate

a plaintiff’s property rights and interests, and there is not another avenue through

which the plaintiff can protect its rights. (Pl.’s Br. Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.

54 at p. 3.)

31. North Carolina courts have long held that “when public officials invade

or threaten to invade the . . . property rights of a citizen in disregard of law, they are

not relieved from responsibility by the doctrine of sovereign immunity even though
they act or assume to act under the authority and pursuant to the directions of the

State.” Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 786, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1992)

(citations omitted); see also T & A Amusements, LLC v. McCrory, 796 S.E.2d 376, 380,

2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 42, *8 (2017) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has recognized the

existence of a limited exception to sovereign immunity in certain cases where

plaintiffs seek declaratory or injunctive relief against State agencies that act ‘in

excess of the authority granted [to them] under [a] statute and invade or threaten to

invade personal or property rights of a citizen in disregard of the law.”); Orange Cty.

v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 378, 265 S.E.2d 890, 909 (1980) (finding

no sovereign immunity “[w]hen public officers whose duty it is to supervise and direct

a State agency attempt to enforce an invalid ordinance or regulation, or invade or

threaten to invade the personal or property rights of a citizen in disregard of law”)

(quoting Schloss v. Highway Comm., 230 N.C. 489, 492, 53 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1949)

(emphasis omitted)). Therefore, North Carolina courts have allowed declaratory

judgments brought by plaintiffs seeking to protect property rights against

governmental interference, because “without seeking a declaratory judgment,

plaintiff would be unable to effectively protect its property rights.” Am. Treasures,

Inc. v. State, 173 N.C. App. 170, 176, 617 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2005) (quoting McCormick

v. Proctor, 217 N.C. 23, 29, 6 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1940)); see also Sandhill Amusements,

Inc. v. Sheriff of Onslow Cty., 236 N.C. App. 340, 351, 762 S.E.2d 666, 675 (2014),

rev’d on other grounds, 368 N.C. 91, 773 S.E.2d 55 (2015) (holding that sovereign

immunity did not bar plaintiff’s claim because “the declaratory judgment procedure
is the only method by which Plaintiffs have recourse to protect their property

interests”).

32. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that it is entitled to the release

of excess amounts held in its Escrow Fund. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff

has a property right in any excess payments it has made into its Escrow Fund, under

certain statutorily-defined circumstances. The NC Qualifying Statute does not

provide a cause of action allowing NPMs to seek release of excess payments, and there

is no administrative process in place for NPMs to seek release of escrow funds.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s only option for redress to protect its property rights is to seek

a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff’s claim for a declaration that funds currently being

held in escrow are in excess of the amount required by G.S. § 66-291, and that it is

entitled to a release of the excess funds, is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity under the circumstances present in this case.

2. Ripeness

33. “As with all other actions, . . . there must be a justiciable controversy

before the Declaratory Judgment Act may be invoked. There is a justiciable

controversy if litigation over the matter upon which declaratory relief is sought

appears unavoidable.” Ferrell v. Department of Transp., 334 N.C. 650, 656, 435

S.E.2d 309, 313 (1993). An action for declaratory judgment is ripe for adjudication

when “there is an actual or real existing controversy between parties having adverse

interests in the matter in dispute.” Andrews v. Alamance Cty., 132 N.C. App. 811,

813–14, 513 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1999); see also Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97
N.C. App. 363, 366, 388 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1990). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) “is seldom an appropriate pleading in actions for declaratory judgments, and

will not be allowed simply because the plaintiff may not be able to prevail. It is

allowed only when the record clearly shows that there is no basis for declaratory relief

as when the complaint does not allege an actual, genuine existing controversy.” N.C.

Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434, 439, 206 S.E.2d 178, 182

(1974).

34. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first count under Rule 12(b)(1)

or, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6), because the claim is not ripe. Defendants argue

that Plaintiff’s claim is not ripe because G.S. § 66-291(b)(2) requires release of an

NPM’s excess escrow payments “including after final determination of all

adjustments,” meaning that final determination of all adjustments must be made

before the State is required to release excess escrow payments. (ECF No. 44 at pp.

13–15.) Defendants contend that “there are still outstanding adjustments for the

sales years 2006–2016” that have yet to be completed, and whether, and to what

extent, Plaintiff overpaid into the Escrow Fund is not yet established. (Id.)

35. Plaintiff argues that its first count should not be dismissed because the

Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that there is an existing and justiciable

controversy over whether Plaintiff made excess payments into its Escrow Fund, and

whether it is entitled to a release of the excess payments. Plaintiff also argues that

the Attorney General has denied Plaintiff’s request for a release of overpayments into

its Escrow Fund, and that a declaratory judgment action “is the proper means for
resolving the parties’ controversy.” (ECF No. 54 at p. 7.) Plaintiff contends that

whether or not the Attorney General is able to determine Plaintiff’s overpayments at

this time goes to the merits of the dispute, not whether a justiciable controversy

exists. (Id.)

36. At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff made the additional

argument that the phrase “including after final determination of all adjustments” in

the NC Qualifying Statute should be read as enlarging, not limiting, the standard for

the release of escrow funds and does not limit the State from making distributions

prior to the final determination of all adjustments. See N.C. Turnpike Auth. v. Pine

Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 120, 143 S.E.2d 319, 327 (1965) (“The term ‘includes’ is

ordinarily a word of enlargement and not of limitation. The statutory definition of a

thing as ‘including’ certain things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning

limited to the inclusions.”) (citations omitted). Under Plaintiff’s interpretation, the

language “including after final determination of all adjustments” serves as a

recognition that adjustments made in the future may ultimately affect the total

amount of excess funds Plaintiff is entitled to, but does not prohibit the release of

excess escrow funds until after those final determinations are made.

37. The Court concludes that the Amended Complaint alleges an actual and

existing justiciable controversy between the parties regarding interpretation of the

statute, and regarding whether Plaintiff has made escrow payments in excess of those

required by the statute. That is all that is required of Plaintiff at the pleadings stage.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Count in the Amended Complaint should be

DENIED.

B. Counts II–IV: Declaratory judgment regarding Constitutional
claims

38. Plaintiff’s Second, Third, and Fourth counts seek declaratory judgments

that the NC Qualifying Statute violates the Constitution of North Carolina. Plaintiff

alleges that the NC Qualifying Statute: protects the market shares and revenues of

the OPMs thereby creating a monopoly in violation of the constitutional prohibition

against monopolies under art. I, § 34; provides a separate emolument or privilege for

the OPMS and to the disadvantage of NPMs like Plaintiff in violation of art. I, § 32;

and requires NPMs to “make substantial payments in excess of PMs’ payments,” and

holds the escrow funds for 25 years, thereby depriving Plaintiff of “substantial fruits

of its labor.” (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 148–77.)

39. Plaintiff frames its constitutional claims as “as applied” challenges,

rather than as facial challenges.3 State v. Packingham, 368 N.C. 380, 392, 777 S.E.2d

738, 748 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct.

1730 (2017) (“A statute that is constitutional on its face nevertheless may be

3 Plaintiff’s arguments in its briefs regarding counts two through four veer between
arguments that the NC Qualifying Statute is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff, and
unconstitutional on its face. The distinction, however, is not critical for purposes of deciding
a motion to dismiss. “An appellant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute by
asserting a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge, or both.” See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review
v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008). “[T]he distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must
always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional
challenge. The distinction is both instructive and necessary, for it goes to the breadth of the
remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 333 (2010).
unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant.”). The Supreme Court of North

Carolina has held

An as-applied challenge contests whether the statute can
be constitutionally applied to a particular defendant, even
if the statute is otherwise generally enforceable. A facial
challenge maintains that no constitutional applications of
the statute exist, prohibiting its enforcement in any
context. The constitutional standards used to decide either
challenge are the same.

Id. at 383, 777 S.E.2d at 743. For purposes of deciding Defendants’ Motion, the Court

will treat Plaintiff’s constitutional claims as challenges to the statute “as applied” to

Plaintiff.

40. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional challenges solely

under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 43 at p. 2.) Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only

warranted “‘where an insurmountable bar to recovery appears’ on the face of a

complaint . . . Such an insurmountable bar may consist of an absence of law to

support a claim, an absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or the disclosure

of some fact that necessarily defeats the claim.” Kelly v. Polk Cty. N.C., 2018 N.C.

App. LEXIS 65, *5 (citing Peacock v. Shinn, 139 N.C. App. 487, 492, 533 S.E.2d 842,

846 (2000)).

41. Defendants contend that the NC Qualifying Statute is a valid exercise

of the State’s police power and is rationally related to the State’s interest in

discouraging the use of tobacco products to protect public health and welfare, and any

incidental imposition on Plaintiff’s constitutional rights is justified by that interest.

(ECF No. 44 at pp. 19, 20, 21, and 22–23.) Plaintiff alleges that the NC Qualifying
Statute does not “preserve the public health, safety, or welfare” or otherwise serve

the public interest. (ECF No. 36 at ¶¶ 154, 165, and 176.) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s allegations that the statute does not serve a public interest are legal

conclusions that should be disregarded by the Court. (ECF No. 44 at p. 19.)

42. Defendants further argue that courts in other jurisdictions have

concluded that other states’ Qualifying Statutes do not violate federal constitutional

rights, and that this Court should do the same. See, e.g., KT&G Corp. v. Attorney

Gen. of Okla., 535 F.3d 1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Oklahoma’s amended escrow

statute is rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in promoting health

and insuring the availability of adequate funds to address the state's future tobacco-

related health care costs.”); Grand Rivers Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d

158, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) ([Discussing the New York escrow statute and stating “the

Escrow Statutes are rationally related to a legitimate state interest: promoting public

health and recovering the costs of tobacco-related illnesses.); Star Scis., Inc. v. Beales,

278 F.3d 339, 361 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Virginia’s qualifying statute serves the legitimate

state interest of ensuring that Virginia has a source of recovery for future smoking-

related healthcare costs attributable to tobacco manufacturers who have not

subscribed to the Master Settlement Agreement and who, therefore, are not already

compensating the Commonwealth for these healthcare costs.”). (Id. at p. 23.)

43. The Court has considered Defendants’ argument that the NC Qualifying

Statute serves North Carolina’s interest in promoting the public health and welfare,

but it is not persuaded that it is appropriate to reach the issue at this early stage of
the case. The NC Qualifying Statute does not contain a provision stating the statute’s

purpose. To the contrary, unlike other states that adopted the model Qualifying

Statute, North Carolina declined to adopt the first section of the model statute

summarizing the public health concerns underlying the MSA and the Qualifying

Statute. (ECF 36.1, Ex. T, pp. T-1 and T-2.) See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health § 1399-nn

(2018) (New York) (adopting the Model Qualifying Statute’s “Findings and Purpose”

provision declaring that it is in the interest of New York to establish an escrow fund

because of public health concerns); G.A. Code Ann. § 10-13-1 (2018) (Georgia); Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 44-7101 (2018) (Arizona). In addition, North Carolina’s appellate courts

have not yet had an opportunity to decide whether the NC Qualifying Statute serves

the State’s interests. The Court believes further development of the record is

necessary to adequately address whether the NC Qualifying Statute, as interpreted

and applied by the Attorney General to Plaintiff, serves the public health or other

compelling State interests.

44. The Court has thoroughly considered the voluminous and detailed

allegations contained in the Amended Complaint and concludes that they sufficiently

allege claims for declaratory judgment regarding whether the Attorney General has

applied the NC Qualifying Statute in a manner that violates Plaintiff’s rights under

the North Carolina Constitution. Defendants raise compelling arguments, and those

arguments may ultimately prevail on Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. At this stage,

however, Plaintiff is required only to place Defendants on notice of the claims it is

raising. Feltman v. City of Wilson, 238 N.C. App. 246, 252, 767 S.E.2d 615, 620 (2014)
(“Under notice pleading, a statement of claim is adequate if it gives sufficient notice

of the claim asserted to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to

allow for the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of case

brought.”) Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts two, three, and four of the Amended

Complaint should be DENIED.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

45. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

This the 2nd day of April, 2018.

/s/ Gregory P. McGuire
Gregory P. McGuire
Special Superior Court Judge for
Complex Business Cases

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11058242. Public record. Not legal advice.
