# Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C.

> North Carolina Business Court · May 2, 2003 · 2003 NCBC 4

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057416

## Case

- **Court:** North Carolina Business Court
- **Decided:** May 2, 2003
- **Citations:** 2003 NCBC 4
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Ben F. Tennille
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C., 2003 NCBC 4

NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
MECKLENBURG COUNTY 00-CVS-10358

SUNBELT RENTALS, INC., a North Carolina
corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.
ORDER AND OPINION
HEAD & ENGQUIST EQUIPMENT, L.L.C.,
d/b/a HI-LIFT, ROBERT HEPLER,
DOUGLAS KLINE, MICHAEL QUINN,
GREGG L. CHRISTENSEN, PATRICK C.
MULDOON, MICHELE U. DOUGHERTY
and BRIAN W. PEARSALL,

Defendants.

{1} This case highlights a basic duality in our economic system and the business laws which govern that
system. Our system is dependent on both competition and ethics. The preservation and promotion of fair
competition is one of the primary goals of our business laws. Competition fuels the engines of our economic
system. Without it, productivity gains, innovation, efficiency and economy would be severely diminished;
employees would have fewer opportunities for betterment; investors would receive smaller returns on their
capital; and consumers would pay more for their purchases. Competition, like any fuel not properly
contained and utilized, can become destructive. To insure that competition is beneficial instead of
destructive, our business laws impose certain constraints on competition. One of the key mechanisms for
imposing those constraints is state unfair competition laws. In this case, the Court is called upon to determine
whether certain conduct of the defendants is outside the bounds of fair, ethical competition, and thus violates
North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“U.D.T.P.A.”), N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. The Court
concludes that in certain instances the competitive actions of the defendants have exceeded the bounds of fair
and ethical competition and thus violated that statute. Plaintiffs have been damaged in the amount of five
million dollars, which amount is trebled pursuant to the statute.

{2} Drawing that boundary and determining appropriate damages for the out of bounds activity has been
difficult in this case. The primary difficulties arise from (1) the failure of the plaintiff corporation to take
even the most rudimentary steps to protect itself from the very competition about which it now complains,
(2) the highly competitive nature of the aerial work platform leasing industry, (3) the key role service and
people play in an industry characterized by a uniformity of physical product, (4) the failure of the defendants
to testify fully and truthfully, and (5) the overlapping impact of both fair and unfair competition on the
damages issues.
{3} The Court has previously granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the plaintiff’s claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. See Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v.
Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C., 2002 NCBC 4 (No. 00 CVS 10358, Mecklenburg County Super. Ct.
July 10, 2002) (Tennille, J.) Additionally, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence the Court granted Defendants
Patrick Muldoon and Michele Dougherty’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against them pursuant to Rule
41 (b).

Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Edward B. Davis, Deborah L. Edney, William L. Rikard, Jr.,
and Eric D. Welsh, for plaintiff.
Helms Mulliss & Wicker, P.L.L.C., by Marna M. Albanese, Irving M. Brenner, and Paul M. Navarro, for
defendants.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

{4} The following Findings of Fact are entered after 10 days of trial without a jury, hearing 28 live
witnesses, reviewing deposition designations for 47 other witnesses covering thousands of pages, and
reviewing written discovery responses and over 600 exhibits.

Parties

{5} Plaintiff Sunbelt is a North Carolina corporation that rents construction and industrial equipment. It
does business throughout the United States, including Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, where it has a
place of business. On April 20, 2000, Sunbelt announced the purchase of BET Plant Services, Inc. (“Plant
Services”), including its division BPS Equipment Rental and Sales (“BPS”). The purchase was
consummated on June 1, 2000. BPS had been in the business of renting, selling and installing construction
and industrial aerial work platform equipment and scaffolding since 1939. Prior to its acquisition by Sunbelt,
BPS was headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, and operated 24 branches located throughout the southeast
and south central United States.

{6} Defendant Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. (“H&E”) is a Louisiana corporation doing business in
various states throughout the United States, including North Carolina, where one of its divisions, Hi-Lift
(“Hi-Lift”), has a branch. Hi-Lift competes with Sunbelt in the AWP leasing business.

{7} Defendant Robert Hepler (“Hepler”) is a citizen and resident of Florida and served as president of BPS
and as a director and officer of Plant Services from 1992 until his employment ended on December 14,
1999. After leaving his position at BPS, Hepler was employed as president of H&E’s Hi-Lift division.
Hepler performs essentially the same duties and responsibilities as president of the Hi-Lift division as he did
as president of BPS.

{8} Defendant Douglas Kline (“Kline”) is a citizen and resident of Florida, and from 1992 until the end of
his employment on December 14, 1999, Kline served as vice president of finance and chief financial officer
of BPS. Kline joined the Hi-Lift division as its executive vice-president and chief financial officer as part of
a package agreement he and Hepler made with H&E. Kline performs essentially the same duties and
responsibilities for Hi-Lift as he did as chief financial officer for BPS.
{9} Defendant Michael Quinn (“Quinn”) is a citizen and resident of Georgia. From 1989 until January 5,
2000, he was a member of the BPS senior management team, acting primarily as product manager for BPS
and its predecessor companies. At one time he was branch manager of the BPS Atlanta branch. On January
5, 2000, Hi-Lift employed Quinn as its product manager and as vice president for its Eastern region. Quinn
performs essentially the same duties and responsibilities for Hi-Lift as he performed for BPS.

{10} Defendant Gregg Christensen (“Christensen”) is a citizen and resident of Texas. Christensen was
director of operations at BPS’s Western division from approximately 1992 until he left that position on
January 14, 2000. He also was branch manager for the BPS Dallas branch until November 1999. After
leaving BPS, Christensen became Hi-Lift’s vice president for its Western division. Christensen performs
essentially the same duties and responsibilities for Hi-Lift as he performed for BPS.

{11} Defendant Brian W. Pearsall (“Pearsall”) is a citizen and resident of Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina. He was the branch manager for BPS in Charlotte, North Carolina until June 2000 and assumed the
same position with Hi-Lift when he left BPS. He is Rob Hepler’s brother-in-law.

{12} Rentokil Initial plc (“Rentokil”) is a British company which obtained ownership of Plant Services in
connection with a hostile takeover in approximately 1997. James Wilde (“Wilde”) was the manager of
Rentokil responsible for oversight of BPS after the Plant Services acquisition. Hepler and Kline reported to
Wilde when Rentokil owned Plant Services and they were employed by BPS. Rentokil is not a party to this
litigation.

The Equipment Rental Industry

{13} Before providing an overview of this case, it is helpful to outline the challenges and general practices in
the equipment rental industry. This action is concerned principally with equipment rentals of aerial work
platforms (“AWP”). AWP equipment consists of boom lifts, scissor lifts, push-around lifts (smaller non-
motorized lifts) and reach forklifts. Boom and scissor lifts come in a wide range of models, sizes and
functions; they are substantial pieces of equipment that cost thousands of dollars each and encompass a
broad variety of devices designed to lift workmen off the ground to do work on jobs that otherwise would be
very difficult to reach. Sometimes included within this class of equipment are “swing stages” and “mast
climbers,” equipment used to climb alongside buildings and other structures. Hi-Lift purports to operate
exclusively in the AWP business.

{14} The business is highly specialized. If not delivered, handled or operated properly, AWP equipment can
cause substantial injury and even death. Thus, the nature of the industry is such that its workmen and sales
people must be highly trained in the mechanics, applications and operations of the equipment.

{15} The larger equipment rental companies typically purchase or lease equipment from a limited number of
manufacturers. As of the fall of 1999, the two primary manufacturers of AWP equipment in the United
States were JLG Industries (McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania) and Genie Industries (Redmond, Washington).
JLG and Genie (and other secondary manufacturers) sell boom lifts, scissor lifts and other AWP equipment
in certain standard sizes with various options such as two-wheel drive or four-wheel drive. Thus, the
competitors in this industry offer, for all practical purposes, the same or very similar equipment to potential
customers. As a result, prices tend to be set by the marketplace, and service and equipment availability have
become significant factors affecting the success of the businesses in the area.

{16} AWP managers and salespeople know, from experience or simply by asking their customers, what type
of equipment is needed by the different types of contractors for particular jobs. For example, electrical
contractors will often use smaller scissor lifts or push-around lifts that can fit through interior doorways,
while glass manufacturers working on the outside of buildings need taller boom lifts which can range up to
120 feet in height. Knowledge of the company’s customer base contributes to higher utilization of
equipment and better selection of the “fleet mix” for a particular market. Such information allows a business
to invest in certain machines that yield better rates and profits. A new market entrant has a significant
advantage if it has access to that information. With such information, a new entrant can maximize its initial
fleet investment with little risk, perhaps saving millions of dollars, and can accurately project an operating
budget.

{17} The potential customers for AWP equipment are general construction contractors, subcontractors (such
as electrical, glass and painting companies) and other industrial or commercial businesses that need
equipment to work “in the air.” These customers are typically identified through numerous public sources—
including the yellow pages, business directories and publications (such as Dodge Reports and PEC Reports
that list various pending construction sites and related contractors)—and through on-jobsite trailers and direct
contacts with contractors. It may be more difficult to determine which industrial customers are in the rental
market, although the types of users—airlines, for example—are easy to determine.

{18} These public directories, reports and other sources not only provide the name of potential customers but
also the customer’s address, phone number and the name of the person to contact. The Dodge Reports and
PEC Reports go further, providing detailed information about construction projects (Dodge) and industrial
plants (PEC).

{19} Long-term rental contracts are rare. Companies typically rent for periods ranging from a day to a month,
with weekly rentals being the most common. Even with longer term rentals, the customer is given the
opportunity to return the equipment prior to the end of the rental period, paying only for the time rented.

{20} Rental companies primarily use outside sales representatives to sell and rent AWP equipment. These
salesmen typically visit job sites or company offices to attempt to rent equipment. Customer rental decisions
are made on varying factors, including price, the relationship between the customer and the sales person,
availability of equipment on the customer’s schedule, customer service, perceived dependability of the
equipment and other considerations particular to the customer. Many customers do business with more than
one company to maintain the flexibility and price competitiveness offered by having multiple sources of
equipment.

{21} The personal relationship between the outside salesman and the customer is particularly important for
success in this industry. Many salesmen have been calling on the same customers for many years and
naturally develop close personal and/or professional relationships that increase the likelihood that the
customer will rent from the salesman’s company, other factors being equal. The hiring of salesmen from
competitors to take advantage of these customer relationships is not unusual in the industry. It would be
unusual, however, for an entire sales force to leave an office at the same time and go to the same competitor
and unusual for the majority of salespeople in a number of offices to leave and go to work for the same
competitor at the same time.

{22} Nothing in the history of the industry is indicative of mass departures of personnel from one branch to a
competitor’s branch. The departure of a number of core-positional people at various levels of the branch
organization, at approximately the same time, to a competitor, has a major detrimental impact on a branch
and can adversely affect the performance of the branch. Personnel changes usually occur as one- or two-
person departures at a time.

{23} In terms of price, historical prices have limited value. Prices are quoted and then negotiated between
the outside sales representative and the customer or over the telephone with inside sales coordinators. While
salesmen would like for prices to remain “confidential,” they understand and expect that prices will become
known in the market. Customers do not consider quoted prices to be confidential and often reveal price
sheets and quoted prices of competitors to obtain more favorable terms. AWP rental companies occasionally
quote good customers a fixed price for a job or period of time; these arrangements would constitute
confidential information. “Sealed bids” or other formal bidding processes are rarely used. Recent
consolidation in the industry has made pricing extremely competitive and has created several large
competitors.

{24} Well-run companies in the equipment rental business study their markets and customers and gather
various financial, sales and marketing information. This information includes average rental rates,
construction information, fleet mix records, revenue per employee, utilization rates and other measures of
operations. This information is shared with employees to improve their performance. It is not generally
shared with competitors. Most of the information is based on a company’s experience and is the type of
information that employees would have some general knowledge about and retain. Such information takes
some time to accumulate.

{25} Efforts to protect that information exists in the AWP rental industry include obtaining covenants not to
compete, placing a general confidentiality policy statement in an employee handbook and limiting access to
the information.

{26} The industry has grown considerably over the last five to seven years through “greenfield” startups—
startup branches in a market where there has been no prior presence— and, more significantly, through
consolidation. As part of the industry consolidation, larger companies have expanded by purchasing smaller
companies rather than through greenfield operations. In these acquisitions, the tangible and intangible assets
of a branch or multiple branches are acquired, including, importantly, the entire human resource components
and goodwill of the company. Consolidation has caused competition to increase and margins to fall. In the
year 2000, acquiring companies were paying multiples of five to seven times EBITDA for the acquired
company or branch.
{27} The industry has historically been in short supply of trained, qualified branch managers, sales persons,
mechanics, inside sales coordinators, drivers and other related positions. Businesses that are able to retain
those personnel develop a considerable competitive advantage based on the investment those businesses
make in the employees’ training, experience and customer relationships.

{28} In a typical mature AWP business, the human resource component includes a branch manager, outside
sales representatives, an inside sales coordinator, credit manager, service manager, branch administrator,
mechanics (both inside as well as field mechanics) and drivers. In a typical greenfield situation, hiring all
these personnel and achieving a satisfactory level of competent employees takes months. The employment
of a number of experienced trained people for these positions within a short time frame (30 days or less) is
atypical for this industry. In fact, such employment is inconsistent with normal marketplace employment
activity.

{29} In the industry, the most important business component is the branch office. Consequently, the branch
manager position is one of critically important leadership in that this person is responsible for the total
operation of each branch. He or she is also responsible for the development of confidential information
about branch operations, its equipment fleet, its customers and employees and other related branch activities.
Significantly, a branch manager must be sufficiently familiar with the branch’s customers to be able to deal
with customers upon the departure of a sales person and thus ensure continuity in the relationship between
the branch and its customers.

{30} A branch manager has “very unique, very useful knowledge” of all personnel in the branch: competency
levels, work ethics, salary/compensation, customer relationships and other personnel related matters. He or
she is intimately involved in supervising a branch’s sales force and in effect operates as a sales manager for
each sales force. He or she must also supervise the service side of the branch, including the service manager,
the mechanics and drivers.

{31} The individuals working for the branch manager—sales personnel, mechanics and other service related
personnel—must act interdependently to deliver the equipment and service to customers. Sales personnel are
the conduit through which businesses (branches) have relationships with customers. As stated by a customer
called by defendant as a witness, sales personnel are the “face person” for the relationship with the
customer. The service manager, mechanics and drivers all support the relationship with the customer by
initial delivery of the equipment, training a customer in the operation of the equipment, regular maintenance
of the equipment and prompt field repair of the equipment in the event of breakdowns. Service personnel
have frequent and close contact with customers. The AWP business requires a high service component and
the presence of a strong team effort.

{32} All AWP personnel undergo regular training. Sales personnel, for example, have to know the uses of the
equipment and the most advantageous applications of it. Inside sales coordinators need to know equipment
applications to provide appropriate advice to customers. The mechanics and service personnel have to be able
to maintain and deliver the equipment to the satisfaction of customers, including OSHA-required
familiarization.
Overview

{33} Before discussing the detailed Findings of Fact, a general overview of the core facts is helpful.

{34} Defendants Hepler and Kline were employed by BPS. They played significant roles in the creation of a
successful business at BPS renting aerial work platforms to construction companies and industrial users both
before and during the time it was owned by Rentokil. BPS had rental locations in several key markets in the
Southeast, including Atlanta, Charlotte, Tampa-Fort Myers, Orlando, Dallas and Houston. When Rentokil
decided to sell BPS in 1999, it did not consult with or inform Hepler and Kline of the decision and did not
offer them any inducement to stay with the company through consummation of any sale. Neither had a
contract that restricted his employment by a competitor.

{35} Accordingly, Hepler and Kline devised a business plan that envisioned competing directly with BPS in
its key branches in the Southeast. A successful AWP leasing business required two key ingredients: capital
and the right people.

{36} At the heart of the plan was the conversion of the employee base of the targeted BPS branches and key
BPS management in addition to Hepler and Kline. With the conversion of those key employees came all the
information necessary to ramp up a greenfield operation more rapidly than would normally occur. The
branch managers were thoroughly knowledgeable about the business of each branch, including the employee
base, competition and pricing in the local market, the fleet mix, the customer base, and every other aspect of
the local operation. The service employees were already trained and knew the equipment, customers, job
sites and safety requirements. The salesmen knew the customers, the locations of current and upcoming jobs,
and the prevailing market prices for the equipment to go on the jobs. The credit managers knew the credit
history of the customer base. Each employee brought with him or her the knowledge of the systems,
information and records necessary to the smooth functioning of an AWP rental operation. Concomitantly, the
departure of each of those employees left BPS with a void, which impacted its ability to compete in the local
market in the short term. Significantly, not one of the employees hired by H&E, including Hepler and Kline,
had any form of contract containing a restrictive covenant or a covenant not to compete.

{37} Capital was required to purchase or lease the significant amounts of large and expensive equipment that
constituted the lease products of the business and to fund other startup costs. H&E provided the capital and
financial backing to bring the business plan to fruition. During the six-month period between their departure
from BPS and the closing of its sale to Sunbelt, Hepler and Kline together with the other defendants
successfully enticed significant numbers of the key management and skilled employees of the targeted
branches to leave and join the new venture with H&E. That six-month period was one of extreme
vulnerability for BPS, but a vulnerability of BPS’s own creation.

{38} Three factors, discussed more fully below, have entered into the determination that defendants’ actions
—which when taken alone or in isolation might not have been outside the bounds of fair competition—when
viewed collectively crossed over the boundary. First is the use of then BPS managers to accomplish the raid
on BPS employees. Second is the magnitude of the raid. Third is the coordinated timing of the departures.
BPS and Its Operations

{39} Five companies acquired by Plant Services were consolidated into BPS in approximately 1993 to 1994.
These included Hepler Hi-Lift, which Defendant Hepler founded, and four other companies: Able
Equipment Company, Safe-T-Green, Booms and Scissors, and Florida Contractor Rentals and Sales.

{40} Defendant Kline was the chief financial officer for Safe-T-Green and in 1994 was moved to BPS
headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida to become the chief financial officer for BPS, working directly under
Hepler.

{41} Under Hepler and Kline, BPS had a senior management team which included: Doug Guy, director of
Eastern operations; Christensen, director of Western operations; Jeff Stachowiak, director of marketing, sales
and safety; John McGraw, director of scaffolding; and Mike Quinn, product manager.

{42} During Hepler’s tenure as president, the senior management team met regularly, at least once per
month. At its meetings, the senior management team discussed customers, mechanic availability, sales
personnel, equipment utilization, safety, marketing, product mix, average rental rates, planning and other
matters. Branches were regularly evaluated branch-by-branch. Senior management regularly shared BPS
marketing, customer and internally developed information. This information included head counts, salary
information, pricing, organizational structure, financial projections and forecasts, cost information, branch
budgets and customer information, including the identity, contacts and requirements of its rental customers,
pricing in effect for those customers and fleet utilization information by branch. Senior management knew
that this information was confidential.

{43} Defendants Hepler and Kline managed the day-to-day affairs of BPS, made strategic decisions,
developed and implemented budgets and hired and fired employees. Hepler was involved in all levels of the
business. He frequently visited branches, discussed up and coming job sites and sales personnel and was
actively involved with customers. Kline was involved in all aspects of the business as the result of his
financial responsibilities. In particular, he was extensively involved with branch managers in budgeting.
Hepler and Kline were highly compensated. Hepler was paid a salary of $260,000 in 1999, and Kline was
paid a salary of $160,000 to manage 24 branch operations throughout the Southeast and South Central
United States. They had access to and knowledge of BPS’s confidential business information.

{44} Defendant Christensen, as Western regional manager for BPS, was closely involved in personnel issues,
budgets, fleet mix and management of the branches for which he was responsible. He was directly involved
in the BPS Texas branches and, in fact, managed the Dallas branch for several years. He had access to all of
BPS’s confidential business information related to his geographic area of responsibility.

{45} Defendant Quinn was involved in a variety of senior management issues, including budgets and, most
importantly for him, fleet management. He was intimately involved with fleet utilization, equipment
ordering, scheduling delivery dates, and equipment movement. Transferring equipment between branches
facilitated utilization. He had access to and knowledge of BPS’s confidential business information.

{46} BPS placed special emphasis on its branches and branch managers. Among its most experienced branch
managers at the end of 1999 were: Mark Alexander (“Alexander”) (9 years, 7 months) (Atlanta); Duke
Drennan (“Drennan”) (18 years, 7 months) (Orlando); Beare Jones (“B. Jones”) (20 years, 5 months)
(Tampa/Fort Myers); Abe Farrington (“Farrington”) (5 years, 3 months) (Dallas); David Hobbs (“Hobbs”) (4
years 3 months) (Charleston, South Carolina); and Defendant Pearsall (13 years) (Charlotte). These branch
managers dominated their branches, recruited, hired, reviewed and fired employees, set salaries, trained and
certified employees, set prices and rates for customers in their markets, developed confidential information
for their respective markets, prepared budgets for their branches and carried out the multiple other business
and leadership duties and responsibilities expected of a branch manager. The branch managers were in
continuous contact with senior management.

{47} Branch managers regularly made presentations to their peers about their branch operations with
emphasis on the keys to success they had found in operating their branches. For example, Alexander made a
presentation to the BPS branch managers in June 1999, in which he emphasized:

(a) the longevity and experience of his sales staff (“60 years of combined experience”);

(b) the branch’s interdependence of its personnel and its emphasis on team work; and

(c) the Atlanta branch’s success in retaining customers. (“ WE DON’T LOSE CUSTOMERS.”)

{48} In order to protect its information, BPS implemented an employee handbook containing a section on
confidential information. In fact, developing the handbook was the direct responsibility of Defendant Kline,
who rewrote, in his own handwriting, that section of the handbook dealing not only with confidentiality but
also with employee loyalty. Each BPS employee was required to acknowledge receipt of the handbook in
writing. Virtually all of the BPS/Sunbelt employees who left to become employed by H&E signed such an
acknowledgment. Hepler and Kline have both separately acknowledged the presence of trade secrets in this
industry. Additionally, some defendants and many of their H&E employees also admitted that certain
information is confidential and is not to be shared with competitors.

{49} BPS’s business information was treated as confidential when discussed by senior management. Efforts
were made to protect it at the branches. For example, the war rooms had the information taken down from
the walls when outside people came in. Pricing was kept in special books. Branch managers (e.g. Pearsall)
had specific rules about file removal from the branch office. Passwords were required and given to only
certain personnel with respect to the BPS computer system. Salesmen’s information was limited to
customers for which they had responsibility. Only branch managers had access to information on all branch
customers. Salary information was kept under lock and key at the branches.

{50} Based on senior management discussions, the individual defendants were acutely aware that BPS lacked
depth in a number of its human resource requirements. BPS senior management had frequently discussed
that it did not have sufficient human resource reserves for its sales people. The individual defendants were
acutely aware of the intense competitive pressures regarding qualified experienced mechanics and drivers
and knew that those positions were in short supply in all of their markets. As a result, Defendants Hepler,
Kline, Quinn, Christensen and H&E knew that the branches from which they successfully recruited BPS
personnel en masse would be seriously harmed by those departures and that those branches would not have
sufficient human resources to compete effectively with H&E until the departed employees could be replaced
and trained.

{51} Over the years at BPS, the branch managers developed close personal and professional relationships
with many of their long-time employees, who in turn formed close relationships among themselves; there are
examples of shared family relationships as well, with fathers, wives, sons or brothers working in the same
branch. These relationships often mirrored those more commonly found in a family-run business.

{52} Outside sales representatives usually reported directly to the branch manager, as did the inside sales
coordinators. The inside sales coordinators were responsible for taking orders over the phone from
customers, both those who had been solicited by the outside salesmen and others who called in to shop for
prices over the telephone. The inside sales coordinators were also responsible for scheduling deliveries and
dispatching drivers to deliver and pick up equipment which had been called “off rent.” Larger branches had
service managers who reported to the branch manager. The service managers were responsible for
supervising the mechanics (both shop mechanics and field mechanics), the parts department, the shop
foreman and, to a limited extent, the drivers.

{53} The branch administrative personnel—i.e., the branch administrator, credit department employees and
receptionist—also ultimately reported to the branch manager. Each of the branch employees served an
important function at the branch and participated in training appropriate to his or her position. Training for
mechanics was handled primarily through on-the-job experience and training classes provided by the
manufacturers. The safety concerns surrounding use of the equipment made trained mechanics critical.
Salesmen, to the extent they were not already experienced in the industry, were trained through experience
and advice from the branch manager and fellow sales representatives. Drivers with no experience were
trained through manufacturer classes, training videos and practice at the branch location. The process of
training drivers typically took no more than two to three weeks.

{54} In addition to routine sales efforts, sales duties at the branch level consisted of assigning salesmen to
territories, identifying target customers, creating “war rooms” to further identify ongoing and potential
jobsite and customer opportunities, and discussing competitive pressures. Sales meetings among the sales
representatives and the branch manager were sometimes held to discuss sales efforts throughout the branch.

{55} Rental contract records were maintained both in the company’s computer database and in “hard copy”
files maintained at the branches. The rental contracts typically included the name, address and telephone
number of the customer; the name and contact information of the customer who had rented the equipment;
the price at which the equipment was being rented; the expected term of the rental; and often directions to
the job site where the equipment was to be used. Sometimes hand tickets were prepared which included
varying amounts of the information found on the typical printed rental contract. The rental contracts were
delivered to the job site with the equipment, and a contract copy was left with the customer.

{56} As of the end of 1999, BPS included the following among its southeastern and Texas branch locations:
Atlanta, Tampa, Fort Myers, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville, Charlotte, Raleigh, Charleston, Richmond,
Dallas, Houston and Austin. BPS had additional branches in Arizona, California and Nevada. By virtue of
his presidency at BPS and prior experience with his own business, Hepler had extensive knowledge of the
AWP market in each of these cities.

{57} Hepler also had long-standing personal relationships with many of the BPS branch managers. As of
January 2000, the branch manager of the Atlanta branch was Mark Alexander. Hepler had known
Alexander, either as a competitor or as one of the BPS branch managers, since the early 1990’s. They were
personal friends in addition to their professional relationship. Alexander was also close to Quinn.

{58} The branch manager of the Tampa and Fort Myers, Florida branches as of January 2000 was Beare Jones
(“Jones”). Hepler and Jones were extremely close friends. Jones has worked for either Hepler or Hepler’s
father in the equipment rental business for nearly forty years. At the age of seven or eight, Hepler, now 46
years old, began working in his father’s business with Jones.

{59} The long-time BPS branch manager for Charlotte was Defendant Brian Pearsall. Pearsall is, as noted
above, Hepler’s brother-in-law. Hepler and Pearsall had worked together for over ten years as of January
2000.

{60} The BPS branch manager for Charleston, South Carolina in January 2000 was David Hobbs (“Hobbs”).
Hobbs started as a BPS employee in the BPS Jacksonville office and developed a close relationship with
Hepler as he was promoted through various positions at the Jacksonville branch and later to the position of
branch manager in Charleston.

{61} The branch manager for the BPS Orlando branch at the beginning of 2000 was Duke Drennan
(“Drennan”). While not as close personally to Drennan as he was to the other branch managers discussed
above, Hepler had known and worked with Drennan for over ten years as of January 2000.

{62} Hepler also had close personal relationships with BPS employees below the branch manager level and
frequently played golf with the salesmen.

{63} In summary, Hepler and Kline were in an ideal position to recruit BPS employees to go to work with
H&E. No BPS employee was restrained by a restrictive covenant.

{64} The announcement that Plant Services was for sale caused uncertainty and insecurity among the BPS
employees. When it had previously attempted to sell Plant Services, Rentokil had purchased some protection
against this vulnerability by contracting with Hepler and Kline to stay on through a transition with a new
owner. In 1999 Rentokil elected not to purchase that same protection, leaving Hepler and Kline to go to
work for a competitor at the time BPS would be most vulnerable. Rentokil was either unaware or
unconcerned about the close relationship between Hepler and Kline and the branch managers.
{65} Insecurity among the BPS employees was understandable. The possibility existed that BPS would be
purchased by a large competitor who would close branches and consolidate management practices. Four of
the key managers who had guided the company to success had left abruptly and without explanation.
{66} Not until the problems posed by Hi-Lift were apparent did Sunbelt/BPS offer “loyalty contracts” to some
of the BPS managers. Sunbelt’s president, Bruce Dressel (“Dressel”), visited nine BPS branches and
discussed with BPS branch managers Sunbelt’s desire that they stay with BPS and work for Sunbelt.
Drennan assured Dressel he was “on board” with the Sunbelt acquisition. Jones did not commit but gave no
indication that he would not be staying. Defendant Pearsall accepted Sunbelt’s invitation to attend
Vendorfest.
{67} Rentokil elected not to spend any money to protect itself against loss of employees during the period of
time BPS was for sale, despite the fact that its two key employees had left to join a company that would
compete with BPS. That fact was clearly known to Sunbelt when it elected to purchase BPS. In fact,
Dressel chided Wilde for his failure to keep Hepler and Kline on board during the transition.
H&E and Hi-Lift and Its Operations

{68} H&E has been in existence since the 1960’s and built a reputation in the Gulf region in the crane and dirt
movement business. At some point in the 1990’s, H&E entered the rental business by acquiring a small fleet
of equipment from Grove Manufacturing (“Grove”), another but smaller manufacturer of equipment. H&E
was not very successful with its fleet. It apparently had a fleet of approximately 1,000 to 1,200 units spread
across at least five locations, including Gonzales, Louisiana; Memphis, Tennessee; and Houston, Dallas and
San Antonio, Texas. The fleet in Dallas was only about 250 units, and the fleet in Houston approximately
300 units. Engquist himself described H&E’s fleet, which operated out of locations that also had the crane
and dirt moving business intermixed, as a problem and “struggling.” The Memphis and Gonzales branches,
even though in “major markets,” were later closed. The Court notes that, during the events of this litigation,
H&E provided no evidence that it opened any branch under the Hi-Lift name in any location other than those
in which BPS had an existing branch, and that it closed the Memphis and Gonzales AWP operations, two
markets in which BPS had no presence.

{69} While H&E had a minor AWP presence in Dallas, Houston and San Antonio, the evidence that the fleet
was struggling suggests that H&E’s efforts were not formed or based on any highly developed business
information. Hi-Lift had no market presence and no market information of its own about Atlanta, Charlotte,
Tampa/Fort Myers or Orlando. The Grove AWP equipment these branches used was not nearly as widely
used as the Genie and JLG equipment. Thus, customers were more familiar with and wanted Genie and JLG
equipment. Quinn was exceptionally knowledgeable with respect to the purchasing of that equipment.

{70} In mid-1999, H&E was purchased in part by an investment group, Bruckmann, Rosser and Sherrill
(“BRS”).[1] At about the same time, ICM (located in Salt Lake City) was also purchased by BRS, thus
linking H&E and ICM. In fact, this common owner considered from the outset merging the two companies.
The Court further notes that the boards of directors of ICM and H&E met jointly, and Gary Bagley
(“Bagley”), C.E.O. and president of ICM, was a member of H&E’s board of directors in part of 2000 and part
of 2001. Further, Hepler testified that he and Kline spent a day in Jacksonville with Earl Rose, branch
manager, conferring about business plans to open locations in the Northwest based on the Hi-Lift plan he
and Bagley had been discussing.

{71} The broader picture for Hi-Lift and its investors is clear. H&E and ICM each had an AWP business that
would benefit from the experienced management that Hepler, Kline, Quinn and Christensen could provide.
When Hepler and Kline were hired, a plan was in place pursuant to which H&E would open AWP rental
operations in Charlotte, Atlanta, Orlando and Tampa Bay-Fort Myers, and the former Grove-dominated
AWP operations in Dallas and Houston would be converted to Genie and J&G equipment and run similar to
the BPS branches in those locations. It is also apparent that there was at a minimum the likely prospect of
some combination of the H&E and ICM AWP business so as to produce a company with coast-to-coast
branches capable of competing with the largest players in the market. That likelihood has come to fruition
with the merger of H&E and ICM and the creation of an AWP division encompassing the branches of both
ICM and H&E.

{72} If carried out in a fair manner, it was a well-conceived and perfectly legitimate business plan. H&E had
every right to compete with BPS Sunbelt in a fair manner, and, given the experience of its management and
the capital resources of its financial backers, it would have been a formidable competitor under any
circumstances. The Court does not find that the existence of such a plan was an unfair trade practice. The
plan was a perfectly proper competitive strategy. The defendants were free to compete fairly with BPS in
any market. BPS and its owners had the ability to provide some protection against that competition and
elected not to pay the price to do so.

{73} The implementation of the consolidation and expansion plan is where the activities occurred which give
rise to liability in this action. In their testimony, defendants contended that no plan existed to raid BPS at
specific locations and that the defections which occurred were unsolicited and unplanned. The Court, as
finder of fact, does not find that testimony credible.

{74} Hi-Lift hired Hepler, Kline, Quinn and Christensen at salaries that were commensurate with the
development of a large organization such as has been developed by Hi-Lift. Quinn provided the necessary
purchasing expertise for such a large operation and expansion, and Christensen provided the West Coast
management necessary since Hepler and Kline wanted to stay on the East Coast.

{75} Hepler and the branch managers testified that there were no prior discussions or solicitation of
personnel. The Court finds that testimony is not credible and that those activities did take place. What
actually happened is a clear indication that these activities occurred. In the cases of the Charlotte, Atlanta,
Orlando, and Tampa-Fort Myers branches, a pattern of lining up salesmen and other key employees to leave
at the same time is apparent.

{76} In each instance, the branch manager was offered compensation, including a signing bonus that was in
excess of his or her BPS compensation or covered the bonus he or she would have gotten from BPS/Sunbelt
for signing a loyalty contract. The branch manager then recruited the key or skilled employees (sometimes
referred to as the “A Team”) needed to open quickly. These key employees included the most experienced
outside sales people, the inside sales person, the service manager, experienced mechanics and drivers, and
the administrative or credit manager. While the detailed information about the branches was useful, it was
not necessary because the recruited employees brought all their knowledge and skills with them. Had H&E
opened a greenfield office in one of the locations, many employees might have switched over in time. It is
also possible that BPS could have made them counteroffers from which they would have benefited and for
which they would have stayed. That did not happen because of the wrongful conversion of employees by
Hepler and the branch managers.

{77} The fact that there was no effort to fill these new positions outside BPS is a strong indicator that the
branch managers knew who was lined up to leave. The ability of Hi-Lift to begin operations at a level and at
a speed far in excess of those normally associated with a greenfield is indicative of the value these key,
skilled, core employees brought with them.

{78} The fact that each of the new H&E locations at former BPS branches were opened before Sunbelt
consummated its purchase of Plant Services is a clear indication that H&E rushed to open these branches
while BPS was in the transition period and most vulnerable to a raid on its employees.[2] The timetable
contributed to the need to use the branch managers as recruiters prior to the establishment of a Hi-Lift
branch.
{79} Most of the individual acts standing alone would not have risen to the level of unfair competition or an
unfair trade practice. For example, if BPS salesman Ken Farris had voluntarily left BPS and gone to work
for United Rentals in Atlanta, he could have called on his old customers, used his past knowledge and
experience with respect to the type of equipment they used and even promised to meet or beat BPS prices,
knowing full well the BPS price structure, including specific prices for particular customers on a known job
site.

{80} Hepler and Kline were free to go to work for a competitor. In doing so, they were not restricted from
directing the sales people of the new employer to call on customers whom Hepler and Kline knew to be
former BPS customers or from using the knowledge and skills they gained while working in the industry.
{81} The critical issues arise from both the expansive nature and the cumulative effects of the H&E actions.
In the context of an industry in which service may be the significant business determinant and trained
employees are not plentiful, the consequences of a secret wholesale raid on a competitor’s employees are
clearly discernable in advance. The competitor’s revenue is likely to be impacted by the inability to service
customers in a normal businesslike manner.
{82} The Court finds that defendants used the BPS branch managers, while they were still employed by BPS,
to recruit employees to leave BPS branches in a concerted and orchestrated manner, which had the dual
effect of temporarily immobilizing the BPS branch and permitting Hi-Lift to fill the void so created to
appropriate BPS’s business to Hi-Lift, at least temporarily.
Hepler/Kline Decision to Leave BPS

{83} The past history of the first attempted sale of Plant Services is instructive. Plant Services had been put
on the market for sale in 1998. During the process of that potential sale, Hepler and Kline were intimately
involved in the preparations for sale. Pursuant to an agreement with Rentokil, Plant Services’ parent, Hepler
stood to make as much as four times his salary if the sale was completed—Kline, a lesser amount. As a
result, Hepler and Kline did not consider departing BPS in 1998.

{84} As part of the process, Hepler and Kline made confidential presentations for Plant Services about BPS.
One of those presentations was made to Bagley, a representative of ICM, a business in the Northwest that
had some AWP operations.

{85} No sale was made in 1998, although Ripplewood/ICM was discussing offering $800 million for Plant
Services.
{86} Rentokil decided in 1999 to put Plant Services back on the market; however, they handled the matter
very poorly. In August 1999, Hepler and Kline learned of the proposed sale before they were informed of it
by Rentokil management. Hepler and Kline reacted negatively to the proposed sale of BPS. In fact, Hepler
described himself as being quite angry about the sale. Their reaction was understandable, given the 1998
arrangement and the contribution they made to BPS and the way they found out about the sale.
{87} After learning of the proposed sale of Plant Services, Hepler and Kline communicated with each other
about their dissatisfaction and their intention to leave BPS. However, they did not communicate their
displeasure and desire to leave to their superiors at Rentokil.
{88} Hepler worked out a potential consultancy with Genie Industries, one of the principal suppliers of
equipment to BPS. Kline had no such prospects, and only had an interview lined up which did not get past a
video interview. Hepler apparently made inquiry of Genie during this time as to whether it would support a
new venture put together by Hepler and Kline.
{89} According to Hepler, he received a call from a potential investor named Bob Williams (“Williams”) in
August 1999, in response to which he and Kline developed a very specific business plan for Aerial
Equipment Specialists (the “AES Plan”). This business plan:

(a) Stated that the management of BPS was committed to the plan:
“The majority of the management team is committed to AES . . . . The five senior
managers (CEO, CFO, Director of Operations, Product Director and Director of
Marketing) have worked together as a team for over six years . . ..”
(b) Stated that specific fleet mixes for the specifically identified markets:
“We have developed a fleet mix for each of the proposed branches, which will
coincide with the needs of the local rental market . . . . The equipment mix, as well as
the option list, was formulated by experience in each of these markets to maximize
utilization.”
(c) Emphasized customer targeting as BPS had done in the past:

“[W]e target . . .those customers for the following reasons:
● [T]hey . . .understand the added value concept of providing exactly what the
customer needs.
● [T]hey are more responsible and less abusive to our products.
● These customers tend to be established and will pay for services rendered
promptly . . . .”

(d) Identified seven geographical locations where the company would do business;

(e) Specified employee compensation and other equipment formulae for the branches;

(f) Set forth specific operating ratios (e.g. AWP’s per delivery driver, sales person and mechanic);

(g) Made projections and forecasts for each location; and

(h) Included average monthly rental rates for each of the seven branches cited, which were then used
to develop the rental revenue in the financial model.

{90} The branch locations, employee compensation and other aspects of the AES Plan are strikingly similar to
the plan defendants actually implemented at H&E. The Court concludes that Kline must have used BPS
information in formulating the AES plan. The information in the AES Plan was accessible to Kline from
BPS information. It is not information that anyone could carry in his head. For instance, the average
monthly rental rates set forth for each market and for each product group in the AES Plan are different, and
as the AES Plan itself states, “[were] formulated by experience in each of these markets to maximize
utilization.” More specifically, there are 20 products listed (12 booms and 8 scissors) and 7 markets; in other
words, 140 different individualized average rental rates were quoted in the AES Plan. Thus, inclusion of such
information in the AES Plan manifests defendants’ intentions, from at least August 1999, to take advantage
of information developed by BPS. Kline admitted that at the time the AES Plan was prepared, he had access
to average rental rates for the BPS branches in Atlanta, Charlotte, Orlando, Dallas, Houston and Tampa, and
that gross margins were based upon his experience at BPS. However, given the commodity nature of the
equipment and the highly competitive market, it was probably not difficult to project margins.

{91} In testifying at trial about the AES Plan, Hepler gave very contradictory testimony. On one day, he
testified he knew nothing about the information contained under operating ratios, contending that Kline
alone had put together that information. The next day, however, Hepler testified that he did know about
those ratios and that they were just generic.
{92} After the development of the AES Plan, Hepler and Kline sent the plan to Williams and made
presentations of it to at least two other investors, one involving a trip to South Bend, Indiana. In those
presentations, Hepler and Kline did not qualify the specific declarative representations contained in the plan.

{93} At least as early as October 19, 1999, Defendants Hepler and Kline began consulting with attorneys
about their activities. Hepler and Kline gave their attorneys earlier employment agreements for review. On
October 25, 1999, they submitted the BPS Employee Handbook and the AES Plan for review. They
specifically conferred with their attorneys regarding “potential litigation issues.”

{94} According to Hepler, he and Kline had decided to resign from BPS on the evening of November 10th in
Houston. Because this dinner with James Wilde was canceled, however, they did not resign.

{95} According to Hepler, sometime before November 11, 1999, he received a call from Gary Bagley at ICM
inquiring about his status. Bagley was aware that Plant Services was again for sale, but ICM was not
approaching Plant Services. As a result of this and follow-up calls, Hepler arranged to meet Bagley in
Dallas, Texas on November 11, 1999, after having a budget meeting in Houston with Hepler’s BPS superiors
on November 10, 1999. Bruckmann and Bagley traveled to this meeting from California and Utah,
respectively, to meet Hepler. Conversations between Bagley and Hepler indicate that there would be no
need for ICM to bid for Plant Services. By hiring Helper and Kline, ICM would be able to benefit from their
implementation of the AES Plan at much less cost than an acquisition of Plant Services.

{96} Bruce Bruckmann, whose investment group owned H&E, attended the November 11, 1999 meeting
between Hepler and Bagley in Dallas. Kline was not present. Defendants characterized the meeting as an
“employment interview.” Hepler testified at his deposition that, even though he had not discussed the
proposition with Kline, he told Bagley and Bruckmann that he was not interested in a position unless Kline
was also offered a position. Hepler and Kline had consulted their attorney about the interview in advance of
it.

{97} Immediately after the November 11, 1999 Dallas meeting, Defendants Hepler and Kline both called
James Wilde, chairman and president of Plant Services and regional managing director of Rentokil, to resign
from BPS. Defendants said nothing about their competitive plans and activities. Wilde would not accept
their resignations without meeting with them. Defendants Hepler and Kline, without Wilde’s knowledge,
proceeded to tell other BPS senior management that they intended to leave.

{98} Shortly after the November 11, 1999 meeting with Bagley and Bruckmann, Hepler began a series of
telephone calls with Bagley. These telephone calls led to a meeting in Dallas on November 23, 1999,
attended by Hepler, Kline, Bruckmann, Bagley, Hal Rosser of Bruckmann Rosser, and others. The meeting
took place at the Admiral Club at the Dallas Airport. Engquist met Helper and Kline for the first time at this
meeting. After approximately two hours of discussion, Hepler and Kline were offered employment at H&E
at salaries of $300,000 and $200,000, respectively. These salaries were more in line with salaries for
managing a nationwide AWP operation, not just H&E’s AWP operation.

{99} Engquist testified that he hired Hepler and Kline in order to address problems with H&E’s fleet, which
consisted of Grove equipment. Thus, Hepler and Kline were offered a $500,000 compensation package, an
amount greater than their BPS compensation, to take over an aging fleet that was approximately a tenth the
size of the BPS fleet.

{100} Significantly, Engquist was concerned about the availability of personnel in the business and at this
meeting specifically “questioned” whether Hepler and Kline would be able to obtain the “right people” to
grow the business. Hepler responded that he was confident that he could. Hepler and Kline’s
disproportionate compensation for the H&E fleet, Engquist’s statements regarding the “right people,”
Bruckmann’s repeated involvement in meeting with Hepler and the large contingency of personnel in
attendance at the November 23 meeting in Dallas, the AES Plan and the subsequent hiring of Quinn and
Christensen at salaries in excess of $100,000 each confirm that defendants intended to expand H&E with
BPS personnel, and on a scope with the AES plan. Engquist remained involved in the decision-making
process that led to the hiring of Christensen, Quinn, Alexander and Hobbs and signed off on the employment
of numerous other BPS employees, including Abe Farrington, Beare Jones, Duke Drennan, Brian Pearsall,
Steve Mathews, Ken Moon and Dan Franz.

{101} Hepler and Kline did not accept the job offers on the spot, contending that they had agreed to meet in
person with Wilde before anything happened on their resignations. Eight days later, on December 1, 1999,
when James Wilde was again in the United States in Jacksonville, they officially resigned and at Wilde’s
request submitted written resignations. Wilde asked Hepler and Kline to stay on to sell BPS, or stay at least
for a longer notice period. Hepler and Kline, after conferring with Engquist, refused. They gave BPS only
two weeks’ notice. A public announcement was made of their resignations on December 1, 1999.

{102} During the notice period, Hepler and Kline had several discussions with their attorneys. On December
14, 1999, before flying to Baton Rouge that night to begin their employment at Hi-Lift, they consulted with
their attorney about litigation risks, solicitation of BPS employees, and consultations with H&E concerning
the same. Defendant Kline testified in his deposition that on December 15th, after discussion of BPS
solicitation of employees came up, Hepler and Kline and Engquist had a conversation with H&E’s attorney,
Ashley Moore.

{103} Hepler and Kline both have testified in deposition and Hepler at trial about going to Baton Rouge on
December 15th. On the afternoon of December 15, 1999, Engquist suggested that they fly to Dallas the next
day to review the H&E AWP fleet at Martin Equipment. After that suggestion, according to Engquist,
Hepler and Kline began conversations with Engquist about the employment of Defendants Quinn and
Christensen.

{104} As described by both Hepler and Kline in deposition, and by Hepler at trial, Hepler and Kline raised the
issue of employment of Quinn and Christensen with Engquist because they needed Quinn to “manage the
fleet” and Christensen to manage the western operations, particularly the branches in Texas for H&E where
Christensen had worked for BPS. They further testified that on December 15th they discussed compensation
in excess of $100,000 each for Christensen and Quinn and that Engquist was agreeable to that
compensation. In their testimony, they suggested that Engquist meet Quinn and Christensen in Dallas the
next day before making any final decision.

{105} Hepler testified that he had had no contact with Christensen and Quinn about getting together in Dallas
until after the December 15th discussion with Engquist. In this, Kline’s deposition testimony and Hepler’s
trial testimony directly conflict with the testimony of their co-defendant, Quinn. Quinn testified in his
deposition that when he was first contacted by telephone by Hepler to tell him that Hepler was going to work
for H&E, Hepler wanted to talk to him about employment at H&E, and would be contacting him again.
Quinn further testified that shortly thereafter he received another call from Hepler setting up a meeting in
Dallas “within the next week or so.” Quinn’s travel itinerary shows that on December 9th he had already
booked a flight from Florida to Dallas arriving in the Dallas airport at 2:30 p.m. December 16th. This timing
supports Quinn’s testimony that the Dallas meeting was arranged several days in advance. Further evidence
that Quinn was conspiring with Hepler is found in Quinn’s testimony that he accepted employment with
H&E without a specific compensation offer even though Quinn expressed doubts about Hi-Lift.

{106} Defendants did not present Defendant Quinn for testimony at trial. Nor did they call Defendant Pearsall,
Drennan, Jones, Shelly Parnell, or others whose deposition testimony contradicted Hepler, Kline or
Engquist.

{107} Immediately upon Hepler’s return from Christmas vacation, he proceeded to recruit additional BPS
employees.

{108} Hepler and Quinn traveled to Atlanta on January 6, 2000 to meet with Alexander; Alexander was the
Atlanta branch manager, BPS’s largest branch and among its most successful. Notwithstanding Hepler’s
testimony that H&E had no definite plan at this time to open in Atlanta, Hepler and Quinn sought assurances
that Alexander would be “available when it came time to leave.” Hepler’s testimony about this meeting is
not credible.

{109} The very next day, Hepler and Quinn had breakfast with Gary Maner, BPS’s national service manager.
At that time, they offered him employment to head up the rebuild facility for H&E, the same initiative that
BPS was supposed to have achieved as a strategic initiative in 1999. This is another example of Hepler and
Quinn’s use of knowledge of BPS’s business plan for the immediate benefit of Hi-Lift.

{110} On January 9, 2000, Hepler, Kline and Quinn flew to Seattle, Washington to meet with Genie Industries,
the major supplier of AWP equipment and according to the AES Plan the “preferred supplier.” According to
Hepler and Engquist, who later joined the other defendants, the purpose of this meeting was to become
acquainted with Genie, with whom H&E had nothing but a casual business relationship at that time.
According to Hepler, H&E was able to convince Genie that it was a sufficient size player to obtain very
favorable pricing and terms on equipment. Even though it was only three days after his Atlanta recruiting
efforts, Hepler testified that an Atlanta branch was not discussed as a real possibility at that point with
Genie. Engquist, however, testified that they had committed to Genie that Hi-Lift would open a branch in
Atlanta. For this reason and other reasons, the Court again finds Hepler’s testimony not to be credible.

{111} Thereafter, H&E set about communicating with JLG, another major AWP equipment manufacturer,
about orders to be placed with JLG. Hepler testified that with respect to both entities, they were able to
achieve contracts that would allow them to move equipment around freely, cancel and substitute orders and
do other things that minimized the financial risks of purchase orders to either manufacturer. There were
serious discrepancies between Hepler’s testimony and the contracts themselves.

{112} Based on the quantity of equipment ordered by Quinn on behalf of H&E, substantial thought had to go
into the ordering of the right kind of units. Utilization reports constitute a substantial competitive advantage
and are based on knowledge of different marketplaces and their respective needs. A review of plaintiff’s
exhibit 522 shows that an Atlanta fleet does not fit Charlotte and a Charlotte fleet does not fit Atlanta. For
example, Charlotte has 3 times (19) more 90-foot booms than Atlanta (6). Thus, the Court concludes that
this type of information about fleet mix is a significant competitive advantage and gives a competitor an
advantage if it knows the requirements of specific markets in general and specific customers in particular.
Accordingly, allocation of dollars to purchases of specific equipment is indeed critical. The immediate, high
utilization rates and profits achieved by H&E as its branches opened confirm that H&E used confidential
information from BPS to establish and set up their fleets in each of the markets in which it opened, just as
Defendants Hepler and Kline stated in the AES plan and as Quinn and Christensen did every day for BPS.

{113} Examples of the Court’s concern with respect to credibility include, but are not limited to, the following
examples:

(a) Hepler specifically testified that at the January 6, 2000 dinner in Atlanta he did not solicit or
recruit the BPS personnel present for H&E. He is flatly contradicted by Quinn on several points, including the
following:
Q: Did Mr. Hepler tell each of these gentlemen [Messrs. Alexander, Leavell,
Cornett, Franz and Brown] that he would like to employ them in his new venture?
A: I don’t know that it was told specifically to each on individually. I don’t recall
how he worded it other than he would like to have all of them with this – to be part
of this new venture. (Emphasis added.)
(b) Engquist testified:
Q. Mr. Engquist, in your experience, how quickly could JLG deliver equipment to
the H&E branch?
...
Q. For example if you ordered something on Thursday when would it get there?
A. It would probably get there Monday, Tuesday. They had availability of
equipment.
Defendants’ order log sets forth the order date and the receipt date for all of H&E’s AWP equipment orders to
JLG and Genie. A casual review shows that occasionally each manufacturer did deliver on a few days’ notice.
However, a more thorough review reveals that Engquist grossly exaggerated delivery times. The average time
from order date to actual receipt based on Defendant H&E’s own documents shows that the average delivery
time of Genie was 28.9 days and JLG 44.5 days – vastly different than “Thursday” to “Monday or Tuesday.”
Additionally, H&E’s initial orders for Atlanta, for the period from February 25 through April 15, 2000, totaled
467 units comprised of over 30 different product models (including options)—a very large order, apparently
intended for more branches than just Atlanta. Approximately 1650 rental items were ordered as reflected by the
log, comprised of approximately 58 different JLG models and 42 different Genie models (including options).
The two most popular such models appear to be models 1932E2 (208 were ordered) and 2032E2 (121 were
ordered). These models’ popularity suggests that they are staples in a fleet, yet their average delivery times were
each 54 days from the date of order. These delivery times, based on H&E’s order log, confirm the testimony of
Guy Ramsey, the industry expert, on lead times.

(c) Hepler’s expense reports concerning the February 22, 2000 breakfast in Fort Myers directly
contradict his testimony about soliciting salesmen with Jones.

{114} The defendants used their knowledge of BPS information in the hiring and recruitment of personnel. In
virtually all cases, employees hired from BPS by H&E occurred after salary increases were offered. Hepler,
Kline, Quinn, Christensen and Pearsall used their knowledge of the skills, training, experiences and
relationships of BPS employees in selecting and hiring those employees.

{115} BPS’s accumulated confidential information concerning its average rental rates, average rental rates per
type of equipment, utilization reports per type of equipment, salary information, employee revenue by
headcount and similar information had significant value to BPS was developed over several years, was not
readily available in the marketplace and could not be easily obtained through legitimate means without great
cost. Defendants used their knowledge of that BPS information in the Hi-Lift business plan.

The H&E Branches

{116} The Court will now review each H&E branch in the order that evidence was presented. The Court finds
that the evidence confirms a common pattern in H&E’s opening of a number of the branches that had known
intentional adverse consequences on the corresponding BPS branch. The pattern can be summarized as
follows:

(a) Hepler, Kline and Engquist decide to open a branch in a particular market.

(b) Hepler, using his past relationship with, and knowledge of, BPS’s branch managers, and with the
assistance of Quinn and/or Christensen, recruits the BPS branch managers.

(c) Hepler, with Engquist’s approval, employs the BPS branch manager and directs that he recruit
and employ on behalf of H&E the best BPS personnel from his branch.

(d) The BPS branch manager, using his prior relationship and knowledge of BPS employees’ skills,
salary, relationships and training, recruits selected BPS employees to come to work for H&E. The branch
manager first recruits the branch’s top sales personnel and service manager, and may recruit mechanics and
drivers, although, this is usually done by the recruited service manager. Based upon the timing and nature of the
departures, the Court finds that many of the employees were recruited by branch managers while the branch
managers were still employed by BPS.

(e) Hepler, either meets directly, or communicates by telephone, with many of those BPS employees
in the recruiting process, especially the salesmen.

(f) The branch manager, sales personnel, service manager and some of the branch personnel all
leave at about the same time to open an H&E branch in the same geographical area, with little or no notice to
BPS. Shortly thereafter, the departing BPS employees are followed by other recruited mechanics, drivers and
other personnel.

(g) The H&E branch opens based on financial and fleet information put together by Kline, Quinn
and Christensen and has immediate business. The financial and fleet information is based on confidential
information gained during their employment with BPS.

(h) On behalf of H&E, the sales representatives are immediately in the market and soliciting
customers, but do not have H&E pricing information or H&E promotional materials. Notwithstanding that, they
are able to secure significant numbers of rental contracts for H&E immediately.

(i) The BPS branch is left in a weakened state. The branch does not have sufficient trained,
knowledgeable human resources to respond to H&E’s competition, address relationships with customers, or
perform the routine service necessary to support the branches relationships with its customers. BPS is required
to rush other personnel resources to the branches to react to the emergency.

{117} Based on this pattern, and as will be shown more explicitly in the following findings for each branch, the
Court makes these summary findings:

(a) Hepler’s testimony as to the circumstances of his meetings and communications with BPS
personnel are contradicted by the recruited employees’ testimony, further discrediting Hepler’s credibility.
Hepler is not a credible witness.

(b) The fact that each new branch had “80%” utilization within weeks of opening is circumstantial
evidence that H&E used BPS’s confidential information to tailor its branches’ rental fleets without spending the
necessary time, money and effort to develop the information itself. The utilization rate is also circumstantial
evidence that a higher percentage of the BPS customer base was converted to H&E in the short term.

(c) In view of the circumstances of this pattern, the Court finds, in the short term, that were it not for
H&E’s interference with BPS employer relationships, and subsequent solicitation of BPS customers, those
customers would have continued doing business with Sunbelt, or, at least, that Sunbelt would have been able to
fairly compete for those customers’ business, an opportunity they were not afforded after H&E’s orchestrated
conversion of BPS employees, customers and information.

(d) BPS, under Hepler and Kline, had built very strong customer relations at the branch level. It
would have been natural for those customers to continue doing business with BPS, subject to normal competitive
pressures. A new start-up such as H&E could have been expected to take some customers or some business of
some customers over time. The mass exodus of key sales employees in each branch with intimate knowledge of
the BPS customer base permitted H&E to effectively solicit the business of that customer base while BPS was
trying to rebuild its sales force. Organized defection of service people, mechanics, drivers, inside sales reps and
credit manager adversely impacted BPS’s ability to service its existing customers, thereby facilitating the
conversion of their short term business by H&E. The loss of each branch manager left the branch leaderless and
adversely impacted the branch’s ability to recover from the other defections. The combined departure of the key
employees both took from BPS and transferred to H&E a vast amount of collective knowledge about the
business and customers of the branch. That combination gave H&E a competitive advantage it would not have
possessed without the organized and orchestrated defections.

Charlotte

{118} The Charlotte Hi-Lift branch opened on or before June 5, 2000, with the following staff from BPS: a
branch manager (Brian Pearsall); an inside sales coordinator (William Huntley); a service manager (Pat
Muldoon); a branch administrator (Michele Dougherty); a sales representative (Ken Farris); and a driver
(Frank Evans). Within a week the H&E Charlotte branch added a BPS master mechanic (Lennie
Merrington). Each of these employees came from BPS.

{119} Although the possibility of a Charlotte greenfield was part of the original AES Plan and was discussed at
the H&E board meeting on February 10, 2000, and although a pro-forma was drawn up for Charlotte by May
9, 2000 and Pearsall was Hepler’s brother-in-law, the defendants claim that there was no plan to open the
Charlotte branch in 2000 until a “chain of events” took place in late May 2000 with Pearsall wanting to leave
BPS. Defendants’ position is not credible. Although defendants made plans as early as May to open a
Charlotte branch, it was the last branch opened. Clearly, defendants felt they could rely on Pearsall to
convert himself and other employees to H&E. It was obviously completed in a rush so that it was done
before Sunbelt took over and had an opportunity to create a relationship with the employees.

{120} Defendants’ documents and their own witness show that:

(a) Engquist testified that a decision to open was made by May 9, 2000, because a branch manager,
specifically Brian Pearsall, was available;

(b) Delores Kline, a real estate agent and the wife of Doug Kline, flew to Greensboro, North
Carolina on May 9, 2000 (coincidentally the same day Engquist, Hepler and Doug Kline were in Atlanta
discussing the Charlotte pro forma), and spent May 9 - 11, 2000 in Charlotte looking for a site for the H&E
Charlotte branch;

(c) Delores Kline’s notes indicate she was looking for licensing reciprocity in North Carolina in
October or November 1999;

(d) Engquist signed the certificate to do business in North Carolina on February 25, 2000;

(e) Hepler discussed opening in Charlotte with Earl Rose on April 17, 2000; and

(f) 159 pieces of AWP equipment, ordered as early as May 22, 2000, arrived in Charlotte between
June 6, 2000 and the end of June 2000.

{121} Meanwhile, Pearsall, Hepler’s brother-in-law and BPS’s Charlotte branch manager, denied in his
deposition knowing about the plan to open an H&E branch in Charlotte until Saturday or Sunday, May 27-
28, 2000. Hepler claimed in his deposition that Pearsall called him at home after Pearsall had a discussion
with Bruce Dressel at Sunbelt’s Vendorfest, which was held over Memorial Day weekend in May 2000, and
that this call, which occurred on either May 27 or 28, 2000, was the beginning of the chain of events which
led to the opening of H&E’s Charlotte branch — eight days later with a facility and a full staff.
{122} Pearsall, although a resident of Charlotte, did not testify at trial and was present in Court several days. In
his deposition, he stated that he called Hepler and “told him that I wasn’t going to, I couldn’t work for
Sunbelt and at that time he [Hepler] asked me if I could, if I wanted to work with, with H&E.” Hepler, on
the other hand, testified at trial that Pearsall called Hepler “and said could you hire me? I would like to
come to work for you.”

{123} In fact, Pearsall and Hepler had been in regular communication from as early as January 14, 2000.
Between January 14, 2000 and March 18, 2000, Hepler called Pearsall at least eight times, including three
phone calls Hepler made to the BPS Charlotte office totaling approximately 37 minutes. In view of the
events occurring by May 9, it is highly improbable that Hepler and Pearsall had no discussion of a Charlotte
branch before May 27 or 28.

{124} The Court does not find the testimony, by deposition, or in person, of either Hepler or Pearsall to be
credible when taken in light of the totality of the evidence. Moreover, Pearsall’s failure to testify calls into
question his ability to rebut the testimony of several Charlotte branch witnesses about his statements and
activities.

{125} Pearsall turned in an oral resignation on May 30, 2000 and a written resignation on May 31, 2000.
Pearsall said he talked to Hepler again on the night of May 30, 2000, but not again until at least June 5,
2000. In his written resignation, Pearsall agreed to work a two-week notice.

{126} As part of, or in lieu of, that notice, Pearsall agreed to help manage the inventory of the Charlotte
branch, which was to be conducted in conjunction with the acquisition of BPS by Sunbelt, during the week
and weekend, following Memorial Day. Traditionally, James “Rocky” Busic was in charge of the inventory
for the scaffolding side of the Charlotte branch. Although the May 2000 inventory was not a regularly
scheduled inventory and Busic had scheduled vacation during that time, Busic approached Pearsall and asked
to reschedule his vacation for the July 4, 2000 weekend so that he could participate in the inventory. Pearsall
insisted that Busic take his scheduled vacation and said to Busic “[W]hy do you care about this inventory?
They [Sunbelt] don’t care anything about you.”

{127} At Pearsall’s insistence Busic took his vacation, only to return 8 days later on June 5, 2000, to find the
branch in a state of “chaotic disorder.” Pearsall did not help with the inventory as promised and left
inexperienced BPS employees to do the inventory. Busic was forced to re-do the inventory a few months
later, spending three days rather than the usual four hours doing the inventory because it had not been done
accurately in May 2000.

{128} Pearsall also incited the BPS employees, apparently in an effort to rally them to the H&E side, or any
side other than BPS, by repeatedly disparaging Sunbelt to other BPS employees. Pearsall told BPS
employees, while he was still employed at BPS, that Sunbelt “was not a company you want to work for,”
were “dirt bags,” “didn’t have a good reputation about their people,” that the BPS employees might “want to
find another job,” that the branch would be run into the ground within “30 to 60 days,” and that Sunbelt “was
buying all the assets [of BPS] and not necessarily the people.”
{129} Defendants hired at least five BPS/Sunbelt employees for the H&E branch in Charlotte immediately
before the date of Sunbelt’s acquisition; they solicited and tried to hire several more. Pearsall directed many
of the “key” Charlotte BPS employees to leave BPS immediately. While still a BPS branch manager and on
site at the BPS Charlotte branch, Pearsall offered jobs at H&E to two salesmen (Farris and Huntley), the
service manager (Muldoon) and the branch administrator (Dougherty), all of whom claim to have accepted
on the spot, and three of whom Pearsall immediately sent to work for H&E. Engquist and Hepler testified
that this very conduct would be improper.

{130} Farris and Muldoon, the top salesman of the entire BPS organization and the Charlotte branch manager
respectively, turned in their resignations on May 30, 2000. Pearsall directed Farris to leave the same day he
resigned. He told Muldoon to leave on the morning of June 1, 2000, prior to Muldoon working a two-week
notice and the same day Sunbelt acquired BPS.

{131} Likewise, although Huntley’s resignation letter offered a notice period, Huntley never returned to BPS
after May 31, 2000. Instead, he showed up for work at H&E on June 5, 2000, and immediately began
calling on BPS customers. Pearsall testified in his deposition that he told Huntley to make a clean break and
leave immediately–a discussion Engquist admitted was improper, particularly for a manager who was also
departing for the same competition.

{132} Bruce Funderburgh was approached by Pearsall approximately 2 to 2 ½ weeks prior to the acquisition of
BPS by Sunbelt. This solicitation was well before Pearsall claims to have called Hepler regarding a job at
H&E (on May 27 or 28, 2000), and in fact coincides more logically with Ms. Kline’s visit to Charlotte to
secure a location for the Charlotte H&E branch in early May 2000. In that conversation, Pearsall told
Funderburgh that he was going to start a new H&E branch and that several other BPS employees, including
Muldoon, Dougherty, Frank Evans, and Ken Farris, would be going with Pearsall to H&E. The Court finds
Mr. Funderburgh’s testimony to be credible.

{133} At trial and in his deposition, Hepler testified that he had no discussion with Pearsall about hiring any
other BPS employees until Pearsall worked out his notice and came on board with H&E, despite the fact that
Pearsall did not come on board with H&E until at least June 5, 2000. By that time, at least four other BPS
employees had been recruited and put to work as H&E employees by Pearsall and Hepler.

{134} The Court finds that, contrary to his testimony, Hepler knew of and was involved with Pearsall’s
recruitment of BPS employees. Hepler spoke to Farris on the day Farris resigned and was fully aware that
Pearsall was recruiting BPS employees at that time, which was long before Pearsall left BPS on June 5,
2000. Specifically, the Court finds that on May 30, 2000, after instructing Farris to leave BPS immediately,
Pearsall instructed him to call Hepler. Furthermore, Farris spoke to Hepler in Jacksonville at that time for
the purpose of organizing the start up of the Charlotte branch six days later.

{135} Further undermining Hepler and Pearsall’s testimony concerning the timing of the opening of the
Charlotte H&E branch and their recruitment efforts, Patrick Muldoon, the BPS service manager for
Charlotte, was also involved in helping to solicit employees for H&E long before he left BPS. Muldoon
solicited Rick Bailey, the BPS shop foreman at the time, well before the end of May 2000:
Q: “You had been talking about H&E moving into the area with Mr. Bailey over a period of
weeks prior to the time you left, hadn’t you?”
A: “It may have been weeks because we knew about H&E coming to the area opening
branches. It may have been weeks before that, yes.”

{136} Muldoon told Bailey that Pearsall and several others would be starting a new H&E branch in Charlotte
and that it was going to be a smaller operation but that “basically, everything would stay the same . . . [that
they] would be doing the same thing in a different place.” Muldoon also suggested that Bailey go look at the
H&E branch a week or so before he left.

{137} Muldoon also solicited Lennie Merrington, a master mechanic, on behalf of H&E. Merrington came to
work at H&E on June 9, 2000, despite the fact that his official termination date from BPS was not until June
19, 2000.

{138} Later, Muldoon, on his last day of work at BPS, solicited Ron Chambers, a road mechanic who worked
on customer owned machines, to come and work at H&E. Muldoon asked Chambers for his phone number
and told him that they were “going to try and keep . . . the A Team together.” Muldoon subsequently called
Chambers at home, offered him a position at H&E, and told him that they were going to pick up two service
trucks for the Charlotte H&E branch.

{139} Pearsall also, either directly or indirectly, solicited the employment of BPS road mechanics Milton
Turner and Ron Chambers, and shop mechanics Reggie Gill and Bill Mann.

{140} Plaintiff called a number of Sunbelt BPS employees who testified, and demonstrated by the fact that they
stayed on and gave Sunbelt an opportunity to compete for their talents, that the timing of the recruitment had
significance.

{141} All in all, when the smoke from Pearsall’s departure had cleared, at least nine of the BPS employees had
left and gone to H&E before the first week of Sunbelt’s ownership of BPS was over. If Pearsall had been
successful in employing each of the employees he solicited or who were solicited on his behalf, the AWP
side of the Charlotte BPS branch would have lost more than 15 employees.

{142} The Court finds that Pearsall used his position and influence over the employees of BPS and his
knowledge as to their skills, salary and training to sow the seeds of fear and doubt with respect to Sunbelt and
use that fear and doubt to solicit them for the new H&E branch and interfere with their relationships with
BPS and Sunbelt. The Court further finds that without Pearsall’s disparagement of Sunbelt and his insistence
that the employees leave immediately, before Sunbelt could come in and fairly compete and bargain for their
continued employment, some, if not all, of the employees who left for H&E would have remained in the
employ of Sunbelt, at least for a sufficient period of time for Sunbelt to compete for their employment on a
level playing field or assist in training their replacements. Their continued presence would have eliminated
many customer problems.

{143} Further, without his “inside” position with respect to the employees, the Court doubts that Pearsall would
have been able, particularly without any increase in salary, and in the guise of a “lateral” move, to convince
so many long-term employees to leave BPS.

{144} The impact of the departure of these employees on the Charlotte branch was significant, as the remaining
employees were required to take on additional responsibilities and work long hours to try to compensate for
the departures. The branch was unable to get equipment out to customers on a timely basis because of the
lack of trained personnel, including mechanics and drivers; equipment out on rent sat for prolonged periods
after it was off rent because of the lack of availability of truck drivers to pick up the equipment.

{145} Customer complaints increased significantly. Sunbelt did not have a viable sales force in the field to
counter H&E’s sales effort in Charlotte. This situation exacerbated customer confusion.

{146} Once Pearsall had taken a full complement of employees and information to start the H&E branch, he
left the BPS office in a state of chaos and disorder, without proper documentation, without a proper inventory
having been conducted, and without enough information for the remaining BPS employees and new Sunbelt
employees to service and deal with BPS customers. These actions of defendants caused BPS/Sunbelt to lose
customers. The Court finds his actions, and the actions of H&E and Hepler in their support, were intended to
put the BPS branch in a state where it could not properly compete for either its employees or its customers in
the early days of the H&E Charlotte branch.

{147} Having left the branch in a state of disorder, Pearsall and the other former BPS employees immediately
targeted BPS customers.

{148} Farris and Huntley called on, and solicited orders from, BPS customers within the first 48 hours of their
resignations from BPS. Both acknowledged that they were put immediately back into their former BPS
territories by H&E, that they had no literature, equipment, or pricing information for H&E, but that they
were able to secure orders for H&E immediately. Huntley immediately called on Universal Drywall, a BPS
customer; Freeman Mechanical, a BPS customer; Davis Erecting, a BPS customer; Delta Electric, a BPS
customer; and Drywall Carolina, a BPS customer.

{149} The Court finds that much of Huntley’s testimony was not credible. His trial testimony was contradicted
by his deposition testimony, and both were contradictory at times.

{150} Farris immediately went to BPS Charlotte’s largest job site–Corning in Midland, North Carolina, and
began calling on customers of BPS at that site. Mr. Farris obtained orders from BPS customers, on behalf of
H&E, as early as June 1, 2000, before the H&E branch was open. In fact, Kline’s June 2000 e-mail to
Bruckmann confirms that defendants’ expected Farris to switch over the Corning customers.

{151} Farris also acknowledged that he had no pricing or other H&E information when he went to call on BPS
customers. In fact, Farris called on BPS customers on behalf of H&E while he was still employed by BPS.
Farris testified that he began his employment with H&E on May 31, 2000, and he submitted his letter of
resignation to BPS on May 31, 2000, but he also acknowledged that he solicited customers at the Corning
site on behalf of H&E on May 30, 2000.

{152} Further, Farris’s acknowledgment of receipt of the H&E policy handbook is dated May 31, 2000 and is
signed by Brian Pearsall as Farris’s H&E supervisor, despite the fact that Pearsall was still employed by BPS
on May 31, 2000.

{153} Farris obtained orders from the following BPS customers within a week of H&E’s opening: Interstate
Electric (order date 6/6/00); Rental Supply (order 6/7/00); Capital City Steel Erectors Supply (price quoted
was “off the seat of [his] pants); Gulf State Electric, Supply (order 6/6/00); Environmetrics (order 6/7/00);
Howard Brothers Electric. Farris’s relationships with these customers were developed while he was
employed at BPS.

{154} The Court finds that many of these customers from which BPS lost business had long standing
relationships with BPS. These customers would have given Sunbelt the opportunity to compete fairly for
their business with H&E, an opportunity that H&E’s actions may have prevented in some cases.

{155} H&E’s new Charlotte employees could not, at least in the beginning, have used the “Dodge” reports to
find and secure new customers for H&E. The new H&E branch did not have credit applications and related
paperwork when it began taking rental contracts. Credit information is an essential part of doing business
when dealing with expensive equipment like the kind at issue here. The only way H&E could have done
business was in reliance on the BPS credit information known to the former BPS employees hired by H&E.

{156} Therefore, the Court finds that H&E used customer information brought to it by the BPS employees it
brought on board immediately—including pricing information, customer information, credit information and
information related to prospective and upcoming jobs—in order to solicit and secure jobs.

{157} The Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to show that BPS considered the compilation of its
customer information, which took considerable time, money and effort to compile, to be confidential.
Further, the Court finds that BPS took reasonable efforts to maintain the confidentiality of that information,
including maintaining passwords on the computer system, not giving each employee a password, shredding
of confidential documents, and requiring each employee to sign an employee handbook with a confidentiality
provision.

{158} Finally, the Court also finds that the BPS employees who left en masse and went to H&E had an
opportunity to acquire and know the confidential information and to use it at H&E.

Orlando

{159} The Orlando Hi-Lift branch opened on or about May 22, 2000, with the following staff from BPS: a
branch manager (Wellington “Duke” Drennan); BPS’s complete AWP outside sales staff (Jay Kiefer, Mark
Stuckie and Jeff Hansen); a shop foreman (Michael Waldrop); mechanics (Todd Chesser and Scott
Waldrop); a credit manager (Patricia Uddo); a branch administrator (Brenda Drennan); and a driver (Henry
Garver). Shortly thereafter, the H&E Orlando branch added an inside sales coordinator (Andrea Ussery) and
another driver (Donald Henderson).

{160} After a conversation with Hepler at the 1999 national sales meeting in Dallas, Duke Drennan
(“Drennan”), the BPS Orlando branch manager, told some of his employees that Hepler might start a
company of his own and that this might be a possibility for future employment. The employees to whom
Drennan made these comments—Jay Kiefer (“Kiefer”), Mark Stuckie (“Stuckie”), Jeff Hansen (“Hansen”),
Patty Uddo (“Uddo”), Peter Casey (“Casey”), Brenda Drennan (“B.Drennan”), Steve Hicks (“Hicks”) and
Andrea Ussery (“Ussery”)—all later left BPS to work for H&E.

{161} Hepler called Drennan at the BPS Orlando branch in March 2000. Drennan testified that he likely
informed Kiefer, Stuckie, Hansen, Uddo, Casey and Hicks of this conversation with Hepler. Hepler’s
telephone records reflect an eight-minute telephone call to the BPS Orlando branch on March 29, 2000.

{162} Drennan resigned from BPS on April 29, 2000 and left BPS on May 4, 2000. Drennan’s employment
offer from Hepler included a salary of $105,000, higher than his salary at BPS, as well as a $25,000 signing
bonus.

{163} Hepler’s H&E expense records reflect meetings with Drennan in April 2000 to discuss H&E, including
Tampa and Orlando branch locations and operations. These records reflect such meetings prior to Drennan’s
resignation from BPS. For example, Drennan, while still employed by BPS, again had dinner with Hepler on
April 13, 2000 at Christine’s restaurant in Orlando along with Delores Kline and Mike Quinn. Hepler,
Quinn and Delores Kline were in Orlando to look at potential properties for an H&E facility in the area.

{164} All of the employees that Drennan solicited on behalf of H&E in April, May or June of 2000 were BPS
employees.

{165} While still a BPS Orlando branch manager, Drennan did the following:

(a) In April 2000, Drennan, after conferring with Hepler, invited BPS employees Kiefer, Stuckie,
Hansen, Uddo and Ussery to have dinner with him and Hepler. Drennan met with these employees separately at
BPS, informed them of his intent to leave BPS if Hepler offered him a job at H&E, and invited each individual to
attend the dinner at the Orlando Ale House.
(b) Drennan testified that at this dinner Hepler discussed the prospect of H&E opening a facility in
the Orlando area. Hepler ended the dinner by saying he would further explore the possibility and it was agreed
that they would continue the discussion in the future. Of course, Hepler testified that they did not discuss the
possibility of an H&E Orlando branch at this dinner. Drennan’s testimony contradicts Hepler’s testimony about
this dinner. The Court finds that Hepler’s testimony is not credible and he used this meeting to recruit BPS
employees to H&E with Drennan’s assistance.

(c) Prior to the Orlando Ale House dinner, Ussery never heard anyone at the BPS branch express a
desire to leave BPS. He testified: “[W]e all loved working there.” The pending sale of BPS was a subject of
curiosity, but not a great concern: “We had already gone through a sale one time, and nothing changed. It was
just curiosity. Everybody was just curious.”
(d) Drennan admits that he openly criticized BPS in conversations with his employees and discussed
his plans with regard to Rob Hepler.
(e) Drennan, following the April 2000 meeting with Hepler, assisted BPS employees Kiefer, Stuckie,
Uddo, Hansen and Ussery in communicating with Hepler regarding employment with H&E and the details of
such employment. Hepler authorized Drennan, prior to Drennan leaving BPS, to offer employment with H&E to
BPS employees and set their H&E salaries. Drennan did just that, discussing H&E employment with BPS
employees while still the BPS Orlando branch manager of. The salaries Drennan offered on behalf of H&E were
consistently higher than the salaries Drennan paid such employees at BPS. Defendants, with the assistance of
Drennan, recruited and hired 12 BPS employees required for H&E’s start up (17 total).
(f) Drennan talked to Kiefer, who already had resigned from BPS, about setting up a boom for an
H&E customer and contacting the necessary personnel to help place the boom on the job site for the customer.
Drennan gave Kiefer the authority to get help with the boom and referred Kiefer to Mike Quinn. The boom was
on the customer’s job site before Drennan left BPS.
(g) Drennan, upon being asked by one of his BPS employees if he would hire her boyfriend to come
work for H&E, told her that he could not approach any employees but it was all right if employees approached
him. The BPS employee in question subsequently approached Drennan at BPS, and Drennan offered him a job
at H&E. Clearly, Drennan knew that recruiting for his employer’s competitor was wrong.

{166} Drennan took confidential business files of BPS with him to H&E, including BPS monthly goals, rental
revenue information, salary/wage reports and a spreadsheet reflecting average salaries, and returned those
files only after the lawsuit was filed.

{167} Not only did Drennan take confidential files and solicit other BPS employees while he was employed at
BPS, he also encouraged at least one employee to bring valuable, confidential BPS information and
documents with him.

{168} In late March 2000, Drennan solicited Rick Breinlinger (“Breinlinger”) at the BPS branch. Drennan first
approached Breinlinger at the BPS branch and told Breinlinger that he was moving to another company
where he would be working with Hepler and wanted Breinlinger to come with him. Drennan said that other
BPS employees were also going with him and that Breinlinger was not to say anything to anybody. Drennan
said that he would get back to Breinlinger about the details, which he did. He called Breinlinger at home
and invited Breinlinger to his house to discuss the details of the H&E offer. Breinlinger met with Drennan at
his house on a Sunday afternoon, at which time they discussed the position, salary and vacation time H&E,
through Drennan, was offering Breinlinger. At this meeting they also discussed the location of the H&E
facility and other BPS employees who Drennan had solicited from BPS. Drennan asked about Breinlinger’s
BPS service log book, which contained detailed information about customer contact information, how such
customers conducted business, and repairs performed for customers. He told Breinlinger to bring the service
log book with him to H&E. Drennan reiterated at this time the importance of keeping the matter quiet and
not discussing it with anyone. Drennan ultimately retracted the H&E offer when Breinlinger refused to leave
BPS without giving a two week notice. Drennan admits he solicited Breinlinger to leave BPS to work for
H&E.

{169} Defendants did not call Drennan as a witness to rebut or deny Breinlinger’s testimony.

{170} H&E salesmen in Orlando were not provided any guidance or parameters with regard to pricing on
behalf of H&E. H&E Orlando did not even compile price lists until 2001. Prior to that time, H&E salesmen
were expected to quote prices to customers based on “information in their head.” Drennan has never
spoken with Hepler or anyone else in Hi-Lift’s corporate office about pricing. He has always set the prices
for his branch.

{171} The territories covered by H&E salesmen were territories that they had covered on behalf of BPS, and
they immediately called on the customers and job sites based on information acquired while employed by
BPS. For example, as soon as Kiefer resigned from BPS, he called on R.C. Aluminum, a BPS customer at
the Hard Rock Café job site, a major project that he covered for BPS. Regarding the order he received from
R.C. Aluminum that first day, Kiefer testified, “I didn’t write it up at all. I mean, I knew the account and
knew R.C. Aluminum, the job.” He did not even ask for a credit application from R.C. Aluminum, despite
H&E’s alleged policy of obtaining a credit application from every customer. On behalf of H&E, Kiefer
called on every trailer on the Hard Rock job site, each of which he had called on for BPS.

{172} Drennan admits, and H&E business records show, that he has personally entertained and solicited former
BPS Orlando customers on behalf of H&E.

{173} The departure of Drennan and other BPS employees in such a short period of time left the BPS Orlando
branch understaffed, lacking experienced personnel, unable to service customers as it had prior to H&E’s
raid on the branch, and caused the branch to lose considerable business from longstanding customers.
Further, without Kiefer, Stuckie and Hansen, its entire AWP sales force, the branch’s business slowed
considerably, and many of its high volume customers began calling BPS equipment off rent and stopped
renting equipment from BPS.

Tampa-Fort Myers

{174} Prior to May 2000, H&E did not have a presence in the Tampa-Fort Myers market. The H&E branches
established in Tampa-Fort Myers were greenfields.

{175} The Tampa and Fort Myers Hi-Lift branches opened on or before May 8, 2000 and June 5, 2000,
respectively, and were staffed with the following BPS personnel: a branch manager (Beare Jones); sales reps
(John Andrachak, John Breadmore, Wade Bercaw, Scott Strawn, Jason Jones and Brian Ditoro); a service
manager (Doug Ashmore); inside sales coordinator (Bonnie Quasnick); drivers (James George, Jonathan
Brunelle, and Charles Heim); an officer manager (Belinda Harrison); a shop foreman (Ronald Good); field
mechanics (Timothy Poole, Billy Marshall, and John Clark); an erector superintendent (Nicholas Cooper); a
shop mechanic (John Taylor); erector foremen (Leon Beebe, Scott Price, and Mark Roesler); and erectors
(Larry Brown, Charles Cansdale, and Eric Ruzycki). Each of these employees were hired from BPS.

{176} The market for trained and experienced drivers, mechanics and salesmen in Fort Myers and Tampa in
2000 was very tight. Trained and experienced employees were then difficult to locate in these markets.

{177} BPS had existing branches in Tampa and Fort Myers in January 2000. BPS had opened up the Tampa
branch in or about 1996 as a greenfield. Hepler testified about the steps undertaken at the time to create that
greenfield. None of those steps were repeated when H&E opened up its Tampa branch in May 2000.
Instead of placing advertisements in the newspaper for employees, H&E used secret meetings with Hepler,
branch manager Beare Jones and service manager Doug Ashmore to solicit employees. Instead of building
slowly as business warranted, H&E opened with a full complement of employees.

{178} Jones claims that when he learned of Defendant Hepler’s December resignation he was “shocked” by the
news, that it “stopped [his] heart,” and that, despite the fact that Hepler was like a brother to him, he did not
speak to him at all for 60-90 days after Hepler departed.
{179} The evidence shows that contrary to his sworn testimony, Jones spoke with Hepler repeatedly throughout
the time period prior to Hepler leaving BPS for H&E, including three times on January 3, 2000, a thirteen
minute conversation on January 13, two conversations on January 18 (4 and 6 minutes respectively), an
eleven minute call on February 17, three calls on February 21, two calls on March 29 (including a seven
minute call), an April 4 call for twelve minutes, a thirty-five minute call on April 11 and three calls on April
12. For this and other reasons stated below, the Court does not find Jones’s testimony credible and notes that
he did not testify at trial. Jones, Hepler and Hepler’s father had been close friends and business associates
for decades.

{180} On February 22, 2000, a meeting occurred in Fort Myers attended by Hepler, Jones and the BPS sales
staff in Fort Myers and Tampa. H&E’s business records reflect that the purpose of the meeting was to
“discuss H&E employment offer with Jones and sales staff.” Hepler submitted that receipt for his breakfast
to his employer and was reimbursed for the expenditure as a proper business expense. Moreover, Hepler’s
attempt to excuse the clear statements on the H&E expense report for this meeting by laying blame on his
secretary is not credible. Ms. Parnell’s testimony is clear that she always tried to be accurate, took the
information that was given to her by Hepler to place on the report, did not add her own musings, and had no
reason to believe that the information was inaccurate. Hepler also admitted that he never called anyone in
Baton Rouge and told them anything was inaccurate or needed to be changed in the report.

{181} Jones admitted that he invited BPS employees to attend the meeting with Hepler on February 22, 2000.
Former BPS employees Wade Bercaw, Scott Strawn, John Andrachak and John Breadmore all met at this
early morning breakfast meeting in Fort Myers. Their claim that it was a casual, non-business breakfast
among old friends is not credible. Kevin White, branch manager of Sunbelt in Fort Myers, testified that
Bercaw stayed with him in Fort Myers the previous night and explicitly told him that he would be meeting
with Jones, Hepler, Andrachak, Breadmore and Strawn the next day about starting a new business in
Florida. White was credible, and his testimony is confirmed by H&E’s business records. His testimony is
also confirmed, in part, by Bercaw, who testified that he knew the night before the meeting that Hepler,
Jones, Andrachak and Strawn would be there and that it would be held at the Shoney’s. White also testified
that in a later conversation he was told by Bercaw that he was offered a job by Hepler at that breakfast.
White’s testimony is also confirmed by the fact that Bercaw telephoned him some months later, after
learning that White had disclosed this meeting to Sunbelt’s CFO, to express his displeasure with the fact that
he had disclosed this clandestine meeting. The Court finds White’s testimony credible. Bercaw’s
testimony, denying that the purpose of the meeting was for employment, is not credible.

{182} The testimony of Hepler and Jones regarding this February 22 meeting is inconsistent in significant
respects. Hepler testified several times that he knew nothing about the fact that others would attend this
breakfast meeting until the morning when Jones picked him up. Jones testified, however, that he discussed
having these people attend when Hepler first called him to tell him he would be traveling to Fort Myers,
several days before the breakfast meeting occurred. Hepler and Jones are not credible in their denials as to
the purpose of the meeting. Hepler recruited Jones to H&E, and then, with Jones’s assistance while Jones
was still a BPS employee, readily recruited other BPS employees for H&E.
{183} Jones had knowledge of Hepler’s efforts to start new branches in Tampa and Fort Myers for H&E and
was an active participant in a plan to hire BPS employees to go to H&E in Tampa and Fort Myers and to
start-up the new branches.

{184} In the span of thirty days, Jones, Bonnie Quasnick (the Tampa inside sales coordinator) and Hepler
solicited and hired 25 experienced BPS employees from BPS’s Tampa and Fort Myers branches; over 90
percent of the H&E work force came from the Tampa and Fort Myers BPS branches. Jones testified that as
the H&E branch manager, he would have a say in the employees and structure of the branch and admitted
that outside sales persons, inside sales persons and the service manager are essential to a new branch. Jones
reviewed these employees while at BPS, was knowledgeable of their BPS salaries and knew these employees
to be good performers These employees were hired for similar positions at H&E and offered a salary increase
to leave BPS. As of January 1, 2001, twenty-six of H&E’s 35 employees in Tampa/Fort Myers were former
BPS employees.

{185} Jones’s denials of knowledge and involvement in the defendants’ plan to recruit employees en masse
from BPS to H&E and switch customers are not credible.

(a) Evidence shows that at the time Jones filled out his application for employment with H&E he
listed the position as branch manager for Tampa and Fort Myers and he also indicated that he would not relocate
from Fort Myers.

(b) Jones also claimed to have been dissatisfied with BPS after Hepler left. Nevertheless, H&E gave
him a $14,000 salary increase and a $25,000 sign-on bonus to leave BPS to go to work for H&E.

(c) Jones claims that at the time he resigned there was no BPS plan to open a Fort Myers branch,
only a Tampa branch. In addition to the admission on his H&E application, Jones hired two employees,
Andrachak and Breadmore from the BPS Fort Myers branch—both of whom indicated in their H&E
employment application that they would not relocate from Fort Myers.

(d) Jones testified that he had no involvement in the location of the H&E branch in Tampa. Kline
also denied having spoken with Jones when he went to Tampa in February 2000. Evidence shows, however, that
Jones was in contact with Defendant Kline right before Kline’ February 27 trip to Tampa and signed a letter of
intent for the rental of property for the H&E Hi-Lift branch.

(e) While still a BPS employee, Jones also met with Hepler on April 26, 2000, to discuss “Tampa
operations,” and he met with Hepler on May 17, after he had resigned, to finalize the recruitments of Breadmore,
Andrachak and Quasnick.

(f) Moreover, defendants’ action in ordering AWP equipment for Tampa confirms the prearranged
plan. On March 31, 2000, defendants placed an order for 99 units for Tampa with JLG. As confirmed by the
events in almost each location, defendants would not have placed such an order without the branch manager
(Jones) in place.
{186} BPS employees in Tampa were also recruited by Doug Ashmore, the former BPS service manager under
Jones. Billy Marshall, Ron Good and Timothy Poole, all experienced service mechanics, worked under
Ashmore. Ashmore testified that it was important to the business to have experienced mechanics. All three
of these mechanics were hired the same day by H&E; Good and Poole left BPS without notice in the early
morning hours on June 1. Sunbelt did not have the opportunity to speak with these employees about
continued employment at the branch.
{187} Ashmore denied, under oath, that he solicited any employees to leave BPS for H&E while employed at
BPS. Billy Dobbs, who Ashmore claims is a trusted friend and worked under Ashmore, testified that
Ashmore solicited him as part of the “chosen few” for H&E while Ashmore was still with BPS. Dobbs also
testified that the mechanics agreed that they would leave early in the morning, Monday, June 1, without
notice. Libby Oleson, an assistant to the inside sales coordinator and Quasnick, also testified that she had
conversations with Ashmore during the time he was employed by BPS. These conversations show that he
had been coordinating with Jones regarding the solicitation of BPS employees for the new H&E branch.
{188} The testimony of other former BPS employees in Tampa and Fort Myers, now H&E employees, is not
credible, and further supports a finding that the defections were planned and orchestrated while the current
H&E employees were still BPS employees.
(a) Andrachak and Breadmore, former BPS sales representatives from the BPS Fort Myers branch,
and now H&E employees, testified that they resigned from BPS without a job offer from defendants. Breadmore
was the sole breadwinner for the family, and he and his wife required insurance through his work. Both testified
that, although they did not know the purpose of their trip to Tampa, they traveled two and half hours from Fort
Myers to Tampa to meet with Jones and Hepler and while in Tampa they were offered a job, which they
accepted. At the time they accepted the offer, they supposedly did not know anything about the job or where it
would be located, even though they were not willing to move from Fort Myers. Finally, although testifying that
when they left BPS they did not have an offer in hand, their employment applications with H&E state that the
reason they left BPS was for a “new” or “better” job.

(b) Andrachak’s employment termination date with BPS was May 26, yet Andrachak submitted an
expense report to H&E for reimbursement of expenses incurred beginning May 15.

(c) Similarly, Quasnick’s last day of work at BPS was May 22, 2000 (with a termination date of June
2), yet she signed her both her W-4 and H&E employment application on May 19, 2000. The May 19 date on
her employment application was crossed out and changed to May 22. Quasnick testified that she did not start at
H&E until May 23, 2000. She also testified that when she spoke with Hepler and Jones at dinner prior to her
resigning, there was no discussion of Strawn and Bercaw. Jones testified that he told Quasnick at that dinner
that he had been speaking with Strawn and Andrachak.

(d) Ashmore filled out his H&E application for employment on May 22 and signed his H&E
employee handbook acknowledgment on May 25. Ashmore, however, continued working at BPS until two days
after Jude Yimin of Sunbelt had arrived at the branch, all the time soliciting BPS employees to leave the branch
for H&E.

{189} After successfully bringing over the BPS employees, defendants immediately began building a revenue
stream by targeting longstanding customers of BPS in Tampa and Fort Myers and “switching” them over to
H&E. Evidence shows, and Jones admits, that efforts were made by H&E to switch customers from BPS to
H&E almost immediately following the departure of the BPS employees to H&E. The evidence also shows
that BPS had longstanding customers in Fort Myers (customers of BPS as early as 1994 and 1995 when
White was employed at BPS) and Tampa and that relationships between sales representatives with customers
was fostered by BPS. In May and June 2000, the BPS branches experienced a decline in AWP lease
contracts while H&E experienced a concurrent rise in contracts with these same customers.

{190} Substantial evidence shows that pricing and customer contact information at the branches was
confidential information, although customers themselves did not treat pricing as confidential. White testified
that he understood that the BPS branch had special or preferred pricing for customers, based on a number of
factors, including volume of business given by that customer, and that this information was confidential
when he was an outside salesman at the BPS Fort Myers branch under Jones in 1994-95. Bercaw admitted
to using special pricing at BPS, which was exclusive for the customer and maintained for at least six
months. In addition, the BPS employees who went to H&E signed acknowledgments of the BPS, and later
the H&E handbooks, which contained confidentiality sections.

{191} In 2000, BPS was the largest rental company in Fort Myers. By taking BPS employees and leaving the
BPS branch in disarray, H&E was able to rapidly gain market share in the Fort Myers’ market and BPS lost
market share in Tampa at a fast rate.

{192} The massive departure of employees from BPS to H&E in such a short period of time left the BPS (now
Sunbelt) branches in Fort Myers and Tampa in a total state of disarray. The H&E employees involved in the
solicitation of these employees were indifferent to the impact of their actions on the BPS branches.

{193} The evidence shows that at the time that H&E was contacting BPS customers, BPS was not in a position
to compete in the marketplace. Salesmen are vital to the business and act as the company representative with
the customer. With the mass exodus of employees from the BPS Fort Myers and Tampa branches, BPS did
not have experienced outside sales representatives who knew the customer base and contacts to call on
customers and present the facts concerning the acquisition. At the same time, however, H&E had their sales
force (the former BPS sales team) in the field immediately calling on customers.

{194} Defendants’ conduct was undertaken for the purpose of harming BPS/Sunbelt and gaining a competitive
advantage over Sunbelt in the Tampa/Fort Myers markets. In summary, the Court finds the following facts:

(a) Over 90 percent of the H&E employees in Tampa and Fort Myers came from BPS and were hired
in a thirty-day period, leaving the BPS branches with virtually no employees. Given Hepler’s experience and
past involvement in starting up a greenfield branch in Tampa and his knowledge of BPS personnel
vulnerabilities, Hepler knew that defendants’ actions would have a debilitating effect on the Sunbelt’s ability to
compete.

(b) Hepler arranged a meeting in February 2000 for the purpose of discussing the opening of
branches in Tampa and Fort Myers This meeting was attended by the same BPS employees who became the
first employees of H&E. Defendants’ and their witnesses’ denials that the meeting was for the purpose of
recruitment are not credible.

(c) The speed by which H&E established itself in Fort Myers and Tampa, a market in which BPS had
significant market share, demonstrates that H&E’s actions were calculated as part of a plan. By year-end 2000,
H&E had profitable branches in Tampa and Fort Myers.
(d) Just as Sunbelt was undertaking efforts to recover in Fort Myers by hiring Kevin White as the
branch manager, Jones made a threatening comment to him to discourage his taking a job with BPS. Hepler
telephoned White to offer him a position in Texas. White had not spoken with Hepler in six years and had not
been talking with him about a position in Texas. In fact, White had had no experience in Texas. The only
apparent reason for offering him a job was to keep experienced employees from going to work for Sunbelt in
Fort Myers.

(e) Jones denied that he did anything intentional to harm Sunbelt. He testified that proof of his
contention was that he had not gone after ICM, the largest industrial customer of BPS in Tampa and a customer
that Bercaw described as having a verbal, exclusive partnership with BPS/Sunbelt. In fact, not more than a week
after Bercaw started at H&E, he was calling on ICM trying to obtain their business with the full knowledge and
support of Jones. When shown his deposition testimony at trial, Bercaw reluctantly admitted that he was trying
to establish the same type of verbal, exclusive partnership with ICM that BPS/Sunbelt enjoyed. Contrary to his
sworn testimony, Jones personally went after ICM’s business; he just wasn’t successful in his efforts.
{195} As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ actions, the BPS/Sunbelt branches in Tampa and Fort
Myers were left in a debilitated state.
(a) Experienced employees in the branches, such as Andrachak (outside sales), Breadmore (outside
sales), Strawn (outside sales), Bercaw (outside sales), Jason Jones (inside sales), Bonnie Quasnick (inside sales),
Brian Ditoro (inside sales), Doug Ashmore (service mechanic), Ron Good (mechanic) and Tim Poole
(mechanic), were gone to H&E within days of each other.
(b) In Fort Myers, the only remaining outside salesman, Tim Kennedy, was moved to the branch
manager position, leaving no outside sales staff until the branch hired Scott Williams, who had no experience
with AWP rentals, and Frank Hight, who was later terminated for poor performance.
(c) In Tampa, the only remaining AWP outside salesman, Dennis Carpenter, had only recently
moved into that position from his prior position as a driver, and he had no AWP sales experience. BPS/Sunbelt
filled the inside sales/dispatch position in Fort Myers with a person who sold copiers and had no AWP
experience.
(d) Drivers and mechanics were hired with no AWP experience.
(e) As Billy Dobbs testified, positions were filled with just “warm” bodies, sometimes by family
me

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057416. Public record. Not legal advice.