# Santos v. Barlett

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057114

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057114

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a criminal statute does not create a private right of action
- affirming that an exception to a state official’s Eleventh Amendment immunity applies if a plaintiff seeks prospective relief
- holding that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains “[t]he bare minimum a plaintiff must set forth in his complaint.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ELIZABETH R. SANTOS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-31-WFJ-LSG

BRUCE BARLETT, District Attorney
for the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court of
Florida,

Defendant.
___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se plaintiff Elizabeth R. Santos moves to proceed in forma pauperis,
Doc. 3. Santos sues Bruce Barlett, the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit
Court of Florida. Docs. 1, 4. Because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, I recommend denying Santos’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, Doc. 3, and dismissing without prejudice Santos’s amended complaint.
Doc. 4.
I. BACKGROUND
Santos initiated this pro se discrimination action against the defendant on
January 6, 2025. Doc. 1. In her initial complaint,1 Santos claimed that Barlett

1 Santos’s initial complaint is titled “Compulsory Counterclaim for Violation of Due Process.” Doc.
1 at 1.
infringed on her rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 219,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1995, “C.F.R. § 72.11,” and 28 C.F.R. § 8.3(2).
Doc. 1. Santos alleged that, before taking her to jail, “Trooper Tyler Husbands”

forced her to the ground while she stood on a friend’s back porch. Doc. 1 at 2. Santos
explained that she was fingerprinted, dressed in a jail uniform, and secured in a cell.
Doc. 1. at 2. She claims that she “wasn’t informed of the charges” against her until
twenty-four hours later. Doc. 1 at 2. Santos claims that her bond was set “extremely
high” and she “bonded out” two weeks later. Doc. 1 at 2. Following her release,

Santos claimed the “states Att” moved to revoke her bond on December 10, 2024,
based on the claim that she was a “danger to civilians.” Doc. 1 at 2. Santos alleges
that she suffered damages from this alleged violation of her civil rights and requests
that the defendant “show [her] the law tha[t] claims he can violate her due process.”
Doc. 1 at 2.

Santos filed her initial complaint without paying the filing fee. Thus, I ordered
Santos to either pay the filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis by January 23,
2025. Doc. 2. Santos filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on January 13, 2025.
Doc. 3. On February 3, 2025, Santos filed an amended complaint.2 Doc. 4. In her

amended complaint, Santos alleges that a pending state court case, number 24-
03636, is “null and void” because it violates her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and

2 Santos filed a document titled “Violation of Due Process,” which repeats and expands her claims
against the defendant. Thus, as explained further below, I construe her filing as an amended
complaint based on the document’s content. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998).
Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 4 at 1. Santos explains that “the state as an abstract
entity cannot be both the accuser and the injured party simultaneously” and claims
that the charges against her violate her right to confront and to cross-examine

witnesses. Doc. 4 at 1–2. Santos explains that “traffic laws” are commercial and,
therefore, do not apply to private “individuals” engaged in “noncommercial” travel.
Doc. 4 at 2. She asserts that the state’s cases against her are void because there is no
injured party and because she is entitled to “face an accuser.” Doc. 4 at 2. Santos
seeks compensation for the violation of her rights under 18 U.S.C. § 245(2)(e).

Doc. 4 at 2.
To support these claims, Santos alleges that, on the evening of April 17, 2024,
she ran away from a friend’s porch when “Defendants someone” climbed over a
nearby privacy fence. Doc. 4 at 2–3. An officer followed Santos, “threw her to the
ground,” handcuffed her, and took her to the Pinellas County jail. Doc. 4 at 3. At the

Pinellas County jail, Santos says she was photographed, fingerprinted, forced to strip
off her clothes in front of female officers, and dressed in a uniform. Doc. 4 at 3.
Santos then describes a state court case from Hillsborough County and
explains that she seeks compensatory damages for her 2008 Suzuki motorcycle.
Doc. 4 at 5. She argues that the “same applies,” which suggests that, like the Pinellas

County case, the Hillsborough County case violated her rights. See Doc. 4 at 5. On
October 31, 2024, Officer L. Haugstab stopped Santos as she rode the motorcycle a
block from her home. Doc. 4 at 5. Santos called her uncle to “step outside” with the
title to the Suzuki. Doc. 4 at 5. Officer Haugstab instructed Santos to stop the engine,
step off the motorcycle, and present her driver’s license. Doc. 4 at 5. Santos informed
Officer Haugstab that she possessed no driver’s license. Doc. 4 at 5. Santos sought to
release the Suzuki to her uncle, who held the title. Doc. 4 at 6. Officer Haugstab

“matched” the title with the Suzuki’s VIN but told Santos that the motorcycle would
be towed. Doc. 4 at 6. Santos says she was then handcuffed and taken to jail. Doc. 4
at 6. Santos claims that the Suzuki was improperly towed to a location farther than
the distance required by law. Doc. 4 at 6. She claims that once she posted bail, the
“bill” for her the Suzuki was $1,600. Doc. 4 at 6. The motorcycle was later

auctioned. Doc. 4 at 6. She claims that Officer Haugstab lacked authority because
her uncle was “there ready to walk [the title] over 100 feet to our house.” Doc. 4 at 6.
Santos seeks $11,899.00 or the return of her motorcycle. Doc. 4 at 6.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff must pay a filing fee to commence a civil action in federal court. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, with the Court’s authorization, a litigant may proceed in
forma pauperis, or without pre-paying the requisite filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant may commence an action “by filing in good faith
an affidavit stating . . . that [the litigant] is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). After reviewing the affidavit to

determine the economic status of the litigant, the Court must review and dismiss if
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); Martinez v. Kristi Cleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307
(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.
1997). The Court may dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff’s legal theories are
meritless or if the complaint’s factual allegations fail to state a plausible claim for

relief. Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (citations omitted).
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the

Court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader’s
entitlement to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)–(3);
McCurry v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (holding
that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains “[t]he bare minimum a
plaintiff must set forth in his complaint.”). A sufficient pleading must “state its

claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances” and state “each claim founded on a separate transaction or
occurrence . . . in a separate count.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). These pleading
requirements
work together to require the pleader to present his claims discretely and
succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming and
frame a responsive pleading, [and so that] the court can determine
which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated
any claims upon which relief can be granted.
Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the facts, as pleaded, fail
to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A plaintiff demonstrates that his claims have a factual basis by
specifically describing “what a defendant did that violated the law.” Brown v. McLeod,
No. 8:23-cv-741-CEH-NHA, 2024 WL 1744304, at *2 (M.D. Fla, Apr. 1, 2024), R. &

R. adopted, No: 8:23-cv-741-CEH-UAM, 2024 WL 1743322, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
23, 2024). The factual allegations must provide enough information to lift the
plaintiff’s claims above the speculative level, that is, more than “unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” accusations. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Rivell v.

Priv. Health Care Sys. Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff’s claims must
offer more than mere conclusions, labels, and characterizations; a procedurally
sufficient complaint alleges specific facts establishing the plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

If the complaint’s factual allegations are baseless or the legal theories are
without merit, the Court may dismiss the complaint before service of process. Carroll,
984 F.2d at 393. The Court must construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally.
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Regardless of this
liberal construction, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Middle District of Florida’s Local Rules. McNeil v. United States,
508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
In addition, the Court must ensure subject matter jurisdiction exists over a pro
se litigant’s action independent of Section 1915. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.”); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)
(“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction.
Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Univ. of
S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409–10 (11th Cir.1999). Therefore, the
Court must dismiss if the complaint fails to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff typically receives one opportunity to amend a pleading before
service of process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1); Hall v. Poppell, No.: 2:19-cv-878-FtM-
38NPM, 2020 WL 814001, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020). “As a general rule, an
amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the

amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.” Schreane v.
Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Varnes v. Local 91, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. and Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982)); see
also Gross v. White, 340 F. App’x 527, 534 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]pecific claims made

against particular defendants in the original complaint are not preserved unless they
are also set forth in the amended complaint.”).
Santos filed a document on February 3, 2025, that repeats and expands the
claims in her initial complaint. Doc. 4. Construing the pleadings liberally and
considering the document’s substance, this paper operates as an amended complaint.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Produce,
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that pleadings

should be considered based on their substance rather than label). Thus, this report
evaluates Santos’s amended complaint, Doc. 4, under Section 1915(e). See Schreane,
522 F. App’x at 847 (“Once the district court accepts the amended pleading, ‘the
original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the
pleader’s averments against his adversary.’”) (citations omitted).

A. Abstention under the Younger doctrine.
In her amended complaint, Santos alleges that the defendant violated her
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 4 at 1. Normally, her
claims would trigger this Court’s federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
However, her claims derive from two pending state court cases against her. Doc. 4.

Thus, the Younger doctrine requires this Court’s abstention. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
Under Younger, a federal court must abstain from interfering with a state
criminal proceeding unless the plaintiff demonstrates (1) that a “great and
immediate” danger of irreparable injury exists as a result of the prosecution, (2) that

“the state law is ‘flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions,’” (3) that the prosecution results from “‘bad faith [or] harassment,’” or
(4) that “‘other unusual circumstances . . . call for equitable relief.’” Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46–54). The Younger
doctrine “is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution
provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal
constitutional rights.” Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.7 (11th Cir.

2004) (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123–25 (1975)). Younger abstention
applies here (1) because Santos asks this Court to interfere in her ongoing state
criminal charges and (2) because she fails to show an exception or “extraordinary
circumstances” warranting such interference. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d

1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983).
The amended complaint shows that she filed this action to interfere with her
pending state cases. Doc. 4. Such an intervention is impermissible and warrants
abstention. Id. Santos may raise arguments protecting her federal constitutional
rights in her pending state cases, but she may not attempt to thwart them here.

Hughes, 377 F.3d at 1263 n.7.
B. Section 1915(e) requirements
Here, the amended complaint contains few factual allegations to support
Santos’s claims that the defendant violated her rights. See Casey v. Scott, No. 2:11–cv–
580–FtM–29SPC, 2011 WL 5080294, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2011). Moreover,
Santos fails to provide any legal basis for her claims, which the Eleventh

Amendment ultimately bars. Thus, Santos’s amended complaint states no plausible
claim for relief and fails under Section 1915(e).
1. Santos provides no legal basis for her claims.
The amended complaint identifies 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(E) and an excerpt of
42 U.S.C. § 3631.3 Doc. 4 at 3–4. Both provisions are criminal statutes that confer no

private right of action. Paletti v. Yellow Jacket Marina, Inc., 395 F. App’x 549, 552 n.3
(11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a criminal statute does not create a private right of
action); Griffin v. Calderon, No: 6:24-cv-1432-PGB-LHP, 2024 WL 5378959, at *9
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 350401 (M.D. Jan. 31, 2025);

Pearson v. DeSantis, No. 8:20-cv-1151-T-60CPT, 2020 WL 7248225, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 24, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 7238489 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2020) (stating
that Section 245 does not provide grounds for a private lawsuit); Kachur v. Bank of
Am. Corp., No. 3:09-cv-1106-J-32MCR, 2010 WL 3632703, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14,
2010) (“The section mainly cited by Plaintiff, § 3631 of the FHA, is a criminal statute

and provides no private cause of action.”). Therefore, the amended complaint
presents no legal basis for her claims.
2. Santos’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Santos names one defendant in her amended complaint. Doc. 4. That
defendant is the State Attorney of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Doc. 4 at 1.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, states enjoy immunity from federal lawsuits.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm’n, 226 F.3d 1226, 1231

3 Santos does not incorporate these two provisions into any analysis. Rather, she lists the statutory
text directly after describing the facts of the first state case but before the facts of the second state
case.
(11th Cir. 2000). “This immunity extends to state agencies,” including the State
Attorney’s Office. See Rich v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:09-CV-454-J-34MCR, 2010
WL 4403095, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining that the State Attorney’s

Office “falls within the ambit of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). A
lawsuit against a government official in his official capacity is equivalent to a lawsuit
against the entity for which he serves. Farrell v. Woodham, No. 2:01-cv-417-
FTM29DN F, 2002 WL 32107645, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2002). This is true for a

State Attorney like Barlett, who is specifically considered an “arm of the state” under
the Eleventh Amendment. Perez v. State Atty’s Off., No. 6:08-cv-1199-Orl-31KRS,
2008 WL 4539430, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2008).
Santos’s amended complaint contains no factual allegation to overcome
Barlett’s immunity. She describes no ongoing violation of federal law and seeks

compensatory damages instead of prospective injunctive relief. See Verizon Md. Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (affirming that an exception to a
state official’s Eleventh Amendment immunity applies if a plaintiff seeks prospective
relief). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment’s prosecutorial immunity covers
defendant Barlett “for all actions performed within the scope of [his] prosecutor’s

role as a government advocate.” Harley v. Cooley, No. 8:08-cv-1761-T-17MAP, 2008
WL 4279651, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008) (citing Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350,
1353 (11th Cir. 2004)); Elder v. Athens-Clarke Cnty., Ga. Through O’Looney, 54 F.3d
694, 695 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A prosecutor’s decision to bring charges against a person,
so long as the prosecutor is acting within the scope and territorial jurisdiction of his
office, is immune from an action for damages under § 1983.”). Santos nowhere
alleges that Barlett acted beyond the scope of his office. Therefore, prosecutorial
immunity applies, and Santos’s amended claims against Barlett are barred. Jd.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I recommend denying the motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
Doc. 3, dismissing the amended complaint, Doc. 4, without leave to amend,
terminating any pending motion, and closing the case.
REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on this 23rd day of April, 2025.

bi ig De
NDSAY S. GRIBF
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from the day of service of this report either to file
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendation or to seek an
extension of the fourteen-day deadline. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Under Eleventh
Circuit Rule 3-1, a party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). If the parties wish to expedite the resolution of this matter, they may
promptly file a joint notice of no objection.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057114. Public record. Not legal advice.