# Guerrero-Sandoval v. Bondi

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057086

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057086

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying these four preliminary injunction factors to the court’s review of a temporary restraining order
- noting that § 1252(g) “strips federal courts of jurisdiction” over such matters

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CARMEN GRACIELA GUERRERO
SANDOVAL ex rel. CDBG, a minor
child, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 2:25-cv-559
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
v. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

PAM BONDI, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
filed by Plaintiffs Carmen Graciela Guerrero Sandoval ex rel CDBG, Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s
minor child, and “Unborn Child,” with whom Ms. Guerrero Sandoval is pregnant. (ECF No. 2.)
Because this Court cannot grant the relief requested under federal law and Sixth Circuit precedent,
the Motion for a TRO is DENIED. (ECF No. 2.)
BACKGROUND
This case involves a recurring and sad set of facts. A nine-year-old child born in the United
States is a citizen by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
mother is not, and she may face deportation. Although the full facts surrounding Ms. Guerrero
Sandoval’s potential deportation are unclear at this point, the situation no doubt brings stress and
potential harm to her family. But federal law and Sixth Circuit precedent are clear that this Court
cannot issue an order blocking the potential deportation based on the rights asserted here.
Ms. Guerrero Sandoval is a citizen of El Salvador who lives in Columbus, Ohio with her
nine-year-old child, CDBG. (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 1, 9.) She is pregnant with another child, who is due
to be born in October 2025. (Id. ¶ 3.) CDBG is a United States citizen who has been deemed
eligible for special education services due to autism by Columbus City Schools. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 10.)
I. Complaint and Status Conference
On May 19, 2025, Ms. Guerrero Sandoval filed a Complaint on behalf of CDBG and her
unborn child (“Plaintiffs”) against Pam Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, and Kristi
Noem, United States Secretary of Homeland Security. (ECF No. 1.) Contemporaneous with the
Complaint, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 2.) The Court held an initial telephone
status conference regarding the Motion for a TRO on May 22, 2025 under Rule 65.1 of the
Southern District of Ohio Civil Rules. (ECF Nos. 3, 6.) Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on
May 22, 2025, just before the conference. (ECF No. 5.)
Plaintiffs state that the Immigration Court in Cleveland, Ohio has ordered Ms. Guerrero
Sandoval to report to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on June 3,

2025, and that she “will be removed from the United States pursuant to an order of the Immigration
Court.” (Id. ¶ 6.) At the status conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel represented that Ms. Guerrero
Sandoval has appealed the Immigration Court’s order to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). Counsel for Defendants, who was added to this case on May 20, 2025, could not confirm
the status of the Immigration Court order or the appeal to the BIA. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiffs did not
provide a case name or number for those proceedings.
In this lawsuit, which is separate from the adjudication of Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s
immigration status and her appeal to the BIA, CDBG argues that the potential deportation of Ms.
Guerrero Sandoval implicates several of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 10–20.) First, he

claims the deportation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eight
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶ 12.) Second, he claims the separation from
his mother will deprive him of her “continued love, affection, care and financial support in
violation of the Ninth Amendment” and “without due process of law.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Third, he raises
an equal protection claim because he is being treated “differently from other U.S. Citizen
children.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Without elaborating, he also claims that his mother’s potential removal
violates his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and violates the Tenth
Amendment. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Additionally, CDBG argues that the separation from his mother constitutes an intentional
tort under Ohio law (id. ¶¶ 16, 27–30) and violates international treaties including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (id. ¶ 17).
Ms. Guerrero Sandoval also brings a claim for relief on behalf of her unborn child, but
Plaintiffs do not articulate the nature of the claim. (Id. ¶¶ 21–26.) Plaintiffs recite the Fourteenth

Amendment and state that the U.S. Supreme Court has heard arguments regarding “President
Trump’s order on birthright citizenship.” (Id. ¶¶ 21–24.) They add “it has never been determined
if an unborn child has standing to challenge an executive order” and “[i]f such order constitutes an
agency rule, then the APA,” presumably the Administrative Procedure Act, “has not been followed
or satisfied.” (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Plaintiffs also cite the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Ultimately, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that various federal immigration statutes are
unconstitutional as applied to Ms. Guerrero Sandoval because they violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. (Id. PageID 29.) They also seek a stay or injunction against the summary removal of Ms.
Guerrero Sandoval. (Id.)

II. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
Contemporaneous with the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for a TRO on behalf of
CDBG and her unborn child. (ECF No. 2.) The full text of the Motion states:
Petitioners [CDBG] and an UNBORN CHILD MOVE THIS Court for an Order in
this matter restraining the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security from removing their mother . . . from the United States until a disposition
in his Complaint for Declaratory Judgment has been filed. Their mother is in
imminent danger of being removed from the United States and the Plaintiffs herein
will suffer damage as stated in his Complaint with no further meaningful recourse.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Court to order the Defendants to cease any
and all activity to summarily remove their mother from the United States until the
disposition of their Complaint for Declaratory Judgment has been completed.

(ECF No. 2, PageID 8–9.) In sum, Plaintiffs ask this Court to block the removal of Ms. Guerrero
Sandoval based on alleged constitutional violations to CDBG and her unborn child that may result
from her deportation.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a temporary restraining order “is to preserve the status quo so that a
reasoned resolution of a dispute may be had.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d
219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). In determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order, courts
consider four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance
of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would
be served by issuance of the injunction.” City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751
F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying these four preliminary
injunction factors to the court’s review of a temporary restraining order).
“These factors are not prerequisites which must be met but are interrelated considerations
that must be balanced together.” Ne. Ohio Coal. For Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc.
1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Radioactive Material Users, Inc.
v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)). “For example, the probability of success that
must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury the movants
will suffer.” Id.
ANALYSIS
I. Standing of the Unborn Child
Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of Ms. Guerrero Sandoval, stating that “it has never been
determined if an unborn child has standing to challenge an executive order.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 25.)
This Court need not determine whether the unborn child has standing to bring claims here because,
even assuming so, the Court has jurisdiction over CDBG’s claims as discussed below, and the
relief requested by both is precluded under federal law.
II. Rule 65 Procedural Requirements
Plaintiffs certify that a copy of the Motion for a TRO was served electronically on

Defendants the day it was filed in this Court. (ECF No. 2, PageID 9.) Counsel for Defendants has
entered an appearance and participated in the Local Rule 65.1 status conference. The Court
assumes without deciding that Defendants have received written or oral notice of the Motion and
that the procedural requirements of Rule 65(b) are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
III. TRO Factors
As acknowledged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs are aware of the main roadblock to the
potential for relief: under Sixth Circuit precedent and federal law, this Court cannot grant a stay or
injunction halting Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s removal order. (See ECF No. 5, ¶ 33.) Nonetheless,
Plaintiffs seek to challenge binding Sixth Circuit precedent that preclude this Court from granting

the requested relief. (Id.) Accordingly, for the reasons explained further below, Plaintiffs are highly
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Generally, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), federal courts do not have jurisdiction “to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see Cooper Butt ex rel. Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 909
(6th Cir. 2020) (noting that § 1252(g) “strips federal courts of jurisdiction” over such matters).
Federal law does provide for courts of appeals to review cases decided by Board of Immigration
Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
But the Sixth Circuit has “held that § 1252(g) does not preclude a court from hearing an
independent action brought by a citizen child when that child raises her own constitutional rights
that are distinct from her parent’s rights.” Cooper Butt, 954 F.3d at 909 (citing Hamdi ex rel.
Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 620–23 (6th Cir. 2010)). Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint brings

constitutional claims on behalf of Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s child, CDBG, § 1252(g) does not bar
this Court’s jurisdiction over the matter under Hamdi. This is true even though Plaintiffs’
constitutional claims may be frivolous. Hamdi, 620 F.3d at 624–25. The Court thus has federal
question jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.
Even so, as the Sixth Circuit has made clear, Ҥ 1252(b)(9) precludes a federal court from
reviewing and ultimately canceling the removal of a parent based on the alleged violations of a
citizen child’s constitutional rights outside of the petition for review” that may be filed with the
U.S. Court of Appeals. Cooper Butt, 954 F.3d at 907 (citing Hamdi, 620 F.3d 615). Under that
statute, “‘no federal court has the authority to review’ [a] Plaintiff’s [parent’s] order of removal to

determine if [the] Plaintiff’s constitutional rights might render the order of removal invalid.’” Id.
(quoting Hamdi, 620 F.3d at 628 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9))). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
has rejected attempts by plaintiffs “to navigate around Congress’s intent to channel judicial review
of order of removal into the petition for review, see, e.g. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), (g), and around this
Court’s holding in Hamdi by seeking a declaration that [a parent’s] removal is unconstitutional
rather than seeking to enjoin the removal itself.” Id. Accordingly, such claims are subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.
Here, Plaintiffs bring constitutional claims, an international treaty-based claim, and a state
law intentional tort claim, all relating to Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s pending removal from the
United States. The Sixth Circuit’s holdings in Hamdi and Cooper Butt are clear: federal district
courts cannot issue a temporary restraining order, injunction, or stay of a removal order of a parent
based on a child’s challenge to the order based on the potential violation of the child’s
constitutional rights. Furthermore, even if such relief was possible, the Sixth Circuit has rejected

Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Cooper Butt, 954 F.3d at 904, 907–08; see also Lopez-Mejia v. Lynch, No. 1:16-
CV-549, 2016 WL 2937479, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2016) (Black J.) (rejecting similar
arguments). “[T]he law is well-settled that lawfully removing a parent from the United States does
not deprive a United States citizen child of a constitutional right,” and Plaintiff’s sparse Amended
Complaint and Motion for a TRO do not articulate grounds for departing from that well-settled
law. Id. at 907.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ international treaty-based claims fail because “none of these
treaties create[s] a judicially [] enforceable cause of action.” Id. at 905. The treaties cited by

Plaintiffs in the Complaint “are not self-executing,” and Plaintiffs do not explain how these treaties
were violated. Id. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to raise claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act and its exceptions, their claims are based on federal agents or agencies violating the
constitution, and those claims fail for the reasons explained above. (See ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 18–20.)
Last, Plaintiffs do not explain the basis of their state law tort claims under state law. Federal
officers are not liable under state law tort claims for following duties imposed by federal law. See
Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 202 (2020). Such claims are barred by the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, even if Plaintiffs could eventually
advance a cogent intentional tort claim, this Court still could not issue an order blocking the
removal of Ms. Guerrero Sandoval under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), as interpreted in Hamdi and
Cooper Butt.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are highly unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. This
factor weighs heavily against granting a TRO because the Court is precluded from granting the
requested relief.

B. Other TRO Factors
“To demonstrate irreparable harm, the plaintiffs must show that . . . they will suffer actual
and imminent harm rather than harm that is speculative or unsubstantiated.” Abney v. Amgen, Inc.,
443 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006). CDBG faces a potential for irreparable harm if his mother is
deported, so this factor would weigh in favor of relief. Although the Court is sympathetic to the
challenge presented by Ms. Guerrero Sandoval’s potential deportation from the United States,
Plaintiffs have not articulated a risk of legal harm upon which this Court can grant injunctive relief.
Additionally, “[s]ociety has a clear interest in enforcing its immigration statutes.” Lopez-
Mejia, 2016 WL 2937479, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2016) (citing Coxcom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536

F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he public has an interest in the enforcement of federal
statutes.”). There is no direct risk to others from granting the relief requested, but the enforcement
of immigration laws and following federal law and appellate court precedent reinforces the
interests of justice, which benefits the public.
The TRO factors weigh heavily against granting an order enjoining the removal order
regarding Ms. Guerrero Sandoval because this Court lacks the authority to issue such an order
under federal law and Sixth Circuit precedent.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for
a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5/22/2025 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11057086. Public record. Not legal advice.