# Mason v. Grillo

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11056173

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11056173

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a state court was not “necessarily in a better position” to decide constitutional questions (internal quotation marks omitted)
- noting a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a case where a plaintiff “positively sues in federal court for . . . child custody, or seeks to modify or interpret [a] child-custody decree”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

COREY MASON,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:25-cv-00335
v. Judge Douglas R. Cole
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

HON. ROBERT GRILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On April 2, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 7). After that, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 9). He
also filed several other motions. (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10). The Undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 9). But, after conducting an initial screen of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Undersigned RECOMMENDS
that it be dismissed. Consequently, Plaintiff’s remaining motions (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10) should
be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an Ohio resident proceeding pro se, alleges Defendants violated his constitutional
rights during juvenile and criminal court proceedings in Vinton County, Ohio. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 1–
2; Doc. 9-1 at 2). Across his pleadings, he names twelve Defendants: Vinton County Judges
Robert Grillo, Jeffrey Griffith, and Steven O. Williams; Vinton County prosecutor Amanda Miller;
attorney Jorden Meadows; South-Central Ohio Job and Family Services (“SCOJFS”); guardian ad
litem Chase Bunstine; Samantha Stilson; court-appointed attorney John Clark, Jr.; Supervisor of
Vinton County Children Services at SCOJFS Missy Robson; SCOJFS caseworker Terry Hale; and
Executive Director of Children Services at SCOJFS Lindsay Sparks. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6–16; Doc.
9-1 at ¶ 17). Plaintiff’s pleadings span hundreds of pages; the Court briefly summarizes his
allegations. (See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3; Doc. 9-1; Doc. 9-2).
From 2014 to 2016, Plaintiff was in a romantic relationship with Defendant Stilson, who
has four children. (Doc 1-1 at ¶¶ 17–18). In 2017, she lost custody of the children, who were

placed in Plaintiff’s care through a kinship program. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 32). Then, in 2021, Defendant
Judge Grillo granted Plaintiff and Defendant Stilson “50/50” custody of the children. (Id. at ¶ 34).
Shortly after that, Plaintiff sought full custody. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–35).
The custody proceedings were delayed for some time. (Id. at ¶ 35). Then, at a 2023
hearing, Defendant Judge Grillo allegedly told Plaintiff that he has “never removed a mother’s
[custody] rights,” and that he did “not plan to anytime soon.” (Id. at ¶¶ 36–38). This statement,
Plaintiff says, shows Defendant Judge Grillo’s “clear gender bias against Plaintiff as a male
caregiver.” (Id. at ¶¶ 38–39). Eventually, on July 25, 2024, the Vinton County Juvenile Court
granted full custody of the children to Defendant Stilson and “companionship rights” to Plaintiff.
(Id. at ¶¶ 40, 42; Doc. 9-2 at 12). Even so, Plaintiff says Defendant Stilson did not allow him to

see the children during his court-ordered time. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 44–45).
Custody changed again less than a month later. In August 2024, the Vinton County
Juvenile Court granted temporary custody of the children to Defendant SCOJFS and found that
Plaintiff “was no longer an appropriate custodian.” (Doc. 1-3 at 6; Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 49). Then, on
September 26, 2024, the juvenile court issued a no-contact order between Plaintiff, Defendant
Stilson, and the children. (Doc. 9-2 at 12–13). After these rulings, Defendants SCOJFS and its
employees, including Defendants Robson, Hale, Sparks, did not allow Plaintiff to see or speak to
the children. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 50–54).
On September 26, 2024, Plaintiff was criminally charged with making “a false statement
in the juvenile case.” (Id. at ¶ 66; see also Doc. 1-3 at 13–14 (allegedly forged documents
submitted in the child custody proceedings)). As of the filing of Plaintiff’s case, the criminal case
is ongoing.

Plaintiff alleges that, since then, Defendant Miller and Defendant Judge Griffith have
coordinated the juvenile and criminal court proceedings to deny Plaintiff “due process.” (Doc. 1-
1 at ¶ 75; see also id. at ¶¶ 64–69, 70–89). He also says Defendants Miller, Robson, Hale, Sparks,
Bunstine, Clark, Stilson, and Meadows “spread[] a false narrative that Plaintiff has done something
‘horrible’ with the children” to “scare[] off attorneys” in Vinton County and “isolate Plaintiff from
legal support.” (Id. at ¶¶ 90–94). Because of this “smear campaign” (id. at 18), Plaintiff says he
has had to proceed pro se in the state court proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 91).
In March and April 2025, Plaintiff filed new motions in the juvenile court case, seeking a
hearing on the no-contact order and sanctions against certain individuals. (Id. at ¶¶ 75, 81–88;
Doc. 9-1 at ¶¶ 147–53). Defendant Judge Steven Williams denied the motions, in part, because

Plaintiff withdrew from the case in October 2024. (Doc. 9-1 at ¶¶ 153–58).
All told, Plaintiff says his criminal charges and continued separation from the children are
the result of Defendants’ coordinated effort to violate his civil rights. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 144–146;
Doc. 9-1 at ¶¶ 160–63). Consequently, he sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for redress of his
constitutional rights. (Doc. 1-1 at 29). As relief, Plaintiff seeks an order “enjoin[ing] [Defendants]
from interfering with Plaintiff’s companionship rights;” dismissal of his pending criminal charge,
and an order to “ensure Plaintiff’s due process rights are protected in all proceedings.” (Id.).
Plaintiff also requests a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his rights “to equal
protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process” and conspired “to violate his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff wants punitive and compensatory
damages. (Id. at 29–30; see also Doc. 9-1 at 10–11 (requesting the same relief)).
II. MOTION TO AMEND
Two weeks after Plaintiff filed this case, he moved to amend his Complaint. (Doc 9).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party can amend a pleading “once as a matter of
course no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or” a Rule 12 motion. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Since no Defendants have been served or responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he
can amend this one time “as a matter of course” without the Court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1);
Tolliver v. Noble, 752 F. App’x 254, 261–62 (6th Cir. 2018).
The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff wants to supplement his Complaint, not replace it
wholesale. (See Doc. 9 at 3 (noting the amendment adds to the original complaint); Doc. 9-1 at
¶ 1 (incorporating “the entirety of [the] original complaint”)). Therefore, the Clerk is DIRECTED
to combine Plaintiff’s Complaint and amendment into one filing on the docket. (Doc. 1-1; Doc.

1-2; Doc. 1-3; Doc. 9-1; Doc. 9-2). The Clerk is further DIRECTED to label that document
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
III. SCREENING STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Amended
Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Courts also “understand § 1915(e)(2) to include screening for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Howard v. Good Samaritan Hospital, No. 1:21-cv-160, 2022 WL 92462, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2022). Indeed, courts are obligated to consider whether they have subject
matter jurisdiction and may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Klepsky v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 489 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). If a court finds that that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
it must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Otherwise, complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less

stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th
Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, “basic pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and providing “the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (saying a complaint must have enough facts to give the defendant with “fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (internal quotation omitted)).
At this stage, the Court must construe Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in his favor, accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. But the Court does not

have “to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Similarly, “[w]hen a document attached to the complaint contradicts the
allegations, the document trumps the allegations” to the extent it “utterly discredit[s] the
allegations.” In re Flint Water Cases, 960 F.3d 303, 329 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation and
quotation marks omitted); see also Joyce v. Roan, No. 2:24-cv-132, 2025 WL 814831, at *1 n.1
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2025) (collecting cases and applying this principle on an initial screen under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). At bottom, a pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
IV. SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
As noted, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants’ conduct and
rulings in state juvenile and criminal court proceedings. Because Plaintiff’s allegations implicate
an ongoing criminal prosecution, child custody issues, and state court judgments, the Court lacks

jurisdiction or should abstain from reviewing most of his claims. As for the rest, Plaintiff sues
immune and improper Defendants or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
A. Criminal Proceedings and Younger Abstention
The Undersigned begins with Plaintiff’s claims about his ongoing criminal prosecution.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant Miller’s prosecutorial decisions and Judge
Griffith’s actions and orders violated Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process rights.
(Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 139, 142; see also id. at ¶¶ 64–89). Further, he seeks a declaratory judgment that
Defendants Miller and Griffith conspired with the other Defendants to “file the baseless
falsification charge” and deny his motions in the criminal case. (Id. at ¶¶ 145–46). He also seeks

an order ensuring his due process rights will be protected moving forward, as well as outright
dismissal of his criminal case. (Id. at 29).
The doctrine set out in Younger v. Harris prevents the Court from granting such relief. 401
U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). Federal courts “must decline to interfere,” or abstain from, “pending state
proceedings involving important state interests unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”
Leveye v. Metro. Pub. Def. Off., 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at
44–45). The doctrine “permit[s] state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts, particularly where the party to the federal case may fully litigate his claim before the state
court.” Burton v. Fentress Cnty. Jail, No. 2:15-cv-51, 2015 WL 5672989, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept.
25, 2015) (quoting Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986)). Abstention under
Younger is appropriate where “(1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve
an important state interest; and (3) the state proceeding will afford the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.” Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995)

(citation omitted).
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief involving his criminal
case fall squarely within the type of interference that Younger proscribes. (Doc. 1-1 at 29); Burton,
2015 WL 5672989, at *2 (saying Younger abstention applies to requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief) (citing Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998)).
As to the first two factors under Younger, Plaintiff’s state criminal case is ongoing, and an
important state interest is at stake, since “state criminal prosecutions have traditionally been
considered an arena in which federal courts decline to interfere.” Leveye, 73 F. App’x at 794
(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45).
All that remains is whether the state court provides Plaintiff an opportunity to raise his

constitutional claims. Importantly, the Court must “presume that the state courts are able to protect
the interests of the federal plaintiff.” Kelm, 44 F.3d at 420. The burden is on Plaintiff to show
otherwise. Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 205 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he cannot raise his constitutional claims in state court at a trial—
or in an eventual appeal if convicted. See, e.g., Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775–76 (6th Cir.
2008) (noting the federal plaintiffs could file motions in the state court, challenge procedural
irregularities on appeal, or challenge certain evidence in the state court); (cf. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 114
(alleging, without any description of what issues have been raised in state court, that the “state
remedies have proven ineffective and biased against [Plaintiff]”)).
With all three prongs met, this Court should abstain and DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims to the
extent he seeks declaratory or injunctive relief related to his criminal prosecution.
B. Domestic Relations Exception and Rooker-Feldman
For the child custody proceedings, Plaintiff requests two forms of injunctive relief. First,

he asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from “interfering with [his] companionship rights.” (Doc.
1-1 at 29). Second, he asks for a court order protecting his due process rights in all proceedings.
(Id.). Both requests should be denied.
1. Injunctive Relief for Companionship Rights
Beginning with Plaintiff’s request concerning his custodial rights, two jurisdictional
doctrines prohibit such relief. To begin, child custody matters fall within the state courts’, not the
federal courts’, jurisdiction. Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)); see also Stephens v. Hayes, 374 F. App’x
620, 623 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of . . . parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.” (internal quotation

omitted)). The doctrine, called the domestic relations exception, prohibits federal courts from
determining who should have custody over a child. Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789,
797 (6th Cir. 2015); Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1205–06 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting a federal
court lacks jurisdiction over a case where a plaintiff “positively sues in federal court for . . . child
custody, or seeks to modify or interpret [a] child-custody decree”); see also Robards v. Slatery,
No. 2:24-cv-52, 2024 WL 4370780, at *3–4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2024) (explaining when federal
courts may adjudicate claims tangentially related to child custody matters).
Similarly, Rooker-Feldman instructs that parties may not “go into federal court essentially
seeking a review of a state-court decision.” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. and Family
Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010). Instead, appellate review of state court judgments “is
vested in the Supreme Court” only, not federal district courts. Id. To determine whether Rooker-
Feldman bars a claim, courts analyze “the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal
complaint.” VanderKodde v. Mary Jane Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020). If the

injury’s source “is the state-court judgment itself, then Rooker-Feldman applies . . . . If there is
some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent
claim.” Id. (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s request to enjoin Defendants from “interfering with [his] companionship
rights” violates both doctrines. (Doc. 1-1 at 29). To issue such an order, the Court would have to
interpret and modify the state court’s custody orders, which the domestic relations exception
expressly prohibits. (See, e.g., Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 49 (saying that the Vinton County Juvenile Court
granted Defendant SCOJFS custody of the children); Doc. 9-1 at ¶ 153; Doc. 9-2 at 12–14 (noting
that the Vinton County Juvenile Court interprets both the no-contact order and previous custody
orders as terminating Plaintiff’s companionship rights)); Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797; Alexander,

804 F.3d at 1205–06.
What’s more, the Court would have to overturn the state court’s custody rulings, since the
Vinton County Juvenile Court awarded custody to Defendant SCOJFS. By seeking this type of
order, Plaintiff is essentially appealing the state court’s custody decision in a federal court.
Rooker-Feldman bars exactly that. See Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 310 (saying a case should be
dismissed if the plaintiff seeks “review or reversal of the decision of the juvenile court to award
temporary custody to the state”); Evans v. Klaeger, 12 F. App’x 326, 327 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding
a request for declaratory relief was barred by Rooker-Feldman where the plaintiff wanted the
federal court to declare that the state court custody decision violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to equal protection and substantive due process). Consequently, this request for injunctive
relief should be DENIED.
2. Injunctive Relief to Protect Due Process Rights
Next, the Undersigned addresses Plaintiff’s request for an order “ensur[ing] Plaintiff’s due

process rights are protected” in future juvenile court proceedings. (Doc. 1-1 at 29). The
Undersigned notes that this request is impermissibly vague. Plaintiff does not specify what
protection he seeks, nor does he provide a jurisdictional basis for the Court to issue such broad,
open-ended relief. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (saying a complaint must contain a statement “of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”).
And there is another reason the request should be denied. The custody proceedings, as they
relate to Plaintiff, appear to be over. While Plaintiff suggests that the juvenile court case is
ongoing, he also says he withdrew from the case in October 2024. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 69). That
allegation is supported by court orders attached to the Amended Complaint. The state court notes
that Plaintiff is no longer a party in the juvenile court proceedings and denies several of his recent

motions for that reason. (Doc. 9-2 at 12–14). The state court also says that Plaintiff’s recent
motions “appear to be designed to appeal [the state court’s] decision.” (Id. at 14). Plaintiff does
not allege he has filed any appeal. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 109–14). Therefore, the Court cannot grant
Plaintiff an order ensuring his due process rights are protected in the juvenile court proceedings
because for Plaintiff, those proceedings seemingly have ended. This request for injunctive relief
also should be DISMISSED.
C. Declaratory Judgment Act
Plaintiff also requests declaratory judgments for Defendants’ actions in the juvenile court
proceedings. (Doc. 1-1 at 29). Once more, the Court should not grant his requests.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added). Such relief is

discretionary, not mandatory. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“In passing the act, Congress ‘created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of
relief to qualifying litigants.’” (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995))). A
declaratory judgment largely serves two purposes. Either it clarifies the legal relations at issue
between the parties or it “terminate[s] and afford[s] relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 495–96 (6th Cir.
2012).
Plaintiff’s requests are fatally ambiguous. Without referencing specific actions, he asks
the Court to declare that Defendants violated his “rights to equal protection, procedural due
process, and substantive due process” and conspired against him in violation of Section 1983.

(Doc. 1-1 at 29; Doc. 9-1 at 10). The Court cannot ascertain how issuing such vague relief would
accomplish the goal of a declaratory judgment. Savoie, 673 F.3d at 495–96; Rudd v. Pittman, No.
1:20-cv-27, 2020 WL 13749259, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2020) (finding a plaintiff’s request
for declaratory relief related to a custody decision was “too general and speculative”), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, No. 1:20-cv-27, 2021 WL 230112 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 22,
2021). Further, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes hundreds of pages of allegations and
exhibits that describe events over several years. (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3; Doc. 9-1; Doc. 9-
2). Given this, it is hard to say which allegations even form the bases of his requests. (Doc. 1-1
at 29 (referencing no specific events); Doc. 9-1 at 10 (same)).
Even if Plaintiff’s requests were more precise, the Court still should decline to exercise
jurisdiction. In deciding whether to maintain jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action,
courts consider the following (the “Grand Trunk” factors):
(1) [W]hether the declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2) whether
the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations in issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for
the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res
judicata;” (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction
between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state
jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or
more effective.

United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole’s Place, Inc., 936 F.3d 386, 396 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Grand
Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984)).
The first two factors weigh against exercising jurisdiction. As noted, the state court granted
custody to Defendant SCOJFS, Plaintiff withdrew from the child custody case, and he has not
appealed the state court’s custody decision. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 69, 109–14; Doc. 9-2 at 12–14).
Therefore, declaring that Defendants violated his rights in the past juvenile court proceedings
would not settle any current controversy or clarify the legal relations between the parties. Savoie,
673 F.3d at 496 (finding the first factor weighed against exercising jurisdiction where a plaintiff
sought declaratory relief for concluded custody proceedings where the court granted custody to
another party).
The third factor, however, is neutral because there is no evidence in the record suggesting
Plaintiff filed this action for a procedural advantage or res judicata purposes. Locke v. Brown, No.
3:18-cv-697, 2019 WL 4675390, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2019) (saying the Sixth Circuit finds
this factor neutral “if there is no evidence of procedural fencing”).
But the fourth factor weighs heavily against jurisdiction. This factor, which considers
whether “accepting jurisdiction would increase friction between federal and state courts,”
includes three sub-parts. Flowers, 513 F.3d at 559.
(1) [W]hether the underlying factual issues are important to an informed resolution
of the case; (2) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those
factual issues than is the federal court; and (3) whether there is a close nexus
between underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public policy, or
whether federal common or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory
judgment action.

Cole’s Place, Inc., 936 F.3d at 396 (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co., 513 F.3d at 560).
Applied here, the first two sub-parts are largely neutral. Because Plaintiff withdrew from
the child custody case and has not appealed, there are no factual findings needed from the state
court to resolve Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory relief. Cf. Locke, 2019 WL 4675390, at *8
(finding a state appellate court’s decisions would be useful, since the plaintiff appealed evidentiary
rulings in a child custody case). And “[s]tate courts are as competent as federal courts to address
claims arising under the federal constitution, including the merits of constitutional claims arising
in the context of a child custody dispute.” Id. (collecting cases); see also Lowden v. Cnty. of Clare,
709 F.Supp.2d 569, 580 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding that a state court was not “necessarily in a
better position” to decide constitutional questions (internal quotation marks omitted)).
But the third sub-part—“whether the issue in this federal action implicates important state
policies and is, thus, more appropriately considered in state court”—tips the scales here. Flowers,
513 F.3d at 561. Undoubtedly, the state court has a “strong interest in addressing” child custody
matters “without interference” from the federal courts. Harmon v. Goodwin, No. 3:24-cv-47, 2025
WL 449809, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 10, 2025) (quoting Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632
(6th Cir. 1978)); see also Shabazz v. Xerox, No. 1:14-cv-578, 2014 WL 4181600, at *6–7 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 21, 2014) (noting Ohio juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
determinations and discussing limits on federal claims related to custody issues). State courts are
also far more adept at handling these types of domestic relations issues. Queen v. Farhat, No. 25-
10444, 2025 WL 1173007, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2025) (“[I]ssues of domestic relations are
primarily reserved for state courts to adjudicate.”); Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 704 (noting that state

courts have “judicial expertise” over child custody matters). Given that Plaintiff’s claims are so
intertwined with the child custody rulings, the state court is a more appropriate forum than this
Court.
Other comity concerns are at play, too. Plaintiff seemingly asks the Court to, among other
things, declare that Judge Grillo’s and Judge Williams’s rulings are unlawful, as well as review
how they handled pending litigation. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 39, 49, 55–63, 103, 113, 136–37, 139–40,
142, 145–46; Doc. 9-1 at ¶ 17). Still more, he wants the Court to impose its view on how county
employees care for children in their custody. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 49–54; 99–104). Doing so would
undoubtedly “increase friction between” this Court and the state courts. Flowers, 513 F.3d at 559;
see Rudd, 2020 WL 13749259, at *6 (finding as much where the plaintiff sought declaratory relief

against a judge in an underlying child custody proceeding); Queen, 2025 WL 1173007, at *5
(same); Locke, 2019 WL 4675390, at *8 (same); Harmon, 2025 WL 449809, at *1, 3–4 (declining
to exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action concerning various defendants’ roles in a
child custody case). Some of these declarations also would violate Rooker-Feldman’s principles,
as this Court would have to evaluate whether the state court’s custodial and legal rulings were
wrong or unconstitutional. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286
n.1 (2005) (noting federal courts cannot “entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court
judgment . . . when the constitutional attack [is] inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment” (internal quotation omitted)).
Finally, an alternative remedy is available. The thrust of Plaintiff’s case is his belief that
the state court’s custody ruling was wrong. While he alleges equal protection and due process
violations, he requests that his custodial rights be restored. (Doc. 1-1 at 29; Doc. 9-1 at 10; see
also Doc. 3 (seeking a temporary restraining order to restore Plaintiff’s companionship rights and

terminate the no-contact order)). Ultimately, he can challenge the custody determination only in
the state courts, who have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody determinations and related
appeals. Lesher v. Lavrich, 632 F.Supp. 77, 84 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (“Substantive child custody
issues are appropriately determined in the State court system, including the State appeal process.”).
And the state courts are as well-equipped as this Court to handle his accompanying constitutional
claims. Locke, 2019 WL 4675390, at *8.
While courts must balance the Grand Trunk factors, “[t]he relative weight of the underlying
considerations of efficiency, fairness, and federalism will depend on facts of the case.” W. World
Ins. Co. v. Hoey, 773 F.3d 755, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). Here, most of the factors weigh against
jurisdiction. When faced with similar declaratory judgment actions about child custody

proceedings, courts often decline to exercise their jurisdiction, even where Section 1983 claims
are raised. See, e.g., Savoie, 673 F.3d at 496; Locke, 2019 WL 4675390, at *8; Rudd, 2020 WL
13749259, at *6; Harmon, 2025 WL 449809, at *5. Given the significant comity and federalism
concerns presented by Plaintiff’s requests, this Court should, too.
In sum, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS DISMISSING Plaintiff’s claims for
declaratory relief related to the juvenile court proceedings.
D. Individual Defendants
Finally, Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 1-1 at 29–30).
Ultimately, Defendants are immune from such relief, or Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Undersigned addresses each group of Defendants in turn.

1. Improper Defendants
As discussed, Plaintiff raises Section 1983 claims only. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 135–46; Doc. 9-1
at ¶¶ 160–63). Defendants SCOJFS, Meadows, Clark, and Stilson cannot be sued under this
statute. A Section 1983 claim requires that a person acting under color of state law violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Graham v. Nat. Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th
Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant SCOJFS, as a department or agency of Vinton County,
is not sui juris and cannot be sued “in its own right” under the statute. Loper v. Cuyahoga Cnty.
Child. and Family Servs., No. 1:18-cv-1598, 2019 WL 1597552, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2019)
(saying the Cuyahoga County Children and Family Services is not sui juris and collecting cases).
For their part, Defendant Stilson is the mother of the children, Defendant Meadows is her

retained counsel, and Defendant Clark was appointed by the state court to represent the children
in the child custody proceedings. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 9, 12, 16). None of them are state actors for the
purposes of Section 1983. See Newton v. Lairson, No. 3:24-cv-P87, 2024 WL 1776395, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2024) (dismissing Section 1983 claims brought against an ex-wife over
allegedly “false testimony during custody hearings” and other conduct); Mulligan v. Schlachter,
389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (saying a private attorney appointed by the court cannot be sued
under Section 1983); Milgrom v. Burstein, 374 F.Supp.2d 523, 527 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (“An ex-wife,
even when an ex-wife acts with her divorce attorney(s), is not a state actor.”); Maben v. Terhune,
No. 16-1025, 2016 WL 9447153, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016) (finding a lawyer who filed a
motion to modify a child custody order and failed to properly serve the father of the children was
not a state actor). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against these Defendants.
2. Judicial Officers
Next, Plaintiff sues Vinton County Judges Grillo, Griffith, and Williams for Fourteenth

Amendment violations. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 7, 135–46; Doc. 9-1 at ¶¶ 17, 160–63). Despite
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, they are entitled to immunity.
Judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that judicial immunity extends to
“those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these
persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune”). This broad protection
exists to ensure that judicial officers are “free to act upon [their] own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to [themselves].” Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115
(6th Cir. 1997).
Judicial immunity can be overcome only where a judge performs “nonjudicial actions” or

acts “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12. This means that
judges are immune from suit even when they act “maliciously, corruptly, in bad faith, or in error.”
Huffer v. Bogen, 503 F. App’x 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2012). To determine if an action is judicial in
nature, courts consider whether it “is a function normally performed by a judge,” as well as “the
expectations of the parties,” like “whether [the parties] dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).
Here, all the acts of which Plaintiff complains were judicial in nature. For instance, he
challenges Defendants’ rulings in the child custody and criminal proceedings (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 79–
89, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 145, 146; Doc. 9-1 at ¶ 17); their decisions or lack thereof on his
motions (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 81, 139; Doc. 9-1 at ¶ 17); and their failure to hold hearings in a certain
manner or respond to his emails (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 60–62, 69, 79–82, 87–88). At bottom, even though
Plaintiff tries to circumvent immunity by claiming these acts were administrative, they occurred
while Defendants were acting in their judicial capacities. See, e.g., Hughes v. Duncan, 636

F.Supp.3d 879, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (“Judicial immunity forecloses plaintiff’s claim based on
a judge’s alleged failure to hold a hearing.” (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted));
Murphy v. Nw. Sch. Dist., No. 5:12-cv-2429, 2013 WL 1500816, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2013)
(“The issuance of judicial orders pertaining to custody, child support, and the issuance of
temporary restraining orders are all actions normally performed by common pleas court judges.”);
Maben, 2016 WL 9447153, at *3 (saying a judge was entitled to immunity for allegations that he
held a hearing and ruled on a child custody motion even though the plaintiff was absent). And
Plaintiff does not allege Defendants acted without jurisdiction in the child custody or criminal
proceedings. (See generally Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 7, 135–46; Doc. 9-1 at ¶¶ 17, 160–63).
As a result, Plaintiff cannot overcome judicial immunity. His claims for damages against

Defendants Grillo, Griffith, and Williams should be DISMISSED.
3. Prosecutor Miller
Plaintiff sues Defendant Miller, a Vinton County prosecutor, for her conduct in his criminal
case and the juvenile custody proceedings. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 139, 145–46).
Like judges, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages for acts that are
“intimately associated with the judicial process.” Cunningham v. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 842 F.
App’x 959, 966 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Specifically, prosecutors are immune for
actions “falling within [their role] as advocate for the state.” Id. (quoting Ireland v. Tunis, 113
F.3d 1435, 1445 (6th Cir. 1997)). This immunity is not overcome if a “prosecutor makes mistakes
or acts with excessive zeal.” French v. Hester, 585 F.Supp.3d 974, 984 (E.D. Ky. 2022) (internal
quotation and quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[p]rosecutorial immunity casts a wide net of
protection.” Id.
Plaintiff claims Defendant Miller is not entitled to immunity because her actions were

“administrative or investigative, not prosecutorial.” (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 139; see also id. at ¶ 145).
The Undersigned disagrees.
Up front, the Undersigned notes that Defendant Miller does not serve as a criminal
prosecutor only. Defendant Miller is also a juvenile court prosecutor and represents Defendant
SCOJFS in the custody proceedings at issue. (See, e.g., Doc. 1-3 at 38–39, 41–44). Plaintiff sues
Defendant Miller for criminally charging him, for moving for pre-trial release conditions, for
filing motions and objections in the child custody case, and for failing to turn over discovery.
(Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 55, 64, 66, 68, 71, 75, 77, 84–87; see also id. ¶ 74 (saying certain motions provide
evidence of “improper coordination and further ghosting”)). These acts all fall within Defendant
Miller’s role as an advocate for the state in both proceedings, and she is entitled to immunity—

even if her underlying motives were as nefarious as Plaintiff believes. Fambrough v. City of East
Cleveland, No. 1:22-cv-992, 2023 WL 4052457, at *7 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2023) (“The motives
of a prosecutor . . . are irrelevant for the purposes of immunity.”); see also Ireland, 13 F.3d at
1446 (saying a prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal complaint is covered by prosecutorial
immunity); Cunningham, 842 F. App’x at 966 (finding a prosecutor enjoyed immunity for actions
taken while seeking an ex parte order for a child custody investigation); Price v. Montgomery
Cnty., 72 F.4th 711, 720 (6th Cir. 2023) (saying prosecutors are immune even when they fail to
disclose evidence).
Plaintiff’s remaining allegations against Defendant Miller concern emails she sent and her
failure to serve Plaintiff with a court filing on time. (Id. at ¶¶ 65, 67, 75, 76; Doc. 9-1 at ¶ 151).
Starting with the emails, Plaintiff suggests they show a conspiracy between the Defendants. (Doc.
1-1 at ¶¶ 144–46 (saying Defendant Miller “coordinated with juvenile case parties”)). In them,

Defendant Miller explains the state’s legal position to Plaintiff because at times, he represented
himself in the state court proceedings. (Id. at 47 (“You are acting as your own legal representation
and, therefore, I will continue to converse with you as I would any licensed attorney whom you
engaged to represent you . . . I am well within my ethical boundaries of representation to highlight
the shortcomings of your arguments[.]”); see also id. 35 (stating the court removed the children
from Plaintiff’s custody and that contact will not be permitted based on “Judge Grillo’s
decision”), 36 (saying the state does not consider Plaintiff a party in the child custody case, even
though the juvenile court had not yet ruled on his motion to dismiss), 46 (saying, before Plaintiff
withdrew his plea in the criminal case, that he would not be allowed to have contact with the
children), 47 (explaining the state’s legal position in the ongoing criminal case)).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim based upon these emails. Importantly, “[a] claim for civil
conspiracy under § 1983 exists only where the plaintiff has established a separate and actionable
injury.” Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. App’x 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2014). Further, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts showing that “(1) a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial
objective to deprive [Plaintiff of his] constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed.”
Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. Appx 900, 914 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273,
290 (6th Cir. 2007)). Specificity is essential. Id. “[V]ague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts” will not do the trick. Id. (quoting Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d
849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008) (saying these
pleading requirements “are relatively strict”).
Plaintiff appears to allege that the injury underlying his conspiracy claim is the state court’s
decision to terminate his companionship rights and issue a no-contact order. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 145–

46). While Plaintiff is correct that parents have “a qualified substantive due process right to raise”
their children, Arsan, 784 F. App’x at 910, Defendant Miller cannot be held liable for the court’s
rulings. Cf. id.; Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. and Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 729
(6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that [the plaintiff] suffered a deprivation of his fundamental right
to family integrity, that deprivation was perpetrated by the juvenile court, not by [the defendant
case worker].”). Therefore, Plaintiff raises no underlying, actionable injury for which Defendant
Miller can be held liable. Rapp, 557 F. App’x at 450.
Even if Plaintiff sufficiently alleged an injury, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against
Defendant Miller is premised on mere conclusions, at best. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (saying
legal conclusions are not entitled to the “assumption of truth,” even at the pleadings stage). He

alleges that Defendant Miller conspired to take away his custody rights, but the emails he provides
show no plan or conspiratorial objective between Miller and the other Defendants. Indeed, all
that can be gleaned from the emails is Defendant Miller’s view on the state court proceedings and
her interpretation of the court’s custody and no-contact orders. (Doc. 1-3 at 36, 46, 47). Without
more facts showing a single plan or conspiratorial objective, Plaintiff fails to allege a conspiracy
claim under Section 1983.
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim seemingly based upon
Defendant Miller’s failure to timely serve a court filing. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 75). This, too, is not a
claim. To allege such a claim, Plaintiff must plead and prove that state processes and remedies
are inadequate to redress his due process violations. Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys.,
360 F.3d 583, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff says the opposite here. When Defendant Miller
failed to timely serve a court filing upon him, Plaintiff contacted the state court, and Plaintiff was
served with the filing. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 75). Because processes at the state-court level were able to

redress this alleged injury, this claim is meritless.
All told, Defendant Miller enjoys absolute immunity for most of Plaintiff’s claims against
her, and Plaintiff’s remaining allegations do not state a Section 1983 claim. His claims for
damages against Defendant Miller should be DISMISSED.
4. Defendants Bunstine, Sparks, Robson, and Hale
Plaintiff’s remaining allegations involve Defendant Bunstine, the children’s guardian ad
litem in the custody proceedings, and Defendants Sparks, Robson, and Hale, all of whom work for
Defendant SCOJFS as children’s services employees. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 11, 13–15). Specifically,
Plaintiff sues Defendant Bunstine for recommending that the children be returned to Defendant
Stilson’s custody in July 2024. (Id. at ¶ 51). He sues Defendants Sparks, Robson, and Hale for

“cutting off [his] contact with the children.” (Id. at ¶¶ 51, 52, 54). And he claims Defendants
Bunstine, Sparks, Robson, and Hale engaged in a “smear campaign” against him to ensure Plaintiff
cannot obtain counsel. (Id. at ¶¶ 90–91).
Once more, immunity blocks most of these claims. Both guardian ad litems and county
children’s services employees are entitled to absolute immunity “akin to the scope of absolute
prosecutorial immunity.” Pittman, 640 F.3d at 724. This means that they are immune from
damages suits for actions taken “within the scope of their roles as advocates for the child in judicial
proceedings.” Arsan, 784 F. App’x at 908 (discussing immunity for guardian ad litems); see also
Pittman, 640 F.3d at 724–25 (saying the same for children’s services social workers). This scope
of immunity includes giving “testimony or recommendations given in court concerning the
children’s best interests,” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 2000), and actions taken
while “reporting to the court their custody recommendations,” Arsan, 784 F. App’x at 908.
Starting with Defendant Bunstine, Plaintiff sues him for recommending that the children

be returned to Defendant Stilson’s custody in July 2024. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 51). Because this
recommendation falls within his scope as the children’s advocate in the juvenile court proceedings,
he is entitled to immunity. Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (granting
immunity to a guardian ad litem for his role within the child custody proceedings). Plaintiff’s view
that this recommendation was the result of Defendant Bunstine’s “antiquated views on parental
roles, gender bias, and ego” does not change anything. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 51). At bottom, “[r]eporting
custody recommendations to the court—based on biases or not—is within the scope of a guardian
ad litem’s functions.” Arsan, 784 F. App’x at 908.
Defendants Sparks, Robson, and Hale’s alleged refusal to let Plaintiff contact the children
after August 8, 2024, also falls under the umbrella of immunity. According to the Amended

Complaint, the Vinton County Juvenile Court placed the children in Defendant SCOJFS’s
temporary custody on that day. (Doc. 9-2 at 12). On September 26, 2024, the juvenile court issued
a no-contact order between Plaintiff and the children. (Id. at 13). Given these facts, Defendants
Sparks, Robson, and Hale’s custodial and visitation decisions “in compliance with the juvenile
court’s order awarding temporary custody” to SCOJFS are “intimately related to the judicial phase
of the child custody proceeding.” Abdulsalaam v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 637 F.Supp.2d
561, 581 (S.D. Ohio 2009). So is their enforcement of the no-contact order. As such, Defendants
Sparks, Robson, and Hale enjoy immunity as well. Bush, 38 F.2d at 847 (finding an officer who
carried out a court order was immune from Section 1983 claims); Abdulsalaam, 637 F.Supp.2d at
581–82 (finding defendants were immune from a claim that they “refus[ed] to reunite a family”
after the juvenile court granted a county agency temporary custody).
Even if these Defendants were not shielded by immunity, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
relief against them. Most of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Bunstine, Sparks, Robson,

and Hale are rooted in the Vinton County Juvenile Court’s orders granting custody of the children
to SCOJFS and prohibiting contact between Plaintiff and the children. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 136, 139,
142, 146 (saying these Defendants terminated his custodial rights and discriminated against him
in doing so)). As discussed, these Defendants cannot be held liable for rights violations caused by
the state court’s orders. Pittman, 640 F.2d at 729–30 (finding that a social worker could not be
held liable for a juvenile court’s decision to terminate custody rights or for the court’s failure to
provide notice of the custody proceedings to the plaintiff); Arsan, 784 F. App’x at 910 (saying
county caseworkers cannot be held liable for a state court’s custody determination).
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Bunstine, Sparks, Robson, and Hale engaged in a
“smear campaign” are also insufficient. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 90). At base, this accusation is too

conclusory. Plaintiff does not specify what actions these Defendants took, nor does he say which
constitutional right was violated. (Id.; see also id. at ¶¶ 135–46 (only raising Section 1983
claims)). To state a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege both. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (saying
a plaintiff must allege what each defendant did to violate his constitutional rights). Because he
does not, this claim cannot proceed.
In sum, Defendants Bunstine, Sparks, Robson, and Hale enjoy immunity from Plaintiff’s
damages claims; and, alternatively, Plaintiff fails to allege a Section 1983 claim against them.
These claims, too, should be DISMISSED.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc.
9) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to combine Plaintiff’s Complaint and amendment
into one filing on the docket and label it as Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 1-2;

Doc. 1-3; Doc. 9-1; Doc. 9-2).
After screening Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the
Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the case be dismissed in its entirety. Specifically, the
Undersigned RECOMMENDS the following:
1. Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as it relates to his ongoing criminal
prosecution, should be DISMISSED under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief for his companionship rights should be DISMISSED
under the domestic relations exception and Rooker-Feldman. Because Plaintiff withdrew
from the child custody proceedings, and because his request is too vague, Plaintiff’s request
for an order ensuring his due process rights are protected in those proceedings should also

be DENIED.
3. Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief related to the child custody proceedings should be
DISMISSED because they, too, are vague. Alternatively, the Court should DECLINE to
exercise jurisdiction over them.
4. Plaintiff’s remaining claims for damages should be DISMISSED for immunity reasons
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5. Finally, because the Undersigned finds that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed,
Plaintiff’s other pending motions should be DENIED. (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10).
Date: May 21, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with
a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended by the Court on a
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11056173. Public record. Not legal advice.