# Friedman v. Bexley Pub. Library

> Ohio Court of Appeals · May 20, 2025 · 2025 Ohio 1799

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11054061

## Case

- **Court:** Ohio Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** May 20, 2025
- **Citations:** 2025 Ohio 1799
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Edelstein
- **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

[Cite as Friedman v. Bexley Pub. Library, 2025-Ohio-
1799.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Robert Friedman, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 24AP-762
v. : (C.P.C. No. 24CV-7363)

Bexley Public Library, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 20, 2025

On brief: Robert Friedman, pro se. Argued: Robert
Friedman.

On brief: Samuel H. Shamansky Co., L.P.A., Samuel H.
Shamansky, and Donald L. Regensburger, for appellee.
Argued: Donald L. Regensburger.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Robert Friedman, appeals, pro se, from the December 16,
2024 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint
against defendant-appellee, Bexley Public Library (“library”). For the following reasons,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
{¶ 2} On September 25, 2024, Mr. Friedman initiated a civil action against the
library in the court below seeking damages in the amount of $500,000. In his complaint,
Mr. Friedman alleged that he had Tourette syndrome1 and claimed the library banned him

1 “Tourette syndrome (TS) is a neurological disorder that may cause sudden unwanted and uncontrolled rapid

and repeated movements or vocal sounds called tics. TS is one of a group of disorders of the developing
No. 24AP-762 2

from its premises for three months, beginning on September 23, 2024, because of his
disability. Mr. Friedman alleged the library’s actions constituted a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and “the Ohio statute dealing with disability
discrimination.” (Sept. 25, 2024 Compl. at ¶ 5.) He also claimed he suffered “humiliation,
sleepless nights[,] and traumatic flashbacks of being banned,” and stated he was “suing for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Compl. at ¶ 6.)
{¶ 3} On October 15, 2024, the library filed a motion requesting the trial court
dismiss Mr. Friedman’s complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and (7) and impose sanctions2
against Mr. Friedman for frivolous conduct. The library’s primary contention was that all
of Mr. Friedman’s claims were deficient on their face and, thus, should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Regarding the intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim, the library also noted that Mr. Friedman had filed complaints
in three separate cases in the last six months alleging humiliation, sleepless nights, and
flashbacks against Panera Bread (ban on April 24, 2024), the Franklin County Law Library
(permanent ban on August 12, 2024), and Target (permanent ban on September 14, 2024).3

nervous system called tic disorders.” National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke: National
Institute of Health, Tourette Syndrome, https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/disorders/tourette-
syndrome (accessed May 16, 2025) [https://perma.cc/4GNV-55YM].

2 The library’s counsel informed the trial court that, if sanctions were imposed against Mr. Friedman, he would

be willing to waive his fee in this matter upon a showing that Mr. Friedman “has made a donation of not less
than $500.00 to the Tourette Association of America, the Columbus Coalition for the Homeless, the National
Alliance on Mental Illness, or some other recognized charity that provides assistance to those with legitimate
mental health or housing needs.” (Oct. 15, 2025 Mot. at 13.)

3 In the case against Panera Bread, Franklin County Common Pleas case No. 24CV-3417, Mr. Friedman

claimed he was banned from the Panera Bread on East Broad Street on April 24, 2024, and alleged that the
Panera Bread manager’s “extreme and outrageous” behavior caused him to suffer deep humiliation, sleepless
nights, and exacerbated his ulcerative colitis, entitling him to two million dollars. On April 4, 2025, the trial
court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Panera Bread on Mr. Friedman’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim.

In the case against the Franklin County Law Library, Franklin County Common Pleas case No. 24CV-6382,
Mr. Friedman alleged that his permanent ban from the law library on August 12, 2024 caused him “flashbacks
of being banned,” humiliation, and difficulty sleeping, entitling him to $500,000 in damages. Finding the
Franklin County Law Library does not possess full capacity and rights to sue or be sued (i.e., sui juris), the
trial court dismissed Mr. Friedman’s complaint in that case on November 19, 2024. See, e.g., Estate of Fleenor
v. Ottawa County, 2022-Ohio-3581, ¶ 3, fn.1 (defining “sui juris”).

In the case against Target, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas case No. 24CV-7131, Mr. Friedman alleged
that the permanent ban he received from Target caused him to feel “very humiliated,” scared by police officers
and vehicles, and difficulty sleeping, entitling him to two million dollars. That case was settled by the parties
and dismissed with prejudice in March 2025.
No. 24AP-762 3

In all three of those cases, Mr. Friedman contended that the bans imposed against him by
those entities caused the same emotional distress he claimed was proximately caused by
the library in this case. (See Oct. 15, 2024 Mot. at 8-10.) Given the overlapping nature of
the harm Mr. Friedman claimed was caused by Panera Bread, Target, the Franklin County
Law Library, and Bexley Public Library, the library argued that these other parties were
indispensable parties under Civ.R. 19 and 19.1. (Oct. 15, 2024 Mot. at 8-10.) However,
because the Franklin County Law Library cannot be sued in its own right, the library posited
that dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(7) was likewise warranted. (See Oct. 15, 2024 Mot. at 8-
10.)
{¶ 4} Mr. Friedman did not file any written response to the library’s motion.
{¶ 5} On December 16, 2024, without holding a hearing, the trial court issued an
entry granting the library’s motion to dismiss, finding Mr. Friedman engaged in frivolous
conduct, and ordering Mr. Friedman to pay the library’s reasonable attorney fees pursuant
to R.C. 2323.51. (Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 3.)
{¶ 6} Mr. Friedman now appeals from that judgment, and asserts the following six
assignments of error for our review:

[I.] THAT I DID NOT ALLEGE ANY SPECIFIC PERSON
WHO OWNS LEASES OR OPERATES A PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMODATION HAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME.

[II.] THE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY WROTE THAT
DAMAGES ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE ADA
ABSENT AN ORDER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL[.]

[III.] THE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY WROTE THAT
LIBRARIES DO NOT FALL WITHIN A PLACE OF PUBLIC
ACCOMODATION[.]

[IV.] THE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY WROTE THAT THE
ACTIONS OF BEXLEY [PUBLIC] LIBRARY WERE NOT
EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS WHICH IS THE SECOND
ELEMENT OF I.I.E.D[.]

[V.] THE COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN THEY WROTE
THAT THEY CLAIM THAT I DID NOT JOIN THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS IN THE OTHER CASES THAT I’M SUING
AND BECAUSE A LIBRARY IS NOT AN ENTITY THAT CAN
No. 24AP-762 4

BE SUED THEREFORE ALL OF MY CLAIM SHOULD BE
DISMISSED[.]

[VI.] THE COURT ALSO ERRED THAT MY CASE IS
FRIVILOUS AND MERITLESS.

(Sic passim.)

II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} The trial court granted the library’s motion to dismiss Mr. Friedman’s claims
of unlawful discrimination under the ADA, discrimination under Ohio law, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. After dismissing Mr. Friedman’s complaint, the trial court
found the library’s motion for sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 well-taken and ordered Mr.
Friedman to pay the library’s reasonable attorney fees.
A. The trial court did not err in dismissing all of Mr. Friedman’s claims
{¶ 8} In his first, second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error, Mr.
Friedman takes issue with the trial court’s various findings in support of its decision to
dismiss his complaint. As explained below, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to
dismiss all of Mr. Friedman’s claims under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
1. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard
{¶ 9} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is a procedural test of a civil complaint’s sufficiency. Cool v.
Frenchko, 2022-Ohio-3747, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), quoting Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger
Co. LPA, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(6) is appropriate “only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts entitling the plaintiff to recovery.” Bullard v. McDonald’s, 2021-Ohio-1505, ¶ 11
(10th Dist.). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the trial court “must
presume all factual allegations contained in the complaint to be true and must make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. “The court need not, however, accept as
true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint.” Id.
{¶ 10} We review a trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State
ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 12, citing Perrysburg Twp.
v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we are mindful that Civ.R. 8(A) provides for notice pleading, which
No. 24AP-762 5

requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to
relief, and . . . a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.”
Accordingly, “[a] judgment granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss may be affirmed
only when there is no set of facts under which the nonmoving party could recover.” Dunlop
v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2017-Ohio-5531, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), citing O’Brien v.
Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus.
2. Disability Discrimination under the ADA and Ohio Law
{¶ 11} Mr. Friedman’s complaint referred generally to the ADA, suggesting he
sought to assert a claim under that law and “the Ohio statute dealing with disability
discrimination.” (Compl. at ¶ 5.)
{¶ 12} “Congress enacted the ADA ‘to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’ ” Wolfe
v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2011-Ohio-6825, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), quoting 42 U.S.C.
12101(b)(1). “The ADA forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three
different areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public
services, programs, and activities, which are covered by Title II; and public
accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Id., citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 516-17 (2004).
{¶ 13} Mr. Friedman alleged in his complaint that the library banned him for three
months because of his Tourette syndrome. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in
employment and, thus, does not apply to his claim. Friedman v. Ebner Properties, 2023-
Ohio-4398, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). Title II of the ADA provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions
of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
12132. And Title III of the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42
U.S.C. 12182.
No. 24AP-762 6

{¶ 14} Regarding Mr. Friedman’s disability discrimination claim under the ADA, the
trial court construed his complaint as alleging a Title III violation and determined that he
“has not alleged that any specific person who ‘owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation’ has discriminated against [him], an essential element for claims made
under the ADA.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 2, citing 42 U.S.C. 12182(a).) In his first
assignment of error, Mr. Friedman contends this finding was error.
{¶ 15} The trial court further observed that “monetary damages are not available
under [Title III of] the ADA absent a request from the Attorney General.” (Dec. 16, 2024
Jgmt. Entry at 2, citing 42 U.S.C. 12188(b)(2)(B).) In his second assignment of error, Mr.
Friedman contends this statement was erroneous.
{¶ 16} The trial court also interpreted Mr. Friedman’s allegation that the library
violated “the Ohio statute dealing with disability discrimination” as referring to R.C.
4112.02(G). That provision prohibits “any proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager
of a place of public accommodation” from denying “to any person, except for reasons
applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, military status,
national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation.” R.C. 4112.02(G).
The trial court found that the library was not a “ ‘place of public accommodation’ as that
term is used in R.C. 4112.02(G)” because, in Ohio, that term “does not refer to locations
offering gratuitous services.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 2.) In his third assignment of
error, Mr. Friedman broadly alleges that the trial court erred in finding “that libraries do
not fall within a place of public accommodation.” (Appellant’s Brief at 3.)
{¶ 17} Initially, we note that Title II—not Title III—typically applies to libraries. See,
e.g., Doe v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Edn., 56 F.4th 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 2023) (“Title II of the ADA
seeks to ensure that people with disabilities may use public facilities like libraries,
courthouses, or schools.”). See also Association of Research Libraries, ADA Title II
Regulations: Implications for Libraries, https://www.arl.org/resources/ada-title-ii-
regulations-implications-for-libraries (accessed May 16, 2025) [https://perma.cc/3VM6-
EBK4]; (summarizing April 24, 2024 revisions to ADA Title II regulations and their
implications for libraries); Library Accessibility Alliance, ADA Title II and Academic
Libraries, https://libraryaccessibility.org/ada-title-ii (accessed May 16, 2025)
No. 24AP-762 7

[https://perma.cc/DYJ8-NK95] (the same). We also note that, unlike Title III of the ADA,
Title II “authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that
violate [Section] 12132.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154, 159 (2006).
{¶ 18} Significantly, however, Mr. Friedman did not allege in his complaint that the
library was a “public entity” subject to Title II of the ADA. Nor does he contend on appeal
that the trial court erroneously construed his complaint as alleging disability discrimination
under Title III of the ADA or R.C. 4112.02(G).
{¶ 19} Instead, Mr. Friedman repeatedly asserts in his merit brief that he “was not
suing under the ADA [or state law] as a cause of action” for disability discrimination. (See
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. See also Appellant’s Brief at 6, 12.) At oral argument, he reiterated
the same. As explained by Mr. Friedman, the alleged violations of federal and state
disability discrimination laws are referenced in his complaint as proof of “extreme and
outrageous” conduct—an element of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
(See Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.)
{¶ 20} In light of Mr. Friedman’s stated position that he is not alleging federal or
state disability discrimination claims, the issues raised in his first, second, and third
assignments of error do not concern a matter in controversy between the parties on appeal.
In his first and third assignments of error, Mr. Friedman challenges the trial court’s finding
that he failed to identify in his complaint any person subject to Title III of the ADA (“any
specific person who owns, leases [or leases to], or operates [a] place of public
accommodation”) and determination that a library is not a “place of public
accommodation” under the ADA or R.C. 4112.02(G). (Appellant’s Brief at 2.) In his second
assignment of error, Mr. Friedman takes issue with the trial court’s determination that
monetary damages are not available under Title III of the ADA. These findings have no
bearing on whether the ban was based on Mr. Friedman’s disability and, thus, are not
relevant to showing the ban was “extreme and outrageous” for purposes of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim.
{¶ 21} “The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 238
No. 24AP-762 8

(1910). See also M.R. v. Niesen, 2022-Ohio-1130, ¶ 13, quoting Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio
St.2d 13, 14 (1970) (observing that courts “decide only ‘actual controversies between parties
legitimately affected by specific facts’ ”). Further, we have a “responsibility to refrain from
giving advisory opinions.” Cyran v. Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 12, citing Smith v. Leis, 2006-
Ohio-6113, ¶ 16. Since Mr. Friedman asserts he is not alleging disability discrimination
claims under federal or Ohio law, we cannot issue a “judgment [which] can be carried into
effect” as to his first, second, or third assignments of error. A reviewing court is not required
to “render an advisory opinion on a moot question or rule on a question of law that cannot
affect matters at issue in a case.” In re A.P., 2022-Ohio-4295, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.), quoting In
re C.C., 2005-Ohio-5163, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). In such instance, we are permitted to instead
overrule assigned errors as moot. See, e.g., A.P. at ¶ 29, citing Bambeck v. Catholic Dioceses
of Cleveland, 2006-Ohio-4883, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 22} Because Mr. Friedman’s first, second, and third assignments of error take
issue with findings that ultimately have no bearing on the trial court’s decision to dismiss
his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we overrule those three
assignments of error as moot.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
{¶ 23} To survive a motion to dismiss when alleging a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, a complaint must include allegations that (1) the defendant intended
to cause or knew or should have known that its actions would result in serious emotional
distress; (2) the defendant’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it went beyond all
bounds of decency and was such as to be considered utterly intolerable in a civilized
community; (3) the defendant’s actions proximately caused psychological injury to the
plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff suffered serious mental anguish of a nature that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure. Brown v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-
4012, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Perry v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-3828, ¶ 16 (10th
Dist.), citing Aycox v. Columbus Bd. of Edn., 2005-Ohio-69 (10th Dist.). See also Coffman
v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-3829, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 24} In this case, Mr. Friedman alleges his three-month ban from the library was
“extreme and outrageous” because it violated federal and state disability discrimination
No. 24AP-762 9

laws. (See Compl. at ¶ 5.) Mr. Friedman claims to suffer “humiliation, sleepless nights[,]
and traumatic flashbacks of being banned for 3 months.” (Compl. at ¶ 6.)
{¶ 25} Whether conduct rises to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct
constitutes a question of law. See, e.g., Meminger v. Ohio State Univ., 2017-Ohio-9290,
¶ 7, 14 (10th Dist.); Morrow, 2009-Ohio-2665, at ¶ 48. “ ‘[I]t is not enough that the
defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by
malice, or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for
another tort.’ ” Meminger at ¶ 15, quoting Mendlovic v. Life Line Screening of Am., Ltd.,
2007-Ohio-4674, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.). “Rather, ‘[l]iability is found only where the conduct is so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ”
Id., citing Mendlovic at ¶ 47, citing Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369,
374-75 (1983). Generally, “extreme and outrageous” conduct that warrants recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress “ ‘must be conduct that would lead an average
member of the community to exclaim, “Outrageous!” ’ ” Meminger at ¶ 15, quoting Perkins
v. Lavin, 98 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (9th Dist. 1994), citing Yeager at 374-75, citing
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 46(1) (1965).
{¶ 26} In this case, taking as true all the allegations in the complaint, we do not find
the conduct alleged—a three-month ban from the library—“ ‘so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Meminger at ¶ 22, quoting
Mendlovic at ¶ 47. Mr. Friedman asserts this ban was borne out by the library’s unlawful
disability discrimination against him. But he did not include in his complaint any factual
allegations surrounding the circumstances of the ban or attribute any particular conduct to
any library representative that could be seen as unlawful discrimination or otherwise
outrageous or extreme as a matter law.
{¶ 27} It is well-established that the obligation to accept factual allegations in a
complaint as true when ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss does not extend to
unsupported legal conclusions. See, e.g., Regulic v. Columbus, 2022-Ohio-1034, ¶ 22-23
(10th Dist.); Kanu v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2018-Ohio-4969, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.) (affirming a
No. 24AP-762 10

Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim by observing that “the court need not
accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the
complaint”). “[O]nly claims supported by factual allegations can avoid dismissal” under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing
Haas v. Stryker, 2013-Ohio-2476, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.). We are not bound to accept Mr.
Friedman’s legal conclusion, couched as a factual allegation, that the library engaged in
disability discrimination when it banned him from its premises for three months.
{¶ 28} At issue, then, is whether a three-month ban from a public library, alone,
constitutes the “extreme and outrageous” conduct required to establish a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. On review, we find that such conduct, in the
absence of any factual allegations regarding the circumstances surrounding Mr. Friedman’s
ban, is not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” Yeager at 375. Thus, the conduct alleged in Mr. Friedman’s
complaint cannot, as a matter of law, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous necessary
for a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
{¶ 29} Based on this court’s de novo review, we find the trial court did not err in
granting the library’s motion to dismiss Mr. Friedman’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). For these reasons, we overrule Mr.
Friedman’s fourth assignment of error.
{¶ 30} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Friedman challenges the trial court’s
finding that he failed to join necessary parties and determination that the Franklin County
Law Library is not an entity that can be sued. These findings pertain to the trial court’s
determination that dismissal of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was
also warranted under Civ.R. 12(B)(7). (See Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 3.) Given our
resolution of Mr. Friedman’s fourth assignment of error finding dismissal of that claim was
appropriate under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), however, any issues regarding the propriety of the trial
court’s findings under Civ.R. 12(B)(7) have now been rendered moot. See App.R.
12(A)(1)(c); State v. Gideon, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 26 (“[A]n assignment of error is moot when
an appellant presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision
No. 24AP-762 11

rendered by the appellate court.”). As such, we overrule Mr. Friedman’s fifth assignment
of error as moot.
B. The trial court erred in granting the library’s motion for sanctions
and attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2323.51
{¶ 31} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Friedman contends the trial court erred
in finding that his case “is frivolous and meritless.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4. See also
Appellant’s Brief at 11.) For the following reasons, we find the trial court erred in imposing
sanctions against him.
{¶ 32} Under R.C. 2323.51, a court “may assess and make an award to any party to
the civil action or appeal who was adversely affected by frivolous conduct.” R.C.
2323.51(B)(1). “Conduct” encompasses “[t]he filing of a civil action, the assertion of a claim,
defense, or other position in connection with a civil action, the filing of a pleading, motion,
or other paper in a civil action, . . . or the taking of any other action in connection with a
civil action.” R.C. 2323.51(A)(1)(a). “Frivolous conduct” means the conduct of a party to a
civil action satisfies any of the following:

(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another
improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing
unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of
litigation.

(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith
argument for the establishment of new law.

(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual
contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that
are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.

R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a).
No. 24AP-762 12

{¶ 33} R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) provides that an award under R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) may be
made only after the court does all of the following:

(a) Sets a date for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with
division (B)(2)(c) of this section, to determine whether
particular conduct was frivolous, to determine, if the conduct
was frivolous, whether any party was adversely affected by it,
and to determine, if an award is to be made, the amount of that
award;

(b) Gives notice of the date of the hearing described in division
(B)(2)(a) of this section to each party or counsel of record who
allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct and to each party who
allegedly was adversely affected by frivolous conduct;

(c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) of this
section in accordance with this division, allows the parties and
counsel of record involved to present any relevant evidence at
the hearing, including evidence of the type described in
division (B)(5) of this section, determines that the conduct
involved was frivolous and that a party was adversely affected
by it, and then determines the amount of the award to be made.

{¶ 34} R.C. 2323.51 does not require a trial court to conduct a hearing before
denying a motion for attorney fees. See Brisco v. U.S. Restoration & Remodeling, Inc.,
2015-Ohio-3567, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). Rather, a trial court is only required to schedule a
hearing on motions demonstrating arguable merit. See id.
{¶ 35} No single standard of review applies in R.C. 2323.51 cases. Judd v. Meszaros,
2011-Ohio-4983, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing Wiltberger v. Davis, 110 Ohio App.3d 46, 51 (10th
Dist. 1996). Indeed, the controlling standard of review hinges on whether the trial court’s
determination resulted from factual findings or a legal analysis. Bell v. Nichols, 2013-Ohio-
2559, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i), (iii), and (iv) require the trial court to make
factual determinations. Our review of these factual determinations is subject to deference
and will not be disturbed where the record contains competent, credible evidence to
support the trial court’s findings. Brisco at ¶ 35, citing Judd at ¶ 18. By contrast, a
determination under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii) that conduct is not warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law requires a legal analysis and is, therefore, subject to de novo review.
No. 24AP-762 13

Brisco at ¶ 35, citing Judd at ¶ 19, and Stuller v. Price, 2003-Ohio-6826, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
Finally, where a trial court finds frivolous conduct, the decision whether to assess a penalty
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Judd at ¶ 19.
{¶ 36} Here, the trial court issued a written judgment finding that Mr. Friedman
engaged in frivolous conduct “through his frivolous filing” and ordered him to pay the
library’s “reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 3.) On appeal, Mr.
Friedman contends the trial court erred in finding he engaged in frivolous conduct. Mr.
Friedman did not specifically allege that the trial court erred (1) in not holding a hearing on
the library’s motion for sanctions, as required by R.C. 2323.51(B)(2), and (2) in not making
findings of fact. Nevertheless, because his sixth assignment of error essentially alleges the
trial court’s frivolous conduct finding was erroneous, we believe it is prudent to address the
lack of hearing and lack of findings.
{¶ 37} The record reflects the trial court did not hold a hearing on the library’s
motion for sanctions before making this award, as required by R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). The
absence of a hearing is significant because the trial court did not receive evidence
establishing the actual amount of the library’s attorney fees and did not make any findings
on the reasonableness thereof. See R.C. 2323.51(B)(5). Instead, the trial court left it to the
parties to negotiate a “reasonable award,” noting that the library’s counsel expressed a
willingness to waive his fees if Mr. Friedman donated at least $500 to one of the suggested
charities. (Dec. 16, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 3.) The trial court’s failure to determine the amount
of attorney fees clearly contravenes R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(c), which requires the trial court to
both conduct a hearing on a motion for sanctions and, where appropriate, “determine[]
the amount of the award to be made.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court erred in granting the library’s
motion for sanctions without holding a hearing. We do not address the remainder of Mr.
Friedman’s arguments and make no findings as to whether he engaged in frivolous conduct
or if sanctions are ultimately appropriate in this matter.
{¶ 39} Accordingly, we sustain, in part, Mr. Friedman’s sixth assignment of error to
the extent that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements set forth in R.C.
2323.51.
No. 24AP-762 14

III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Mr. Friedman’s fourth assignment of
error, overrule Mr. Friedman’s first, second, third, and fifth assignments of error as moot,
and sustain Mr. Friedman’s sixth assignment of error, in part, to the extent outlined in this
decision. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this decision and the applicable law.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with instructions.

BEATTY BLUNT and DINGUS, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11054061. Public record. Not legal advice.