# Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

> Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 14, 2025 · 340 Or. App. 482

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11053345

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Oregon
- **Decided:** May 14, 2025
- **Citations:** 340 Or. App. 482
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Powers
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11053345

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing a jurisdictional judgment based on the mother’s substance abuse due to lack of evidence that the mother “used drugs while caring for [the child] or that her drug use had any effect on her parenting”

## Opinion text

482 May 14, 2025 No. 427

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of M. L.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
and
M. L.,
Respondent,
v.
K. B. L.,
aka K. L.,
Appellant.
Columbia County Circuit Court
24JU01603; A184809 (Control)
In the Matter of K. L.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
and
K. L.,
Respondent,
v.
K. B. L.,
aka K. L.,
Appellant.
Columbia County Circuit Court
24JU01604; A184810
In the Matter of B. L.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
and
B. L.,
Respondent,
v.
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 483

K. B. L.,
aka K. L.,
Appellant.
Columbia County Circuit Court
24JU01605; A184811

Denise E. Keppinger, Judge.
Argued and submitted February 26, 2025.
Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey,
Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, argued the cause
for respondent Department of Human Services. Also on the
brief was Dan Rayfield, Attorney General.
Erica Hayne Friedman filed the brief for respondents
M. L., K. L., and B. L. Also on the brief was Youth, Rights
& Justice.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
POWERS, J.
Reversed and remanded for entry of jurisdictional judg-
ments omitting allegations 4(D) and 4(E) as bases for juris-
diction; otherwise affirmed.
484 Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

POWERS, J.
In this consolidated juvenile dependency case,
mother challenges judgments asserting jurisdiction over her
three children. The court took jurisdiction based on allega-
tions related to mother’s substance abuse and exposing the
children to an adult who injured one of them. In 24 assign-
ments of error, mother makes two primary arguments. First,
in assignments of error one through six, mother asserts that
the juvenile court erred by admitting toxicology lab reports
of the children under the business records exception to hear-
say, OEC 803(6), and by admitting testimony about those
lab reports. Second, in assignments of error seven through
24, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in asserting
dependency jurisdiction because the department failed to
prove that mother exposed the children to a cognizable risk
of harm. As explained below, we conclude that the juvenile
court erred by admitting the lab reports and related testi-
mony and that the court erred in asserting jurisdiction in
part. Accordingly, we affirm the jurisdictional judgments in
part and reverse in part.
Absent de novo review, which mother does not seek,
we view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by
permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favor-
able to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether,
when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit
that outcome. Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App
633, 639, 307 P3d 444 (2013). We are bound by the juve-
nile court’s express and necessarily implied findings of fact,
if supported by any evidence. Id. at 639-40. We recite the
underlying facts with that standard of review in mind.
Mother has three children, M, K, and B. At the
time of the underlying jurisdictional trial in 2024, M was
five years old, K was four, and B was two. In 2022, the juve-
nile court originally took jurisdiction over the children after
B tested positive at birth for various controlled substances.
Father died of an accidental drug overdose a few months
later. Mother completed family treatment court, and in
January 2024, the court dismissed jurisdiction because it
concluded that mother addressed the issues that brought
the children into care.
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 485

Less than a month after the juvenile court dismissed
the case, the Department of Human Services (the depart-
ment or DHS) received a hotline call that prompted a child-
welfare investigation that led to new dependency petitions.
DHS investigator, Lovett, interviewed mother and thought
that mother “appeared anxious” and that it was “kind of
hard [for mother] to focus.” Lovett urged mother to get a drug
and alcohol assessment but did not remove the children.
One month later, the department received another
call, and Lovett went to inspect mother’s residence. When
Lovett arrived, mother appeared to be under the influence of
drugs and was confused about B’s whereabouts. Mother ini-
tially told Lovett that B was napping upstairs, but B was not
there when Lovett went inside. Mother then remembered
that B was at the babysitters. While in the home, Lovett saw
small alcohol bottles all around the apartment that could
have been within the children’s reach, including one that
was full and uncapped. Additionally, Lovett saw a “whole
setup for injecting substances,” which she described as a “fix
kit,” including a razor blade, a spoon, used syringes, and a
water bottle that had cocaine residue on the outside, sitting
in the apartment’s only working bathroom. Mother acknowl-
edged that the syringes were dangerous for the kids but
denied that they were hers and told Lovett that the syringes
belonged to someone else whom she just let use her shower.
A few days later, DHS received a report that M had
injuries. Lovett went to M’s school and reported that he had
a “goose egg” on his head. M told Lovett that his mother’s
friend, Marsh, who occasionally stayed the night at their
home, was in their home and kicked M, which caused M to
fall down the stairs. In addition to Lovett, M told several
other adults about Marsh kicking him and falling down
the stairs. When mother was confronted about M’s injury,
mother told Lovett that the children “hurt each other. All
these fucking kids have bruises on their heads from each
other.” When mother was told by Lovett that Marsh would
need to be kept away from the children, she was upset and
said “no,” and she referred to Marsh as “all I have.”
At Lovett’s urging in response to M’s injuries,
mother drove all three children to the Amani Center, a
486 Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

child advocacy center that conducts forensic interviews and
medical exams. Lovett observed that, at this time, mother
seemed to be impaired but allowed her to drive the children
because there was no “pickup order yet.” Reardon, a family
nurse practitioner at the Amani Center, examined the chil-
dren and noted that all three children had scratches and
bruises. Reardon, who described the children as generally
well-groomed and otherwise well-cared for, took urine sam-
ples from the three children and a hair sample from K, all
of which she sent to a lab for testing. While at the Amani
Center, Lovett obtained an order authorizing her to remove
the children from mother’s care and place them in foster
care, at which point mother told Lovett, “My children are
fucking liars.”
Antonucci, a DHS permanency worker, also observed
mother under the influence of substances several times,
including during one of mother’s family visits with the
children. In one instance, while Antonucci was walking
with mother, mother seemed unaware that she was hold-
ing B while carrying him down a hallway, and later mother
dropped B 14 to 16 inches into his car seat.
DHS petitioned the juvenile court to take jurisdic-
tion based on five allegations: 4(A), mother exposed the chil-
dren to an adult (Marsh) in her home who caused injury to
M; 4(B), mother’s substance abuse interferes with her ability
to safely parent the children; 4(C), father is deceased; 4(D),
K and B tested positive for controlled substances while in
the care of mother; and 4(E), despite receiving treatment for
an admitted substance abuse allegation in a prior depen-
dency case, including inpatient treatment and participating
in specialty court, K and B tested positive for controlled sub-
stances approximately 10 weeks after dismissal of the prior
dependency case and mother has been observed to be under
the influence of controlled substances.
At trial, the juvenile court accepted Reardon as
an expert in diagnosing child medical maltreatment. DHS
introduced Reardon’s reports, which included copies of the
lab reports documenting the children’s drug tests. Mother
objected to the lab reports and related testimony regard-
ing those reports on hearsay grounds. The court overruled
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 487

the objection, citing the business records hearsay excep-
tion, OEC 803(6), and admitted the exhibits reasoning that
the lab reports were part of the routine process informing
Reardon’s opinion. Reardon proceeded to testify that she
conducted a forensic medical evaluation of all three children
and that she collected the hair and urine samples, but that
she did not have any involvement in running those samples
or preparing the lab reports. Reardon concluded that the
children had recently been exposed to substances given that
B’s urine tested positive for amphetamines and metham-
phetamines and K’s hair sample tested positive for meth-
amphetamines and marijuana.
Mother also testified at trial. Mother denied that
Marsh was an important person to her. When asked if she
believed M that Marsh hurt him, she answered yes, but she
also provided conflicting testimony, including: “[y]es and
no, because I always believe something my child comes and
tells me, right? However, * * * it was a little hard to believe,”
that M has “stated things to me * * * that are not true,” that
M has “falsely accused people before,” and that she “can’t a
hundred percent say my kid is lying. What I’m saying is [M]
has been known to say things that are not true.”
Ultimately, the juvenile court concluded that the
department established all the bases for jurisdiction.1
Mother timely appeals.
In mother’s first six assignments of error, mother
asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting the lab
results and testimony about the lab results. We review
whether evidence qualifies under the OEC 803(6) busi-
ness records hearsay exception for errors of law. Arrowood
Indemnity Co. v. Fasching, 369 Or 214, 247, 503 P3d 1233
(2022).
Mother asserts that the lab reports do not qualify
as business records because it is undisputed that Reardon
did not have any knowledge about how the lab reports were
1
Although the judgments note that the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction
based on allegations “3A” through “3E,” the court orally referred to the allega-
tions as “4A” through “4E,” which tracks the numbering in the petition. Like the
parties’ briefs on appeal, we similarly use the numbering from the petitions and
assume that the notations in the judgments are scrivener’s errors.
488 Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

generated, and the fact that she relied on the lab reports for
her own purpose does not establish anything about their cre-
ation, which is what OEC 803(6) requires. The department
concedes that the court erred by admitting the lab reports
as business records, but it argues that the reports were
admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining the
foundations for Reardon’s expert opinions, thus any error is
harmless. In her reply, mother asserts that the testimony is
inadmissible because, although an expert may testify about
inadmissible evidence to provide the foundation necessary
to explain the expert’s opinion, it is not admissible for its
truth, and here, the court considered the lab reports for
their truth. Further, mother argues Reardon’s opinion was
nothing more than a recitation of the lab reports.
We first turn to the lab reports themselves. Hearsay
evidence, which is defined in OEC 801(3) as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted,” is generally inadmissible. See OEC
802. Unlike statements made in court, which are subject to
immediate cross-examination and where the trier of fact can
observe the demeanor of the witness who swears or affirms
to tell the truth, hearsay evidence is presumptively excluded
because of its untrustworthiness. Arrowood Indemnity Co.,
369 Or at 222. One exception to hearsay in the evidence code
is what is commonly known as the business record exception.
Under OEC 803(6), qualifying business records are exempt
from the bar on hearsay evidence if there is testimony that
the records were “kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity” and that it is “the regular practice of that
business activity” to make the records. Thus, “a party seek-
ing to utilize the business records exception must present evi-
dence about the record-making practices of the business that
created the record.” Arrowood Indemnity Co., 369 Or at 226.
Here, no such foundation was established. Reardon did not
create the reports or have any insight into how the reports
were generated. Accordingly, we accept the state’s concession
that the juvenile court erred in admitting the lab reports
under OEC 803(6).
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 489

We turn next to mother’s objection to Reardon’s tes-
timony. OEC 703 allows an expert witness to offer an opinion
based on inadmissible evidence, as long as the information
is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data.” Importantly, however, “OEC 703 does not
render otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible merely
because it was the basis for the expert’s opinion.” McCathern
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 332 Or 59, 70, 23 P3d 320 (2001). An
expert may testify about the inadmissible evidence only “to
provide the foundation necessary to explain [the expert’s]
opinions, not for its truth.” Id. Moreover, an expert may not
merely parrot the statement of another for its truth. State v.
Bowman, 373 Or 213, 227, 564 P3d 121 (2025). Accordingly,
if a testifying expert is relying entirely on the conclusions
reached by other technicians, that testimony is not allowed
because it would simply be parroting hearsay statements.
Id. at 226 (citing Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence
§ 703.03[3], 690-91 (7th ed 2020)).
Here, although the lab results might be the type of
information that a nurse might reasonably rely upon to form
an opinion about potential child medical maltreatment,
Reardon did not testify to the results of the lab reports for the
purpose of explaining her own diagnostic opinion. Rather,
her conclusion relied entirely on the conclusions reached by
other technicians. That is, DHS elicited and relied upon that
testimony for the truth of the matter asserted. For instance,
the department referenced the testimony and lab results in
closing arguments, asserting that “the evidence also showed
through expert testimony that two of her children tested
positive for controlled substances,” and “we do have children
through lab urinalysis and hair samples who have tested
positive for controlled substances.” Ultimately, because
Reardon was relying entirely on the conclusions reached by
other technicians, the trial court erred in allowing her testi-
mony because it was merely parroting inadmissible hearsay
statements.
In sum, we agree with mother’s arguments that the
juvenile court erred in admitting the lab reports as exhibits
and in allowing Reardon to testify over her hearsay objection
490 Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

about the lab results. Those errors are not harmless. The
effect of the court’s evidentiary error becomes clear as we
discuss mother’s challenge to the merits of the dependency
judgments.
Turning to the remaining assignments of error,
mother asserts in a combined argument that the juvenile
court was not authorized to assert dependency jurisdiction
over each of her children because the department failed to
prove that mother exposed the children to a cognizable risk
of harm. We agree that the juvenile court erred in asserting
jurisdiction in two instances and affirm the remaining por-
tions of the jurisdictional judgments.
ORS 419B.100(1)(c) allows a juvenile court to assert
dependency jurisdiction over a child whose “condition or
circumstances are such as to endanger [a child’s] welfare.”
The evidence must show “that the child’s condition or cir-
cumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious
loss or injury that is likely to be realized.” Dept. of Human
Services v. A. W., 276 Or App 276, 278, 367 P3d 556 (2016).
DHS has the burden of showing a nexus “between the par-
ent’s conduct or condition and a threat of harm to the child
that exists at the time of the jurisdictional trial.” Dept. of
Human Services v. C. A. M., 294 Or App 605, 615, 432 P3d
1175 (2018). A record may support a nexus if there is evi-
dence that a parent does not believe that another person
poses a risk of harm to a child, when that other person does
pose such a risk. See Dept. of Human Services v. K. V., 276 Or
App 782, 792-93, 369 P3d 1231, rev den, 359 Or 667 (2016)
(concluding that evidence that the father did not believe that
there were issues with the mother’s parenting that would
have led to the child’s injury supported the court’s findings
that the father was likely to fail to protect the child from the
mother); Dept. of Human Services v. H. H., 266 Or App 196,
204-05, 337 P3d 929 (2014), rev den, 356 Or 837 (2015) (not-
ing that, because the mother did not believe that the father
played a role in harming the child and did not perceive the
need to take steps to protect her children from the father,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the father would again
inflict a significant injury on one of the children).
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 491

Applying those standards here, the record permits
the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction based on alle-
gation 4(A), that mother exposed the children to an adult
(Marsh) in her home who caused injury to M, allegation 4(B),
that mother’s substance abuse interferes with her ability to
safely parent the children, and allegation 4(C), that father is
deceased. We further conclude that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the court’s determination of jurisdiction
based on allegations 4(D) and 4(E).
Both allegations 4(D), regarding K and B testing
positive for controlled substances while in mother’s care, and
4(E), which focuses on K and B testing positive for controlled
substances shortly after the dismissal of the prior dependency
case, rely on evidence that the children tested positive for con-
trolled substances. As we explained above, the juvenile court
erred in admitting both the lab reports and testimony from
Reardon about the lab results. Although there is evidence
that the children were exposed to controlled substances, such
as mother’s intoxication while caring for the children and the
drugs and “fix kit” in the home, the evidence from the lab
reports and the testimony are significant, if not dispositive,
that the children tested positive for controlled substances.
Thus, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s disposition, the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the court’s determination on those two bases for jurisdic-
tion. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in
asserting jurisdiction based on allegations 4(D) and 4(E).
As to allegation 4(A), the evidence adduced at trial
was that M sustained a noticeable injury, a “goose egg” on
his forehead, and mother continued to have difficulty artic-
ulating that she believes Marsh injured M. Even though
M is young, M made consistent statements to a number of
adults that he received the injury from Marsh. M was able
to clearly articulate how he was injured, and those state-
ments matched the injury and were made near the time of
the injury. Further, when mother was confronted about M’s
injury, she referred to Marsh as “all I have” and became
upset and said “no” when she was told Marsh could not be
around the children. Although mother later testified that
Marsh was not important to her, the department argues that
492 Dept. of Human Services v. K. B. L.

there is evidence that contradicts that statement. Viewing
that evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s disposition, there was sufficient evidence from which
the court could conclude that mother exposed the children
to an adult who caused injury to M. Further, there is evi-
dence to support the finding that mother does not believe
that Marsh injured M or seemingly perceive that Marsh is a
danger to the children, which supports a determination that
the children remain at risk of harm.
As to allegation 4(B), there is evidence that supports
that mother’s substance abuse interferes with her ability to
safely parent the children. Mother admitted using alcohol
and marijuana, including using marijuana on the morning
of the trial, and Lovett and Antonucci both testified that they
encountered mother while she was seemingly under the influ-
ence of intoxicants while interacting with her children. For
example, while mother was intoxicated, mother was unaware
of where B was, telling Lovett that B was inside but later
realizing B was at the babysitters. Mother at one point was
apparently unaware that she was holding B and later dropped
B into a car seat. Further, alcohol bottles were strewn across
the home, including an opened and uncapped full bottle of
alcohol that could have been within reach of the children.
There was also drug paraphernalia, including a rusty razor,
spoon, used syringes, and a bottle that had cocaine residue on
the outside, in the only working bathroom of the apartment.
On appeal, mother argues that evidence that a par-
ent uses drugs is insufficient to establish jurisdiction with-
out some theory, supported by the facts, as to how that use
poses a risk to the child. See, e.g., A. W., 276 Or App at 280
(reversing a jurisdictional judgment based on the mother’s
substance abuse due to lack of evidence that the mother
“used drugs while caring for [the child] or that her drug use
had any effect on her parenting”). Here, however, we agree
with DHS’s argument that the evidence was sufficient given
the evidence that mother was intoxicated and unaware that
B was in her arms while carrying him down a hallway, and
evidence of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and alcohol in areas
where the children could reach. Ultimately, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
Cite as 340 Or App 482 (2025) 493

disposition, there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile
court to determine that mother’s substance abuse interferes
with her ability to safely parent the children.
As to allegation 4(C), it is undisputed that father
is deceased. Although jurisdiction is not warranted over
a child who has a parent that is capable for caring for the
child safely, Dept. of Human Services v. E. M., 264 Or App
76, 84-85, 331 P3d 1054 (2014), because we conclude that
the state sufficiently proved allegations 4(A) and 4(B), the
juvenile court did not err in establishing allegation 4(C).
In sum, the evidence was sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the three children based
on allegations 4(A) through (C), but insufficient to support
jurisdiction based on allegations 4(D) and 4(E). Accordingly,
we reverse and remand for the court to enter judgments
establishing jurisdiction based on allegations 4(A) through
(C) only.
Reversed and remanded for entry of jurisdictional
judgments omitting allegations 4(D) and 4(E) as bases for
jurisdiction; otherwise affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11053345. Public record. Not legal advice.