# Mayanja v. City of Shoreline

> District Court, W.D. Washington · May 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052825

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Washington
- **Decided:** May 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding 12 amendment would be futile where plaintiffs already filed an amended complaint 13 containing the same defects as their original complaint

## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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AT SEATTLE
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10 ISAAC NSEJJERE MAYANJA, CASE NO. C25-0429JLR
11 Plaintiff, ORDER
v.
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CITY OF SHORELINE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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15 I. INTRODUCTION
16 Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Isaac Nsejjere Mayanja’s amended complaint
17 against Defendants the City of Shoreline, City Attorney Sarah Roberts, City Victim
18 Coordinator Alyssa Schultz Banchero (“City Defendants”),1 and Michelle Rene Mayanja
19 (together with City Defendants, the “Defendants”). The court has considered Mr.
20 Mayanja’s amended complaint and concludes that he states a plausible substantive due
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1 Mr. Mayanja sues Ms. Roberts in her official capacity and Ms. Schultz Banchero in her
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individual and official capacities. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 7) ¶¶ 5, 6.)
1 process claim against City Defendants and a plausible § 1983 malicious prosecution
2 claim against Shoreline and Ms. Roberts. The court, however, DISMISSES Mr.

3 Mayanja’s substantive due process claim against Ms. Mayanja, as well as his § 1983
4 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja, and his
5 claims for fraud, § 1985(3) conspiracy, equal protection, and manifest negligence, for
6 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
7 II. BACKGROUND
8 In March 2025, Mr. Mayanja commenced this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

9 §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging that City Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth,
10 Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and engaged in fraud, malicious prosecution and
11 manifest negligence in prosecuting him for felony assault. (1st Compl. (Dkt. # 4) at 1,
12 18, 23-52, 34.) He also alleged that Ms. Mayanja made false accusations against him.
13 (Id. at 18.)

14 On March 17, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan granted Mr.
15 Mayanja’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and recommended that the
16 court review Mr. Mayanja’s first complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After
17 reviewing Mr. Mayanja’s first complaint, the court determined that the allegations therein
18 failed to state a claim. (4/1/25 Order (Dkt. # 6) at 2.) The court dismissed Mr. Mayanja’s

19 complaint with partial leave to amend. (See id.)
20 On April 30, 2025, Mr. Mayanja amended his complaint, alleging claims for
21 (i) substantive due process violations; (ii) § 1983 malicious prosecution; (iii) fraud;
22 (iv) § 1985(3) conspiracy; (v) equal protection violations; and (vi) manifest negligence,
1 all in connection with his prosecution for felony assault against Ms. Mayanja. (Am.
2 Compl. ¶¶ 39-135.) The court reviews Mr. Mayanja’s amended complaint pursuant to 28

3 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2) to determine whether he states a claim sufficient to survive
4 dismissal. Below, the court discusses the applicable legal standard, and then addresses
5 Mr. Mayanja’s claims.
6 III. ANALYSIS
7 To state a claim, a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a
8 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

9 (2007). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require “detailed factual
10 allegations[;]” however, it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
11 harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,
12 550 U.S. at 555) (requiring the plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to
13 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).

14 Furthermore, fraud claims are governed by Rule 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to “state
15 with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also
16 Ticey v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. C22-1110MJP, 2023 WL 2742055, at *2 (W.D.
17 Wash. Mar. 31, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-35614, 2025 WL 671114 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025) (to
18 allege fraud, the plaintiff must provide facts demonstrating the “who, what, when, where,

19 and how” of the misconduct charged) (citation omitted). “In reviewing the sufficiency of
20 a complaint,” the court considers “the complaint itself and its attached exhibits,
21 documents incorporated by reference, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.” In
22 re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014).
1 A. Substantive Due Process Claim
2 In his amended complaint, Mr. Mayanja alleges that “with the acquiescence and

3 active encouragement of Shoreline and . . . [Ms.] Schultz Banchero,” Ms. Mayanja made
4 false assault accusations against Mr. Mayanja that led to his prosecution and wrongful
5 conviction for felony assault. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-12, 16; see id. ¶ 39 (incorporating
6 these paragraphs into his substantive due process claim).) Specifically, he alleges that
7 City Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence and impeaching information during his
8 criminal proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 20-22, 36.) He further contends that in September

9 2023, the trial court “overturned the jury conviction premised on [the] suppression of
10 exculpatory evidence” and granted a new trial. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 23.) Mr. Mayanja points to
11 Exhibits A, C, E, and G to his complaint as evidence of the alleged suppressed
12 exculpatory and impeaching evidence and the overturned verdict. (See id. ¶¶ 11-12, 29,
13 36.)2 He further alleges that Shoreline dismissed his criminal case in November 2024.

14 (Id. ¶ 14.)
15 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process rights “forbid[] the
16 government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that shocks
17 the conscience or interferes with the rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
18 Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation

19 omitted). To state a substantive due process claim, “a plaintiff must, as a threshold
20 matter, show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Samuelson v. Jewell
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2 Mr. Mayanja specifically directs the court to “page 12 at 6” of Exhibit A and to
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“[p]age 3 at 23” of Exhibit C. (See id. ¶¶ 11-12.)
1 Sch. Dist. 8, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1214 (D. Or. 2024) (quoting Nunez v. City of L.A.,
2 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998)). More specifically, a plaintiff “must plead that the

3 government’s action was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
4 relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.’” Cox v. Mariposa Cnty.,
5 No. 1:19-CV-01105-AWI-BAM, 2021 WL 4976698, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2021)
6 (quoting Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Ct., 883 F.2d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 1989)).
7 Here, Mr. Mayanja alleges that City Defendants made “false, invidious, and
8 pernicious assault allegations” that led to his wrongful conviction. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.)

9 He further asserts that City Defendants improperly suppressed exculpatory and
10 impeaching evidence that would have exonerated him. (See id. ¶¶ 29, 31-32.) The court
11 has reviewed the exhibits cited in support of Mr. Mayanja’s claims. (See id. ¶¶ 11-12, 29,
12 36.) Exhibit A is the trial court’s order concluding in relevant part that Shoreline
13 erroneously suppressed certain exculpatory medical records and other documents it had

14 in its possession and that Mr. Mayanja did not receive a fair trial as a result. (See id., Ex.
15 A at 41-43, 45.)3 Mr. Mayanja contends that Exhibit E contains the suppressed medical
16 records.4 (See id., Ex. E at 152-60; id. ¶ 29.) The court concludes that Mr. Mayanja has
17 plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the City Defendants. See Cox,
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19 3 Mr. Mayanja attached the exhibits to his complaint. When citing to the exhibits, the
court refers to the CM/ECF page numbers at the top of the page.
20 4 Exhibit C includes a court order finding that certain documents submitted to the court
for in camera review contained exculpatory and impeaching information and were therefore
21 discoverable. (Id., Ex. C at 109.) Exhibit G includes Shoreline’s brief that appears to have been
filed before the trial court conducted its in camera review. (Id., Ex. G at 162-72.) The court
22 therefore did not consider these materials in its analysis.
1 2021 WL 4976698, at *12 (concluding that plaintiff stated substantive due process claim
2 when he alleged in part that county defendants prosecuted him on false accusations and

3 suppressed exculpatory evidence.)
4 Mr. Mayanja’s substantive due process claim against Ms. Mayanja, however, fails
5 as a matter of law. To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must show that a
6 “government official” deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected life, liberty, or
7 property interest. See Nunez, 147 F.3d at 871. Because Ms. Mayanja is not a
8 government official, Mr. Mayanja cannot state a substantive due process claim against

9 her. Accordingly, Mr. Mayanja’s substantive due process claim against Ms. Mayanja is
10 dismissed with prejudice.
11 a. Monell Municipal Liability Claim
12 Mr. Mayanja separately alleges that Shoreline is liable for the alleged substantive
13 due process violations under a municipal liability theory. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-65.) As the

14 court stated in its April 1, 2025 order, to state a Monell municipal liability claim, Mr.
15 Mayanja must plausibly allege either that the alleged “constitutional deprivation was the
16 product of a policy or custom of the local government unit” or that “an officer with final
17 policymaking authority” made a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify the alleged
18 unconstitutional action. (4/1/25 Order at 7 (case citations omitted).)

19 In his amended complaint, Mr. Mayanja alleges that Shoreline had a “practice” of
20 suppressing exculpatory evidence. (Am. Compl. ¶ 62.) Mr. Mayanja also alleges that
21 Shoreline is subject to municipal liability under a ratification theory. Specifically, he
22 asserts that Ms. Roberts is an “official with final policymaking authority.” (Id. ¶¶ 52; see
1 id. ¶¶ 47, 50.) He next contends that Ms. Roberts made the “affirmative choice” to “file[]
2 the case” against him and “ratified the initial disclosure that omitted the exculpatory

3 evidence,” including “exculpatory evidence from Ms. [Schultz] Banchero’s victim’s
4 coordinator file.” (Id. ¶¶ 45-46, 53, 56.) In construing Mr. Mayanja’s pleading liberally,
5 see McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992), the court concludes that he
6 has plausibly alleged municipal liability for substantive due process violations sufficient
7 to survive the pleading stage. See Luke v. City of Tacoma, No. C18-5245BHS, 2018 WL
8 3972021, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2018) (“It is sufficient for the purposes of pleading

9 a claim [against a city] that [p]laintiff has alleged that policy-making officials personally
10 directed the investigation against him and approved the decision to omit exculpatory
11 evidence[.]”). The court notes, however, that Mr. Mayanja will ultimately need to
12 demonstrate that Ms. Roberts had final policy-making authority to prove his Monell
13 municipal liability claim. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bellevue, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1095,

14 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (denying Monell claim on summary judgment because
15 “plaintiffs have not directed the court to any legal authority that grants the City Attorney
16 final policy-making authority”).
17 B. Malicious Prosecution Claim
18 Mr. Mayanja also alleges a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. (Am. Compl.

19 ¶¶ 66-98.) To state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly
20 allege that the defendants “prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause, and
21 that they did so for the purpose of denying him equal protection or another specific
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1 constitutional right.”5 Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)
2 (cleaned up and citation omitted).

3 The court understands Mr. Mayanja to allege that Shoreline, through Ms.
4 Roberts, wrongfully initiated and continued criminal proceedings against him without
5 probable cause because they were in possession of exculpatory evidence that purportedly
6 demonstrated his innocence. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-75; see id. ¶ 45 (alleging that Ms.
7 Roberts “actually filed the case”).) He further alleges that Shoreline dismissed his
8 criminal proceedings and that he suffered damages as a result of the prosecution. (Id.

9 ¶¶ 28, 94-96.)
10 The court concludes that Mr. Mayanja pleads sufficient facts to state a § 1983
11 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Roberts and Shoreline. As to his claims against
12 Ms. Roberts, “state actors who are made aware of [new exculpatory] evidence but then
13 suppress it may be liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983” where such evidence

14 negates probable cause to continue a prosecution. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 290 n.5
15 (9th Cir. 1994). As to his claims against Shoreline, “[l]iability will lie against a
16 municipal entity under § 1983 only if a plaintiff shows that his constitutional injury was
17 caused by employees acting pursuant to an official policy or ‘longstanding practice or
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5 Malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 are based on the elements of the state law
19 tort action. Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1994); Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d
1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). To maintain a malicious prosecution claim under Washington law, a
20 plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) the prosecution was instituted or continued by the defendant;
(2) there was want of probable cause for the institution or continuation of the prosecution; (3) the
proceedings were instituted or continued through malice; (4) the proceedings terminated on the
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merits in favor of the plaintiff or were abandoned; and (5) the plaintiff suffered injury or damage.
See Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492, 500 (1983).
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1 custom,’ or that the injury was caused or ratified by an individual with ‘final policy-
2 making authority.’” Pataky v. City of Phoenix, No. 2:09-cv-0534-HRH, 2011 WL

3 13183214, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2011) (quoting Chudacoff v. Univ. Medical Ctr. of S.
4 Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)). Because the court
5 concludes that Mr. Mayanja has sufficiently pleaded the ratification theory of municipal
6 liability, see supra, the court also concludes that he has sufficiently pleaded a § 1983
7 malicious prosecution claim against Shoreline on this basis.
8 The court reaches a different conclusion with respect to Mr. Mayanja’s § 1983

9 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja. Mr.
10 Mayanja contends that Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja “wrongfully caused the
11 charges [against Mr. Mayanja] to be filed.” (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84, 92.) Mr. Mayanja
12 is correct that § 1983 malicious prosecution actions “may be brought . . . against [non-
13 prosecutors] who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at

14 1066. However, when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against a non-prosecutor for
15 conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, as Mr. Mayanja appears to do here (see Am. Compl.
16 ¶ 84), the plaintiff must also allege specific facts showing that the defendant “controlled
17 the decision-making process of the prosecutor,” or “otherwise engaged in wrongful or
18 bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal

19 proceedings.” McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). Mr. Mayanja
20 has not alleged any facts demonstrating that Ms. Schultz Banchero or Ms. Mayanja
21 controlled the prosecutors’ decisions. (See generally Am. Compl.) He appears to allege,
22 however, that Ms. Schultz Banchero or Ms. Mayanja engaged in “wrongful or bad faith
1 conduct” by “changing the narrative” and “suborning perjury.” (See id. ¶ 84.) Mr.
2 Mayanja asserts that Exhibits B and J—which include emails between Ms. Schultz

3 Banchero, Ms. Mayanja, and other non-defendants—support his allegations. (See id.)
4 Mr. Mayanja, however, does not point to any specific facts in these two exhibits that
5 plausibly shows that Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja colluded to “chang[e] the
6 narrative” or to make false accusations. Nor does Mr. Mayanja allege sufficient facts
7 demonstrating that the alleged collusion between Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja
8 was “actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” McCarthy, 827

9 F.2d at 1316. Accordingly, Mr. Mayanja’s malicious prosecution claim against Ms.
10 Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja is dismissed without prejudice.
11 C. Fraud Claim
12 Mr. Mayanja alleges that Defendants colluded to advance false accusations against
13 him. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-109; see id. para 102 “[Ms.] Mayanja and [Ms.] Schultz

14 Banchero actively and knowingly perpetuated a false narrative [] intended to align with []
15 Shoreline’s objective of securing a conviction”.) Specifically, he contends that Ms.
16 Mayanja “state[d] that the assault occurred behind Lake Forest Park Mall” but then Ms.
17 Schultz Banchero “induced [Ms. Mayanja] . . . to change the jurisdiction to Shoreline at
18 Trader Joe’s parking lot” and “[h]ad it not been for this change, Shoreline would not have

19 had [j]urisdiction to prosecute plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 104-05 (citing Exs. B, D).) He also
20 alleges that Ms. Schultz Banchero “induced [Ms.] Mayanja to change the story and omit
21 the fact that she actually assaulted [Mr. Mayanja] first.” (Id. ¶ 106 (emphasis omitted).)
22 Mr. Mayanja contends that Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja’s “correspondence to
1 manipulate the record continued throughout the proceedings.” (See id. ¶ 107.) Mr.
2 Mayanja asserts that his allegations are supported by Exhibits B, D, and F. (Id. ¶¶ 102,

3 104, 105, 107, 108.)
4 Having reviewed the cited exhibits, the court concludes that Mr. Mayanja’s
5 allegations do not state a plausible fraud claim. Exhibit B contains various emails
6 between Ms. Mayanja, Ms. Schultz Banchero, and third parties, but there are no
7 communications showing Ms. Schultz Banchero “induc[ing]” Ms. Mayanja to “change
8 her story.” Exhibit D is a motion filed by Mr. Mayanja seeking dismissal of his criminal

9 proceedings for alleged Brady violations, discovery violations, and other alleged
10 prosecutorial misconduct. (Id., Ex. D.) That motion, however, does not discuss alleged
11 fraud or collusion between Defendants. Exhibit F is a statement given by Ms. Mayanja
12 describing the events that precipitated Mr. Mayanja’s criminal proceedings. (Id., Ex. F.)
13 The statement was prepared by a deputy of the King County Sheriff’s Office based on an

14 oral statement provided by Ms. Mayanja and does not appear to be connected to Ms.
15 Schultz Banchero. (See id.) As pleaded, Mr. Mayanja’s fraud allegations “stop[] short of
16 the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
17 at 556 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Mayanja’s fraud claim
18 is dismissed without prejudice.

19 D. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Claim
20 Mr. Mayanja also alleges a § 1985(3) claim, which “prohibits conspiracies for the
21 purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
22 equal protection of the laws[.]” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005).
1 Mr. Mayanja’s § 1985(3) claim is premised on the same allegations that he pleaded with
2 respect to his fraud claim. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113 (alleging that the “[o]bject of

3 the conspiracy” “was to [c]hange the story from an assault behind [L]ake [F]orest [P]ark
4 [M]all to an assault in Shoreline to fraudulently establish jurisdiction” and “omitting the
5 fact that . . . [Ms.] Mayanja attacked [Mr. Mayanja] first”); id. ¶¶ 114-15 (alleging
6 conspiracy to suppress and “ensure non-disclosure” of evidence).) Mr. Mayanja alleges
7 that Defendants conspired “[t]hrough emails and phone calls[.]” (Id. ¶ 117 (citing Ex.
8 B).) Having reviewed Mr. Mayanja’s § 1985(3) claim allegations and the exhibits cited

9 allegedly reflecting the conspiracy, the court concludes that Mr. Mayanja has not
10 plausibly alleged facts sufficient to establish a conspiracy. Accordingly, his § 1985(3)
11 claim is dismissed without prejudice.6
12 E. “Equal Protection” Claim
13 The court understands Mr. Mayanja’s “equal protection” claim to relate to his

14 § 1985(3) claim. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121, 125 (describing the alleged conspiracy); 42
15 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (prohibiting conspiracies “for the purpose of depriving, either directly
16 or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws”)
17 (emphasis added). Under his alleged “equal protection” cause of action, Mr. Mayanja
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6 Under his § 1985(3) cause of action, Mr. Mayanja appears to include prosecutors Emma
20 Vetter and Carmen McDonald as “defendants” who participated in the alleged conspiracy. (See
Am. Compl. ¶ 116.) Mr. Mayanja’s claims against Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald, however,
were dismissed from this action in the court’s prior order. (See 4/1/25 Order.) Furthermore, Mr.
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Mayanja did not name Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald as defendants in his amended complaint.
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-7) (omitting Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald as defendants).) Accordingly,
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the court does not consider these allegations against Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald.
1 asserts that Shoreline “legitimize[d] [] egregious racial bias as a ‘legitimate trial
2 strategy[.]’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 124 (citing Ex. K).) Exhibit K includes Shoreline’s

3 response to Mr. Mayanja’s motion for a new trial in his criminal proceedings. (See Am.
4 Compl., Ex. K at 217-32.) The court has carefully reviewed Exhibit K and cannot locate
5 any portion thereof from which the court could “draw the reasonable inference” that
6 Defendants are “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does
7 Mr. Mayanja plead any specific facts demonstrating collusion or racial bias. (See
8 generally Am. Compl.) Mr. Mayanja’s “equal protection” claim is therefore dismissed

9 without prejudice.
10 F. “Manifest Negligence” Claim
11 Mr. Mayanja also alleges that Shoreline is liable for “manifest negligence” in
12 connection with Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald’s purported failure to turn over
13 exculpatory evidence. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129-35.) As Mr. Mayanja acknowledges, the

14 court dismissed his “manifest negligence” claims against Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald
15 in its April 1, 2025 order on the basis that prosecutors are immune from civil damages
16 suits for failing to turn over exculpatory evidence. (4/1/25 Order at 10.) Having
17 determined that Ms. Vetter and Ms. McDonald cannot be held liable for “manifest
18 negligence” (see id.), Mr. Mayanja’s negligence claim cannot stand against Shoreline and

19 is hereby dismissed with prejudice. See Merrill v. Golik, No. C12-5674KLS, 2013 WL
20 5176844, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2013) (dismissing negligence claims against the
21 City of Vancouver after determining that detective was not liable for negligence).
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1 G. Leave to Amend
2 Mr. Mayanja’s substantive due process claim against Ms. Mayanja and his

3 manifest negligence claim are dismissed with prejudice as legally erroneous. The court
4 dismisses Mr. Mayanja’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Schultz
5 Banchero and Ms. Mayanja, as well as his fraud, § 1985(3) conspiracy, and equal
6 protection claims for failure to state a claim, without prejudice and without leave to
7 amend. “A trial court’s discretion to deny a motion for leave to amend is particularly
8 broad where, as here, a plaintiff previously has been granted leave to amend.” Booth v.

9 Pioli, No. C10-5204RBL-KLS, 2010 WL 5591249, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2010)
10 (citing Griggs v. Pace American Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also
11 Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
12 amendment would be futile where plaintiffs already filed an amended complaint
13 containing the same defects as their original complaint). Mr. Mayanja was previously

14 granted leave to amend his complaint, but his amended complaint continues to suffer
15 from many of the same deficiencies as identified in the court’s April 1, 2025 order.
16 Furthermore, having reviewed the exhibits that Mr. Mayanja alleges reflect his § 1983
17 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Schultz Banchero and Ms. Mayanja, as well as
18 his fraud, § 1985(3) conspiracy, and equal protection claims, the court concludes that

19 further leave to amend would be futile. See Kendall, 518 F.3d at 1051-52.
20 IV. CONCLUSION
21 For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows:
22 (1) Mr. Mayanja’s substantive due process claim against Ms. Mayanja is
1 DISMISSED with prejudice;
2 (2)Mr. Mayanja’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Ms. Schultz

3 Banchero and Ms. Mayanja is DISMISSED without prejudice;
4 (3)Mr. Mayanja’s fraud claim is DISMISSED without prejudice;
5 (4)Mr. Mayanja’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is DISMISSED without
6 prejudice;
7 (5)Mr. Mayanja’s equal protection claim is DISMISSED without prejudice;
8 (6)Mr. Mayanja’s manifest negligence claim is DISMISSED with prejudice;

9 (7)The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons to Defendants the City of
10 Shoreline, Ms. Roberts, and Ms. Schultz Banchero.
11 Dated this 16th day of May, 2025.
A
12
JAMES L. ROBART
13 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052825. Public record. Not legal advice.