# CARRICO v. BROWN

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052623

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** May 16, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052623

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that dismissals of claims under Heck are without prejudice

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHAEL R. CARRICO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00472-JPH-MG
)
RICHARD BROWN Warden, WVCF, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO ASSERT
PREVIOUSLY WAIVED DEFENSES AND DISMISSING ACTION

After a prison disciplinary committee found him guilty of possessing a
cell phone, possessing a weapon, and inciting a riot, Michael Carrico was
placed in segregation for two years. Dkt. 74-1 at 23–24; dkt. 32 at 4, 6. He
brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants, alleging
constitutional violations. Dkt. 18 (Amended Complaint). After screening, the
Court permitted certain claims to proceed. Dkt. 32. The Court granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment.
Dkt. 87; dkt. 88. Mr. Carrico appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed as to
all claims except as to Mr. Carrico's due process claim against Sergeant
Jennifer Rinehart. Carrico v. Vanihel, No. 23-1381, 2023 WL 7015274, at *6
(7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2023).
For that claim, the Seventh Circuit concluded that issue preclusion—
which this Court relied on in granting summary judgment to Sgt. Rinehart—did
not apply. Id. at *2. Defendants argued on appeal that they were nonetheless
entitled to summary judgment on the due process claim against Sgt. Rinehart
because (1) Mr. Carrico failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) it
was "barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because his
challenge would necessarily imply the invalidity of disciplinary sanctions." Id.

Although Defendants had waived those affirmative defenses by not raising
them before this Court, the Seventh Circuit determined that "the question
remains whether there was some ground to relieve the defendants from the
consequence of their waiver." Id. The Seventh Circuit therefore remanded "so
that the district court can evaluate whether to exercise its discretion and
forgive the defendants' waiver of either argument based on grounds rooted in
state sovereignty." Id.
On remand, the parties submitted their statements of position as to what

action the court should take. Dkts. 101; 102; 104. This Court then set a
deadline for Defendant Rinehart to file a motion to assert previously waived
defenses and a briefing schedule. Dkt. 105. Defendant filed a motion, dkt.
106, and Mr. Carrico did not file a response. In her motion, Defendant argued,
among other things, that she should be allowed to raise the Heck bar as a
defense. Dkt. 107 at 3–5.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997),
the Supreme Court extended the Heck bar to § 1983 suits brought by prisoners
challenging the outcome of prison disciplinary proceedings in which the
plaintiff sought money damages rather than release. The Heck framework has
been "reaffirmed" by the Supreme Court several times and thereafter applied by
the Seventh Circuit. Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 2020).
Here, Defendant argues that this Court should forgive her waiver and
allow her to now raise the Heck bar as a defense. Defendant argues that her
failure to raise Heck was due to her "good-faith excuse", dkt. 107 at 4, of
interpreting the screening order to not "include a due process claim related to
the procedures of Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing", dkt. 102 at 2. Defendant
also argues that the Court should consider that Heck is "a defense rooted in
state sovereignty grounds" and that Mr. Carrico was given notice and the
opportunity to respond, dkt. 107 at 5. In his statement of position, Mr. Carrico

argues that the Court should not allow Defendant to raise the Heck bar now
because she was on notice of his due process claim against Sgt. Rinehart and
had ample time to raise Heck but didn't. Dkt. 104.
The Court finds that Defendant had plausible, good-faith reasons for not
previously raising the Heck bar before this Court. First, Mr. Carrico's Amended
Complaint, which is 51 pages long not counting exhibits, does not clearly set
forth a due process claim against Sgt. Rinehart based on her actions at the
disciplinary hearing. In the section entitled "Cause of Action," the Amended
Complaint sets forth six "grounds": Ground 1, cold cell; Ground 2, boil order;
Ground 3, SCU visitation rules; Ground 4, lack of periodic review; Ground 5,

continued segregation; and Ground 6, violation of "IS 3 status." Dkt. 18 at 9-
12. Sgt. Rinehart is only mentioned in Ground 4, lack of periodic review. Id. at
11. The gist of Ground 4 is that the named defendants sentenced Mr. Carrico
"to an excessive amount of time in disciplinary segregation or, by failing to
conduct meaningful periodic reviews and, or, classification hearings, thereby
unnecessarily prolonging Plaintiff's stay in solitary confinement" in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Ground 4 also alleges that Mr. Carrico's
conditions of confinement were inhumane, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Id.
None of the six grounds set forth in Mr. Carrico's Amended Complaint
state that Mr. Carrico is bringing a due process claim against Sgt. Rinehart for
her conduct as the hearing officer at the disciplinary hearing. While
paragraphs 91 and 92 allege that Sgt. Rinehart failed to provide detailed
factual findings at the hearing and failed to hear certain exculpatory evidence,
those are two of 238 paragraphs in the Amended Complaint. Moreover, the
crux of Mr. Carrico's Amended Complaint relates to the length and conditions

of his confinement in segregation, not what happened at his disciplinary
hearing.
Also, like the Amended Complaint, the Court's screening order does not
expressly set forth a claim for due process violations based on Sgt. Rinehart's
conduct at the disciplinary hearing. Under the section entitled, "Claims to
Proceed in this Action", the screening order says, "Mr. Carrico's claims based
on extended placement in segregation without due process SHALL PROCEED

against Sergeant Rinehart [and 9 other defendants]." Dkt. 32 at 6.
Last, a statement made by Defendants in their summary judgment brief
corroborates their argument that they didn't think there was a due process
claim based on Sgt. Rinehart's conduct at the disciplinary hearing:
Of course, there are due process implications raised during the
disciplinary proceedings that put a prisoner on disciplinary
segregation in the first instance. But in Mr. Carrico's case there is
no argument to be made that he failed to receive due process in the
disciplinary proceeding underlying the disciplinary segregation he
complains of in this case. This Court, in a habeas proceeding, has
already found that Mr. Carrico received sufficient due process in his
underlying disciplinary proceeding. Carrico v. Zatecky, S.D. Ind.
Case No. 2:19-cv-78-JMS-MJD, ECF 10 at 1 (1/8/20).

Dkt. 75 at 8-9 n.4.
In his summary judgment response, Mr. Carrico argued, among other
things, that he "did not receive sufficient due process under Wolff v. McDonnell
during his disciplinary hearing for a falsified charge of rioting. Defendant
Rinehart, acting as Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO), denied plaintiff his right
to introduce exculpatory evidence, and failed to provide a detailed fact-finding
statement as part of her decision." Dkt. 82 at 11-12. This argument appears
in a section of Mr. Carrico's brief entitled, "Due Process Violations Did Occur
during Plaintiff's Disciplinary Segregation and Administrative Segregation." Id.
at 7.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that "a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
However, "the rule that forfeits an affirmative defense not pleaded in the

answer (or by an earlier motion) is … not to be applied rigidly." Matthews v.
Wis. Energy Corp., Inc., 642 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2011). As relevant here,
courts may forgive a party's waiver of its Heck defense "in accordance with the
principle that treats the waiver of defenses based on grounds rooted in
considerations of state sovereignty less harshly than other waivers." Carr v.
O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, Defendant has provided a plausible, good-faith explanation for why
she didn't raise the Heck bar earlier in the proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Carrico

has not explained how allowing Defendant to assert the Heck bar at this
juncture would prejudice him. Dkt. 105 (Court's order giving Mr. Carrico
opportunity to file a response to Defendants' motion to assert previously waived
defenses); Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 436–37 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Court has considered the facts presented here along with the comity issues
that would be implicated by precluding Defendant from asserting the Heck bar
to Mr. Carrico's claims. See Bell v. Raoul, 88 F.4th 1231, 1233 (7th Cir. 2023)
("A parallel civil suit would trigger the same considerations and concerns that

Heck sought to avoid, including respect for federal-state comity and the
preservation of habeas corpus as the sole avenue of relief for a state prisoner
seeking post-conviction relief."). The Court exercises its discretion to allow
Defendant to assert the Heck bar as a defense, despite her earlier waiver, and
proceeds to the merits of the Heck defense.
If a suit for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner's

disciplinary conviction, the prisoner may not bring the damages claim "unless
and until the inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas,
challenge to his conviction or sentence." Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d
1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646
(2004); applying Heck, 512 U.S. 477). Here, Mr. Carrico challenged his
conviction in a habeas petition which was ultimately denied and dismissed,
and he did not appeal that judgment. Carrico v. Zatecky, 2:19-cv-00078-JMS-
MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2020), dkts. 10, 11. He has therefore not obtained a

"favorable termination" of a challenge to his conviction or sentence. Given that
Mr. Carrico seeks money damages as relief, dkt. 18 at 50, a judgment in his
favor "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary sentence",
Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1119 (7th Cir. 2019). See Savory v. Cannon,
947 F.3d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 2020). Mr. Carrico's claim that Sgt. Rinehart
violated his due process rights in the disciplinary proceeding is therefore
barred by the Heck doctrine. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr.
Carrico's due process claim against Sgt. Rinehart must be dismissed without

prejudice. Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that
dismissals of claims under Heck are without prejudice).
Because the Heck claim is dispositive, the Court need not address Set.
Rinehart's alternative arguments that Mr. Carrico failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies or that the claim is barred by issue preclusion.
The defendant's motion, dkt. [106], is GRANTED. Accordingly, this action
is dismissed without prejudice. The clerk is directed to enter final
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
S) ars rk anor
Date: 5/16/2025 Pat
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
MICHAEL R. CARRICO
106495
MIAMI - CF
MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
3038 West 850 South
Bunker Hill, IN 46914-9810
All Electronically Registered Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052623. Public record. Not legal advice.