# Harris v. Luntumbuez CA2/7

> California Court of Appeal · May 16, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052395

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** May 16, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 5/16/25 Harris v. Luntumbuez CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

KARIO HARRIS, B335247

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV27294)
v.

PAUL LUNTUMBUEZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Kario Harris, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Paul Luntumbuez, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Respondent.

__________________________
Kario Harris challenges the dismissal of his suit against
Paul Luntumbuez following the trial court’s decision to sustain
Luntumbuez’s demurrer to Harris’s second amended complaint.1
Harris contends the court erred in concluding Luntumbuez’s
allegedly false statements—on which Harris’s causes of action
are based—were protected by an absolute privilege because they
were made during an official investigation. He also argues the
court wrongly ruled that his claims were time-barred. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Harris’s Original and First Amended Complaint, and
Luntumbuez’s Demurrers
Harris, a civil servant employed by the United States
Army, alleges that, beginning in 2016, Luntumbuez, a human
resources specialist at the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs in Long Beach, California, falsely accused him of making
sexual advances and stalking Luntumbuez. Harris contends his
employer sought to terminate his employment in large part based
on Luntumbuez’s lies about him, and that Luntumbuez’s actions

1 The trial court’s signed order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend also stated “the case is dismissed with
prejudice.” No separate order or judgment of dismissal was
entered. “An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to
amend is not an appealable order, but an order dismissing a case
is an appealable order.” (Hudis v. Crawford (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1590, fn. 4; see Bullock v. City of Antioch
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 407, 411.) It is appropriate to construe the
court’s order dismissing the case as an appealable order. (See
Hudis, at p. 1590, fn. 4.)

2
have interfered with his right to peaceful employment. Harris
has been self-represented throughout this case.
Harris filed his original complaint in July 2021, asserting
four causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (3) intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and (4) declaratory relief. Harris alleged
that “[b]etween the period 2016 and continuing Defendant Paul
Luntumbuez communicated to third parties by knowingly false
sworn testimony and e-mails that Plaintiff, Harris had made
sexual advances toward him; that Harris had touched him on his
mid-thigh area during a lunch conversation; had been harassed
by Plaintiff Harris; had created a hostile working environment
and an unsafe working environment; and had assisted a potential
job applicant Hanna Kim with her resume which included some
exaggerated experience . . . ; [and] that Harris had bypassed the
Human Resources Division in the hiring process.” The complaint
stated the “slander/defamation occurred at the US Army
Garrison Yongsan Seoul South Korea, [and] US Army Reserve
Training, Garden Grove California.”
After Harris served Luntumbuez with the complaint in
November 2022, Luntumbuez demurred on the basis that
Harris’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations (one year for defamation and two years for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference).
Luntumbuez also contended that Harris’s complaint generally
failed to state sufficient facts for the causes of action alleged. The
superior court sustained Luntumbuez’s demurrer with leave to
amend.
In February 2023, Harris filed a first amended complaint,
reasserting the same causes of action, and adding allegations of

3
additional false and malicious statements made by Luntumbuez
in November and December 2021 and October 2022. The court
sustained Luntumbuez’s demurrer in May 2023, again concluding
the allegations were time-barred and failed to plead allegations
sufficient to state any of the causes of action. The court once
more granted leave to amend.

B. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
In June 2023, Harris filed a second amended complaint (the
complaint) alleging that Luntumbuez’s “statements against
Harris . . . caused an official investigation of Harris” that was
“conducted at the direction of the [United States] Army Reserve,”
Harris’s employer. Luntumbuez made all statements “under oath
during the course of an official investigation,” which made the
statements difficult for Harris to find.
The second amended complaint identifies four instances
where Luntumbuez allegedly made the defamatory statements:
October 2017: Luntumbuez made “defamatory written
statements” to an individual named Dr. Christine Altendorf that
Harris “exhibited homosexual sexual tendencies toward” him and
stalked and harassed him and his family at their California
residences. The statements “caused an official investigation” of
Harris, and “[t]he written untrue statements . . . were made
under oath during the course of an official investigation . . . and
[were] difficult for [Harris] to find.” Because senior officers
“withheld” the documents, Luntumbuez did not learn of them
until the officers presented him with the investigation results on
February 13, 2023.
September 2018: Luntumbuez “revised” the same
allegations that Harris engaged in improper sexual conduct

4
towards him. These statements were “withheld” from
Luntumbuez until he received a “US postal mailing” on
October 27, 2019.
October 2018: Luntumbuez repeated the same allegations
to a “Fort Irwin Criminal Investigator.”
December 2021: Luntumbuez “resurfaced the knowingly
false and malicious statements of September 2018” to senior
Army Reserve individuals at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He
reiterated that Harris “exhibited homosexual sexual tendencies
toward” him, sent him “sweet” text messages, and touched him on
his mid-thigh area. Luntumbuez added that Harris stalked and
harassed him and his family in Texas and suggested that Harris
traveled to Saudi Arabia and Long Beach to see him. These
statements were false because Harris had never visited
Luntumbuez’s or his family’s residences, schools, or workplaces.
Luntumbuez also asserted that Harris violated hiring practices
by helping a job applicant exaggerate her experiences on her
resume and that Harris used “unauthorized access to US
government Human Resources systems” to find Luntumbuez’s
home address. This was false because Luntumbuez knew Harris
only had access to records of the members of his own division.
Harris first learned of these statements when the investigation
results were reported to him on February 13, 2023.
October 2022: Luntumbuez reported to “third parties in
senior positions of the US Army Reserve” that Harris was again
stalking him and his family and was harassing him “in the form
of civil court summons.”
Harris sought economic damages of at least $2.125 million,
noneconomic damages of at least $3 million, and punitive

5
damages of at least $6 million. Harris also sought a declaration
that Luntumbuez’s statements were defamatory and false.

C. The Demurrer Ruling and Case Dismissal
In October 2023, over Harris’s opposition, the superior
court sustained Luntumbuez’s demurrer without leave to amend
and dismissed the case with prejudice.
The court ruled that Harris’s first cause of action for
defamation, based on the 2017 and 2018 statements, was barred
by the statute of limitations. The court further concluded that all
the relevant statements were protected by the privilege under
Civil Code section 47. Harris’s second amended complaint
asserted the 2017 and 2021 statements “were made under oath
during the course of an official investigation;” the 2021 and 2022
statements were made “in sworn testimony and emails;” and the
2018 statement, which “revised” the 2018 statement, was
“provided to third party, Fort Irwin Criminal Investigator.”
The court also sustained Luntumbuez’s demurrer to
Harris’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and third cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage without leave
to amend, reasoning that both claims were based on the same
privileged statements. Because the court had dismissed Harris’s
substantive claims, it found no present controversy to support
declaratory relief and sustained the demurrer to that claim as
well. The court denied further leave to amend.2

2 Harris failed to designate Luntumbuez’s demurrer, his
previous complaints, or the trial court’s orders on the first two
demurrers as part of the appellate record. We requested these

6
Harris timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e),
authorizes a demurrer on the ground that the complaint “ ‘does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Roy
Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017)
2 Cal.5th 505, 512.)
“ ‘[W]here the existence of a privilege is revealed on the face
of the complaint, it may be asserted in a demurrer.’ ” (Green v.
Cortez (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1068, 1072-1073; see generally
Estate of Moss (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 521, 535 [“ ‘A demurrer
can be utilized where the complaint itself is incomplete or
discloses some defense that would bar recovery.’ ”].) Likewise,
the statute of limitations may be asserted by such a general
demurrer if the defect clearly and affirmatively appears on the
face of the complaint. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa
Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42; see
Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 326.)
On appeal, we independently review the judgment of
dismissal and accept as true all material allegations in the
complaint, “but do not ‘assume the truth of contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law.’ ” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v.
American Asphalt South, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 512; see New
Livable California v. Association of Bay Area Governments (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 709, 714.) We “determine de novo whether the

pleadings from the superior court and augment the record on our
own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

7
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or
discloses a complete defense.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.)
We review a trial court’s failure to grant leave to amend for
abuse of discretion. (Moore v. Centrelake Medical Group, Inc.
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 515, 537.) In so doing, “we must decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure
the defect with an amendment. [Citation.] If we find that an
amendment could cure the defect, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion
has occurred. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving
that an amendment would cure the defect.” (Schifando v. City of
Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; see Ivanoff v. Bank of
America, N.A., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 735.)

B. Harris’s Causes of Actions Are Based on Privileged
Statements
Harris contends the superior court erred in ruling
Luntumbuez’s “knowingly false and malicious statements were
privileged communications” under Civil Code section 47 (section
47).
As pertinent here and with some exceptions, section 47
provides that a “privileged publication or broadcast is one made
. . . [i]n the proper discharge of an official duty,” and “[i]n any . . .
official proceeding authorized by law” or “in the initiation or
course of any . . . proceeding authorized by law.” (Civ. Code § 47,
subds. (a), (b); see Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955, 971 [“[S]ection 47, subdivision (b)
provides absolute immunity for publications and statements
made in an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ ”].) The

8
privilege bars all tort liability based on a qualifying statement,
except the tort of malicious prosecution. (Hagberg v. California
Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360 (Hagberg); see Rusheen
v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) The privilege applies to
“communications intended to instigate official investigation into
wrongdoing.” (Hansen v. California Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1546-1547 [where
allegedly false statements were communicated to CDCR officials
as part of an internal investigation, they were absolutely
privileged]; see Hagberg, at p. 362.)
The complaint contends Luntumbuez made the actionable
statements “under oath during the course of an official
investigation” that was “conducted at the direction of the US
Army Reserve.” Thus, the alleged statements fall within the
absolute privilege.
On appeal, Harris contends that the privilege does not
apply because Luntumbuez made deliberately false and
defamatory statements. However, subject to one relatively recent
exception that is not applicable here, the privilege applies
“without respect to the good faith or malice of the person who
made the statement.” (Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361; see
Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770, 778; Hansen v.
California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra,
171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546.)
The recent exception to section 47 was created by a 2020
amendment to section 47. (§ 47, subd. (b)(5), Stats. 2020, ch. 327,
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1., 2021.) It provides that false reports to “a law
enforcement agency” that another person “has committed . . . a
criminal act or is engaged in an activity requiring law
enforcement intervention” are not privileged if the speaker makes

9
the report knowing it is false, or with reckless disregard for the
truth or falsity of the report. (Ibid.)
One set of the defamatory statements alleged by Harris —
vaguely described only as statements to a “Fort Irwin Criminal
Investigator” — potentially could fall within this exception to the
absolute privilege. But those statements allegedly were made in
October 2018, and the amendment was not effective until 2021.
There is no indication the Legislature intended the amendment
to apply retroactively. (See Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th
945, 955 [“statutes ordinarily are interpreted as operating
prospectively in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary
legislative intent.”].) Thus, the amendment would not apply to
the statements made to the criminal investigator. And under the
pre-2021 version of the statute applicable to Luntumbuez’s 2018
statements, even knowingly false statements to a law
enforcement agency are subject to the absolute privilege.
(Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 364 [applying pre-2021 law and
finding communications made to “law enforcement personnel to
report suspected criminal activity and to instigate law
enforcement personnel to respond” enjoyed “an unqualified
privilege” under section 47].)3

3 Even if Luntumbuez’s October 2018 statements to a
criminal investigator could fall within the law enforcement
exception under section 47, subdivision (b)(5), and even if the
Legislature’s amendment applied retroactively to exempt the
statement from the privilege, all of Harris’s causes of action
based on this statement would be time-barred. The statute of
limitations is one year for defamation (Code Civ. Proc., § 340,
subd. (c)) and two years for both intentional infliction of
emotional distress and intentional interference with prospective

10
Thus, all of Luntumbuez’s alleged statements were
absolutely privileged, barring each of Harris’s causes of action.
Regarding leave to amend, “ ‘the burden is on plaintiff to
show in what manner plaintiff can amend the complaint, and how
that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading[.’]
Although ‘such showing may be made in the first instance to the
appellate court,’ the . . . appellant ‘must still offer details on how
the amendment would cure the defects.’ ” (Moore v. Centrelake
Medical Group, Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 537; accord,
Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125,
1145.) “Where the appellant offers no allegations to support the
possibility of amendment . . . , there is no basis for finding the
trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’
Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.) Harris has made no
showing of how he could amend his complaint to cure its defects.
The superior court did not err in sustaining Luntumbuez’s
demurrer without leave to amend.

///

economic advantage (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; Wassmann v.
South Orange County Community College Dist. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852-853). Unlike for most of Luntumbuez’s
statements, Harris does not allege that his discovery of the
October 2018 statements was delayed. Harris filed his original
complaint in July 2021, outside of the relevant statute of
limitations periods.

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DISPOSITION

The order of dismissal is affirmed. Luntumbuez is entitled
to recover his costs on appeal.

STONE, J.
We concur:

FEUER, Acting P. J.

PULOS, J.*


Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11052395. Public record. Not legal advice.