# A. Edwards v. PA's Sentencing Scheme in Sentencing Third Degree Murder Convictions to Mandatory Life without Parole for their Second Murder Conviction

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11051458

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 15, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Fizzano Cannon. McCullough
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Attorney General improper party to sex offender registration case where Pennsylvania State Police was party charged with administration and enforcement of the sex offender registration statute

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Edwards, :
Petitioner
:
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme :
in Sentencing Third Degree Murder :
Convictions to Mandatory Life without :
Parole for their Second Murder :
Conviction; General Assembly, :
and Attorney General, : No: 184 M.D. 2023
Respondents : Submitted: November 6, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 15, 2025

Presently before this Court are the preliminary objections filed by the
Pennsylvania General Assembly (General Assembly) and the Pennsylvania Attorney
General (AG) (collectively, Respondents) to the petition for review (Petition) filed
by pro se petitioner Anthony Edwards (Petitioner) in this Court’s original
jurisdiction. In the Petition, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his

1
Because the vote of the commissioned judges was evenly divided, this opinion is filed
“as circulated” pursuant to Section 256(b) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa.
Code §69.256(b). McLinko v. Commonwealth, 270 A.3d 1278, 1280 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) imposed pursuant
to Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code,2 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a) (Section 9715(a))3
which requires that an individual previously convicted of murder or voluntary
manslaughter receive a sentence of life imprisonment for a subsequent third-degree
murder conviction. For the reasons that follow, we (1) sustain Respondents’
preliminary objections as to Petitioner’s constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction
and transfer those claims to the Court to Common Pleas of Philadelphia County; and
(2) sustain Respondents’ demurrer to Petitioner’s statutory claims pursuant to
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) and dismiss those claims.
I. The Petition
Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in 1973 (First
Murder) and thereafter, in 1999, was found guilty of third-degree murder (Second
Murder) and sentenced to LWOP pursuant to Section 9715(a). See Petition at 9.
In his first constitutional claim, the Petition argues that Section 9715(a)
violates the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions contained in article I, section
13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution4 and the Eighth Amendment of the United States

2
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701-9799.75.

3
Section 9715(a), entitled “Life Imprisonment for Homicide,” provides:

(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.–Notwithstanding [certain
provisions of the Sentencing Code not applicable here,] any person
convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who
has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary
manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially
equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or
other statute to the contrary.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a).

4
Article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 13.

2
Constitution5 by imposing a sentence of LWOP for an unintentional killing. See
Petition at 5-15. Next, the Petition alleges that Section 9715(a), which was enacted
in 1982, is impermissibly retroactive, in violation of the provisions of the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions against ex post facto laws,6 if applied to his
First Murder.7 See Petition at 15-19.
Petitioner also challenges the statutory basis for his LWOP sentence.
See Petition at 2-5. Petitioner argues that “[t]he General Assembly’s intent [in
drafting Section 9715(a)] was not to incarcerate [Petitioner] for the remainder of his

5
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII.

6
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Likewise, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or
immunities, shall be passed.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 17. Our analysis remains the same under either Constitution. See
Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 798 n.11 (Pa. 2015). “In order for a criminal or penal law
to be deemed an ex post facto law, ‘two critical elements’ must be met: ‘it must be retrospective,
that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender
affected by it.’” Rose, 127 A.3d at 799 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)).

7
The Petition lists both 1973 and 1974 as the date of the commission of Petitioner’s First
Murder. See Petition at 9, 16 & 18. The docket number listed for the first murder, CP-51-CR-
0609411-1974, relates to a defendant with a different name (James Smart). See Petition at 16.
This issue is of no moment, however, as the exact year of Petitioner’s First Murder is immaterial
to our determination here.

3
life without the chance of parole.” Petition at 4. Petitioner argues that, because
Section 9715(a) does not include the phrase “without the possibility of parole,” the
sentencing court was required to sentence him to a minimum sentence of 20 years.
See id. at 4-5.
Based on these claims, Petitioner asks this Court to declare
unconstitutional his LWOP sentence imposed pursuant to Section 9715(a) for the
Second Murder. See Petition at 19-20. Petitioner further seeks to have the Court
resentence him to a 20-year minimum sentence for the Second Murder.
II. The Preliminary Objections
Initially, we note that

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as
true all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review] and all
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the
legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
the [petition for review].

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Respondents each filed preliminary objections (collectively, the
Preliminary Objections) in this matter seeking dismissal of the Petition with

4
prejudice.8 Respondents first claim this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s
claims, which Respondents argue challenge the legality of his criminal sentence and
therefore constitute claims properly raised solely under the Post Conviction Relief
Act9 (PCRA), over which claims this Court lacks jurisdiction. In a related challenge,
Respondents also seek dismissal of the Petition because Petitioner has failed to
exhaust the statutory remedies available to him under the PCRA. Respondents also
raise demurrers, claiming that the Petition fails to state claims against them and
because they are not proper parties. Respondents also argue for the dismissal of the
Petition based on a failure to join a necessary party, the Pennsylvania Parole Board.

8
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a) provides:

(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading
and are limited to the following grounds:

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
or the person of the defendant, improper venue or improper
form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint;

(2) failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court
or inclusion of scandalous or impertinent matter;

(3) insufficient specificity in a pleading;

(4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer);

(5) lack of capacity to sue, nonjoinder of a necessary party
or misjoinder of a cause of action;

(6) pendency of a prior action or agreement for alternative
dispute resolution;

(7) failure to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy; and

(8) full, complete and adequate non-statutory remedy at
law.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a).

9
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

5
The General Assembly also raises a subject matter defense under Pa.R.Civ.P.
1028(a)(1) based on the speech and immunity clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.10
We address Respondents’ PCRA argument first, as it implicates this
Court’s jurisdiction.
III. Discussion
A. The Petition’s Constitutional Claims
Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code outlines this Court’s original
jurisdiction as follows:

The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government,
including any officer thereof, acting in his official
capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of
applications for a writ of habeas corpus
or post-conviction relief not ancillary to
proceedings within the appellate
jurisdiction of the [C]ourt[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has held that, “if
the necessary consequence of granting relief is that the conviction or sentence is
undone or otherwise modified, then the claim is in the nature of . . . a writ of habeas

10
Article II, section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[t]he members of
the General Assembly . . . for any speech or debate in either House [] shall not be questioned in
any other place.” Pa. Const. art. II, § 15.

6
corpus or post-conviction relief.” Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 284 A.3d 178,
189 (Pa. 2022) (Scott II) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Petitioner asserts that he was sentenced to LWOP for the Second
Murder pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. In the Petition, he asks this Court to
declare the LWOP sentence imposed pursuant to Section 9715(a) for the Second
Murder unconstitutional and to resentence him to a 20-year minimum sentence. As
such, through both his cruel and unusual punishment claim and his ex post facto
claim, the Petition seeks post-conviction relief by means of a collateral challenge to
the legality of the Second Murder sentence. See Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
256 A.3d 483, 486 & 488-89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff’d, Scott II (concluding that
inmates’ petition contesting the constitutionality of their criminal sentences in fact
levied “challenges [] in the nature of claims seeking post-conviction relief”);
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(recounting the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition challenging the legality of a
criminal sentence predicated on mandatory minimum sentence requirements of
Section 9712.1 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1).
Section 9542 of the PCRA

provides for an action by which persons convicted of
crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal
sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action
established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose
that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including
habeas corpus and coram nobis.[11]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001)
(explaining that “[t]he plain language of [Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S.

“A writ of coram nobis ‘is generally available to challenge the validity of a judgment
11

based on facts not before the court when the judgment was entered.’” Commonwealth v.

7
§ 9542,] demonstrates quite clearly that the General Assembly intended that claims
that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under that Act” (emphasis
in original)); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999) (citing Section
9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542) (stating that “[b]y its own language, and by
judicial decisions interpreting such language, the PCRA provides the sole means for
obtaining state collateral relief”). Petitioner, therefore, can challenge the legality of
his criminal sentence only through a PCRA petition. See Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d
394, 402 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542)
(explaining that a petitioner “may not use a civil action for declaratory judgment in
our original jurisdiction to collaterally attack the legality of his criminal
proceedings,” as “[t]he PCRA is the sole means ‘by which persons convicted of
crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences’ may obtain
collateral relief”).
However, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain claims under the
PCRA. See Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i); see
also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a) (“Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under [the
PCRA] shall be in the court of common pleas.”). Accordingly, we sustain the
Preliminary Objections to the extent they challenge the Petition for lack of
jurisdiction over Petitioner’s PCRA claims.
Lacking jurisdiction over Petitioner’s PCRA claims, this Court may
transfer the claim to the appropriate court. See Dockery v. Wolf, 259 A.3d 566, 572
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103 (“Transfer of erroneously filed

Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 494 n.1 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465,
467 (Pa. 1971)).

8
matters”);12 Pa.R.A.P. 751 (“Transfer of Erroneously Filed Cases”).13 However,
where a PCRA petition would be late-filed and would lack an applicable timeliness
exception under the PCRA,14 transfer to the court of common pleas for the purpose

12
Section 5103 of the Judicial Code provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought
in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does
not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or
magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the
matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of
this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall be
treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date
when the appeal or other matter was first filed in a court or
magisterial district of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or magisterial district judge of
this Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other tribunal
of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to
the proper court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth where
it shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee court or
magisterial district of this Commonwealth on the date when first
filed in the other tribunal.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).

13
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 751(a) provides as follows:

(a) General rule. If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought
in a court or magisterial district which does not have jurisdiction of
the appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district judge
shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer
the record thereof to the proper court of this Commonwealth, where
the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if originally filed in
transferee court on the date first filed in a court or magisterial
district.

Pa.R.A.P. 751(a).

14
Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA provides exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing
deadline only when

the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

9
of litigating the petition is not warranted, as the petition would be properly dismissed
as untimely. See Scott II, 284 A.3d at 198 n.17 (noting that transfer of a PCRA case
to the trial/PCRA court is not warranted where the PCRA petition would be
dismissed as untimely). However, in previous cases where this Court has dismissed
PCRA claims outright in lieu of transferring them to the trial court to act as the
PCRA court, the petitioner had previously conceded the untimeliness of the PCRA
claim or the Superior Court had already decided that issue. See Scott II, 284 A.3d at
198 nn.16-17 (citing Section 5103 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103)
(“declin[ing] to remand the case to the Commonwealth Court with directions to
transfer the petitions to the relevant courts of common pleas”; concluding that
“judicial economy dictate[d] . . . affirm[ing] the order” where the inmates
“concede[d] that their petitions would be dismissed as untimely,” such that “there
[was] no possibility that the result would be any different”; and further explaining
that “[t]he PCRA exists to provide finality to the criminal process and the General
Assembly did not intend to permit an end-run around the time-bar through creative
pleading”); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 & 521-22 (Pa. Super.

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
10
2011) (affirming the dismissal of an inmate’s “motion to correct illegal sentence,”
which the trial court treated as a PCRA petition, where the trial court lacked
jurisdiction under Section 9545 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545, to consider the
“patently untimely” motion, and the inmate “concede[d] that he filed his [motion]
years after his judgment of sentence became final, and that the [trial court] lacked
statutory jurisdiction to consider his claim”); see also Boyd v. Pa.’s Sent’g Scheme
for Sent’g 18 Year Old’s to Mandatory Life Without Parole AG, 311 A.3d 63, 66-67
& 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (declining to transfer a PCRA petition, where the trial
court had already denied the inmate’s PCRA claim as untimely, and the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial on appeal). Where a
petitioner has not conceded that a PCRA petition would not satisfy any of the PCRA
timeliness exceptions and the Superior Court has not already ruled on such
timeliness, on the other hand, this Court should transfer the matter to the common
pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on the timeliness of the PCRA petition. See
Birdwell v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 80 M.D. 2023, filed
September 5, 2024)15 (transferring petition raising a collateral challenge to a
conviction to court of common pleas to litigate petition as PCRA court, including
determining timeliness of PCRA claims, where the Superior Court had not already
determined that a petitioner’s PCRA petition would be untimely and not subject to
any exception and petitioner had not conceded as much).
Here, having concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
Petitioner’s PCRA claims, we nonetheless will transfer rather than dismiss the
matter. We note that the Superior Court has not already determined that the PCRA
claims raised in the Petition, if filed, would be untimely and not subject to any PCRA

15
Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure Section 414(a), 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be
cited for their persuasive value.

11
timeliness exception, and Petitioner has not conceded as much. Accordingly,
although the Petition appears facially untimely, we decline to dismiss this action
outright. Instead, we conclude that Petitioner must be allowed an opportunity to
raise and argue a PCRA timeliness exception, however unlikely its merit, before a
court with jurisdiction over the collateral claims raised herein. Accordingly, we
transfer the PCRA claims to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
which is the court with jurisdiction over the collateral claims raised herein.
We also decline to dismiss the matter based on Petitioner having
arguably named improper parties in the Petition. Because we lack jurisdiction over
the underlying claims, it is for the transferee court, the court with jurisdiction, to
dismiss improper parties to the action. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a); Pa.R.A.P. 751. We
find this to be especially so where, as here, dismissing certain parties would have the
functional effect of dismissing the Petition. Thus, here, the task of dismissing certain
parties on preliminary objections (or to entertaining motions to substitute the proper
parties to the action) falls to the court with jurisdiction over the matter – here, the
court of common pleas acting as a PCRA court.
B. The Petition’s Statutory Claims
The Petition also raises a statutory interpretation claim in which
Petitioner claims that, in enacting Section 9715(a), the General Assembly did not
intend that Petitioner would receive a LWOP sentence for a third-degree murder
committed after he had committed a second-degree murder. Petitioner claims that,
because Section 9715(a) does not include the words “without the possibility of
parole,” the sentencing court should have imposed a minimum as part of his Second
Murder sentence, which he argues should have been 20 years.
This claim is distinct from Petitioner’s PCRA claims discussed supra.
Petitioner does not contend that the imposition of his sentence was greater than the
lawful maximum, which would bring the claim into the realm of a PCRA claim. See

12
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii). Instead, Petitioner argues that his sentence for the
Second Murder should have included a minimum date (for parole eligibility
purposes). As a result, this claim is one of statutory interpretation as opposed to one
seeking post-conviction relief, and we need not dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
As a result, we need not dismiss Petitioner’s statutory claim against Respondents on
jurisdictional grounds.
However, Respondents also demur to the Petition’s statutory
interpretation claims on the basis that are not proper parties to the claim because they
do not impose sentences under the Sentencing Code, and therefore, the Petition fails
to allege that any of their actions resulted in harm to Petitioner. We agree with
Respondents that they are improper parties to Petitioner’s statutory interpretation
claims. This Court has determined that a litigant must bring suit against the party
charged with maintaining the enforcement and administration of a statute, and that
state actors who lack such duties and responsibilities are improper parties to actions.
See Wagaman v. Att’y Gen. of Com., 872 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (holding
that Attorney General improper party to sex offender registration case where
Pennsylvania State Police was party charged with administration and enforcement
of the sex offender registration statute); see also Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 304 M.D. 2022, filed March 22, 2024), slip op. at 6 (dismissing
Department of Corrections from declaratory judgment action because the
Department of Corrections is not the state agency responsible for prosecuting crimes
or appointing counsel and has no discernible role in administering the PCRA
process). In this case, neither the AG nor the General Assembly is a proper party.
Neither has authority under the Sentencing Code regarding Petitioner’s sentencing
or resentencing, which responsibility falls to Pennsylvania’s courts of common
pleas. As such, Petitioner has not asserted claims for which relief may be obtained

13
from either Respondent. Accordingly, we sustain Respondents’ demurrers and
dismiss the Petition to the extent it raises statutory claims against them.
IV. Conclusion
We are constrained to interpret the Petition’s two constitutional claims
as being “in the nature of [an] application[] for . . . post-conviction relief.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). Given that the action is not ancillary to any proceedings
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
such claims. Accordingly, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection to those
claims based on a lack of jurisdiction and transfer the claims to the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County as a PCRA court.16 We further sustain Respondents’
preliminary objection to the Petition’s statutory interpretation claims on the ground
that they are not proper parties.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

16
We note that by transferring these claims because we lack jurisdiction to entertain cases
under the PCRA, we take no position on the merits or timeliness of Petitioner’s claims before the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Edwards, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme :
in Sentencing Third Degree Murder :
Convictions to Mandatory Life without :
Parole for their Second Murder :
Conviction; General Assembly, :
and Attorney General, : No: 184 M.D. 2023
Respondents :

ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of May, 2025, the General Assembly’s and Attorney
General’s (Respondents) preliminary objections to Petitioner Anthony Edwards’
(Petitioner) petition for review (Petition) on the bases that we lack jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s constitutional claims and that they are not proper parties to Petitioner’s
statutory interpretation claims are SUSTAINED. The statutory interpretation claims
contained in the Petition are DISMISSED. The remaining constitutional claims
contained in the Petition are TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County as a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546.
Petitioner’s application for relief seeking leave to file an untimely reply brief,
which was docketed in this Court on November 4, 2024, is DENIED as the matter
had already been submitted to the Court, pursuant to this Court’s Order of October
9, 2024 for decision on November 6, 2024.

__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Edwards, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 184 M.D. 2023
:
Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Scheme : Submitted: November 6, 2024
in Sentencing Third Degree Murder :
Convictions to Mandatory Life without :
Parole for their Second Murder :
Conviction; General Assembly, :
and Attorney General, :
Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA. A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: May 15, 2025

I agree with the thoughtful Majority that Anthony Edwards’ challenge
to the statutory basis for sentencing him to Life Without Parole (LWOP) imposed
pursuant to Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a), must be
dismissed pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) because it is lodged against the
Attorney General and the General Assembly, who have no statutory authority to
make decisions as to Edwards’ sentence under the Sentencing Code and are,
therefore, not proper parties to such a claim.1 But as they are likewise not proper
parties to any potential, and not mistakenly or properly filed Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA)2 claim, and the sentencing court has no jurisdiction over them, the
matter should be dismissed, not transferred. The Majority further seeks to preserve
the filing date in this Court upon transfer to the sentencing court, even though it is
not a mistakenly filed PCRA petition and it is unclear what Edwards would possibly
file, even if the trial court permitted Edwards to file a brand new pleading. It is here
that I must respectfully depart ways with the Majority.
In general, and as more specifically discussed below, the controlling
precedent in this matter is currently Hill v. Governor of Commonwealth, 309 A.3d
238 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, 317 A.3d 551 (Pa. 2024), which was affirmed by our
Supreme Court, and which dictates that where the sentencing court has no
jurisdiction over the named parties, our Court should dismiss the matter. Further, as
discussed in Hill, the rules governing the transfer of cases from one court to another
are set forth in Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a), and Rule
751 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.). These rules quite
clearly apply to the situation where a party has mistakenly filed his action in the
wrong court. These transfer rules direct courts to transfer such actions where (1) the
originating court lacks jurisdiction over the action; and (2) another court (the
transferee court) has jurisdiction over it.
Whether a court has jurisdiction to resolve a case is based not only on
the matter but the parties as well. A court must have both subject matter jurisdiction

1
I also agree with the Majority to the extent it concludes that we are without authority to
address Edwards’ constitutional claims because they implicate the legality of his sentence.

2
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

PAM - 2
and personal jurisdiction to determine a legal action. “Jurisdiction to resolve cases
on the merits requires authority over the category of claim in suit (subject matter
jurisdiction) and authority over the parties involved (personal jurisdiction), so that
the court’s decision will bind them.” Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc.,
265 A.3d 383, 400 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574, 577 (1999)).
Here, the sentencing court does not have jurisdiction over the
Respondents named in Edwards’ Petition for Review. As such, consistent with Hill
and the rules, the Petition for Review should be dismissed, not transferred.
Nonetheless, under the auspices of “preserving” Edwards’ filing date, the Majority
seeks to implement a new rule to transfer the entire case, except where: (1) the
petitioner concedes the untimeliness of the PCRA petition; or (2) the Superior Court
or sentencing court have already denied the claim as untimely. See Majority Op. at
11 (“Where a petitioner has not conceded that a PCRA petition would not satisfy
any of the PCRA timeliness exceptions and the Superior Court has not already ruled
on such timeliness, this Court should transfer the matter to the common pleas court
with jurisdiction to rule on the timeliness of the PCRA petition.”).3 However, there
is nothing in Rule 751 or Section 5103 that requires transferring a case only if the

3
Contemporaneously with the filing of the en banc memorandum decision in this case, the
Majority issued memorandum en banc decisions in Hawkins v. Department of Corrections, Adult
Probation & Collections Unit (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 404 M.D. 2023, filed May 15, 2025), and Davis
v. Pennsylvania Legislature (General Assembly), Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, and
Pennsylvania Attorney General (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 245 M.D. 2023, filed May 15, 2025), both of
which also transfer a complaint/petition for review filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction based
on its sua sponte inquiry into whether, if transferred, the petitioners’ claims against certain
Commonwealth government parties would be timely under the PCRA. As my concurring and
dissenting opinions in those cases reflect, consistent with my opinions herein, I disagree wholly
that transfer of the complaint/petition for review to the sentencing court is appropriate under
Section 5103.
PAM - 3
petitioner has not conceded the untimeliness of his PCRA petition or the issue has
not already been denied as untimely.
In crafting this new rule out of whole cloth, the Majority has committed
a series of missteps. First, an inmate’s petition for review filed in this Court’s
original jurisdiction that does not contain the averments required in a PCRA petition
is not a PCRA Petition “filed in the wrong court” merely because the relief requested
is a change to his sentence. Second, the transfer rules require that the transferee
court have jurisdiction over the transferred action. Suffice it to say, if the transferee
court does not have jurisdiction over the action, it cannot, and should not, be
transferred. The Majority, however, decides only that the “transferred” Petition for
Review in this case would not be futile from a timeliness standpoint, and completely
ignores the fact that the sentencing court is not a “proper tribunal” to consider the
action because it clearly does not have jurisdiction over the named respondents, the
Attorney General and the General Assembly. Third, neither of the “exceptions to
transfer” created by the Majority appear in Section 5103. The Majority has
erroneously added conditions to Section 5103 that do not exist. I believe the
necessary and correct statutory interpretation analysis of Section 5103 and Rule 751
dictate that the transfer of Edwards’ Petition for Review filed against the Attorney
General and General Assembly is simply not proper, irrespective of any timeliness
concerns.
I.

FIRST: A petitioner’s petition for review filed in this
Court’s original jurisdiction that does not contain the
averments required in a PCRA petition is not a PCRA
petition “filed in the wrong court” merely because the
relief requested is a change to his sentence

PAM - 4
A. Edwards’ Petition for Review is Not a “Mistakenly” Filed PCRA
Petition That Can Simply be “Transferred” to the Sentencing Court
i. Section 5103(a)
Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, titled “Transfer of Erroneously
Filed Matters,” requires this Court to transfer an “appeal or other matter” when we
do not have jurisdiction over an action and another court does have jurisdiction.
It provides:
(a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken to
or brought in a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the
appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district
judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter,
but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper
tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other
matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was
first filed in a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of a court or magisterial district judge of this
Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other
tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by
the other tribunal to the proper court or magisterial
district of this Commonwealth where it shall be treated as
if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial
district of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed
in the other tribunal.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a) (emphasis added).
Transfer under this section is without prejudice (“shall be treated as if
originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the appeal”). The tolling
theory behind this rule requiring transfer is that a plaintiff who timely files an action
should not lose his opportunity to litigate the case simply because he is technically
in error regarding the jurisdiction of the court. Oleski v. Department of Public
Welfare, 822 A.2d 120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).

PAM - 5
Even though the Majority transfers Edwards’ Petition for Review
pursuant to Section 5103(a), it pays no heed to its actual language. Instead, it is
relegated to a footnote and not discussed in any meaningful way.
Section 5103(a) defines exactly when an action should be transferred.
Transfer is triggered when a “matter” is brought to a court which “does not have
jurisdiction” of the matter, and another tribunal does. In that situation, the court
shall transfer the “matter” to the “proper tribunal.” Where a “matter” is within the
“exclusive jurisdiction” of a court, but is commenced in another court, the matter
shall be transferred to the proper court.
Based on a reading of Section 5103(a), which is unambiguous, it is clear
that the only concern the legislature had in enacting Section 5103 was to provide a
vehicle by which entire cases (not isolated arguments or issues) mistakenly filed in
the wrong court could be transferred to the court in which they should have initially
been brought. Crucial to my interpretation is our legislature’s use of the term
“matter” to describe what may be transferred under this statute. A “matter” is
defined in the Judicial Code as “an action, proceeding or appeal.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102
(emphasis added). An “action” is “[a]ny action at law or in equity.” Id. This
legislative language thus forces the conclusion that Section 5103 only provides
authority to transfer an action as a result of the transferring court’s lack of
jurisdiction over it.
ii. Rule 751
The same is true for Rule 751, which is based upon Section 5103(a) of
the Judicial Code, and titled “Transfer of Erroneously Filed Cases.” It provides:

(a) General rule. If an appeal or other matter is taken to
or brought in a court or magisterial district which does not
have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or

PAM - 6
district justice shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the
matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper
court of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other
matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the
transferee court on the date first filed in a court or
magisterial district.

Pa.R.A.P. 751(a) (emphasis added).

iii. “Matter”
In turn, “matter” is defined in the Appellate Rules to include (1) action
(which is defined as any action or proceeding at law or in equity); (2) proceeding
(which is undefined); and (3) appeal (which is defined as any petition or other
application to a court for review). Pa.R.A.P. 102 (Definitions).
Thus, under a clear reading of both the transfer statute and appellate
rule, if a party mistakenly files an appeal in an appellate court or in an incorrect
office within the Unified Judicial System, the court that receives the mistakenly filed
appeal must transfer the appeal or action to the proper court. Similarly, if an action
is originally filed in the wrong court, the court must transfer the action to the proper
court.
In concluding that Section 5103 authorizes the transfer of Edwards’
entire Petition for Review, Respondents and all, to the sentencing court merely
because he includes an argument that should have been raised in a properly and
timely filed PCRA petition, the Majority interprets Section 5103 too broadly. It is
clear to me that Edwards did not “mistakenly” file “a PCRA action” in this Court
that we are required under Section 5103 to transfer to the sentencing court so as to
“preserve his filing date.” At best, Edwards makes an argument in his two-count
Petition for Review against the Attorney General and General Assembly that he
should have raised in a valid and timely filed PCRA petition filed against the
PAM - 7
Commonwealth as the defendant in the sentencing court. Notably, Edwards has
already filed three other PCRA petitions in the sentencing court. This Court’s
research reveals that the Superior Court has already affirmed the PCRA court’s
dismissal of three PCRA petitions filed by Edwards. His first PCRA petition, filed
on April 22, 2002, was dismissed as meritless. Edwards did not appeal from that
order. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of his second PCRA petition as
untimely. In his third PCRA petition, Edwards alleged that the imposition of LWOP
for his conviction of second-degree murder under Section 9715 of the Sentencing
Code violated Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Superior Court
affirmed the dismissal of his third PCRA petition because he failed to plead and
prove an exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. See Commonwealth v.
Edwards (Pa. Super., No. 2553 EDA 2014, filed July 22, 2015) (recounting the
history of Edwards’ PCRA petitions and finding Edwards’ third PCRA petition
untimely). Thus, it does not appear that he is confused or “mistaken” as to which
court they belong.
In order to justify the transfer here, the Majority misconstrues Edwards’
Petition for Review as though it was a valid PCRA petition that can simply be
transferred lock, stock and barrel to the sentencing court for the continuation of
proceedings. However, Edwards’ Petition for Review is not a PCRA petition.
Under Section 9543 of the PCRA, a PCRA petition4 must plead and support the

4
Specifically, Section 9543 of the PCRA provides:

(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under this
subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance
of the evidence all of the following:

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under
the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
PAM - 8
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment,
probation or parole for the crime;

(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for
the crime;

(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before
the person may commence serving the disputed
sentence; or

(iv) has completed a sentence of imprisonment,
probation or parole for the crime and is seeking
relief based upon DNA evidence obtained under
section 9543.1(d) (relating to postconviction DNA
testing).

(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or
more of the following:

(i) A violation of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.

(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the
circumstances make it likely that the inducement
caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the
petitioner is innocent.

(iv) The improper obstruction by government
officials of the petitioner’s right of appeal where a
meritorious appealable issue existed and was
properly preserved in the trial court.

(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of
exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become
(Footnote continued on next page…)
PAM - 9
essential elements of a claim. Commonwealth v. Rivers, 786 A.2d 923, 937-38 (Pa.
2001). The PCRA includes very specific requirements that must be stated in a PCRA
petition. Also, the PCRA contains a jurisdictional time bar, which is subject to
limited statutory exceptions.5 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). For the sentencing court to

available and would have changed the outcome of
the trial if it had been introduced.

(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the
lawful maximum.

(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without
jurisdiction.

(3) That the allegation of error has not been previously
litigated or waived.

(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial,
during unitary review or on direct appeal could not have been the
result of any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543. See also Rule 901 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Pa.R.Crim.P.) 903 (Initiation of Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902
(Content of Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, Request for discovery) (“A petition for
post-conviction collateral relief shall bear the caption, number, and court term of the case or cases
in which relief is requested”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A)-(B) (explaining that, upon receipt of PCRA
petition, the clerk of court shall “make a docket entry, at the same term and number as the
underlying conviction and sentence . . . and . . . place the petition in the criminal case file,” then
“transmit a copy of the petition to the attorney for the Commonwealth”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 906(A)
(providing, generally, that an attorney for Commonwealth may elect to file answer or must do so
if ordered by court).

5
The statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar are as follows:

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:

(Footnote continued on next page…)
PAM - 10
have jurisdiction to review the claims raised therein, the PCRA petition must
demonstrate the applicability of one of the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time
bar. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. 1999).
Here, Edward’s Petition for Review does not meet the pleading and
proof requirement of the PCRA. Edwards’ Petition for Review is not styled as a
PCRA petition, i.e., it does not include the requisite averments for a valid PCRA
petition, and it is not brought against the Commonwealth, which is the only proper
party to a PCRA proceeding. Edwards does not raise a single exception to timeliness
under Section 9545(b).6 He does not claim that his late filing was the result of
interference by government officials. He does not claim that the facts upon which

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)-(2).

6
A PCRA petition seeking to invoke one of these exceptions must be filed “within 60 days
of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
PAM - 11
he bases his Petition for Review were unknown to him. He does not base his
argument on any newly recognized constitutional right. Consequently, this is not a
situation where an inmate clearly intended to proceed under the PCRA but
“mistakenly” filed his PCRA action in this Court, instead of in the sentencing court.
The Majority is, in effect, transferring to the sentencing court a case that will need
to be completely re-pled to adhere to the PCRA, re-captioned to name the correct
parties, re-docketed to reflect the criminal docket number, and re-served on the
Commonwealth. The Attorney General and General Assembly will need to appear
before the sentencing court and seek removal from the case.
The Majority is also requiring this Court to assume that Edwards wants
to pursue his claims in the PCRA context and that he “mistakenly” filed his PCRA
petition in the wrong court. We may not assume that. It is equally likely that
Edwards very purposely did not file his current claims in the PCRA court against the
Commonwealth, but rather very purposely filed his action in this Court against
those respondents he believes are responsible for enacting and implementing the
various laws he challenges. If we were to assume anything, it would be that Edwards
knows exactly how and where to file a PCRA petition and against whom.

II.
SECOND: The Transfer Rules Require that the
Transferee Court Have Jurisdiction Over the
Transferred Action, and the Sentencing Court Does
Not Have Jurisdiction in this Case
Not only does Edwards’ Petition for Review lack the essential elements
of a PCRA petition, but the sentencing court also lacks personal jurisdiction over the
named respondents, the Attorney General and General Assembly. Again, in order
to toll the filing date under Section 5103(a), the action must be mistakenly brought

PAM - 12
in a court that lacks jurisdiction and there must be a proper court to transfer it to
(“[i]f [a] matter is taken to or brought in a court . . . which does not have
jurisdiction of the . . . other matter, the court . . . shall transfer the record thereof to
the proper tribunal”) (emphasis added).
Edwards filed his Petition for Review against the Attorney General
and the General Assembly, which consists of two causes of action alleging (1)
constitutional violations, and (2) statutory violations.

A. The Sentencing Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the
Attorney General and General Assembly
As explained, under Section 5103(a), it is contemplated that in order to
transfer an action to another court, that transferee court must be the “proper” court
that has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction (“shall transfer the
record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth”). See Bisher, 265
A.3d at 400. Otherwise, it would be futile to transfer it.
Edwards’ action, as pleaded, is against the Attorney General and the
General Assembly, neither of which are proper parties in a PCRA proceeding; the
Commonwealth is the proper party to participate in post-conviction proceedings.
Without question, the sentencing court has no personal jurisdiction over the Attorney
General or the General Assembly. See Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, which
provides, “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions or proceedings: (1) [a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any
officer thereof, acting in his official capacity[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) (emphasis
added). Therefore, we cannot transfer the petition for review to the sentencing court
because it does not have personal jurisdiction over the named Respondents.
As noted, the most recent published case that held this is Hill, authored
by the Court’s current President Judge, Judge Cohn Jubelirer. In Hill, a pro se

PAM - 13
inmate serving a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder filed a petition
for review in our original jurisdiction against the Governor and the Pennsylvania
Parole Board asking this Court (as Edwards does here) to change his sentence. Upon
finding that we lacked authority to change his sentence, this Court then undertook a
separate analysis to determine whether dismissal or transfer to the sentencing court
would be appropriate. This Court first noted that Section 5103(a) states that,
generally, a court “shall not dismiss an erroneously filed matter for lack of
jurisdiction, but shall transfer the case to the proper tribunal.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).
However, notwithstanding that general provision, we decided not to
transfer the action to the sentencing court because, as here, the Governor and Parole
Board were not proper parties to the criminal action at the criminal docket. We
explained that it is the Commonwealth that participates in proceedings under the
PCRA. Therefore, transfer would be inappropriate and “an unjustifiable expenditure
of judicial resources.” Critically, we found that the inmate was not without recourse.
We explained that the inmate’s “proper recourse would be to pursue relief under the
requirements of the PCRA.” Hill, 309 A.3d at 246. That is precisely what Edwards
is required to do here.
Prior to Hill, this Court was inconsistent in the way in which it handled
the disposition of these types of petitions for review that are brought against the
wrong parties.7 Hill clarified that if the wrong parties are named, we should not

7
See, e.g., Cook v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 472 M.D. 2019, filed May 13, 2020) (transfers
petition for review against the Governor to the common pleas court; follows no case, statute or
rule); Ellis v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 596 M.D. 2019, filed April 13, 2021) (follows Cook); Henry
v. Wolf, 256 A.3d 48, 53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (transfers petition for review against the Governor to
the common pleas court, citing Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code); Dockery v. Wolf, 259 A.3d
566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (same); Green v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 336 M.D. 2021, filed July 5,
2022) (transfers petition for review against the Governor to the common pleas court, citing Henry
and Dockery).
PAM - 14
transfer the petition for review to the sentencing court. However, Birdwell v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 80 M.D. 2023, filed
September 5, 2024), decided after Hill, did not follow its precedent but, rather, citing
no case, statute, or rule, transferred the petitioner’s petition for review to the
common pleas court, even though the named respondent was the Parole Board, over
which the common pleas court had no personal jurisdiction. Like this case, the
Hawkins and Davis decisions, filed contemporaneously with this decision, also do
not follow Hill. 8 They also all conflict with a line of cases that have applied this
same rationale applied in Hill to cases seeking a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum and mandamus relief.
For example, in Borsello v. Colleran, 833 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2003), this Court held that an inmate’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Testificandum against the prison superintendent (not an officer of the
Commonwealth) was properly dismissed by the trial court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, rather than being transferred to this Court as an “erroneously filed”
matter under Section 5103(a). The petition raised constitutional questions relating
to the Parole Board’s decision to recommit the inmate as a technical parole violator
and the Parole Board’s decision to deny him parole. We held:

the trial court did not err in failing to transfer this matter
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103, which mandates the transfer
of erroneously filed matters. In the instant case, although
the trial court acknowledged this Court’s exclusive

8
I respectfully note that panel decisions of this Court, such as Hill and the cases cited in
Hill, can only be overruled by an en banc panel of this Court. See Commonwealth Court IOP §
257, 210 Pa. Code § 69.257. However, the Majority has elected not to publish its decision and
does not specifically overrule Hill. Thus, it is entirely unclear to me if Hill has been overruled sub
silentio by the Majority. If perchance Hill remains valid law, I do not see how the Majority’s
decision and Hill can be interpreted to give effect to each other.
PAM - 15
jurisdiction over parole revocation appeals, the Board is
not a party named in the caption of Borsello’s petition.
Id. at 1215 (emphasis added).
In Burton v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 130 M.D. 2021, filed February
10, 2022), an inmate filed a petition for review against the Department of Corrections
(DOC) in our original jurisdiction, seeking an order directing DOC to terminate his
restitution obligations to his murder victim’s mother. We held that we did not have
jurisdiction over the matter because the inmate’s request to terminate his restitution
obligation must be directed to the sentencing court. We dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction, rather than transferring it to the sentencing court, because the District
Attorney, who represents the Commonwealth’s interests in criminal matters, was not
named in the caption:

This Court acknowledges that, pursuant to Section 5103(a)
of the Judicial Code: “A matter which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of a court . . . of this Commonwealth
but which is commenced in any other tribunal of this
Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other
tribunal to the proper court . . . of this Commonwealth .
. . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a) (emphasis added). However, in
the instant case, [DOC] is not a party to the criminal
action at the criminal docket. Rather, the
Commonwealth’s interests in the criminal matter are
represented by the District Attorney. See
Commonwealth v. Jury, 636 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. 1993).
Because the District Attorney is not named in the
caption of [p]etitioner’s [p]etition, rather than transfer
the matter to the sentencing court, this Court must
dismiss the [p]etition. See Borsello v. Colleran, 833 A.2d
1213, 1215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (trial court did not err in
not transferring case to this Court because, inter alia, “the
[Pennsylvania] Board [of Probation and Parole, the proper
party,] is not a party named in the caption of the
petitioner's petition[]”).

PAM - 16
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). See also Lee v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 251 A.3d 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (court declined to treat improper appellate
petition for review as original jurisdiction petition for review in the nature of
mandamus because proper respondent would have been DOC, which was not named
as a party or served, explaining “the Court cannot simply transfer this matter to its
original jurisdiction against an unnamed party, here, DOC”); Scott v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole, 256 A.3d 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (declining to
transfer action against Parole Board attacking a sentence of LWOP as
unconstitutional because Parole Board was not a proper party to post-conviction
proceedings); Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 364 M.D. 2021, filed August 30, 2023) (declining to transfer case to sentencing
court under Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code because the Commonwealth and
not the Parole Board is the proper party to participate in post-conviction
proceedings); Freeman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and General
Assembly (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 238 M.D. 2021, filed December 7, 2022) (declining to
transfer under Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code a petition for review seeking
declaratory judgment that Section 6137 of the Prisons and Parole Code violates
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the Parole
Board and General Assembly do not participate the post-conviction proceedings).
III.
THIRD: neither of the “Exceptions to Transfer”
created by the Majority appear in Section 5103(a)
Rather than adhering to the plain language of Section 5103(a), Hill, and
the multitude of other cases that have declined to transfer an action where it was
brought against parties which would not be proper parties in the proceedings before
the transferee court, the Majority has created a new rule to be applied in PCRA cases

PAM - 17
– by distilling from other cases which have declined to transfer an action filed in this
Court if it would be futile from a timeliness standpoint, irrespective of the sentencing
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the named defendants. The Majority, therefore,
countenances that (1) we should not consider whether the petitioner has named the
appropriate respondents or whether the sentencing court has jurisdiction over the
action as pled, and (2) we should raise, sua sponte, the question of the timeliness of
a petition for review that raises an argument that should have been raised in a PCRA
petition and factor timeliness into the transfer analysis. That consideration is not
present in either Section 5103(a) or Rule 751, and the Majority does not rely upon,
distinguish, or otherwise discuss Hill, even though it is directly on point.
Addressing briefly the issue of wrong parties, the Majority “declines”
to dismiss the matter on the grounds that Edwards “arguably” named improper
parties to a PCRA petition. First, Edwards did not arguably name the wrong parties
to a PCRA petition, he did name the wrong parties. We definitely can, and should,
take that obvious reality into consideration when deciding whether to transfer the
case to the sentencing court. That is precisely what Section 5103(a) requires us to
do before transferring an action to another court. The Majority, without any support
whatsoever, declares that “it is for the transferee court, the court with jurisdiction, to
dismiss improper parties to the action.” To the extent it does so, I submit that it is
inappropriate to leave that decision to the sentencing court after the action has been
transferred ostensibly under Section 5103(a). Section 5103(a) specifically provides
that if an action is “brought in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth
which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or
magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall
transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal.” There is no principled reason

PAM - 18
to transfer an action to a court that obviously does not have jurisdiction over the
named parties, as is the case here. To do so is in clear violation of Section 5103(a).
Finally, I note that if we transfer Edwards’ Petition for Review under
Section 5103(a) (which preserves filing dates), the sentencing court would be bound
to treat the matter as if originally filed on the date the Petition for Review was filed
in this Court, in a situation where the pleading is not a valid PCRA petition and must
first be amended in order to bring into compliance with the PCRA. In reviewing a
PCRA petition for timeliness, it is for the sentencing court to decide if the inmate’s
filing meets the requirements of a PCRA petition, and whether the PCRA petition
contains the requisite averments to invoke an exception to timeliness. Transferring
this action under Section 5103(a) would, in essence, “preserve a filing date” for a
pleading that does not comply with the PCRA. In this situation, we would be
usurping the sentencing court’s role in deciding PCRA matters.
Conclusion
Basing the decision to transfer a case simply on whether the petition is
facially untimely, without consideration of the other requisite transfer factors in
Section 5103(a) and our current precedent, Hill, misses the mark. As noted, there
are problems inherent in attempting to craft a rule for transfer that requires this Court
to sua sponte raise issues of timeliness, assume the petitioner really meant to file it
in the sentencing court, and ignore whether proper parties have been named so as to
give the transferee court jurisdiction over the matter—an express requirement of
Section 5103. The bottom line is that an action which merely seeks some of the
relief that can only be awarded under the PCRA should not be treated as a “mis-
filed” PCRA petition. This Court should not treat a petition for review as a PCRA
petition simply because it raises one issue that should have been raised in a PCRA

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petition, particularly when the petition is filed against parties who are not proper
parties in post-conviction proceedings. Hill. The better course of action is to follow
our precedent, dismiss the Petition for Review as baseless, and allow the petitioner
to refile a compliant PCRA petition under the PCRA, as we held in Hill.
For these reasons, I must dissent to the portion of the Majority’s
decision to transfer the Petition for Review to the sentencing court.

__________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

President Judge Cohn Jubelirer and Judge Covey join in this Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11051458. Public record. Not legal advice.