# McDaniel v. Shelby County Jail

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · May 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11050958

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11050958

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”
- recognizing that police department is not an entity capable of being sued under § 1983
- stating that sheriff’s department “is not a legal entity subject to suit” under § 1983

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

TONY MCDANIEL, )
)
Plaintiff,
)

) Civ. No. 2:25-cv-02284-SHM-tmp
v.
)

)
SHELBY COUNTY JAIL,
)
Defendant. )

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET,
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

On March 11, 2025, Plaintiff Tony McDaniel, inmate number 421143, who is presently
confined at the Shelby County Jail (the “SCJ”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915, et seq. (ECF No. 6.)
For the reasons that follow, McDaniel’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Leave to amend is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to
add Shelby County, Tennessee, as a Defendant and to remove the SCJ as a Defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
McDaniel alleges that from July 1, 2024 to July 14, 2024, while confined at the SCJ, he
was forced to sleep on a metal bed without a “bed mat.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) McDaniel
alleges that the complained “everyday” about the lack of a bed mat. (Id.) McDaniel alleges that
he filed two grievances about the SCJ’s failure to provide a bed mat. (Id.) McDaniel alleges that
he suffered from “body aches” and “back pain” from sleeping on a metal bed. (Id.) The Court
construes McDaniel’s complaint to allege a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
McDaniel sues the SCJ as the sole defendant. (Id. at PageID 2.) McDaniel seeks $200,000
in damages for his “pain and suffering.” (Id. at PageID 5.)

II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of
it, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court
applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57
(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the
Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that
conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a
complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). It also requires factual allegations to
make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 555 n.3
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal
of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v.
Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
B. Requirements to State a Claim Under § 1983
McDaniel sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
III. ANALYSIS
McDaniel sues the SCJ as the sole Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) “To state a claim
under § 1983, the plaintiff . . . must show that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The SCJ is neither a “person” under § 1983 nor an entity
capable of being sued under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);
see also Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6,
2000) (noting that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”); Matthews

v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that police department is not an entity
capable of being sued under § 1983); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991)
(stating that sheriff’s department “is not a legal entity subject to suit” under § 1983).
The Court construes McDaniel’s claim against the SCJ as a claim against Shelby County,
Tennessee, (the “County”). See Matthews, 35 F.3d at 1049. The County may be held liable only

if McDaniel’s injuries were sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy of the
County. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003).
“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts
of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
McDaniel’s complaint does not allege any deprivation of a constitutional right because of

a policy or custom of the County. McDaniel’s allegations are based on his particular experience
at the SCJ. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) McDaniel does not state a claim to relief against the
County because McDaniel fails to allege facts demonstrating any official policy or custom of the
County, much less an unconstitutional policy that injured McDaniel.
McDaniel’s § 1983 claim against the County is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief.
IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)). Leave to amend should
not be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-
Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending
the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry,
246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal

of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and
does not infringe the right of access to the courts”). The Court GRANTS leave to amend within
21 days of the date of this Order, and under the guidelines set forth below.
An amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including
but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement of claims. If McDaniel
decides to amend his claims, he shall: (1) comprehensively and particularly list, in ONE document,
all defendants and all claims within this Court’s jurisdiction; and (2) submit the amended
complaint on the Court’s official form: Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (See https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/sites/tnwd/files/CivilRightsComplaint.pdf.)
An amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and must be complete in itself

without reference to the prior pleadings. McDaniel must sign the amended complaint, and the text
of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to
any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate
count and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. All claims alleged in the amended
complaint must arise from the facts alleges in the complaint.
If McDaniel fails to file an amended complaint in a timely manner, the Court will dismiss
the case and enter judgment. The Court recommends that any such dismissal of this case be treated
as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th

Cir. 2021). The “three strikes” provision of § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in forma
pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . brought
an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:
A. McDaniel’s § 1983 claim against the County is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief.
See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
B. Leave to amend the is GRANTED. McDaniel may amend his complaint within 21
days of the date of this Order, under the guidelines set forth supra.
C. McDaniel is ORDERED to notify the Court immediately, in writing, of his current
address, if he is transferred or released. If McDaniel fails to provide the Court with
his current address or fails to follow any other requirements of this order, the Court
may impose appropriate sanctions, up to and including dismissal of this action,

without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of May, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. .
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11050958. Public record. Not legal advice.