# DWIGHT v. KRASNER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11049381

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEVIN DWIGHT : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
:
v. : NO. 24-CV-2513
:
LARRY KRASNER, et al., :
Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. MAY 9, 2025

Currently, before the Court is a Second Amended Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Kevin
Dwight alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to his pending
criminal case and the medical care and mental health treatment he has received while incarcerated.
For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 After the Court dismissed Dwight’s Amended Complaint and granted him leave to amend
certain claims, see ECF No. 12, Dwight filed an amended complaint, (see ECF No. 16), and subsequently
filed a second amended complaint on March 12, 2025, (see ECF No. 19). An amended complaint, once
submitted to the Court, supersedes the prior pleading and serves as the governing pleading in the case. See
Shahid v. Borough of Darby, 666 F. App'x 221, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“Shahid’s amended
complaint, however, superseded his initial complaint.” (citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs. LLC v.
Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d
69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes
the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended
complaint becomes the operative pleading.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Argentina v. Gillette, 778
F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint
does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings”). Here, for the reasons set forth, the
Second Amended Complaint filed on March 12, 2025, is the operative pleading and supersedes the
Amended Complaint filed on February 19, 2025.

Dwight used the form complaint available to unrepresented litigants to file his Second Amended
Complaint and attached five additional pages. (ECF No. 19.) The Court considers the entire submission
to constitute the Second Amended Complaint and adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF
docketing system. The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Second Amended
Complaint. The Court may also consider matters of public record when conducting a screening under §
1915. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
Dwight, a pretrial detainee in custody at the Philadelphia Detention Center, initiated this
civil rights action pursuant to § 1983, naming as Defendants Philadelphia District Attorney Larry
Krasner, House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion, the City of Philadelphia, and Philadelphia Prison
Commissioner Michael Resnick.2

In a December 5, 2024, Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Dwight leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. (See
ECF Nos. 11, 12.) The Amended Complaint was dismissed, in part, with prejudice, and, in part,
without prejudice. (See ECF No. 12 at 2.) All claims raised against Philadelphia District Attorney
Lawrence Krasner, in both his official and individual capacity, all official capacity claims against
House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion and Philadelphia Prison Commissioner Michael Resnick,
and all claims against Resnick based on the handling of grievances were dismissed with prejudice.
(Id.) All other claims were dismissed without prejudice. (Id.)
Specifically, there were three claims that were dismissed without prejudice. The first claim
was for municipal liability against the City of Philadelphia. See Dwight v. Krasner, No. 24-CV-

2513, 2024 WL 4988974, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2024). The Court explained that to state a claim
for municipal liability, Dwight “must allege that the City’s policies or customs caused the alleged
constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). Dwight “‘must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or
policy was’ to satisfy the pleading standard.” Id. (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d
636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)). The Court reiterated that “it is not enough, however, to allege the

2 This case was initially filed by a letter Complaint, which was deficient as a Complaint in a
civil action. (ECF No. 1). On July 2, 2024, the Court ordered Dwight to, inter alia, file a proper complaint
with all defendants identified in the caption. (ECF No. 3). Dwight substantially complied by filing an
Amended Complaint naming these Defendants. (ECF No. 4).
existence of a policy or custom. ‘A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the
‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.’” Id. (quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789,
798 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted). The Court found that “Dwight ma[de] only vague,
generalized, or conclusory allegations that are entirely insufficient to support a Monell claim

against the City.” Id. When dismissing Dwight’s claim against Champion in her individual
capacity, the Court found that this claim was “entirely undeveloped. He ha[d] not alleged facts
that describe what happened to him, or what specific actions Champion took when allegedly failing
to comply with an order.” Dwight, 2024 WL 4988974, at *4. The third claim dismissed without
prejudice was Dwight’s individual capacity supervisory liability claims against Resnick. Id. at *5-
6. Because there was “no allegation that Resnick was personally responsible for the medical care
Dwight received at the Philadelphia Detention Center,” the Court determined that “any liability
against him must be premised, if at all, on facts alleging deliberate indifference to the consequences
of a policy he established that caused constitutional harm.” Id. at *6. The Court found that
Dwight’s allegations were “insufficient to state a plausible claim against Resnick” based on that

theory of supervisory liability. Id.
Dwight was given leave to file a second amended complaint as to the claims dismissed
without prejudice, but the Court specifically ordered that he “may NOT reassert any claim that has
already been dismissed with prejudice.” (ECF No. 12 at 2-3 (emphasis in original.)) He ultimately
filed the pending second amended complaint.3 In his Second Amended Complaint (“Second Am.

3 Dwight was ordered to file his second amended complaint within thirty days from the date
of the Court’s December 5, 2024, Order. (ECF No. 12 at 2, 4.) On January 31, 2025, the Court dismissed
this case without prejudice based on Dwight’s failure to file his second amended complaint. (ECF No. 13.)
On February 7, 2025, Dwight filed a Motion for Emergency Relief requesting relief related to his pending
state case. (ECF No. 14.) The Court denied his request for emergency relief but vacated its dismissal Order
to give Dwight a second opportunity to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 15 at 1-2.) On February
19, 2025, Dwight filed an amended complaint dated on December 24, 2024, see ECF No. 16, and filed
motions requesting this case be reopened and for the Court to appoint him counsel, see ECF Nos. 17, 18.
Compl.”), Dwight names the following Defendants:4 Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
(“DAO”), Philadelphia Department of Adult Probation and Parole (“Probation and Parole”),
Philadelphia Prisons System, Yes Care Medical (Prison Medical Contractor) (“Yes Care”),
Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Juna Murray, House Arrest Agent Andrea

Champion, Medical Prescriber Helen Sarskaya, and Psychiatrist Ms. Teri (“Dr. Teri”) in their
respective official capacities. (See Second Am. Compl. at 1-3.) The individual defendants are
also named in their respective individual capacities. (See id. at 2-3.) He did not name as
defendants the City of Philadelphia or Resnick, nor did he bring amended claims against them.
Dwight alleges that the events giving rise to his claims arose at the Philadelphia Detention
Center on December 8, 2023, and mentions Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”) as
another facility where his claims occurred without further detail. (See id. at 4, 6.) He also alleges
August 24, 2020, as a date giving rise to his claims, which appears to be the date he was arrested
for his underlying state criminal case.5 (See id. at 5.) It is unclear which date coincides with which
claim. Dwight contends that Defendants Philadelphia DAO and ADA Juna Murray abused their

prosecutorial charging discretion and “allowed unfounded charges to be filed” against him “in the
form of child molestation when the complaining witness was a [forty-five-year-old] woman.” (Id.
at 12.) He claims that “this charge was the cause of bail being escalated” and the charge “was not

Dwight alleges he sent an amended complaint through the United States Postal Service on December 24,
2024, see ECF No. 17 at 1, which the Court has no record of receiving. On March 12, 2025, Dwight filed
a second amended complaint, see ECF No. 19, which serves as the operative pleading for the reasons
explained above in footnote 1.

4 Certain Defendants are named only in the heading of the operative pleading, see Second
Am. Compl. at 1, and others are listed only in “The Defendants” section provided on the form, id. at 2-3.
The Court recognizes each Defendant that Dwight listed in both sections out of an abundance of caution.

5 A review of public records indicates that Dwight was arrested on August 24, 2020, for
sexual assault and related charges for which he is awaiting trial. Commonwealth v. Dwight, CP-51-CR-
0001167-2021 (C.P. Philadelphia); Commonwealth v. Dwight, MC-51-CR-0015979-2020 (M.C.
Philadelphia).
removed for [three] years and [seven] months[,] which violated [his] constitutional rights and civil
rights to reasonable bail.” (Id.) He asserts that the Philadelphia DAO must “ensure correct charges
are filed and approved,” and their failure to do so was a violation of his constitutional rights by
“this malicious prosecution.” (Id.)

Dwight’s allegations concerning Defendants House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion and
Probation and Parole are brief. He alleges that they refused “to honor, Honorable Judge Monica
Gibbs[’s] Order to allow [him] to attend his treatment and appointments for chronic illnesses,
cancer diagnosis, spinal disease and etcet[e]ra.” (Id.) As a result, they violated his due process
rights and Probation and Parole “knew or should have known this was occurring under their watch
which makes them compliant in violating his due process and constitutional rights against cruel
and unusual punishment.” (Id.)
The remainder of Dwight’s allegations focus on claims relating to the grievance process
and inadequate medical care and mental health treatment provided by Defendants Yes Care, a
medical contractor for the Philadelphia Prison Systems, Medical Prescriber Helen Sarskaya, and

Psychiatrist Ms. Teri. (See id. at 7, 14-15.) Dwight asserts that he filed grievances with “no
positive results” or “corrective actions taken” for “refused medical treatment for colon cancer and
mental health treatment, for depression, anxiety, stress[,] torture, systematic ass[a]ult, poisoning,
[and] the use of food and medication for punishment.” (Id. at 7.) He further alleges that Yes Care
and the Philadelphia Prison System “failed to ensure that [he] receive[d] medical and mental health
care despite numerous grievances submitted asking the administration to intervene with [him], Yes
Care, and medical prescriber Helen Sarskaya. The medical provider acted arbitrarily in not getting
proper and adequate treatment of [his] chronic illnesses, spinal disease, [and] [] colon/lung
[cancer].” (Id. at 14.) He claims that “this was complicated by the mental health provider Dr. Teri
whom failed to adequately evaluate [his] present and current mental state and used diagnosis from
1995 under A.K.A. Kevin Wright in administering medication.” (Id.) He asserts both Defendants
Sarskaya and Dr. Teri failed to correctly evaluate and treat him and did not “assist a chronically ill
incarcerated person whom suffers also from mental health issues.” (Id. at 15.) Dwight claims that

Philadelphia Prison System “should have created or enforced a policy that requires Yes Care to
provide correct adequate evaluations and treatment for chronic care incarcerated persons,” (id. at
14), and Yes Care should have known about “their policy of reviewing charts prior to state
inspectors.” (Id. at 15.)
As a result of these events, his constitutional rights were violated, and he suffered post-
traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, despair, depression, paranoia, “irreversible damage to his
reputation,” and his medical conditions were left untreated. (Id. at 5.) Dwight seeks money
damages, and “immediate release back into house arrest.”6 (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dwight is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statute

requires the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a second amended complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

6 Dwight’s request to be released must be dismissed. His only avenue for that type of relief
in federal court is by a habeas petition after exhausting state remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); Williams v. Consovoy,
453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that a § 1983 complaint that seeks release may not proceed because
the proper vehicle for such claims is a petition for writ of habeas corpus); see also Hope v. Warden York
Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Where a petitioner seeks release from detention, habeas
(not a § 1983 action seeking release) is proper.”).
determine whether the Second Amended Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early
stage of the litigation, the Court must accept the facts alleged in a pro se second amended complaint

as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that second
amended complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter
v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by
Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Further, the Court construes the allegations of a pro se complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel,
8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with
imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244
(3d Cir. 2013)). However, ‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout

procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.; see
also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1,
2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law,
irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,
688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible
claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Dwight asserts constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which
federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. “Section 1983 is not a source of
substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law
committed by state actors.” See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). “To state a
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v. Twp.
of Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of state law element is a threshold
issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.”). “A defendant in
a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).
A. Philadelphia Prison System
The claims against the Philadelphia Prison System cannot proceed as pled. As the Third
Circuit has held, “the Philadelphia Prison System, [a] department[ ] of the City of Philadelphia
itself, [is] not [a] proper defendant[ ]” in an action brought under § 1983. Russell v. City of

Philadelphia, 428 Fed. App’x 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 53 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 16257; Bey
v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 422, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1998)); see also Durham v. Philadelphia
Prison Sys., No. 18-2113, 2018 WL 3105589, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2018) (explaining that the
“Philadelphia Prison System is not an entity that is subject to suit separate from the City of
Philadelphia.”) (citing 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 16257). Because the Philadelphia Prison System
is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983, Durham, 2018 WL 3105589 at *2 (citing
Peele v. Philadelphia Prison Sys., No. 12-4877, 2015 WL 1579214, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 8, 2015)),
Dwight’s claim against it is dismissed with prejudice. In any event, even if he had named the City
as a Defendant, Dwight has not clearly alleged a municipal policy or custom that led to a violation
of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (plaintiff “must allege that the City’s
policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.”).
B. Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages
1. Philadelphia DAO and ADA Juna Murray
Dwight names the Philadelphia DAO and ADA Juna Murray in her official capacity. A
suit against Murray in her official capacity is indistinguishable from claims against the

governmental entity that employs her, here the Philadelphia DAO. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690 n. 55). As such, the official capacity claim must be dismissed with prejudice because, as
noted in the Court’s prior opinion, see Dwight, 2024 WL 4988974 at *2, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that district attorney’s offices in Pennsylvania are not
entities subject to suit under § 1983. See Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that “the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office is not an entity for purposes of § 1983
liability”); see also Briggs v. Moore, 251 F. App’x 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[T]he

Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office is not a separate entity that can be sued under § 1983.”).
But see Harper v. City of Philadelphia, No. 18-365, 2018 WL 5784549, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2,
2018) (“District courts within the Third Circuit disagree about whether the DAO is a separate
entity from the City of Philadelphia such that it can be sued separately under § 1983.”). In any
event, Dwight has failed to articulate any basis for municipal liability against the DAO here. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (to state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation).
2. House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion and Probation and Parole
Even though Dwight was not given leave to reassert any claim that has already been
dismissed with prejudice, he again brings claims against House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion
in her official capacity and seeks money damages as part of his relief. This claim has already been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court and will be dismissed again on the same grounds.7 See

Dwight, 2024 WL 4988974, at *3. He also brings a claim against Probation and Parole, which
will be dismissed for similar reasons. In Pennsylvania, probation offices are part of the Judicial
Branch of the Commonwealth. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d
193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We have held that Pennsylvania’s judicial districts, including their
probation and parole departments,” are “part of the Commonwealth government[.]”). The
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary
damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. And Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A.W.
v. Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Commonwealth has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court, see 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 8521-22, it and its departments are immune from suits filed in federal court. “Furthermore,

even if the Eleventh Amendment did not bar these claims, the Board of Probation and Parole is
also not a “‘person’ within the meaning of section 1983.” Wyatt v. Dep’t of Prob. & Parole, No.
19-5460, 2020 WL 2307351, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2020) (quoting Fenton v. Pennsylvania Dep't
of Corr., No. 18-5484, 2019 WL 398929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019). Accordingly, Dwight’s
claims against Probation and Parole will be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be
futile.

7 Any claims based on the handling of grievances were also dismissed by the Court with
prejudice and will not be readdressed to the extent Dwight intended to reallege those claims. See Dwight,
2024 WL 4988974, at *5.
C. Individual Capacity Claims
1. ADA Murray
Dwight’s claim against Murray fails because it is brought against Murray based on her role
as a Philadelphia ADA, acting on behalf of the Office that brought the relevant criminal charges

against him, resulting in his arrest on August 24, 2020. As the Court previously explained to
Dwight when he attempted to bring a similar claim against Philadelphia District Attorney
Lawrence Krasner in his Amended Complaint, “[t]he individual capacity claims against Krasner,
or any of his Assistant District Attorneys, must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity
from liability under § 1983 for acts that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process’ such as ‘initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.’” Dwight,
2024 WL 4988974, at *4 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). Absolute
immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution, id. at 431, including, “soliciting false
testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings,” Kulwicki v.

Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at
431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.
2020).
Because Dwight’s claims against Murray are based upon her actions as a prosecutor for
bringing criminal charges against him on behalf of the Commonwealth, and perhaps, for how she
has been handling the prosecution, Murray is entitled to absolute immunity and the claims against
her will be dismissed. Leave to amend will not be granted as to this claim because it would be
futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-113 (3d Cir. 2002).
2. House Arrest Agent Champion
Dwight alleges that Champion failed to comply with an alleged order entered by Judge
Gibbs allowing him to attend appointments and treatments related to his medical conditions,
presumably while on house arrest. (See Second Am. Compl. at 13.) Although a review of the

public record indicates that Dwight’s bail status was changed during the time of his confinement
and a motion to modify his house arrest was granted,8 Dwight’s claim that Champion acted to
violate his rights is undeveloped. As the Court explained to him when dismissing a similar claim
against Champion, Dwight “has not alleged facts that describe what happened to him, or what
specific actions Champion took when allegedly failing to comply with an order.” Dwight, 2024
WL 4988974, at *4. Even under the most liberal reading of the Second Amended Complaint,
Dwight does not allege sufficient facts to suggest plausibly that Champion violated Dwight’s
constitutional rights. Indeed, he does not explain what the Court’s Order said, what care he
required, and how Champion’s actions interfered with that care or otherwise violated his rights.
He makes only vague, generalized, and conclusory allegations that are entirely insufficient. See

Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2024) (in determining whether a complaint states
a claim, “we disregard unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations”).
D. Yes Care, Medical Prescriber Helen Sarskaya, and Psychiatrist Ms. Teri
Dwight’s remaining claims are best understood as arising from alleged deliberate
indifference to his medical needs and mental health needs against Defendants Yes Care, Sarskaya,
and Dr. Teri.9 See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We

8 See Dwight, MC-51-CR-0015979-2020. Dwight also attached one page of the public
record to his Second Amended Complaint reflecting this information. (See Second Am. Compl. at 16.)
9 As an initial matter, to the extent that Dwight intended to assert claims against Sarskaya
and Dr. Teri, employees of Yes Care, in their “official capacities,” such claims are not cognizable because
apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). To
state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege
facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.10
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). A prison official is not deliberately indifferent

“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “A medical need is serious,
. . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth
Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations
omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary
medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed
or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A

serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and
unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).

Yes Care is a private entity. See Kreis v. Northampton Cnty. Prison, No. 21-2360, 2022 WL 4236692, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2022) (stating that official capacity claims are “inapplicable to suits against private
parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit”) (citing Owens v. Connections Cmty. Support Programs,
Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 791, 796 (D. Del. 2012)) (“Generally, a suit against a [ ] public officer in his or her
official capacity is used to compel that officer to take some official action [and that] concept . . . is
inapplicable to suits against private parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit.”). Therefore, the
official capacity claims against Sarskaya and Dr. Teri must be dismissed.

10 As it appears that Dwight is a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment governs his
claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). However, the standard under the Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims related to a prisoner’s medical needs is essentially the
same for purposes of the analysis. See Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam); see also Moore v. Luffey, 767 F. App’x 335, 340 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (declining to address whether
a new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues related to medical care).
As pled, Dwight’s allegations are vague and entirely undeveloped to proceed. He alleges
that “the medical provider,” presumably Sarskaya, “acted arbitrarily in not getting proper and
adequate treatment of [his] chronic illnesses, spinal disease, [and] [] colon/lung [cancer],” and
“this was complicated by the mental health provider Dr. Teri whom failed to adequately evaluate

[his] present and current mental state and used diagnosis from 1995 under A.K.A. Kevin Wright
in administering medication.” (Second Am. Compl. at 14.) He generally asserts both Sarskaya
and Dr. Teri failed to correctly evaluate and treat him and did not “assist a chronically ill
incarcerated person whom+ suffers also from mental health issues.” (Id. at 15.) Assuming that
Dwight’s medical needs were serious, and construing the allegations liberally, the allegations
nevertheless fail to support a plausible claim that either Sarskaya or Dr. Teri were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. He does not state factual allegations regarding when the medical
care was denied, specific interactions or conversations with Sarskaya or Dr. Teri, what medical
care or treatments they failed to provide, and how they were aware of and disregarded an excessive
risk to his health. The allegation that Sarskaya and Dr. Teri failed to provide proper care is

conclusory and fails to allege a plausible claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. These claims will be
dismissed. However, because it may be possible for Dwight to allege additional facts to
demonstrate a plausible claim against Sarskaya and Dr. Teri, the claims against them will be
dismissed without prejudice and he will be permitted an opportunity to file a third amended
complaint.
As his claims relate to Yes Care, a private corporation under contract to provide medical
services at a jail or prison may be liable under § 1983 in certain circumstances. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “a private health company providing services
to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability.’” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App’x 16, 20 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003)
(applying Monell to claims against medical contractor)). Rather, in order to hold a private health
care company like Yes Care liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983, Dwight must allege

the provider had “a relevant . . . policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional
violation [he] allege[s].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84 (citing Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan
Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)); see also Lomax v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 13-1078, 2017 WL 1177095, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Because [defendant] is a private
company contracted by a prison to provide health care for inmates, . . . it can only be held liable
for constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs.”) (citations and quotations omitted). A plaintiff may also state
a basis for liability against an entity like Yes Care by “alleging failure-to-supervise, train, or
discipline . . . [and alleging facts showing] that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to
the constitutional rights of those affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019). In

the context of a contract medical provider, the provider’s “failure to train or supervise must amount
to a policy or custom in disregard of an obvious risk that its employees or agents would commit
constitutional violations.” Ponzini v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 444, 526 (M.D. Pa.
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Ponzini v. Monroe Cnty., 789 F.
App’x 313 (3d Cir. 2019).
Dwight makes only vague, generalized, and conclusory allegations that are entirely
insufficient to support his claim against Yes Care. He alludes generally to policies by claiming
that Philadelphia Prison System “should have created or enforced a policy that requires Yes Care
to provide correct and adequate evaluations and treatment for chronic care incarcerated persons,”
(Second Am. Compl. at 14), and Yes Care should have known about “their policy of reviewing
charts prior to state inspectors.” (Id. at 15.) It is unclear if the policies he refers to are even
attributable to Yes Care. It is also unclear how any alleged policy related to reviewing charts
impacted Dwight’s medical care. Further, his failure to support a plausible underlying claim that

either Sarskaya or Dr. Teri were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs is an additional
indication that there is a lack of sufficient factual allegations against Yes Care. See City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (Crucially, an individual claiming a Monell violation must
demonstrate “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. All
claims against Probation and Parole, the Philadelphia DAO, the Philadelphia Prisons System,
House Arrest Agent Andrea Champion, Philadelphia ADA Juna Murray, in both her official and
individual capacity, will be dismissed. Since Dwight has already been given an opportunity to

amend these claims, and since his amended pleading added little to his first pleading, he will not
be given further leave to amend on these claims. Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp.
Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be futile when litigant
“already had two chances to tell his story”). Dwight’s official capacity claims against Sarskaya
and Dr. Teri will also be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. However,
Dwight’s claims against Sarskaya and Dr. Teri in their respective individual capacities, and the
claims against Yes Care will be dismissed without prejudice. He will be provided one more
opportunity to amend the claims if he is capable of curing the defects the Court has identified in
these claims dismissed without prejudice. Dwight may not reassert any claim that has already
been dismissed with prejudice. Dwight’s remaining motions to reopen this case and for the Court
to appoint him counsel are denied as moot.
An Order providing additional instructions on amendment will be entered.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11049381. Public record. Not legal advice.