# Quaddariontae Burnom v. State of Tennessee

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · May 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047244

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 9, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047244

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the same standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases
- stating that the same standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases

## Opinion text

05/09/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs May 6, 2025

QUADDARIONTAE1 BURNOM v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dyer County
No. 22-CR-50 Mark L. Hayes, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2024-00636-CCA-R3-PC
___________________________________

Petitioner, Quaddariontae Burnom, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-
conviction relief from his 2022 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, for
which he is serving an agreed twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends
that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately
explain to him the significance of our supreme court’s decision in State v. Booker, 656
S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), before he entered his plea. After a thorough review of the record
and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE
AYERS and STEVEN W. SWORD, JJ., joined.

M. Todd Ridley (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender—Appellate Division; Sean Day,
District Public Defender; and Patrick R. McGill, Assistant District Public Defender, for the
appellant, Quaddariontae Burnom.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Katie Neff, Assistant Attorney
General; Danny Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General; and Lance E. Webb, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

1
The indictment and judgment of conviction spelled Petitioner’s name “Quaddriontae”; however,
the post-conviction record reflects that the correct spelling is Quaddariontae.
OPINION

This case arises from the January 1, 2022 shooting death of Nicholas Sampson.
Petitioner was fifteen years old at the time of the shooting and after a hearing in juvenile
court, the case was transferred to circuit court. The Dyer County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Petitioner with first degree premeditated murder.

a. Guilty plea

At the plea hearing, the State announced that a plea agreement had been reached.
The State noted that Petitioner had been transferred from juvenile court and charged with
first degree premeditated murder, for which there was “only one sentence for a juvenile,
which is a life sentence” and that Petitioner would be pleading guilty to second degree
murder with an agreed sentence of twenty-five years at 100% service.

The State provided the following factual basis for the plea:

Your Honor, the facts of the case are that on January lst of 2022,
[Petitioner] was at a New Year’s party on . . . Light Street in Dyersburg. He
was there along with the victim in this case, who was Nicholas Sampson.
There were also numerous other people present at that party. The owner of
the residence was Angelica Blackwell. She, for some reason, I don’t know
if she was just tired of the people being there, but she wanted the people to
leave, wanted the party to end, so she asked [Petitioner], as well as a couple
of others, Preston Landers and Serenity Triplett, to ask the 22 people to leave.

So, those three did go out onto the porch. They told everyone that
they needed to leave the party. [Petitioner] actually had a handgun at that
time. When he went out, he kept making the statement over and over to
people that were out there, “A-- or bullets; A-- or bullets,” is what he kept
saying to the individuals out there. At that point, a fight did start in the front
yard between Preston Landers and a female who was there, who was Santana
Gunn. When that fight began, the victim . . . came out of the house with an
attempt, trying to break up the fight. Sometime during that altercation that
was going on, [Petitioner] did shoot [the victim] four times. He did strike
him three times in the chest and once in the hip, and that did cause his death.

Petitioner testified that he had just turned sixteen and that he had been in the seventh
grade before his arrest. Petitioner agreed that he had been charged with first degree murder.
The trial court asked, “And you heard [the prosecutor] indicate that the only punishment
-2-
that’s available if you were found guilty of first degree murder is life imprisonment. Did
you hear that?” Petitioner responded, “Yes, sir.”

Petitioner testified that he understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and
proceed to a jury trial; that the State would be required to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that he had the right to counsel, call witnesses, question the State’s
witnesses, testify or choose to remain silent, and appeal the jury verdict. He affirmed that
he had spoken with trial counsel about his rights and that he was able to talk to trial counsel
when he needed to do so. Petitioner affirmed his understanding that, by entering a guilty
plea, he was waiving his rights, that his case would be concluded without a trial or appeal,
and that his conviction could be used to increase his sentence in future cases.

When asked whether the State’s recitation of the facts was correct, Petitioner said
that his “involvement in the death of the victim” was correctly stated. Petitioner affirmed
that he was voluntarily pleading guilty and that no one had promised him anything or
threatened him to plead guilty. The trial court continued examining Petitioner as follows:

THE COURT: Has anybody told you that you have to plead guilty?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has anybody forced you to plead guilty?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

THE COURT: Are you understanding the question that I’m asking you about
that? I want to make sure nobody’s put you in a position where you feel like
you don’t have any other choices, because they’re going to do something to
you?

[PETITIONER]: No, sir.

Petitioner affirmed that he was not under the influence of any drugs, medications,
or alcohol. He agreed that he had been able to talk with trial counsel about his case and
that counsel had advised him about the consequences of pleading guilty and the risks and
benefits of going to trial. Petitioner further agreed that trial counsel had answered all his
questions and done everything Petitioner wanted him to do in preparation of the case.
Petitioner stated that he was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation. When asked twice
whether he felt like he understood what he was doing, Petitioner answered affirmatively
both times.

-3-
Petitioner testified that he signed the plea form, that trial counsel explained the form
to him, that he understood it, and that the agreed sentence was filled out at the time he
signed it. Petitioner denied that he had any questions. When asked whether he wanted to
go into the hall and talk to trial counsel further, Petitioner answered negatively. Petitioner
agreed that he felt he was acting in his own best interest.

Upon examination by trial counsel, Petitioner testified that the trial court had
reviewed everything they had talked about “for weeks and weeks[.]” Petitioner agreed that
his mother was present at every meeting with trial counsel and that they had talked about
the degrees of homicide, what the State would have to prove for each one, and the potential
sentences. Petitioner affirmed that some of their meetings lasted hours and that trial
counsel had provided Petitioner his cell phone number. Petitioner agreed that pleading
guilty was a difficult decision and that he understood that he would be age thirty-five or
thirty-six when he was released, provided he “successfully complete[d] the program.”
Petitioner agreed that his mother had advised him and helped him make the decision to
plead guilty, along with other family members.

The trial court found that Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary, that there
was a factual basis for the plea, and that it would approve the plea of second degree murder
and a twenty-five-year sentence.

b. Booker

On November 18, 2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued State v. Booker, 656
S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), a plurality opinion holding “that an automatic life sentence when
imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile’s age or
other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 52. The court reasoned
that “in juvenile first-degree murder cases, and only in these cases, a sentence is
automatically imposed without considering age, the nature of the crime, or any other
factors.” Id. at 63 (emphasis added). The Booker court fashioned the following remedy
for cases where a juvenile homicide offender was automatically sentenced to life:

In remedying this constitutional violation, we exercise judicial restraint. We
need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr. Booker—his life
sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal
Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.
Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) and grant Mr. Booker an individualized
parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be properly
considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility
in the unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect,
-4-
that provides for a term of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent,
but not less than twenty-five years of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains
sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has served between twenty-
five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole hearing
where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited
ruling, applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State’s
interest in finality and efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker’s
Eighth Amendment rights, and is based on sentencing policy enacted by the
General Assembly.

Id. at 53.

c. Post-conviction proceedings

On October 3, 2023, Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction
relief (“the Petition”). In relevant part, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his entering an unknowing, involuntary, and
unintelligent plea. Petitioner stated as follows:

Petitioner’s guilty plea was entered on December 20, 2022; just 32 days
[a]fter the [Tennessee Supreme Court’s] ruling [in Booker] prohibiting the
imposition of a life sentence upon [] Petitioner if, convicted at trial. Trial
counsel’s advice to the Petitioner and to the Petitioner’s mother was that, []if
convicted at trial of first degree murder, the Petitioner faced an automatic
sentence of life in prison without parole meaning that, Petitioner will have to
serve at least, fifty-one (51) years day-for-day, before becoming eligible for
release. Therefore, trial counsel’s advice was reprehensibly incorrect and
designed to strike fear into the juvenile Petitioner and [his] mother’s mind;
thus convincing [] Petitioner and his mother that Petitioner should accept the
plea agreement offered by the State for a twenty-five (25) year sentence @
100%, for a lesser . . . offense of second degree murder.

[] Petitioner asserts that he did not truly wish to plead guilty, but wanted to
exercise his right to a jury trial and testify in his own defense that, [he] was
merely defending himself against the victim’s violent and threatening
actions. [] Petitioner asserts that, had he known about the landmark decision
in Booker, and that Petitioner could not have been exposed to an automatic
life sentence, he would not have plead guilty . . . [and] would have instead,
insisted upon a jury trial.

-5-
After post-conviction counsel was appointed, Petitioner filed a notice that no
amended post-conviction petition would be filed. At the post-conviction hearing, Geitha
Porter testified that she was Petitioner’s mother and that she was present for all of
Petitioner’s meetings with trial counsel. Ms. Porter stated that they met with trial counsel
five times before the plea hearing. She agreed that, at every meeting, trial counsel
discussed “over and over” that Petitioner faced “51 years to life without parole” if he was
convicted of first degree murder at trial. She said that, from the first meeting with trial
counsel, Petitioner maintained that he did not want to plead guilty and wished to proceed
to trial.

Ms. Porter testified that, on the day of the plea hearing, she and Petitioner met with
trial counsel accompanied by her sister Latonya Hockett and Ms. Hockett’s daughter.
According to Ms. Porter, Petitioner still wanted to go to trial. She noted that, when they
were in that last meeting, trial counsel repeated that Petitioner would serve fifty-one years
if he was found guilty, whereas the plea offer was for twenty-five years. Ms. Porter urged
Petitioner to accept the plea offer because, if he was found guilty, she would “never have
a chance to see [him] again. [He] would do life.” She stated that, in response, Petitioner
changed his mind and decided to plead guilty, although he was “crying, saying he didn’t
want to take it.”

Ms. Porter testified that, to her knowledge, trial counsel never spoke to her about a
change in the law or the Booker case specifically. Ms. Porter stated that the first time she
heard about Booker was two weeks after the plea hearing, when her cousin called and told
her about it. She denied that trial counsel ever discussed with them that Petitioner would
be eligible for parole after twenty-five years if he received a life sentence at trial.

On cross-examination, Ms. Porter acknowledged that, at the time of the guilty plea,
there was no question that Petitioner shot the victim. She stated that they hired trial counsel
when the case was pending in juvenile court because he was recommended by a friend and
was “very highly respected.” Ms. Porter said that trial counsel insisted she be present at
all of his meetings with Petitioner. Ms. Porter stated that she and Petitioner were familiar
with the State’s proof, which did not change between the juvenile transfer hearing and
Petitioner’s December 2022 guilty plea.

Ms. Porter agreed that the State’s offer was made “very late” in the case. Ms. Porter
denied that she could have confused discussion about Petitioner’s being paroled at age
fifty-one with earlier conversations about his serving a fifty-one-year sentence.

Ms. Porter affirmed that, until the State extended its offer of twenty-five years in
November 2022, the only other offer it made was for Petitioner to plead guilty as charged.
Ms. Porter said that, to her knowledge, a trial date was never set. When asked whether
-6-
there was “no rush” to plead on a particular day, Ms. Porter responded, “It actually was a
rush because we kept asking for more time and [trial counsel] kept telling us that the DA
wouldn’t give us more time.”

Ms. Porter denied having called trial counsel to ask about Booker or going with trial
counsel to explain the implications of Booker to Petitioner. Ms. Porter stated her belief
that the State extended its new offer before Booker’s issuance.

On redirect examination, Ms. Porter testified that the State extended the new offer
“two or three months before” Booker. Ms. Porter stated that the plea offer would have
expired if Petitioner did not accept it on the day of the plea hearing.

Latonya Hockett testified that she was Petitioner’s aunt and that she was present
during Petitioner’s meeting with trial counsel on the day of the plea hearing. She stated
that they met in a private room for about thirty minutes. Ms. Hockett testified that
Petitioner was crying and told her that he did not want to accept the plea offer. According
to Ms. Hockett, trial counsel told them that, if Petitioner went to trial, he “would get 50 to
life” and that Ms. Porter began to cry and told Petitioner he should plead guilty so that she
could see him again. Ms. Hockett stated that trial counsel did not discuss other sentences
with them. Ms. Hockett stated that she told Ms. Porter that they could not force Petitioner
to take the plea offer, but that Petitioner decided to accept it. Ms. Hockett said that “the
officer . . . gave [them] a little bit more time” but that her impression was that Petitioner
was running out of time to decide. She noted that Petitioner was “crying and just laying
on [her]” because he “didn’t want to do it.” Ms. Hockett stated that trial counsel
encouraged Petitioner to plead guilty by telling him that, if he proceeded to trial, he was
“taking a chance of getting life.”

Petitioner testified that he was seventeen years old at the time of the post-conviction
hearing. Petitioner stated he understood that, if the post-conviction court vacated his guilty
plea, he could go to trial and be convicted of first degree murder. He affirmed that he
wanted to continue with the post-conviction proceedings.

Petitioner testified that the last grade of school he completed before the shooting
was seventh or eighth grade. He stated that he read and wrote “pretty okay” but that he
had “mental disorders” when he was in school. Petitioner did not know the name of the
disorders, but he referred to having an individualized education plan. Petitioner stated that
he had not been in juvenile court for committing delinquent offenses before the shooting,
although he had attended an alternative school “for something.” He denied that he was
familiar with the adult court system.

-7-
Petitioner testified that he met with trial counsel about six times before entering his
guilty plea and that his mother was present for every meeting. Petitioner stated that, during
their first meeting, trial counsel conveyed a plea offer “for the [fifty-one] years” and told
him that he also faced a fifty-one-year sentence at trial. Petitioner told trial counsel that he
wanted to go to trial. Petitioner testified that trial counsel later conveyed the State’s twenty-
five-year offer. He stated that, although he did not know the exact date, it was “[p]robably
like a few months” before the day of the plea hearing.

Petitioner testified that, before the plea hearing, trial counsel told him that the offer
would expire that day. Petitioner denied that he knew anything about the Booker case or
the change in the law stating that juveniles were entitled to a parole hearing before fifty-
one years. Petitioner stated that, at the time he entered his plea, he believed that he would
serve fifty-one years if convicted as charged at trial. Petitioner testified that he learned
about Booker three weeks after he entered his plea, when Ms. Porter told him about it
during a telephone call. Petitioner stated that he thought his plea “was kind of for nothing”
because, if he had been convicted at trial, he faced “almost . . . the same thing” as the
twenty-five-year agreed sentence.

When asked why he wanted to vacate his guilty plea, Petitioner stated, “I felt like
[trial counsel] gave me untruthful information about my plea and the sentencing that I could
get regarding my charge[,] and I feel like my plea was not knowing[ly] and voluntarily
entered.” Petitioner averred that, if he knew that he would have been eligible for parole
before fifty-one years, he would not have pleaded guilty. Petitioner read a statement he
prepared for the hearing, which included a denial that he intended to kill the victim and his
belief that a jury would acquit him “if they heard all the facts.” Petitioner also noted his
desire to have a sentencing hearing “that would allow [him] to get a sentence less than the
maximum.” Petitioner also stated that trial counsel was ineffective “for advising [him] to
plead guilty in order to avoid a life sentence, which [he] could not get anyway[.]”

On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that he thought he could have convinced
the jury that he acted in self-defense. Petitioner noted that he told trial counsel that he fired
the gun accidentally as he fell backward after the victim attacked him and that a bullet hole
in the porch ceiling would corroborate his version of events.

Upon being shown the medical examiner’s chart of the victim’s injuries, which
included three gunshot wounds in a “pretty tight grouping . . . in the middle of [the victim’s]
chest” and a fourth gunshot wound in the lower abdomen, Petitioner maintained that the
shooting was accidental. Petitioner agreed that the victim was unarmed; he noted that the
victim attacked him “[w]ith his hands.”

-8-
Petitioner testified that he heard the State’s witnesses testify at his juvenile transfer
hearing. He denied learning about any new evidence between the transfer hearing and his
guilty plea. When asked why the case did not go to trial, Petitioner stated that trial counsel
advised him that he was facing a life sentence if he was convicted at trial and that “it would
be best” if he took the twenty-five-year offer.

Petitioner testified he understood that, if he went to trial and was convicted of first
degree murder, he might have to wait until he had served thirty-six years before getting a
parole hearing and that receiving parole was not automatic.

District Attorney General Danny Goodman testified that he personally handled
Petitioner’s case. He agreed that, initially, the victim’s mother “did not want anything less
than a conviction for first degree murder” and that the only plea offer he extended to
Petitioner was to plead guilty as charged. General Goodman said that the State’s
anticipated proof did not change between Petitioner’s transfer to adult court and Booker’s
issuance in November 2022.

General Goodman testified that Booker was the only reason that he extended the
twenty-five-year offer. General Goodman explained that he learned of the decision a few
days after it was issued and that he called trial counsel “to tell him that . . . this case had
come out and that [he] thought it could have an impact on his client’s case.” General
Goodman and trial counsel discussed Booker, and he told trial counsel that he needed to
speak to the victim’s mother but that it could change the State’s offer.

General Goodman testified that, after a lengthy discussion about Booker, the
victim’s mother agreed to a plea offer for second degree murder and a twenty-five-year
sentence. General Goodman stated that trial counsel asked him whether a lesser sentence
would be acceptable but that he declined because the victim’s mother would not agree to
anything but the maximum sentence.

On cross-examination, General Goodman testified that the District Attorney
General’s Conference explained Booker to him at a monthly meeting. After that meeting,
General Goodman called trial counsel; he did not recall whether trial counsel was already
aware of the case. General Goodman agreed that the plea hearing was a few weeks before
the trial date; he further agreed that he told Petitioner at the hearing that the plea offer
would be withdrawn that day. General Goodman noted, though, that Petitioner knew about
the offer before the day of the plea hearing. General Goodman testified that Petitioner was
“iffy” about the plea offer when he arrived in court on the day of the plea hearing and that
trial counsel “went back and talked to him.”

-9-
When asked about his and the trial court’s stating at the plea hearing that Petitioner
faced a life sentence if he went to trial, General Goodman stated, “Well, I think that’s
correct. I think even with the change in Booker that’s what you get. You get life. It’s just
you’re eligible for parole once you hit that 25-year mark. It doesn’t mean you’re going to
get it.”

Trial counsel testified that he had been practicing law for forty-three years and that
he had handled about 100 criminal jury trials. Ms. Porter retained trial counsel prior to
Petitioner’s juvenile transfer hearing. Trial counsel stated that he advised Petitioner at
every meeting until November 2022 that he was facing a life sentence, which was a
minimum of fifty-one years and a maximum of sixty years.

Trial counsel testified that he asked General Goodman multiple times about the
State’s extending an offer “of something besides life” but that General Goodman said the
victim’s mother refused to allow it. Trial counsel agreed that the trial was set for January
11, 2023, and that the plea hearing occurred on December 20, 2022.

Trial counsel estimated that he met with Petitioner at “the McDowell Center” two
or three times and that, after Petitioner was transferred, they met once per month or every
six weeks. Trial counsel stated that Ms. Porter was present for all of his meetings with
Petitioner.

Trial counsel testified that Petitioner gave him a detailed account of what happened
the night of the shooting. Petitioner told him that a friend who was thirteen years old
brought a gun to the party and that the homeowner asked Petitioner to take the gun and get
rid of it; Petitioner stated that he put it in his pocket and forgot about it. Petitioner told him
that, at some point, a fight broke out between several women in the front yard; the victim
“came flying in” to the fight because one of the women was his sister. Petitioner stated
that he tried to break up the fight and was “involved in it” before retreating to the porch.
According to Petitioner, the victim “looked at him real hard, like angry . . . . And . . . said
that was my sister and he started charging toward” Petitioner. Petitioner stated that he shot
the victim because he was afraid the victim would hurt him.

Trial counsel testified Petitioner told him that he fired the gun accidentally as he fell
backward and that one of the shots went into the porch ceiling. Trial counsel noted
Petitioner also said that, as he fell, he scraped his back against the edge of the porch. Trial
counsel stated that Petitioner had no scar. Trial counsel said that he immediately visited
the crime scene and looked for a bullet hole in the porch ceiling; however, there was no
hole or evidence that the ceiling had been repaired. Trial counsel stated that it would have
been difficult to argue Petitioner’s version of events in light of the lack of evidence.

- 10 -
Trial counsel testified, though, that he was prepared to proceed to trial on a theory
of self-defense. Trial counsel testified that, in their meetings, he told Petitioner that self-
defense “has to be the equivalent force” and that he did not know if they could convince a
jury that he had the right to shoot the victim.

Trial counsel stated that he learned about Booker over Thanksgiving weekend when
Ms. Porter called him and asked if he knew about it. Trial counsel testified that, within the
next week, he and Ms. Porter visited Petitioner at the Dyer County jail; the State had not
yet made its new plea offer at that time. Trial counsel stated that he never told Petitioner
the name of the case, but he told Petitioner that “they did away with the 51 years.” Trial
counsel said that he referred to the ages at which Petitioner would be parole eligible, rather
than the number of years. Trial counsel stated that Petitioner would have a parole hearing
when he was age forty and that, if he did not receive parole, his next hearing would be
when he was age fifty-one. Trial counsel testified that he told Petitioner that parole
depended on his behavior as a prisoner. Trial counsel agreed that “[t]he life part [of the
sentence] never changed. It’s just the eligibility to get out on parole.”

Trial counsel testified that, soon after that meeting, he contacted General Goodman,
discussed Booker, and suggested a plea agreement to second degree murder. Trial counsel
tried to negotiate a shorter sentence, but General Goodman refused and told him that the
victim’s mother would not agree to that. Trial counsel testified that Booker was the only
reason General Goodman extended the new offer.

Trial counsel conveyed the offer to Petitioner and Ms. Porter at a meeting at the jail.
He told Petitioner that the offer would allow him to be released at age thirty-six. Trial
counsel stated that Petitioner did not want to accept the offer and was “still thinking self-
defense.” When asked whether trial counsel “talk[ed] him into” accepting the offer, trial
counsel responded negatively and noted that Petitioner did not decide that day.

Trial counsel testified that the plea “cut-off date” was December 20 and that, before
court, trial counsel met with Petitioner, Ms. Porter, and two female relatives. Trial counsel
stated that he told Petitioner again that pleading guilty to second degree murder meant that
he would serve twenty-one years and “definitely” be released at age thirty-six,
“[g]uaranteed.” Trial counsel agreed that no risk was involved because Petitioner’s release
would not depend upon the parole board. Trial counsel stated, “So the guarantee was 36
years old. The maybe was 40 years old or 51, depending on the parole board, and that’s
the risk.”

Trial counsel testified that one of Petitioner’s family members explained to
Petitioner how parole worked. Trial counsel stated that Petitioner and his family were
crying. He said, “I don’t want to say that [they] were pressuring him to take the deal, but
- 11 -
it just -- it was obvious to me that they were afraid that if he went to trial and lost it would
cost him a lot of years in jail.”

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that he did not know if he discussed
the name of Booker with Ms. Porter. He explained, “If I ever used that word, it would have
been just in passing.” Trial counsel stated that he believed Petitioner understood the plea
agreement. He stated that he gave Petitioner ages at which he would be eligible for release
because he thought it would be “more relevant to a young person[.]” Trial counsel stated
that, although Petitioner only had formal education through the seventh grade, Petitioner
was “[v]ery intelligent common sense-wise . . . . He’s a smart young man and able to
communicate with you.”

Trial counsel testified that the meeting before the plea hearing was very emotional.
Trial counsel stated that he believed everyone in the room “knew what we were talking
about” because one of Petitioner’s relatives discussed the possibility of parole being denied
and what happened after. Trial counsel estimated that the plea offer was open for a month
at most.

The post-conviction court entered an April 8, 2024 order denying post-conviction
relief. In the order, the post-conviction court noted that the testimony of Petitioner, Ms.
Porter, and Ms. Hockett conflicted with the testimony of General Goodman and trial
counsel. The post-conviction court explicitly credited the testimony of General Goodman
and trial counsel and found that Petitioner and Ms. Porter’s assertion that the State extended
its plea offer before the issuance of Booker “cannot be true” based upon General
Goodman’s testimony that the offer was made in response to Booker’s holding.

The post-conviction court noted:

No claim is asserted by [P]etitioner that [trial counsel] failed to fairly analyze
the risks and benefits of trial versus a plea agreement. The focus of that
portion of the petition is that [trial counsel] inaccurately advised the
[P]etitioner of the possible punishment he would receive if convicted of first-
degree murder.

The post-conviction court noted Petitioner’s testimony at the plea hearing that his
decision to plead guilty was voluntary, that he had not been threatened, and that he had not
been “put in a position where he felt he had no other choice.” The post-conviction court
found that trial counsel’s advice regarding Petitioner’s exposure at trial changed in light of
Booker. The post-conviction court further found that trial counsel “made use of the Booker
decision to negotiate a plea to second-degree murder which would assure the release of the

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[Petitioner] even earlier than a possible parole review date as a juvenile offender under the
principles in Booker.” The post-conviction court continued,

[Trial counsel] sought a more lenient plea agreement or the opportunity for
an open plea to second-degree murder, both of which were rejected by the
[S]tate. He accurately advised [P]etitioner of the change in sentencing if
[P]etitioner was convicted of first-degree murder as soon as he was aware of
the Booker decision. [P]etitioner’s mother was present at every meeting
[P]etitioner had with counsel.

[P]etitioner had the benefit of good and experienced counsel and made
reasonable decisions based upon advice from counsel that was the product of
counsel’s complete investigation, fair analysis of the risks and benefits of
proceeding to trial, and with the benefit of the latest caselaw applicable to
[P]etitioner’s circumstances . . . . [Trial counsel’s] performance as defense
counsel far exceeded the minimum standards for defense counsel
representing a juvenile felony offender. [P]etitioner received the effective
assistance of counsel.

Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief
because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, leading Petitioner to enter an
involuntary and unknowing plea. Petitioner avers that the post-conviction court’s
resolution of the witness testimony in favor of General Goodman and trial counsel “was
incomplete and therefore in error.” Although Petitioner acknowledges that this court is
bound by the post-conviction court’s accrediting trial counsel’s testimony that he explained
the effect of Booker to Petitioner, Petitioner avers that “the circumstances required more.”
Specifically, Petitioner complains that trial counsel “did not mention the name of [Booker]
or discuss the specifics of the underlying case.” Petitioner also argues that he should have
been given more time to consider the plea agreement because Booker was confusing and
issued one month before he entered his plea. Petitioner notes that he was young, had
learning difficulties, and had no knowledge of the court system. Petitioner asserts that he
was “forced to make this life altering decision under intense pressure . . . . in a matter of
hours, if not minutes,” because the State’s offer was set to expire that day. Petitioner does
not explain how trial counsel should have delayed the proceedings.

The State responds that the extent of trial counsel’s explanation of Booker to
Petitioner was not raised in the post-conviction court. The State argues that because
Petitioner relies upon different grounds for relief on appeal than raised in the court below,
Petitioner’s issue has been waived. Alternatively, the State submits that trial counsel’s
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performance was not deficient and that Petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for the alleged deficiency, he would not have pleaded guilty.

Post-conviction relief “shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or
voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of
Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The
right to effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by the Constitutions of both the
United States and the State of Tennessee. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9.
In order to receive post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must prove: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiency
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see State v.
Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that the same standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases). Both factors
must be proven for the court to grant post-conviction relief. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 580 (Tenn. 1997); Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370
(Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, if we determine that either factor is not satisfied, there is no
need to consider the other factor. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (citing
Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004)). Additionally, review of counsel’s
performance “requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;
see Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579. We will not second-guess a reasonable trial strategy, and
we will not grant relief based on a sound, yet ultimately unsuccessful, tactical decision.
Granderson v. State, 197 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).

As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective
if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523
S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369. In order to prove that
counsel was deficient, the petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s acts or omissions
were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see
also Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

Even if counsel’s performance is deficient, the deficiency must have resulted in
prejudice to the defense. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370. Therefore, under the second prong of
the Strickland analysis, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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A substantially similar two-prong standard applies when the petitioner challenges
counsel’s performance in the context of a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985); see Dorsey v. State, No. W2021-01135-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 2840738, at *4
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2022). First, the
petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance fell below the objective standards of
reasonableness and professional norms. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Second, “in order to
satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.

As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge the State’s position that Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claim on appeal is distinct from the one raised in the post-conviction
court. However, we think that the issue is similar enough to permit our review on the
merits because the post-conviction court considered and addressed trial counsel’s
explanation of Booker and the nature of Petitioner’s plea. Cf. Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d
450, 459 (Tenn. 2020) (holding that, in post-conviction cases, this court is without authority
to review issues not raised during the post-conviction proceedings or addressed by the post-
conviction court).

However, to the extent that Petitioner makes a separate argument that the special
circumstances attendant to juvenile defendants, as articulated in Booker and Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), should extend to enhanced standards of assessing
whether a juvenile defendant is sufficiently informed to make a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea, it was not raised in the court below and has been waived. See Holland, 610
S.W.3d at 459.

The State also urges this court to waive any freestanding claim contesting the
knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty plea, arguing that Petitioner’s stated issue on
appeal is ineffective assistance of counsel. In Petitioner’s appellate brief, he states that the
sole issue is “[w]hether the post-conviction court erred when it found that . . . trial counsel
provided effective assistance to enable [Petitioner], a minor, to knowingly agree to plead
guilty to second-degree murder and to accept a 25-year sentence of incarceration.”

We do not believe that Petitioner attempts to raise the nature of his plea as a separate
issue, but rather, he discusses it only as a result of trial counsel’s alleged ineffective
assistance. To the extent he may have intended to do so, we note that this court recently
considered a similar case and concluded that the only issue properly presented was “that
[the petitioner’s] plea was invalid because he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel.” Webb v. State, No. M2024-00833-CCA-R3-PC, 2024 WL 5087470, at *2-3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2024) (discussing that this court would limit its review to
ineffective assistance, notwithstanding petitioner’s having discussed “other factors more
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typically considered in assessing the voluntariness of the plea apart from ineffective
assistance”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2025).

We conclude that the record amply supports the post-conviction court’s finding that
trial counsel rendered effective assistance in this case. Trial counsel stayed abreast of
changes in the law and used Booker to negotiate a beneficial plea agreement that would
allow Petitioner’s guaranteed release after serving twenty-one years, assuming that he
earns good time credit. The post-conviction court credited trial counsel’s testimony that
he thoroughly explained to Petitioner how Booker changed his sentencing exposure, the
choices available to him, and the risks and benefits. Trial counsel was cognizant of
Petitioner’s youth and endeavored to communicate the abstract aspects of release eligibility
by referring to Petitioner’s age at his potential release. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion
that he had to decide whether to plead guilty in hours or minutes, trial counsel, Petitioner,
and Ms. Porter agreed that trial counsel told Petitioner and Ms. Porter about the plea offer
well before the plea hearing, although the exact timing differed; at minimum, Petitioner
had two or three weeks to consider his decision.

Similarly, the record does not support Petitioner’s assertion that, as a result of trial
counsel’s alleged deficiency, he entered an unknowing and involuntary plea. Contrary to
Petitioner’s characterization of the plea hearing as “perfunctory,” the record reflects that
the trial court took great care with Petitioner, explained his rights in an accessible manner,
allowed him opportunities to ask questions, and offered him more time to speak to trial
counsel before entering his plea. Petitioner affirmed under oath when questioned by trial
counsel and the trial court that trial counsel had explained his options and rights, that he
wished to plead guilty, and that he understood what he was doing. Petitioner has not
overcome the “formidable barrier” of the statements he made under oath at the plea hearing.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (holding that statements made by a
petitioner, his attorney, and the prosecutor during the plea colloquy, as well as any findings
made by the trial court in accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any
subsequent collateral proceedings” disputing the knowing and voluntary nature of the
plea). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

Conclusion

We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the Petition.

s/ Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047244. Public record. Not legal advice.