# State of Florida v. Michelle Lynn Howard

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · May 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047136

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** May 9, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
__________________________________

Case No. 5D2024-0176
LT Case No. 2021-MM-003066-A
__________________________________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE LYNN HOWARD,

Appellee.
_______________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Seminole County.
John L. Woodard, III, Judge.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A.
Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellant.

Stuart I. Hyman, of Stuart I. Hyman, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

May 9, 2025

BOATWRIGHT, J.

This is an appeal by the State of Florida of the lower court’s
order granting a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop
and a subsequent driving under the influence (“DUI”)
investigation filed by the Appellee, Michelle Lynn Howard
(“Howard”). We reverse because the lower court erred in granting
the motion in several respects as more particularly described
herein.

I.

On September 21, 2021, an officer with the Casselberry Police
Department was on patrol on State Road 436 (“SR 436”) within the
city limits of Casselberry observing traffic for speed violations. The
officer was positioned in a parking lot off of SR 436 so that he could
observe traffic from all directions and visually estimate speeds
while sitting stationary in his patrol vehicle. He noticed a vehicle
moving eastbound down SR 436 at a quick speed and visually
estimated that the vehicle was traveling at 69 mph in a 45 mph
zone. According to the officer, he was not using a radar device, nor
did he pace the vehicle to determine the speed. He merely visually
estimated the speed for a matter of a second while still in the
parking lot. The officer then pulled out of the parking lot to initiate
a traffic stop. He caught up with the vehicle as it was approaching
an intersection, at which point he observed that the vehicle was
being driven between the right and middle lane (essentially
straddling the two lanes) for a period of at least 15 seconds. The
vehicle continued on the same path into the intersection and the
officer initiated a traffic stop by activating his emergency lights.
At that point, the vehicle turned right from the intersection into a
convenience store parking lot and then turned left into the parking
lot hitting a curb before parking in a parking space. According to
the officer at the suppression hearing, the driver of the vehicle was
not merging from the center lane to the right turn lane to make a
turn, as the vehicle did not make the turn until it was out into the
intersection still between the center and right lane. According to
the officer, his initial reason for initiating the traffic stop was that
the driver was speeding and failed to maintain a single lane in
violation of Florida traffic laws.

The officer approached the vehicle and identified the driver as
Howard. Upon speaking with Howard, the officer noticed that she
had slurred speech and spoke with a thick tongue. In addition, she
had a flushed face; glossy, watery, bloodshot eyes; and an odor of
alcohol emanating from her person. Howard denied having had
any alcohol that evening, but then appeared confused while

2
perusing her purse for her driver’s license. Howard again appeared
confused when the officer asked her for her registration.

Based on the totality of the aforementioned observations
regarding the odor of alcohol coupled with Howard’s behavior and
driving pattern, the officer suspected that she was under the
influence and decided to initiate a DUI investigation. The officer’s
body worn camera video footage of this interaction, which was
entered into evidence, depicts Howard appearing to be visibly
intoxicated. Howard declined to participate in field sobriety
exercises. As a result, the officer informed Howard she was under
arrest for driving under the influence. Howard then refused to step
out of the vehicle as the officer requested and resisted his arrest
when he physically removed her from the vehicle. He then
transported Howard to the Seminole County Jail which was
outside the city limits of Casselberry. According to the officer, he
transported Howard in furtherance of an investigation that
originated in his jurisdiction of Casselberry, Florida. While at the
Seminole County Jail, Howard provided two valid breath samples
which were taken by an employee of the Seminole County Sheriff’s
office.

Subsequently, Howard’s legal counsel filed a motion to
suppress. The trial court granted the motion. In granting the
motion, the trial found that: 1) there was no probable cause for the
officer to initiate a traffic stop on Howard’s vehicle; 2) the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Howard for a DUI
investigation, and the resulting investigation yielded insufficient
probable cause for the arrest; and, 3) it was impermissible for the
officer to ask Howard to perform breath testing after he
transported her to the county jail, which was outside of his
geographic territory. The State challenges each of these rulings on
appeal.

II.

A.

The trial court first erred in finding that there was not a legal
basis for the traffic stop involving Howard. In making this
determination, we note that initially, the trial court applied the

3
wrong legal standard in making its decision. The trial court,
relying on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), ruled that
at a minimum, “probable cause of a violation of a law” is needed to
justify a traffic stop, and thus rejected the State’s argument that
reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a stop for traffic
infractions.

Florida’s courts have routinely discussed Whren when holding
that probable cause justifies a traffic stop based on a traffic
infraction. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.
1997) (“The Whren Court rejected the reasonable officer test in
favor of a strict objective test which asks only whether any
probable cause for the stop existed.”); State v. Nelson, 183 So. 3d
1074, 1076 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“[A] seizure is permissible if the
deputy has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
occurred.”); State v. Parker, 311 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA
2021) (“[A] traffic stop is considered reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ‘where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred.’” (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 810)).

However, the lower court misinterpreted Whren as
constricting traffic stops to the standard of probable cause when it
ruled that Whren was controlling in the State of Florida on the
standard applicable to justify a traffic stop. The premise in Whren,
however, on which Florida courts have primarily relied is based on
its holding that an objective, rather than a subjective, standard
applies when determining whether a stop is constitutionally
reasonable. See Holland, 696 So. 2d at 759. Specifically, this Court
in Parker cited Whren for the purpose of rejecting an argument
that a traffic stop was invalid because it was pretextual, stating:
“While the trial court found the instant traffic stop invalid for
being pretextual, the United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop is not
dependent on the subjective motivations of the individual officers
involved.” 311 So. 3d at 1032 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13).

Our courts have not interpreted Whren as imposing an
exclusive probable cause standard for an investigatory stop. To the
contrary, the Florida Supreme Court, post-Whren, opined that
“[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a

4
vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only where
there is a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an
occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law.” Hilton v. State,
961 So. 2d 284, 290 (Fla. 2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1979)). As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, “a stop
for the violation of motor vehicle laws is similar to the investigative
detention in [a Terry stop] and may be made when there is founded
suspicion.” See State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 2006)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). In line with the Florida
Supreme Court’s opinions, this Court has held that the standard
of law to justify a stop of a motor vehicle is reasonable suspicion.
State, Dep’t of High. Safety & Motor Vehs. v. Dean, 175 So. 3d 939,
940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“[T]he lower court applied the wrong
standard of law to justify a stop of a motor vehicle—probable cause,
rather than reasonable suspicion[.]”).

“In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion
in any given case, ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.’” Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla
1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18
(1981)). “[W]hile reasonable suspicion ‘is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably
less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment
requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop.’’” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 294 (Fla. 2007) (citing
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). In considering
whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion, one looks to the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether “the detaining
officer [had] ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting
legal wrongdoing.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

Upon applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we find
that the trial court erred in determining that the stop was invalid.
While we agree with the trial court that the officer’s reason for
stopping Howard for speeding is not well-founded based on the
lack of specific and articulable facts provided to support a basis for
the infraction, see Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v.

5
Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the officer did have
reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard failed to maintain a
single lane in violation of section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes
(2023). As this determination requires us to interpret section
316.089(1), we first look to the text of the statute.

The analysis of a statute turns on the plain language of the
text. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 278 So. 3d 545, 548 n.3 (Fla.
2019) (“The interpretation of a statute begins ‘with the plain
meaning of the actual language’ the statute employs.” (quoting
Nat. Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498, 504
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016))). In interpreting statutes, “every word . . . is
to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense,” absent
some contrary indication in the statute. Ham v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Advis.
Op. to Gov. re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Rest.
Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020)). When interpreting the
statute at issue, “[o]ur objective is to arrive at a ‘fair reading’ of the
text by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts on
the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the
language, would have understood the text at the time it was
issued.’” Baldwin v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 396 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla.
5th DCA 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Ham, 308 So. 3d at
947)).

Further, “[a] fundamental principle of statutory construction
(and, indeed, of language itself) [is] that the meaning of a word
cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022)). As a
result, “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning.” Id.
(quoting Davis, 339 So. 3d at 324). In considering the context of a
statute, we look to “the specific context in which that language is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Conage v.
United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). As such, a “statute should
be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord
meaning and harmony to all of its parts[,]” and is not to be read in
isolation, but in the context of the entire section. Jones v. ETS of
New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914–15 (Fla. 2001).

6
According to section 316.089:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or
more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following
rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith,
shall apply:

(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved
from such lane until the driver has first ascertained
that such movement can be made with safety.

§ 316.089, Fla. Stat. (2023). In order to be immune from violating
the statute at issue, one must drive their vehicle “as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane[,]” and in addition, the
vehicle “shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”

The trial court based its decision on the finding that Howard’s
driving pattern did not affect any other traffic and thus, there was
not a valid basis for the traffic stop. 1 However, the trial court only
considered the latter part of the statute (i.e., that “the driver has
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety”),
and did not consider whether Howard was driving “as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane.” In accordance with this
statutory language, this Court has held that, “irrespective of
whether anyone is endangered[,]” a stop is valid for a violation of
section 316.089(1), when the driver deviates “from his lane by more
than what was practicable.” Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26–27
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding when motor vehicle crossed over fog
line three times within span of one mile, even though no traffic was

1 The trial court relies on State v. Riley, 638 So. 2d 507 (Fla.

1994), to support its position. However, Riley dealt with a violation
of section 316.155, Florida Statutes, and its interpretation of that
statute. The present case deals with a violation of section
316.089(1), which governs a wholly different traffic violation and
contains different statutory language than that of section 316.155.
In particular, section 316.155 requires that other traffic be affected
by the driver’s conduct, a requirement which is not present in the
language of section 316.089(1).

7
affected, there still was reasonable suspicion to believe driver had
failed to maintain his lane justifying the stop).

The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he
observed Howard driving for at least 15 seconds between both the
center and the right lane. Regardless of whether Howard affected
any traffic or endangered anyone, his testimony established that
the vehicle was not driven as nearly as practicable within a single
lane. Moreover, this was not a momentary lapse wherein Howard
subsequently corrected her vehicle. Rather, Howard continued on
this pattern into the intersection without correcting her vehicle
until the officer activated his emergency lights. In addition, we find
the trial court’s assertion that Howard was merging from the
center lane to the right lane to make a turn into the parking lot is
not supported by competent substantial evidence. In light of the
officer’s uncontroverted testimony regarding Howard’s violation of
section 316.089, we determine that there was reasonable suspicion
to stop Howard’s vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane.

B.

After the trial court found that there was not a legal basis for
the traffic stop, the court found there was insufficient evidence to
establish reasonable suspicion to detain Howard longer than
necessary to issue a traffic citation. Further, the court found that
there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to require
Howard to perform field sobriety exercises or probable cause to
place her under arrest as there was no competent substantial
evidence to believe that Howard’s normal faculties were impaired.
We agree with the State that the officer had a reasonable suspicion
that Howard was driving under the influence which justified the
detention and the resulting investigation yielded probable cause
for the arrest.

Florida courts have held that a traffic stop must last no longer
than the time it takes to write a traffic citation, but the detention
may be prolonged if the law enforcement officer has a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity was
committed or was about to be committed. State v. Kindle, 782 So.
2d 971, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In the context of a DUI
investigation, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a law

8
enforcement officer may temporarily detain a driver for a DUI
investigation based upon a reasonable suspicion. State v.
Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703–04 (Fla. 1995). The purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether probable cause exists for a
DUI arrest. Id.

“In order to detain someone for a DUI investigation, the officer
must have reasonable suspicion that the detainee committed the
offense.” State v. Castenada, 79 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla 4th DCA 2011).
Reasonable suspicion in this context is premised on the totality of
the circumstances approach as “observed by the officer, when those
circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer's
knowledge and experience.” Id. Our district courts have found that
reasonable suspicion for a DUI may be based on the commission of
traffic infractions, an odor of alcohol, and glassy, bloodshot eyes.
Id. (“[T]he officer observed Defendant speeding, smelled an
alcoholic beverage on Defendant’s breath, and observed that
Defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.”); see also State v.
Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d 339, 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding
reasonable suspicion for DUI investigation when suspect sped,
smelled of alcohol, and exhibited glassy, bloodshot eyes).

Based on a DUI investigation, whether a person has
consumed sufficient alcohol to be deemed “under the influence” or
impaired to an appreciable degree to be considered driving under
the influence is a judgment call made by a police officer based on
objective facts and circumstances observed by the officer. State v.
Brown, 725 So. 2d 441, 443–44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The offense of
driving under the influence occurs when a “person is driving or in
actual physical control of a vehicle” and “is under the influence of
alcoholic beverages . . . when affected to the extent that the
person’s normal faculties are impaired.” See § 316.193(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2021); see also Hoffman v. State, 743 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999) (“The three elements of DUI are driving, being
under the influence, and being impaired.” (citing State v. Weitz,
500 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986))). Although the smell of alcohol
is a critical factor, probable cause for a DUI arrest must be based
upon more than a belief that a driver has consumed alcohol; it
must arise from facts and circumstances that show a probability
that a driver is impaired by alcohol or has an unlawful amount of
alcohol in his system. State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16, 22 (Fla.

9
4th DCA 2000); see Brown, 725 So. 2d at 444 (noting “under the
influence” as used by statute means the driver’s normal faculties
were “impaired,” not simply that the driver had consumed alcohol
but the odor of alcohol on a driver’s breath is a critical factor in
determining whether probable cause existed).

The officer in this case testified that he stopped Howard
because he witnessed a driving pattern of failing to maintain a
single lane; he then saw the defendant’s vehicle making contact
with a curb going into the parking lot of the convenience store
while she was pulling over. Upon making contact with Howard, the
officer noticed slurred speech, thick tongue, and a flushed face.
Howard had glossy, bloodshot eyes, as well as the odor of alcohol
emanating from her person. He further observed that she
appeared to have significant issues locating her driver’s license
and registration. This was sufficient to detain Howard for a DUI
investigation and to request her to perform field sobriety exercises.
Once she refused to perform the field sobriety exercises, these
same observations provided probable cause for Howard’s arrest for
driving under the influence. See Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 704 (refusal
to perform field sobriety exercises admissible as a suspect’s
consciousness of guilt and can factor into a finding of probable
cause).

The trial court in this case stated that it had reviewed body
cam footage from the officer on the evening in question and found
it to contradict the officer’s testimony. However, upon review of the
video evidence, 2 the body cam footage does not contradict the

2 The Casselberry police officer was the only witness who
testified at the suppression hearing regarding the traffic stop and
subsequent DUI investigation. He was wearing a body camera
during his investigation. The video was admitted into evidence
and is provided in the record on appeal. We are therefore “in the
same position to review it as the trial court.” See Baxter v. State,
389 So. 3d 803, 803 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024); see also State v.
Vazquez, 295 So. 3d 373, 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“Our record
contains the recording of Vazquez’s interview, and we ‘may
independently review the audio recording of an interview to assess
whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

10
officer’s testimony as the trial court suggests. For example, the
court stated that Howard was able to articulate where she was
coming from and that she was able to readily locate her driver’s
license and registration. However, it is evident in viewing the video
that Howard took several seconds (and appeared confused) to
respond to the officer’s question regarding where she came from;
she took a significant amount of time to find her driver’s license in
her wallet (including, as the officer testified to, combing the wallet
several times and throwing her hands up in frustration before
finally finding it, fumbling and dropping it, and then retrieving it
to provide to the officer); her speech seemed slow and slurred; and
she exhibited an abnormal degree of confusion when asked to
provide her insurance and registration. The video also does not
refute the officer’s testimony that Howard had a strong odor of
alcohol and that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Thus, our
review of the video footage leads us to the conclusion that the
court’s findings based on the video were unsupported.

C.

Finally, the State argues the court erred when it determined
the officer lacked authority to require Howard to submit to a
breath test outside of the city of Casselberry and we agree. The
State contends the court relied on inapposite cases from other
district courts of appeal in determining that the officer lost the
authority to require Howard to take a breath test when he crossed
over the Casselberry city limits and ignored binding precedent
from this Court even though it was presented to the court during
the suppression hearing. Why the lower court overlooked this
Court’s binding precedent is unclear. See Pardo v. State, 596 So.
2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1992) (“[I]f the district court of the district in
which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court
is bound to follow it. Contrarily, as between District Courts of
Appeal, a sister district’s opinion is merely persuasive.” (quoting
State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976))); see also
State v. Washington, 114 So. 3d 182, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
(noting while a lower court is free to disagree and to express its
disagreement with an appellate court ruling, it is duty-bound to

findings.’” (quoting State v. Thompson, 193 So. 3d 916, 919–20
(Fla. 2d DCA 2016))).

11
follow it, and the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly
articulated, “[t]he decision of the district courts of appeal represent
the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this
Court.” (quoting Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980))).

In State v. Torres, 350 So. 3d 421, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022),
this Court clearly held that there is an exception to the limitation
of municipal law enforcement officers’ utilization of powers outside
of their territory where the officer continues “to act or investigate
outside of his or her geographic jurisdiction” and “the subject
matter of the officer’s investigation originates inside their city
limits.” (citing Knight v. State, 154 So. 3d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA
2022); Nunn v. State, 121 So. 3d 566, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
This Court has applied the “ongoing investigation exception” to
DUI investigations that originate in an officer’s municipality but
then result in the suspect being transported to a neighboring area
outside the city limits for a request for administration of a breath
test. Torres, 350 So. 3d at 426. This case falls squarely within the
ambit of Torres, and the lower court offered no explanation or
justification for wholly ignoring Torres in favor of precedent from
another district. 3 Therefore, we find Torres controlling and we hold
that the court erred in finding that the officer did not have the
authority to request the employee with the Seminole County
Sheriff’s Office to administer the breath test. 4

3 The State, in its initial brief, acknowledges there is a case

emanating from the Sixth District (which was not cited by the
lower court), State v. Repple, No. 6D23-1448, 2024 WL 2983786
(Fla. 6th DCA June 4, 2024), in which it disagreed with this Court’s
holding in Torres that there is an ongoing investigation exception
to a law enforcement officer’s jurisdiction outside his municipality
and certified conflict to the Florida Supreme Court. Review was
granted on January 16, 2025, State v. Repple, 49 Fla. L. Weekly
D1296 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2025).

4 We note that the Casselberry police officer did not read
implied consent to Howard nor administer the breath test.
Although he made this request, the reading of the implied consent
and administering of the breath test was done solely by an
employee of the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office. The trial court’s
ruling is one that could be considered a slippery slope, as local law

12
III.

We reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence
obtained as a result of the stop of Howard’s vehicle and the
subsequent DUI investigation. The trial court erred when it ruled
there was no legal basis for the traffic stop; and it also erred when
it found there was neither reasonable suspicion to conduct the
DUI investigation nor probable cause to justify the arrest of
Howard. We also find that the breath test results were lawfully
obtained under our precedent in Torres, 350 So. 2d at 424.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

enforcement agencies routinely send requests outside of their
jurisdiction for testing of evidentiary items such as drugs, blood,
fingerprints, bullets, and firearms in furtherance of their
investigation which appears to be no different than what took
place in this case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047136. Public record. Not legal advice.