# Sabino v. Port Authority Police Department

> District Court, S.D. New York · May 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047041

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047041

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that there must be “sufficient instances of tolerant awareness by supervisors of abusive conduct to support an inference that they had a policy, custom or usage of acquiescence in such abuse.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
───────────────────────────────────
SAUL SABINO,
Plaintiff, 21-cv-5731 (JGK)

- against - MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
PORT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
───────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The pro se plaintiff, Saul Sabino (“Sabino”), brought this
action against the Port Authority Police Department (the
“PAPD”), and Port Authority Police Officers Joffre G. Cortez
(“P.O. Cortez”) and John-Patrick Natiku (“P.O. Natiku”)
(collectively, “the defendants”), alleging that the defendants
violated the plaintiff’s rights when Port Authority Officers
used excessive force in arresting the plaintiff after the
plaintiff shoplifted from a store and threatened a store
employee with a hammer. For the reasons explained below, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing this action
is granted.
I.
The standard for granting summary judgment is well
established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.
L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).1 “[T]he trial court’s
task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is

carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its
duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it
does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224.
However, “disputed legal questions present nothing for trial and
are appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment.”
Flair Broad. Corp. v. Powers, 733 F. Supp. 179, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the
district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the
matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant

meets that burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences against the moving party. See id.

1 Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits
all internal alterations, citations, footnotes, and quotation
marks in quoted text.
The plaintiff initially failed to respond to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the Court granted
the defendants’ request for the Court to treat the motion as

unopposed. See ECF No. 209. The Court subsequently received
notice that the plaintiff had been incarcerated and had not
received mailings from the Court. See ECF Nos. 210, 212. The
plaintiff requested the opportunity to oppose the motion, and
the Court granted that request, providing that “[i]f the
plaintiff does not respond by May 5, 2025, the motion will be
treated as unopposed.” See ECF Nos. 212, 213. The Court directed
the Clerk to mail that Order to the plaintiff at the updated
address he provided as well as at the plaintiff’s parents’
address. See ECF No. 213. The plaintiff failed to respond to the
motion for summary judgment by May 5, 2025, and the Court
therefore treats the motion as unopposed.

However, “[e]ven when a motion for summary judgment is
unopposed, the district court is not relieved of its duty to
decide whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241,
244 (2d Cir. 2004). The district court may not grant an
unopposed motion for summary judgment “without first examining
the moving party’s submission to determine if it has met its
burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains
for trial.” Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001).
“[I]n determining whether the moving party has met this burden
of showing the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the
district court may not rely solely on the statement of

undisputed facts contained in the moving party’s Rule 56.1
statement. It must be satisfied that the citation to evidence in
the record supports the assertion.” Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at
244.
II.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.2
On August 10, 2020, the plaintiff shoplifted from a
Marshalls department store. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 19, ECF No.
201; Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1.3 The plaintiff alleged that he had

2 Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires the moving party to submit a
“short, and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the
material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no
genuine issue to be tried,” to which the nonmoving party must
then reply by submitting “a correspondingly numbered paragraph
admitting or denying, and otherwise responding to, each numbered
paragraph in the statement of the moving party, and if
necessary, additional paragraphs containing a separate, short
and concise statement of additional material facts as to which
it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.”
Local Civ. R. 56.1(a), (b). Because the plaintiff has not
responded to the defendants’ motion and has not responded to the
defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement, the assertions made in the
defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement, where supported by evidence in
the record, are deemed uncontested and admitted for purposes of
this motion for summary judgment. See T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 2009); Parker v. Fantasia, 425
F. Supp. 3d 171, 176 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

3 The plaintiff later filed first, second, and third amended
complaints, adding defendants and claims. See ECF Nos. 16, 119,
not taken his medication for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder
and that he was in the midst of a “psychotic episode” at the
time of the incident. See 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 19–20; Compl. at 5;

Kromm Decl., Ex. L (“Sabino Dep.”) at 29:18-24, ECF No. 199. The
plaintiff further acknowledges that he was under the influence
of narcotics at the time of the incident. 56.1 Statement ¶ 19;
Sabino Dep. at 28:7-14; Compl. at 5 (alleging that Sabino was
“under the influence of a ton of street [d]rugs/[n]arcotics”).
As the plaintiff was leaving the store, he was approached
by loss prevention employee Vincent Johnson (“Johnson”). See
56.1 Statement ¶ 20; Kromm Decl., Ex. M (“Johnson Statement”),
ECF No. 199. Suffering from a “psychotic episode,” the plaintiff
believed Johnson to be a “demon[] on fire,” pulled out a hammer,
and swung it at Johnson to “try to scare the [d]emons on [f]ire
away.” 56.1 Statement ¶ 20; Compl. at 5. Johnson asserted that

the plaintiff threatened him with a hammer and that Johnson “ran
out of the store with [the plaintiff] chasing.” 56.1 Statement ¶
21; Kromm Decl., Ex. I (“Motion to Amend”) at 11, ECF No. 199.
Outside the store, Johnson encountered P.O. Natiku and P.O.
Cortez and informed them that the plaintiff had a hammer and had
stolen merchandise from Marshalls. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 22; see
also Kromm Decl., Ex. B (“Cortez Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 199;

126. However, the most complete statement of facts by the
plaintiff is found in the original complaint.
Kromm Decl., Ex. C (“Natiku Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 199. The
officers pursued the plaintiff in their patrol car, identified
themselves as officers over the car’s loudspeakers, and ordered

the plaintiff to stop. See Cortez Decl. ¶ 8; Natiku Decl. ¶ 8.
Eventually, the officers were able to approach the plaintiff.
See Cortez Decl. ¶ 11; Natiku Decl. ¶ 11. To prevent the
plaintiff’s escape, the officers engaged in “compliance holds
with the [p]laintiff while he continuously refused to comply
with verbal orders and actively resisted arrest by flailing
arms, pulling away, and twisting his body away from” them. See
Cortez Decl. ¶ 13; Natiku Decl. ¶ 13.
An independent eyewitness observed that, “[the plaintiff]
ran out into the middle of the street and as [p]olice reached
out he screamed ‘I can’t breath’ before [p]olice actually
touched him. The [p]olice took him down and [he] was resisting

arrest by not allowing the [p]olice to handcuff him.” Kromm
Decl., Ex. N (“Gomez Statement”), ECF No. 199.
The plaintiff acknowledges that the defendants did not
punch or kick him during the arrest. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 24;
Sabino Dep. at 80:11-17, 81:6-15. Moreover, an independent
witness observed that once the plaintiff was handcuffed, “the
[p]olice rolled the [plaintiff] onto his side and helped him
stand up.” Gomez Statement. After being taken into custody, the
plaintiff was transported to Bellevue Hospital Center for a
psychiatric evaluation. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 27; Ex Parte Kromm
Decl., Ex. O (“Bellevue Hospital Records”), ECF No. 204. The
plaintiff’s x-ray results were normal. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 27;

Bellevue Hospital Records at 47. The plaintiff’s physical
examination noted a “superficial round abrasion about 4 cm in
diameter” on the plaintiff’s right shoulder and a “round area of
abrasion about 4 cm diameter” on the plaintiff’s upper right
arm. 56.1 Statement ¶ 27; Bellevue Hospital Records at 44.
Following the arrest, P.O. Cortez was transported to New York
Presbyterian Hospital and received medical treatment. Cortez
Decl. ¶ 19. As a result of injuries sustained during the arrest
of the plaintiff, P.O. Cortez underwent surgery on his shoulder
and elbow in August 2021 and March 2022, respectively. Id. ¶ 20.
In connection with the August 10, 2020 incident, the
plaintiff pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in

the third degree. 56.1 Statement ¶ 11; Kromm Decl., Ex. D.
(“Moses Order”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 199. On December 10, 2020, the
plaintiff brought this action against the defendants pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. See ECF No. 4. On July 2, 2021, the action was
transferred to this Court. ECF No. 5. On September 1, 2021, the
Court dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims against the
PAPD, leaving only the plaintiff’s excessive force claim. See
Sabino v. Port Auth. Police Dep’t, No. 21-cv-5731, 2021 WL
3914092 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021). The Court later denied the
plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add
claims for malicious prosecution and violation of the Equal

Protection Clause, but granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave
to amend to add state assault and battery claims. See Sabino v.
Port Auth. Police Dep’t, No. 21-cv-5731, 2024 WL 3728974
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2024). The defendants filed an answer in
response to the plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, and now
move for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.
See ECF Nos. 188, 198.
III.
The defendants move for summary judgment, contending that:
(1) the plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for use of excessive
force and the plaintiff’s state assault and battery claims
should be dismissed because the officers used reasonable force

in arresting the plaintiffs; (2) the individual officers are
entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the plaintiff has failed to
establish that the PAPD is liable under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the actions of the
individual officers; (4) the plaintiff failed to serve a notice
of claim on the PAPD as required by state law; and (5) the PAPD
is not subject to punitive damages. The Court will address each
of these arguments in turn.
A.
The defendants first move for summary judgment dismissing
the plaintiff’s section 1983 excessive force claims and state

law assault and battery claims.
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred
by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal
statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
146 n.3 (1979). To prevail on a section 1983 claim, the
plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of
state law. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980);
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004).
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force

in making an arrest, and whether the force used is excessive is
to be analyzed under that Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’
standard.” Brown v. City of N.Y., 798 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir.
2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). A
police officer’s use of force is “excessive” in violation of the
Fourth Amendment if it is objectively unreasonable in light of
the facts and circumstances known to the officer. Lennon v.
Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 425–26 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Maxwell v.
City of N.Y., 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004). “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
Under New York state law, “[w]here there is a lawful
arrest, intentional contact with the arrested person does not
constitute assault and battery, provided such force is
reasonable.” Fischetti v. City of N.Y., 158 N.Y.S.3d 163, 166
(App. Div. 2021). Moreover, “[c]laims that law enforcement
personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of
objective reasonableness.” Id. “[E]xcept for § 1983’s
requirement that the tort be committed under color of state law,
the essential elements of excessive force and state law assault

and battery claims are substantially identical.” Humphrey v.
Landers, 344 F. App’x 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Posr v.
Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1991)).
“Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, granting
summary judgment against a plaintiff on an excessive force claim
is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the officers’ conduct was objectively
unreasonable.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,
123 (2d Cir. 2004). However, “the mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Jeffreys v. City of N.Y.,

426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005).
In this case, undisputed facts support the conclusion that
the officers used reasonable force to arrest the plaintiff, and
that no reasonable factfinder could find for the plaintiff. To
determine whether the amount of force applied to a plaintiff was
unreasonable, courts consider the “the facts and circumstances
of each particular case,” including, “the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see Cugini v. City of N.Y.,
941 F.3d 604, 608 (2d Cir. 2019) (balancing “an individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against countervailing governmental
interests, including the severity of the crime and whether the
suspect poses a safety or flight risk or resists arrest”).
Moreover, “[d]e minimis injury can serve as conclusive evidence
that de minimis force was used.” Washpon v. Parr, 561 F. Supp.
2d 394, 406–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Kayo v. Mertz, 531 F.
Supp. 3d 774, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Drummond v. Castro, 522 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 678–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Both the severity of the crime at issue and the threat to
the safety of others strongly support the conclusion that the
officers used reasonable force in arresting the plaintiff.

During the incident, it is uncontested that the plaintiff was
experiencing a psychotic episode and was under the influence of
narcotics. See 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 19–20. Although the plaintiff
was initially approached for shoplifting, he subsequently
brandished a hammer at a store employee whom he believed to be a
“demon on fire.” See 56.1 Statement ¶ 20. The plaintiff
ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in
the third degree. Moses Order ¶ 8. Accordingly, both the
severity of the crime for which the defendant was arrested and
the threat that the defendant posed to Johnson and the officers
support the conclusion that the officers used reasonable force
in arresting the defendant.

Moreover, the plaintiff “actively resist[ed] arrest [and]
attempt[ed] to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
After threatening Johnson with a hammer, the plaintiff fled
several blocks before being arrested. See 56.1 Statement ¶ 21-
22; Cortez Decl. ¶ 10; Natiku Decl. ¶ 10. An independent
eyewitness confirmed that the plaintiff resisted arrest, see
Gomez Statement, and P.O. Cortez required surgeries on his
shoulder and elbow for injuries sustained while attempting to
restrain the plaintiff during the arrest, see Cortez Decl. ¶¶
18-20. Accordingly, this factor supports the conclusion that the
officers used reasonable force in arresting the defendant.
Finally, the plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis. The

plaintiff alleges that he suffered two large lacerations to his
right arm, loss of feeling in his right hand and extreme lower
back pain,” as a result of his arrest. Compl. at 5. However, the
plaintiff’s hospital records do not support the plaintiff’s
allegations. Medical records from the date of the plaintiff’s
arrest found only a “superficial round abrasion about 4 cm in
diameter” on the plaintiff’s right shoulder and a “round area of
abrasion about 4 cm diameter” on the plaintiff’s upper arm. See
56.1 Statement ¶ 27; Bellevue Hospital Records at 44. Moreover,
a physician retained by the defendants to examine the plaintiff
concluded that the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not
caused by the August 10, 2020 incident with the Port Authority

police officers. Kromm Decl., Ex. P (“Lenzo Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No.
204. The plaintiff’s “bald assertion[s]” to the contrary do “not
present a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury.” See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991).
In sum, no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff
was subjected to excessive force in connection with his arrest
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or that the individual
officers are liable for assault and battery against the
plaintiff in violation of state law.
B.
In the alternative, the defendants argue that qualified
immunity shields the individual officers from liability for the

plaintiff’s excessive force claim. “The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009). However, because the officers did not use
excessive force, the Court need not consider whether, if the
officers had used excessive force, qualified immunity would
nevertheless have shielded them from liability.
C.
The defendants next move for summary judgment dismissing
the plaintiff’s Monell claim against the Port Authority.4 Section

1983 provides a cause of action for any person who has been
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law
under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To impose
section 1983 liability upon a municipality, a plaintiff must
identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the
plaintiff’s injuries. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of

4 As a bi-state agency, Monell has been found applicable to the
Port Authority. See, e.g., Mack v. The Port Auth., 225 F. Supp.
2d 376, 382 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1974). In the absence of an
official policy, “a municipal policy may be inferred from the
informal acts or omissions of supervisory municipal officials,”

and “municipal inaction such as the persistent failure to
discipline subordinates who violate [individuals’] civil rights
could give rise to an inference of an unlawful municipal policy
of ratification of unconstitutional conduct.” Zahra v. Town of
Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995); Jones v. Town of E.
Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012) (observing that there must
be “sufficient instances of tolerant awareness by supervisors of
abusive conduct to support an inference that they had a policy,
custom or usage of acquiescence in such abuse.”). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “isolated acts of
excessive force by non-policymaking municipal employees are
generally not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom,

policy, or usage that would justify municipal liability.” Jones,
691 F.3d at 81.
In this case, the plaintiff has failed either to allege or
to provide any evidence that the PAPD either maintained an
official policy that caused the plaintiff’s injuries or
persistently failed to discipline employees who violated
individuals’ civil rights. See Zahra, 48 F.3d at 685.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s federal claim against the PAPD is
dismissed.
D.

Additionally, the defendants contend that the state assault
and battery claims against the PAPD should be dismissed because
the plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim on the Port
Authority. “The Port Authority, a bi-state agency created by a
compact between New York and New Jersey, enjoyed sovereign
immunity until 1951, when New York and New Jersey consented to
suits against it” on the condition that certain prerequisites
are satisfied. Caceres v. Port Auth., 631 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir.
2011). These prerequisites include a 60-day notice of claim
requirement and a one-year statute of limitations. See id.
Specifically, section 7107 of the Unconsolidated Laws of
New York requires that (1) any suit brought against the Port

Authority be commenced within one year after the accrual of the
cause of action and (2) a notice of claim be served by the
plaintiff on the Port Authority at least sixty (60) days prior
to filing suit. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 7107 (McKinney). Section
7108 of the New York Unconsolidated Laws requires that the
notice of claim:
[S]hall be in writing, sworn to by or on behalf
of the claimant or claimants, and shall set
forth (1) the name and post office address of
each claimant and of his attorney, if any, (2)
the nature of the claim, (3) the time when,
the place where and the manner in which the
claim arose, and (4) the items of damage or
injuries claimed to have been sustained so far
as then practicable.

Id. § 7108 (McKinney).
Courts have held that “Sections 7107 and 7108 constitute
jurisdictional prerequisites to a suit against the Port
Authority, and failure to comply with them ‘compels the
dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.’” Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. The Port Auth. of
N.Y. & N.J., 435 F. App’x 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Giannone v. Port Auth., 511 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (App. Div. 1987).
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s state law claims against the PAPD
are dismissed for failure to comply with New York’s notice of
claim requirement.
E.
Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s request
for punitive damages against the PAPD must be dismissed because
PAPD is immune from such damages. The law is well-settled that
municipalities are not subject to punitive damages. See City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 261 (1981). “As a
government entity, the Port Authority is immune from punitive
damages.” See Rose v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 13 F. Supp. 2d
516, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Vernon v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
154 F. Supp. 2d 844, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Martinez v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.d., No. Ol-cv-721, 2005 WL 2143333, at *1 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005); Urbina v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
No. 15-cv-8647, 2017 WL 3600424, at *6 (S.D.N.¥. Aug. 18, 2017).
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request for punitive damages
against the PAPD is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments. To
the extent not specifically addressed, those arguments are
either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment dismissing this action with
prejudice. The Clerk is also directed to close all pending
motions and to close this case. The Clerk is directed to mail a
copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and to note mailing on
the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
May 7, 2025 ao OK, ,
□□□ John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11047041. Public record. Not legal advice.