# Bell v. Moore

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · April 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046954

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** April 9, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046954

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the authority to investigate and initiate criminal complaints rest exclusively with the United States Attorney

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

JAYLEN DALAINO BELL,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-00198
v.

DAVID KYLE MOORE,
in his official and individual capacity as
Prosecuting Attorney for Jackson County,
West Virginia,

Defendant.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff’s “Complaint for Identity Theft, Invasion of
Privacy, and Constitutional Violations” (ECF No. 1). By Standing Order, this matter was referred
to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact
and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 2) Having
examined the “Complaint”1 (ECF No. 2), the undersigned concludes that this case must be
dismissed given this Court enjoys inherent authority to dismiss complaints at any time if the Court

1 While it is the undersigned’s practice to allow pro se litigants to amend their complaints when upon initial review,
there appears no cognizable claim for relief, the undersigned has no confidence that this particular litigant will be able
to comply with that directive given this Plaintiff’s previous failure to comply with the Court’s Order in Civil Action
No. 2:25-cv-00134 (ECF No. 6).

1
determines that the action fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.2 3
Factual Allegations
The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
alleges that the Defendant, the prosecuting attorney for Jackson County, West Virginia, while

acting under color of law and within the scope of his official duties, initiated an Interstate
Identification Index (also known colloquially as a “Triple I report”) criminal background inquiry
on January 30, 2023, subsequent to the Plaintiff’s arrest on or about January 3, 2021 (ECF No. 1
at 2). This resulted in the acquisition of the Plaintiff’s Social Security Number (“SSN”) (Id.). The
Plaintiff asserts that he did not consent to his personal identifying information being obtained and
the Defendant’s actions have exposed the Plaintiff to an “increased risk of identity fraud, financial
harm, and reputational damage, and have caused severe emotional distress.” (Id. at 3) The Plaintiff
states that he only recently learned of the Defendant’s unauthorized acquisition of his personal
data (Id.).

2 See Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012)(“frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant
to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid); see, e.g., Mallard v. United States
Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) ...
authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have the power to do
so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.
2000); see also, Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181-83 (7th Cir. 1989)(because a court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process if permitted); and see,
e.g., Cabbill v. United States, 2015 WL 6905072, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015).

While the undersigned notes the Plaintiff failed to file an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of
Fees or Costs, or pay the filing and administrative fee in this action, it is noted that this particular Plaintiff has filed
numerous lawsuits in this Court recently, and had in those cases, filed the appropriate paperwork to proceed in forma
pauperis. See Case No. 2:25-cv-00132, ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3; Case No. 2:25-cv-00134, ECF Nos. 1, 2; Case No. 2:25-cv-
00155, ECF No. 1; Case No. 2:25-cv-00196, ECF No. 1. In any event, for the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned
declines to direct this Plaintiff to submit the Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs, or pay the
filing and administrative fee.

3 Because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the documents she filed in this case are held to a less stringent standard
than had they been prepared by a lawyer, therefore, they are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-521 (1972).
2
The Plaintiff alleges five claims against the Defendant: for Count I, identity theft in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028; for Count II, the West Virginia state common law claim of invasion
of privacy; for Count III, violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; for Count IV, violations
of the Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and for Count V, violation of the West

Virginia Identity Theft Statute pursuant to W. Va. Code § 61-3-54. (Id. at 3-4)
The Plaintiff asks for declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, statutory damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs and for any other relief this Court
deems just and proper. (Id. at 4)
The Standard
As noted supra, the Complaint is subject to pre-service screening. On screening, the Court
must recommend dismissal of the case if the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. A “frivolous” complaint is one which is based upon an
indisputably meritless legal theory. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). A “frivolous” claim
lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”
Id., 490 U.S. at 327. Although the standards for screening pursuant to Section 1915A and a Rule
12(b)(6) motion may be the same, a Court should look with “a far more forgiving eye” when
examining whether a complaint rests on a meritless legal theory. Nancy v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605,
607 (2nd Cir. 1990). A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or
delusional scenarios.” Id., 490 U.S. at 327-328. A complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted factually when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Deference is given to pro se

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Complaints. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1978) (A District Court should
allow pro se plaintiffs reasonable opportunity to develop pleadings.); Coleman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d
603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965) (Pro se plaintiff should be given an opportunity to particularize potentially
viable claims.). A pro se Complaint may therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if

it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972), quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Where a pro se Complaint can be remedied by an amendment, however,
the District Court may not dismiss the Complaint, but must permit the amendment. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992).
Though this Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents and hold them to a
less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys4, liberal construction “does not require
courts to construct arguments or theories for a pro se plaintiff because this would place a court in
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Miller v. Jack, 2007 WL 2050409, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. 2007)(citing Gordon
v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.1978)). Further, liberal construction does not require the

“courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). In other words, a court may not construct legal argument for
a plaintiff. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1993). Finally, the requirement of liberal
construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts
which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of
Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.1990)).

4 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295
(1978).
4
Analysis
Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that are empowered to consider cases
authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d

501 (1986). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that the Federal Courts have jurisdiction over cases
involving federal questions: “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
No Private Right of Action to Prosecute Criminal Statutes:
As an initial matter, it is noted that the Plaintiff has alleged the Defendant violated both a
federal and a state criminal statute. Thus, to the extent that the Plaintiff intends to initiate criminal
proceedings against the Defendant, this is impermissible. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973)(“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); see also, Hester v. West Virginia, 2008
WL 4298471, at *6 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 18, 2008)(“no private right of action can be inferred from

18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242”)(Johnston, J.); see also, Young v. Herald, 2005 WL 1048117, * 8 (E.D.
Ky. May 3, 2005)(the authority to initiate criminal complaints rests exclusively with state and
federal prosecutors); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60
L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)(the decision whether to prosecute and what charges to file rest in the
prosecutor’s discretion); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 447 F.2d 375 (2nd
Cir. 1973)(finding that the authority to investigate and initiate criminal complaints rest exclusively
with the United States Attorney). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1028 and W. Va. Code § 61-3-54 should be dismissed with prejudice.

5
Younger-Abstention Doctrine:
Based on the Plaintiff’s own allegations, as well as his allegations set forth in his Petition
for Habeas relief (see Case No. 2:25-cv-00155, ECF No. 2-1), it is clear that there are ongoing
criminal proceedings in Jackson County, West Virginia, and that those proceedings are related to

the issues raised herein. Accordingly, this Court should abstain from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claims based upon the Younger-abstention doctrine. See Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Under the Younger-abstention doctrine, interest of comity and
federalism counsel federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been
or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.”
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-238 (1984).
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “Younger abstention is appropriate only in those
cases in which (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates
important state interest, and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims in
the state proceeding.” Employers Resource Management Co., Inc. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, (1996). A court should disregard Younger’s mandate

only where “(1) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment by state officials responsible for the
prosecution; (2) the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions; or (3) other extraordinary circumstances exist that
present a threat of immediate and irreparable injury.” Nivens v. Gilchrist, 44 F.3d 237, 241 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “[I]t is the plaintiff’s ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar
of Younger abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.”
Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1997).

6
The undersigned finds that the Younger abstention doctrine applies in the instant case, as
there is no indication from the Plaintiff’s claims that the State-initiated proceedings have
concluded. Despite the Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the Defendant’s Brady discovery
disclosures shows his personal data, as part of the official criminal proceedings, the Plaintiff

provides no grounds that support any of the enumerated Nivens exceptions to the Younger
mandate: the Plaintiff fails to show improper prosecution against him in State court, or facts
supporting a claim for unreasonable harassment that comports with the bad faith exception.
It is also notable that the Plaintiff is seeking a species of injunctive or declaratory relief, to
the extent that he wants this Court to “[e]nter a judgment against Defendant for identity theft,
invasion of privacy, constitutional violations, and statutory violations . . . [i]ssue injunctive relief
enjoining Defendant from further unauthorized acquisition or use of Plaintiff’s personal
information” (ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶¶ A, F). Courts have long recognized that such extraordinary
remedies may only be used sparingly and in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Sarsour v. Trump,
245 F.Supp.3d 719 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2017). To prevail on such a remedy, the Plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his case; (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in his favor;
and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. This Court can exercise
no jurisdiction over the parties and matters indicated in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, therefore, this
Court is unable to provide injunctive relief in accordance with the Plaintiff’s request, particularly
given how facially absurd they are. Since there has been no appreciable showing that such an
extraordinary remedy would be in the public interest, or that the Plaintiff is likely to suffer any
irreparable harm in the absence of same, to the extent these particular prayers for relief can be

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construed as requests for injunctive relief they must be denied.
Legal Immunities:
Given the Plaintiff’s de minimis factual allegations against the Defendant, he has failed to
state a claim against the Defendant upon which relief can be granted. The Defendant is a

prosecutor, and the Plaintiff’s allegations solely concern the disclosure of the Plaintiff’s Triple I
report during ongoing criminal proceedings. To that extent, the Defendant is entitled to absolute
immunity: prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities performed as “an officer of the court”
if the conduct at issue is closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 - 343, 129 S.Ct. 855, 860 - 862, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009).
In determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity, the Court must apply the
“functional approach” examining the nature of the function performed. Id., 555 U.S. at 342, 129
S.Ct. at 861. It is well established that prosecutors are absolutely immune “for their conduct in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486,

111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-
431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128) (1976). Further, absolute immunity extends to “actions
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (quoting Imbler,
424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995 - 996)). A prosecutor acts as an advocate or “officer of the court”
when performing tasks, such as (1) initiating a judicial proceeding, (2) presenting evidence in
support of a search warrant application, (3) conducting a criminal trial, bond hearing, grand jury
proceeding or pre-trial hearing, (4) engaging in “an out-of-court effort to control the presentation

8
of [a] witness’ testimony,” and (5) making a “professional evaluation of the evidence assembled
by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before the grand jury after
a decision to seek an indictment has been made.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272, 113 S.Ct. at 2615
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995 - 996); Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct.
at 861; Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 471 - 472 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that

“numerous courts have found prosecutors absolutely immune when undertaking [extradition
proceedings].”)
Furthermore, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity even if he or she “acted with an
improper state of mind or improper motive.” Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2nd
Cir. 2005); also see Smith v. McCarthy, 349 Fed.Appx. 851, 859 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562
U.S. 829, 131 S.Ct. 81, 178 L.Ed.2d 26 (2010); Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d 1351 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]o the extent [plaintiff] alleges that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct during the
prosecution of this case . . ., the prosecutors are absolutely immune.”). Thus, prosecutors are
entitled to absolute immunity for withholding materially exculpatory evidence, and knowingly

presenting perjured testimony or false or misleading evidence to the Court or grand jury. Burns,
500 U.S. at 490-92, 111 S.Ct., at 1941-42 (“A state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune
from liability for damages under § 1983 for participating in a probable-cause hearing . . ..”); Imbler,
424 U.S. at 422, 96 S.Ct. 984 at 991 (citing Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed.
395 (1927)) (finding prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for allegations that he “maliciously
and without probable cause procured plaintiff’s grand jury indictment by the willful introduction
of false and misleading evidence.”); also see Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d at 1352; Lyles v. Sparks,
79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

9
513 U.S. 1150, 115 S.Ct. 1101, 130 L.Ed2d 1068 (1995). Although prosecutors may be entitled to
absolute immunity, prosecutors are subject to criminal and professional sanctions for prosecutorial
abuses. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429, 96 S.Ct. at 994; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, n. 5, 106
S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). It is well recognized that “[a]bsolute prosecutorial immunity

‘is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform these functions, and certainly not
from a desire to shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair
the judicial process itself.’ ” Dababnah, 208 F.3d at 471 (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
127, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997)). The Imbler Court determined the importance of
protecting the integrity of the prosecutor’s office and the judicial system outweighs the desire to
afford civil redress to a wronged defendant. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 - 429, 96 S.Ct. at 993 - 994.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff only complains the Defendant violated his constitutional
rights (and an assortment of other claims) due to his involvement in the prosecution of Plaintiff’s
criminal case. Notably, the Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that the Defendant complied with
his disclosure obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10

L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and produced the information contained in the Triple I report to the Plaintiff’s
defense counsel. To that extent, the Defendant would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims concerning any decision he made concerning the
prosecution of Plaintiff’s State charges pursuant to Imbler. Even assuming arguendo that the
Defendant acted outside of his prosecutorial functions, he would be entitled to qualified
immunity.5 In sum, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant simply do not rise to the level of

5 It is significant that the Plaintiff’s complaint and supporting exhibit indicate that his claims concern events
surrounding his arrest for a felony drug trafficking offense on January 3, 2021, eventually leading to his indictment
on the charge, for which the Plaintiff is now alleging unreasonable search and seizure, as well as violations to his due
process and equal protection rights (See ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 23, 24). On that note, the Plaintiff’s common law claim for
10
any constitutional violation, because he fails to allege any factual support for his claims that would
survive scrutiny under the Iqbal and Twombly heightened pleading standard.6 Thus, the Plaintiff’s
claim against the Defendant should be dismissed.
Privacy Act Inapplicable to Individual Officials:

The Plaintiff’s claims under the Privacy Act are likewise doomed, because not only does
the Plaintiff have to show “actual damages”, as opposed to generalized and threadbare allegations
of damages as set forth in his complaint,7 he is precluded from filing such an action against an
individual official. See Haywood v Owens, 2019 WL 2292548, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019)
(failure to state a claim for violation of Privacy Act because it is inapplicable to individual
officials), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2284931 (D.S.C. May 29, 2019); see
also, White v. Cain, 2011 WL 1087489, at *7 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 21, 2011)(Goodwin, J.) (plaintiff’s
Privacy Act claim against individual officer dismissed because no remedies provided against
individual officials). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim against this Defendant should be
dismissed.

invasion of privacy is likely precluded by the applicable statute of limitations for bringing such claims – which is one
year from a reasonable awareness of such acts, and the Plaintiff did not file this action until March 25, 2025. See
Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., 578 F.Supp. 63 (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 31, 1983). While the Plaintiff has alleged
he “only learned . . . recently” of this alleged identity theft, he attaches an exhibit that indicates his defense attorney
received supplemental discovery from the Office of the Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney on February 2, 2023
via facsimile (See ECF No 1-1). This included the Plaintiff’s SSN and other personal identifying data gleaned from
the “Interstate Identification Index CIB From for the [Plaintiff]” (Id.). Although there is no evidence before the Court
that the Plaintiff’s defense counsel failed to share this information with the Plaintiff, it does render his claim of only
recently having discovered the alleged unauthorized acquisition of his personal data suspect, or at least strains
credibility. Regardless of any statute of limitations concerns, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such claims as
being frivolous. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rubenstein, 2014 WL 2765698 (S.D.W.Va. May 21, 2014), report and
recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 2765717 (S.D.W.Va. Jun. 18, 2014).

6 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

7 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004)(holding that a claimant who provided his
SSN on application for benefits under Black Lung Benefits Act not entitled to award from Department of Labor
disclosing his SSN in violation of Privacy Act because he failed to show actual damages as a result of violation).

11
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Plaintiff’s
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned therefore respectfully PROPOSES that the District Judge confirm and

accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS the
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) and remove this matter from the Court’s docket. The parties are
notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is hereby FILED, and a copy will be
submitted to the Honorable Irene C. Berger, United States District Judge. Pursuant to the
provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rules 6(d) and 72(b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and then three
days (mailing/service) from the date of filing this Proposed Findings and Recommendation within
which to file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of
the Proposed Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such
objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause shown.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo
review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 106
S.Ct. 466, 475, 88 L.E.2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.E.2d 933
(1986); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d
91, 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S.Ct. 2395, 81 L.E.2d 352 (1984). Copies of
such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Berger, and this Magistrate
Judge.

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The Clerk of this Court is directed to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation and
to send a copy of same to the pro se Plaintiff.
ENTER: April 9, 2025.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046954. Public record. Not legal advice.