# DeJesus v. Shoemaker

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046948

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046948

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement’ was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”
- holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a state agency and not a “person” under Section 1983
- finding that PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of Section 1983” and thus not subject to liability under that statute

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALEX CHRISTOPHER DEJESUS, : No. 3:25-CV-0483
Plaintiff :
: (Judge Munley)
V. :
WARDEN SHOEMAKER, ef a/., :
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Alex Christopher DeJesus initiated the above-captioned pro se
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,’ alleging unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at Lycoming County Prison. The court will dismiss DeJesus’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted but will provide leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
In his complaint, DeJesus asserts that he is a pretrial detainee at Lycoming
County Prison who is housed in the “SMU/DLU” on the G-Block unit. (Doc. 1 at
2, 4). His allegations are succinct: he maintains that unspecified prison officials
keep the lights illuminated in his housing unit 22 out of 24 hours a day, causing
inmates significant sleep deprivation. (Id. at 4). DeJesus further alleges that, as

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed b
state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism fc
vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 US. □□□
284-85 (2002}.

none of the inmates in the unit are on suicide supervision, there is no legitimate
penological justification for the constant lighting. (Id.) He contends that the near

continuous illumination has caused him “sleep deprivation, depression, anxiety,
delusion, mood swings, [and] sight distortion.” (Id. at 5).
DeJesus lodged the instant complaint in this court on March 17, 2025.

(See generally Doc. 1). He sues four defendants: Warden Brad Shoemaker,
Deputy Warden Ryan Barnes, Deputy Warden Chris Ebner, and the Lycoming
County Prison Medical Administration. (Id. at 2-3). He seeks “monetary
compensation’ as his only requested relief. (Id. at 5).
ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”
unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or
employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening
stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted[.]” Id. § 1915A(b}(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they
utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b}(6). See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 &n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O'Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov't, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(nonprecedential); cf. Allah _v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974): see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must
accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts
alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents” attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's
claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct 2
three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). At
step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)

(alterations in original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded
factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions,

| which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-
| truthful allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
| entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is

a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
Because DeJesus proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally
construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
| stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when
the pro se litigant, like DeJesus, is incarcerated. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3c
366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
lll. DISCUSSION
DeJesus asserts a single Fourteenth Amendment? claim of unconstitutiona
conditions of confinement. His complaint, however, fails to state a claim upon

? Although DeJesus invokes the Eighth Amendment, he avers that he was a pretrial detaine
(not a convicted and sentenced prisoner) at the time of the alleged events, so his conditions-o
confinement claim implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not th
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Jacobs v. Cumberlan
County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 22
n.4 (3d Cir. 2014); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (Hubbard |); see als

which relief may be granted. The court will discuss DeJesus’s pleading
deficiencies in turn.
A. Personal Involvement
It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be
“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also
Ashcroft v. lgbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens
context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that
demonstrate the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Personal involvement can
include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated
through evidence of “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and
acquiescence’; however, such averments must be made with particularity. Id.
(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Furthermore, it is equally settled that
involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does not give rise to
section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison
officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement’ was
“their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp.

Paulino v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, 438 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explainin
that “sentenced prisoners are protected from punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual,’ whil
pretrial detainees are protected from any punishment” (citing Hubbard |, 399 F.3d at □□□□□□□□□

3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’
923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x
924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner's claims
against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations
| against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance
process’ ).
DeJesus’s first and primary deficiency is that he fails to allege personal
involvement by Defendants in the purported constitutional violation. His
complaint is silent as to the alleged unlawful action (or inaction) of any of the
Defendants he identifies in his complaint. In fact, besides being listed in the
caption and the defendant-identification section, the prison entity and officials
DeJesus sues do not appear anywhere else in the pleading. Accordingly, the
court must dismiss the Section 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against all
Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal
involvement.
B. “Person” for Section 1983
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege “the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, anc
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). Only “persons”
are subject to suit under Section 1983, and entities such as prisons, agencies,
and private businesses do not qualify as “persons.” See Will v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989): Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435
F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that
district court properly “dismissed Clarion County Jail as a defendant in this case,
quoting district court’s reasoning that “it is well established in the Third Circuit
that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under federal civil rights laws’”);
Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp. 2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that
PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of Section 1983” and thus not
subject to liability under that statute); see also Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991,
992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a
state agency and not a “person” under Section 1983); Ali v. Ann Klein Forensic
Center, No. 21-CV-316, 2022 WL 138084, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding
that state hospital “is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”).
DeJesus attempts to sue the Lycoming County Prison Medical
Administration. (See Doc. 1 at 3). This entity is not a “person,” and therefore
DeJesus has failed to assert a viable Section 1983 claim against it. Moreover,
DeJesus does not allege an unconstitutional policy or custom by the prison
medical administration such that a Section 1983 lawsuit could be maintained

against Lycoming County. See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the prison medical administration
must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relie
C. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement
When a pretrial detainee asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to consider
“first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by the[] conditions, and
second, whether the[] conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hubbard Il} (quoting Union
Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)). If pretrial
detainees are subjected to conditions that are not reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, an inference may be made that the purpose o
the prison official's action is punishment. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 97:
F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, “a particular measure amounts to
punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of
detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally relatec
to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is
excessive in light of that purpose.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir
2007) (quoting Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).

As the Third Circuit instructs, courts confronted with a Fourteenth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must “consider the totality of the
circumstances of confinement.” Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (citing Hubbard |, 399
F.3d at 159-60). And, like an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement
claim by a convicted prisoner, a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim by a pretrial detainee requires a showing of deliberate
indifference on the part of prison officials. Edwards v. Northampton County, 663
F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Colburn v. Upper
Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991)).
DeJesus’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim fails
because he has not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by any Defendant.
He has not alleged who was potentially responsible for the near-constant
illumination in his housing unit, who had knowledge of these conditions and was
deliberately indifferent toward them, or whom he informed about the conditions
and subsequently acted with deliberate indifference toward them. Without such
fundamental allegations of deliberate indifference by any Defendant, dismissal ot
this claim is required under Section 1915A(b)(1). See Edwards, 663 F. App’x at
135-36.

D. Leave to Amend
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. The cour
will grant DeJesus leave to amend in the event that he could plausibly allege a
Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against a state actor or
actors.
lf DeJesus chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this
Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and
without reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should sel
forth his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in short,
concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs.
DeJesus must address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Memorandum.
Most notably, he must clearly set forth the personal involvement of any named
defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. That is, he must plausibly plead
the unconstitutional action (or inaction) of each defendant he is attempting to

sue.
DeJesus must also sign the amended complaint and indicate the nature of
the relief sought. He may not include unrelated claims against different
defendants in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). If he does nc

10

timely file an appropriate amended pleading, dismissal of his complaint will
automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the court will close this

case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss DeJesus’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Leave to amend will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

Date:. = be 3% THE\COURT:

“JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY
United States District Court

44

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046948. Public record. Not legal advice.