# Daniels v. Trusewych

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · May 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046825

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DARRIAN DANIELS,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03089-JEH

GREENE, et al.,
Defendants.

Order
Plaintiff Darrian Daniels, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”), filed a Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. This matter is now
before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc.
11) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Protective Order.
(Doc. 12). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Protective Order is DENIED.
I
On April 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants
Warden Greene, John/Jane Does Mental Health Staff, John/Jane Does Placement
Staff, and Dr. Trusewych violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him
a single-man cell and accommodations for his hearing loss under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. (Doc. 1).
On April 29, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint without
prejudice as a violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 and
permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 10).
On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint (Doc. 11). Plaintiff’s Motion is granted. The Court must now conduct a
merit review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and dismiss any legally
insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is
legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,
422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
A
Plaintiff names Dr. Trusewych as the sole Defendant in his Amended
Complaint. He no longer names Warden Greene, John/Jane Does Mental Health
Staff, and John/Jane Does Placement Staff as Defendants. Therefore, they are
dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff states he was transferred to Western on January 22, 2025. During
an examination with Defendant Dr. Trusewych on February 3, 2025, Defendant
allegedly told Plaintiff there was no indication in his medical records that he failed
a hearing test or had any ear injuries. As a result, Plaintiff claims he was denied an
ADA disability phone call with his attorney.
On February 13, 2025, an unidentified nurse called Plaintiff to the Health
Care Unit (“HCU”) for a hearing test. When Plaintiff failed the test, the nurse
allegedly informed him that he would be referred to an outside audiologist for a
treatment plan.
On February 15, 2025, Defendant Dr. Trusewych called Plaintiff back to the
HCU and informed him he would not be referred to an audiologist because there
was no indication that he had failed a hearing test in the past.
Plaintiff alleges it is well-documented in his medical records at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”), his former facility, that he is hearing-impaired
due to ear injuries. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was stabbed in his right ear,
which caused complete deafness in that ear. In 2020, Plaintiff alleges he was shot
at close range with a large mace gun in his left ear, which caused hearing loss. Due
to these injuries, Plaintiff alleges he was given hearing aids in 2022. Without
hearing aids, Plaintiff asserts he is unable participate in video meetings with his
psychologist and speak with his family and his attorney on the phone.
Plaintiff also alleges he spoke with Defendant Dr. Trusewych about
unhealed burns on his right arm on February 3, 2025. Defendant allegedly denied
medical treatment because there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records that
stated he was burned.
B
1
It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is
actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,
522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective
and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy
the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition
is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition
is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s
attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate
must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an
excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the
defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct
approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware
Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Dr.
Trusewych based on his alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s hearing
impairment and the alleged failure to refer him to an audiologist for further
treatment in February 2025.
2
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §
12132. Plaintiff’s ADA claim is reviewed under Title II of the ADA, which applies
to state prisoners. See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
(1998). “To establish a violation, a plaintiff must show “he is a qualified individual
with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such an
entity, and that the denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability.’”
Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 430 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778
F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015)). A disability is defined as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual.” § 12102(1)(A). “[T]he phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ in §
12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison
programs.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006); see also Crawford v. Ind.
Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997).
In addition, the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e, protects
qualified persons with disabilities who are denied access to programs or activities
because of their disability. Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir.
2012) (“[r]efusing to make reasonable accommodations is tantamount to denying
access”). “Like Title II, the Rehabilitation Act authorizes private citizens to bring
actions for money damages, but its coverage is not restricted to public entities. The
Rehabilitation Act applies to any ‘program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.’” Ruffin v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 181 F. App’x 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2006)
(internal citation omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). A claim under the RA is
functionally identical to an ADA claim, Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672, and the remedial
scheme of the RA is incorporated into the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12133; Garcia v.
S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 111 (2d. Cir 2001). As state prisons
accept federal funding, they are subject to the RA. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d
586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff, who alleges he is hearing-impaired, has adequately alleged he is
qualified person with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 U.S.C. § 794. Due to the
lack of hearing aids, Plaintiff states he is forced to communicate by writing. He
claims that he was unable to participate in a video conference with his
psychologist on April 22, 2025, and has been unable to talk to his family and his
attorney on the phone. These allegations are sufficient to proceed on a claim under
the ADA and RA.
While the ADA applies to public entities and the RA to federally funded
programs or activities, neither applies to individuals. “As a general rule, there is
no personal liability under Title II of the ADA or the RA. The only proper
defendant in a claim under the ADA and/or RA is the state agency (or a state
official acting in his or her official capacity); employees of the IDOC are not
amendable to suit under either Act.” Hogle v. Baldwin, No. 17-01059, 2017 WL
4125258, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017) (citing Jaros, 684 F.3d 670) (internal citations
omitted)); see also McNish v. Kayira, No. 16-00430, 2016 WL 2851122, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
May 16, 2016) (dismissing ADA and RA claims against IDOC employees with
claims to proceed only against the IDOC Director).
The proper defendant is the relevant State department or agency. §
12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available;
the proper defendant is the agency or its director in his official capacity).
Accordingly, the Court will sua sponte name Latoya Hughes, in her official capacity
as Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), as a
Defendant. Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed on his ADA and RA claims against
Defendant Hughes.
3
Plaintiff’s allegations related to his unhealed burns are insufficient to
proceed on a deliberate indifference claim, however. In a conclusory fashion,
Plaintiff alleges he spoke with Defendant Dr. Trusewych about “unhealed burns
on [his] right arm” on February 3, 2025. (Doc. 11-1 at p. 4). Dr. Trusewych allegedly
told Plaintiff there was nothing in his medical records that stated Plaintiff had been
burned with anything. Plaintiff provided no information about his burns or what
medical treatment he allegedly needed. Therefore, Plaintiff had not sufficiently
alleged that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition or that Dr.
Trusewych was deliberately indifferent. The claim regarding the alleged denial of
medical treatment for his unhealed burns is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff is advised that he may file a separate complaint regarding the
alleged denial of medical treatment for his burns, as such a claim against Dr.
Trusewych would not be properly joined with Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims
against Defendant Hughes and his Eighth Amendment claim against Dr.
Trusewych based on the denial of hearing aids in this matter. See George v. Smith,
507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Thus multiple claims against a single party are
fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim
B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits….”).
II
On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Protective Order seeking a Court Order requiring prison officials at Western to
remove him from segregation and provide him with a single-man cell. (Doc. 12).
Plaintiff states his prior cellmates violently assaulted him; they stabbed him in the
right ear and left eye, leaving him completely deaf in his right ear and partially
blind. Plaintiff alleges that a cellmate at Menard threw hot fluid on him, causing
burns which have not fully healed. Due the attacks, Plaintiff alleges he suffers from
depression and fears being in a cell with another inmate. As a result, a psychologist
at Menard allegedly ordered a single-man cell permit.
When Plaintiff was transferred to Western, however, prison officials refused
to place him in a single-man cell. Plaintiff refused his housing assignment and was
placed in segregation. Plaintiff informed mental health staff members that he had
been violently assaulted by past cellmates, but they allegedly advised him to either
accept a cellmate or go to segregation. Plaintiff states he submitted two emergency
grievances to Warden Greene, but she took no action. Plaintiff alleges the isolation
in segregation has worsened his depression and that he is being denied mental
health treatment.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden
of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); accord Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”). To prevail, “the moving party
must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an
adequate remedy at law; and (3) an irreparable harm will result if the injunction is
not granted.” Foodcomm Int’l v Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). If the moving party meets the first three requirements, then the district
court balances the relative harms that could be caused to either party. Incredible
Tech., Inc. v. Virtual Tech., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) limits the scope of the Court’s
authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context. Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d
679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief “must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court
finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (the
PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and
discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
The purpose of a temporary restraining order and ultimately a preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final hearing on the merits of the
case. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1330 (7th Cir. 1980). The relief Plaintiff
seeks here is different. The Seventh Circuit has described the type of injunction
Plaintiff seeks, where an injunction would require an affirmative act by the
defendant, as a mandatory preliminary injunction. Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio,
130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are “cautiously viewed
and sparingly issued,” because they require the court to command a defendant to
take a particular action. Id. (citing Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978)).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success of the merits.
Plaintiff did not name Warden Greene or the mental health staff members as
Defendants in his Amended Complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff did not allege that
he was denied a single-man cell or mental health treatment while he was in
segregation. Plaintiff’s request for a single-man cell is unrelated to his Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Dr. Trusewych and his ADA and RA claims
against Defendant Hughes based on the alleged denial of hearing aids. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Protective Order is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint [11] is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 11-
1).
2) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on (1) a claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act against Defendant
Latoya Hughes, in her official capacity as the Acting Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, based on the alleged denial of Plaintiff's hearing aids
at Western Illinois Correctional Center; and (2) a claim under the Eighth
Amendment against Defendant Dr. Trusewych based on his alleged deliberate
indifference to the treatment of Plaintiff's hearing impairment and failure to refer
him to an outside audiologist for treatment in February 2025. Additional claims
shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion
by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
3) The Clerk is directed to ADD Latoya Hughes as a Defendant.
4) Defendants Greene, John/Jane Does (Mental Health Unit), and
John/Jane Does (Placement Staff) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and §
1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE these Defendants
5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff
to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as
premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless
otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of
service. If Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendants and will require
Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
7) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk
sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer
should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ position. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no
response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not
filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this
Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
8) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the
entity for whom Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk
Defendants’ current work address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding
address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by the
Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to
discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed
with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly
to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be
returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.
Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and
the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process
in more detail.
10) Defendants’ counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at
Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change
in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records
upon request.
13) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel an
authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the
authorization to Defendants’ counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard
qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
14) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from
the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter
scheduling deadlines.
It is so ordered.

Entered: May 8, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11046825. Public record. Not legal advice.