# Megan Hedgepeth v. Nash County

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11023507

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 6, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11023507

## Opinion text

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 1 of 16

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1638

MEGAN HEDGEPETH,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

NASH COUNTY; NATALIE WEBB, in her individual capacity; MARY REEVES,
in her individual capacity,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:21-cv-00144-FL)

Submitted: March 5, 2025 Decided: May 6, 2025

Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Sharika M. Robinson, THE LAW OFFICE OF SHARIKA M. ROBINSON,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Nikole M. Crow, Atlanta, Georgia, Sonny S.
Haynes, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 2 of 16

PER CURIAM:

Megan Hedgepeth filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Nash County,

North Carolina, and two county employees asserting numerous causes of action, including

malicious prosecution and procedural Due Process claims. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Hedgepeth appeals. Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

I.

This case involves benefits—colloquially referred to as food stamps—under the

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The food stamps program is administered by

the states and provides benefits to qualified recipients under a formula that considers the

number of people living in the household and the total income available to the household.

See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2014; 7 C.F.R. § 273.10. Benefits are paid for a specified period

of time, known as a “certification period.” 7 U.S.C. § 2012(f). The certification period

generally may not exceed 12 months, and benefits terminate automatically at the end of the

certification period. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(a) (“No household may participate beyond the

expiration of the certification period assigned in accordance with § 273.10(f) without a

determination of eligibility for a new period.”). As the end of the certification period

approaches, the state agency notifies recipients that their benefits are expiring and informs

them they must submit an application with certain required information to be recertified

for benefits. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(b).

Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Hedgepeth and her three minor children

lived on Womble Road in Nashville, North Carolina. Tawaildo Brown is the father of two

2
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 3 of 16

of Hedgepeth’s children. Hedgepeth received food stamps, which were administered

through the Department of Social Services for Nash County (“DSS”). Hedgepeth

subsequently moved to Hollister, North Carolina. Because Hollister is in Halifax County,

Hedgepeth should have notified DSS when she moved. She did not do so.

In Hollister, Hedgepeth rented a trailer owned by her aunt and located on property

owned by her father on Medoc Mountain Road. The Medoc Mountain Road property

appears to be family homestead land, with multiple homes on it and multiple mailing

addresses associated with it. The physical address of Hedgepeth’s trailer is 8163 Medoc

Mountain Road, but Hedgepeth does not have a mailbox, so she receives her mail at her

father’s address—8185 Medoc Mountain Road.

In April 2018, DSS received an anonymous tip that Hedgepeth had been living in

Halifax County with Brown for the last five years. Hedgepeth had never included Brown

as a member of her household in the information she provided when applying or being

recertified for food stamps. The tip was referred to Defendant/Appellee Natalie Webb, a

DSS fraud investigator in the Program Integrity department. Webb opened a file and sent

Hedgepeth a notice requesting information about where she lived and who lived with her.

Hedgepeth responded, informing Webb that she and her children now lived in Halifax

County in a house owned by her aunt and providing a copy of her lease. After Webb spoke

to Hedgepeth’s parents, who both confirmed that she was living with her children only,

Webb closed the fraud investigation.

Even though Hedgepeth by then lived in Halifax County, Nash County was required

to first re-certify Hedgepeth’s eligibility for food stamps before transferring her case to

3
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 4 of 16

Halifax County. The County began the process of re-certifying Hedgepeth’s eligibility for

Food Stamps sometime in June 2018. Not long after, the County received another tip that

Hedgepeth was living in Halifax County with Brown. The tip was from the original

anonymous tipper, but this time he identified himself as Jimmy Silver, a retired Highway

patrol officer and Hedgepeth’s uncle by marriage. Silver also reported that people in the

community might not cooperate with the investigation because Hedgepeth had falsely told

others that DSS was trying to take her children from her. After talking to Hedgepeth’s uncle

Calvin Hedgepeth, who confirmed that Hedgepeth was living in Halifax County and that

Brown was living with her and had been for at least five years, Webb reopened the fraud

investigation, and Hedgepeth’s recertification was subsequently put on hold.

After reopening the investigation, Webb found additional information suggesting

that Hedgepeth and Brown lived together. Nash County school records indicated that

Hedgepeth and Brown lived at the Womble Road address in Nashville before the move to

Hollister. Brown bought a Mercedes in June 2018; when registering the car, he gave his

address as 8185 Medoc Mountain Road—the address Hedgepeth uses as her mailing

address. The Hollister Post Office confirmed to Webb that both Hedgepeth and Brown

received mail at 8185 Medoc Mountain Road. Brown also provided a different Medoc

Mountain Road address—8201 Medoc Mountain Road—for his driver’s license. And

when Webb interviewed Brown, he claimed that he lived with his sister in Greenville,

North Carolina. Webb learned that Brown’s sister receives food stamps but has never listed

Brown as being a member of her household.

4
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 5 of 16

Webb had other reasons to question the truthfulness of the information she was

getting from Hedgepeth and her relatives. For example, Hedgepeth asserted that she was

paying her aunt $500 per month for rent, but Hedgepeth was not employed and her only

apparent source of income was a $750 monthly Supplemental Security Income benefit

received by one of her children, who is disabled. In addition, as part of her attempt to show

that Brown did not live with her, Hedgepeth provided DSS with an envelope from a

Greenville, North Carolina, branch of State Employees’ Credit Union that was addressed

to Brown at his claimed address in Greenville. Hedgepeth’s cousin worked at that particular

branch, and the envelope was machine-stamped by a postage machine at that branch.

Because neither Brown nor Hedgepeth had accounts at the credit union, Webb believed

that Hedgepeth and her cousin created the envelope to provide further proof that Brown

lived in Greenville. Webb also believed at the time that what purported to be a letter from

GEICO confirming insurance for Brown at the same Greenville address was a forgery. 1

After considering the information uncovered by Webb, DSS concluded that Brown

was a member of Hedgepeth’s household and that his income had to be considered when

calculating the amount of food stamps Hedgpeth was entitled to receive. Hedgepeth was

therefore recertified as eligible to receive food stamps but at a lower amount--$94 per

month less than her previous benefit. DSS mailed Hedgpeth notice of her recertification at

the lower benefit amount on July 10, 2018.

1
As we will explain, subsequent events called into doubt Webb’s view that
the GEICO letter was a forgery.

5
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 6 of 16

Hedgepeth appealed the reduction of her benefits, and a hearing was held on August

30, 2018, before a Department of Health and Human Services hearing officer. The hearing

was handled by employees from the DSS department responsible for Food Stamps

eligibility; Webb, who worked in Program Integrity—a different DSS department—was

not present for or otherwise involved in the hearing. At the hearing, Hedgepeth, her father,

and her aunt testified that Hedgepeth lived in Hollister and that Brown did not live with

her. While the County presented evidence showing several different addresses used by

Brown, the employees handling the hearing were uncertain of their ability to use the

information gathered by Webb. Accordingly, none of that evidence was presented at the

hearing. See Hearing Officer’s Order, J.A. 199 (“The County felt they had enough

information to support the fact that Mr. Brown lived in the house during the period in

question. However, at the hearing they did not present any information. The County

representative simply stated that the Fraud Investigator gathered information and made the

decision [to reduce benefits]. No information gathered by the investigator was

submitted.”).

The hearing officer concluded that DSS failed to prove that Brown lived with

Hedgepeth, and that her benefits, therefore, were improperly reduced. DSS appealed the

hearing officer’s order. DSS noted in its appeal that the Food Stamps division had been

“waiting for clarification from Program Integrity at the state level to see what

documentation and verification could be provided to the Hearing Officer due to [the] open

on-going investigation. We never heard back from Program Integrity . . . .” J.A. 450. On

6
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 7 of 16

September 28, 2018, the appeals officer issued an order upholding the decision below. The

County restored Hedgepeth’s benefits on October 3, 2018.

The next day, Webb compiled the information from her investigation and presented

it to a magistrate for issuance of a warrant to arrest Hedgepeth for fraud. Although the

actual warrant application is not in the record, there is no dispute that Webb did not include

in it any information about the administrative hearing and determination that DSS failed to

prove that Hedgepeth and Brown lived together. The magistrate found probable cause and

issued the warrant. Hedgepeth was arrested in her home and held in custody for a couple

of hours before being released.

The county prosecutor subsequently asked Webb to prepare a summary of her

investigation and the evidence she had collected. Her report to the prosecutor, which she

called the “Superior Court Summary,” J.A. 410, included a narrative of her investigation

and conclusions and listed 28 items of documentary evidence supporting her belief that

Brown lived with Hedgepeth.

In April 2019, the prosecutor dismissed the charges against Hedgepeth. In a letter

to DSS explaining his decision, the prosecutor noted that Hedgepeth claimed the GEICO

letter was generated through its website, which she could demonstrate to a jury, and that

the administrative ruling in favor of Hedgepeth would “be an impediment to the State in a

criminal trial.” J.A. 454. The prosecutor explained that he had “concluded that the State

would not prevail in a jury trial in this case and [was] therefore dismissing the charge.” He

also noted, however, that “[t]his is not the same as saying Ms. Hedgepeth is innocent of

any wrongdoing, and I am sorry I could not achieve a better result.” J.A 454.

7
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 8 of 16

Hedgepeth subsequently filed this action on October 1, 2021, against Nash County,

Webb, and Mary Reeves, who was Nash County’s Food Stamps Supervisor during the

relevant time. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on all counts. Hedgepeth appeals.

II.

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standards as the district court.” Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th

244, 254 (4th Cir. 2025). “Thus, we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and ask whether genuine disputes of material fact

preclude judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned up).

Hedgepeth’s complaint asserts nine overlapping causes of action under state and

federal law. The claims can generally be categorized into three groups: those relating to

Hedgepeth’s arrest (claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process); those relating

to the process by which her benefits were reduced (claims of violations of her procedural

due process rights); and those relating to the manner in which she was personally treated

by Nash County employees (claims of equal protection violations, sex- and race-based

discrimination, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress). She asserts

all claims against all three defendants.

A. Arrest-based Claims

Hedgepeth’s causes of action for malicious-prosecution and abuse-of-process are

premised on her view that she never should have been arrested because the administrative

8
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 9 of 16

proceedings had already established that Brown did not live with her and that fact was not

provided to the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant.

“When a person seeks to challenge a warrant-backed arrest under the Fourth

Amendment as lacking probable cause, that challenge at most can be pursued through a

cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Thurston v. Frye, 99 F.4th 665, 673 (4th Cir.

2024) (cleaned up). To succeed on a Fourth-Amendment based malicious-prosecution

claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants “(1) caused (2) a seizure of the

plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal

proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th

Cir. 2012). Unless the warrant applicant deliberately or recklessly made false material

statements or omitted material information intending to make the application misleading,

a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists is conclusive and thus

fatal to a malicious prosecution claim. See English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 648 (4th Cir.

2024) (“Warrants and indictments usually conclusively determine the existence of probable

cause, but not when an officer deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced

the judge’s or grand jury’s decision.”) (cleaned up); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party challenging the veracity of a

warrant application must show that the officer(s) deliberately or with a reckless disregard

for the truth made material false statements in the warrant application, or omitted from that

application material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether

they thereby made, the application misleading.”) (cleaned up).

9
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 10 of 16

The district court concluded that there was no evidence showing Webb deliberately

made material false statements or omitted material facts to make the warrant application

misleading. The court pointed to Webb’s explanation in her deposition that she did not

include information about the administrative proceedings because those proceedings

involved Hedgepeth’s eligibility for food stamps and thus fell on the Food Stamps side of

the department, while Webb was on the Program Integrity side investigating possible fraud.

See J.A. 348 (Webb deposition explaining her view that the hearings “had nothing to do

with the program integrity investigation. The food stamp hearing and program integrity are

two different things.”); id. (“[T]he food stamp hearing was not to determine whether she

had committed fraud or not. The food stamp hearing was to determine eligibility . . . .”). In

the district court’s view, “[t]his testimony does not give rise to a plausible inference of a

deliberate omission of facts she knew would negate probable cause, in light of Webb’s

stated position that the two prior hearings had nothing to do with the program integrity

investigation.” J.A. 537 (cleaned up). The district court alternatively held that the

malicious-prosecution claim “fails as a matter of proof because the warrant application

itself is not in the record. Accordingly, the court is unable to undertake the necessary

inquiry . . . .” J.A. 539.

Because we may affirm for any reason appearing in the record, see, e.g., McMahan

v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 964 F.2d 1462, 1467 (4th

Cir. 1992), we need not consider Hedgepeth’s specific challenges to the district court’s

analysis. Even if the district court’s analysis was erroneous, reversal would not be required.

10
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 11 of 16

As we will explain, the information about the administrative proceedings was not material,

and summary judgment in favor of the defendants was therefore proper.

To prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that the false

statement or omission was material—that is, “necessary to the neutral and disinterested

magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (cleaned up). “To

determine materiality, the Court must excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts

recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the corrected warrant affidavit would

establish probable cause.” Id.; see English, 90 F.4th at 648.

As to probable cause, there is little question that the information actually presented

to the magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Hedgepeth

committed fraud by lying about living with Brown. “Probable cause to justify an arrest

means facts and circumstances within the [applicant’s] knowledge that are sufficient to

warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances

shown, that the suspect has committed an offense.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 555 (cleaned up).

“While probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence

necessary to convict.” Id. at 556 (cleaned up).

Here, Webb had two witnesses in a position to have direct knowledge tell her that

Brown had been living with Hedgepeth for years. The witnesses were not anonymous, and

they were related to Hedgepeth. Moreover, Webb’s evidence showed that Brown was listed

as a member of Hedgepeth’s household on school records, and Brown used Hedgepeth’s

mailing address as his address when registering his car with the DMV. Whether or not this

evidence would have been enough to convince a jury, particularly in the face of contrary

11
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 12 of 16

claims by other relatives, it is more than enough to establish probable cause. The question,

then, is whether the information about the administrative proceedings would undermine

the evidence gathered by Webb in a way that negates probable cause. See id. at 556

(“Omissions are made with reckless disregard when the evidence demonstrates that [the

applicant] failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate probable

cause.”) (cleaned up).

As previously discussed, the evidence Webb gathered after reopening the

investigation was not presented to the hearing officer. A “corrected” warrant application

would therefore include all the information gathered by Webb, along with a statement

explaining that although recently concluded administrative proceedings had determined

that DSS had not proven Brown lived with Hedgepeth, none of the evidence being

presented to the magistrate was presented in the administrative hearing. Adding that

statement does not negate probable cause or change the probable-cause analysis in any

way. Because Webb’s evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause, it is irrelevant

that a different judge considering different evidence reached a different conclusion.

Accordingly, because the information that was presented was sufficient to establish

probable cause and the omitted information was not material, there was no constitutional

violation and Hedgepeth’s arrest-based claims fail. 2 We therefore affirm the grant of

summary judgment to the defendants as to these claims.

2
Because there was no constitutional violation, we need not consider whether
the defendants would otherwise have been entitled to qualified immunity or whether
Hedgepeth could have satisfied the other elements of her claim against Nash County under
(Continued)
12
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 13 of 16

B. Due Process Claims

Although Hedgepeth was provided a hearing—and prevailed at that hearing—after

her benefits were reduced, she contends that the Due Process clause required the County

to provide a hearing before her benefits were reduced. Hedgepeth thus contends the district

court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. We

disagree.

To establish a procedural due process violation, Hedgepeth must show that she had

a property interest in her food-stamp benefits and was deprived of that interest without due

process of law. See Tri Cnty. Paving, Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., 281 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 2002);

Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 1983) (“To trigger the application of due

process concepts, there must be both governmental action and the deprivation of a life,

liberty, or property interest to warrant constitutional protection.”) (cleaned up).

The district court relied on our opinion in Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.

1987), when rejecting these claims. In Holman, we adopted the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in

Banks v. Block and held that food-stamp recipients have “no protected interest in the

continuous receipt of food stamps.” Holman, 823 F.2d at 59; Banks, 700 F.2d at 297

(“Under the Food Stamp Program . . . the certification period of eligibility . . . establishes

no property interest beyond the term of the assigned period.”). Hedgepeth, however, insists

that Holman is inapplicable because the County reduced her benefits after she had been

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See, e.g., Balogh v. Virginia,
120 F.4th 127, 138 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[Plaintiff’s] Monell claim fares no better. Like
qualified immunity, it too requires an underlying constitutional violation.”), cert. denied
sub nom. Balogh v. Thomas, No. 24-891, 2025 WL 1020379 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025).
13
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 14 of 16

recertified, and she contends that due process requires a hearing before food stamps can be

reduced during the certification period. The record does not support Hedgepeth’s assertion.

The evidence in the record shows that the County began the recertification process

in June 2018, after learning that Hedgepeth had moved to Halifax County. As Webb’s re-

opened fraud investigation progressed and additional information was uncovered, the

recertification process was then placed “on hold” because of “questionable information

that has to be resolved prior to the case being certified.” J.A. 304. After considering Webb’s

information, DSS ultimately concluded that Brown lived with Hedgepeth and that his

income must be considered when calculating Hedgepeth’s benefit amount. By letter mailed

on July 10, 2018, DSS informed Hedgepeth that she had been recertified for food stamps

for the period of July 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018, at a lower benefit amount of

$364 per month. Thus, contrary to Hedgpeth’s assertion, her benefits were not lowered

after she was certified. Instead, Hedgepeth was certified for a new six-month period at a

benefit amount lower than she had received during the prior certification period.

We recognize that, as Hedgepeth points out, the hearing officer’s decision states that

Hedgepeth “was recertified in June 2018.” J.A. 198. The decision also states, however, that

Hedgepeth “was recertified in June and early July 2018 with the decision notice being

mailed July 10, 2018.” Id. (emphasis added). And, though not relied on by Hedgepeth, a

timeline prepared by a DSS employee likewise indicates that Hedgepeth was recertified in

June and that recertification was put on hold after the investigation restarted, see J.A. 397-

98. These imprecise statements—which do not even give a specific date in June—do not

support Hedgepeth’s assertion that her benefits were lowered in the middle of a

14
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 15 of 16

certification period. As discussed above, the DSS records make it clear that the

recertification process started in June and was put on hold after Webb reopened the

investigation, and that Hedgepeth was recertified for a new period of benefits at a lower

amount. Indeed, the hearing officer’s decision sends the case back to Nash County DSS

with directions to “issue a new recertification determination decision.” J.A. 200. If, as

Hedgepeth contends, her benefits had been reduced after she had been recertified at a

higher benefit amount, the hearing officer would not have ordered a new recertification but

would instead have directed the County to reinstate the full benefit amount. Accordingly,

Hedgepeth’s focus on a snippet of information stripped of all context is insufficient to show

a genuine issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., St. Louis N. Joint

Venture v. P&L Enters., Inc., 116 F.3d 262, 265 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Although the non-

movant is entitled on a motion for summary judgment to have all reasonable inferences

drawn in its favor, the court is not required to draw unreasonable inferences from the

evidence.”) (cleaned up).

Because Hedgepeth’s benefits were reduced when she was recertified for a new

period of benefits, this case is directly controlled by Holman, as the district court

concluded. Under Holman, Hedgepeth had “no protected interest in the continuous receipt

of food stamps,” 823 F.2d at 59, and no constitutional right to a hearing before the new

certification period. The district court therefore properly granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendants on Hedgepeth’s Due Process claims.

15
USCA4 Appeal: 24-1638 Doc: 30 Filed: 05/06/2025 Pg: 16 of 16

C. Remaining Claims

Hedgepeth’s remaining federal claims of race- and sex-based discrimination under

§ 1981 and § 1983, and her state-law claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress

may be summarily rejected. While Hedgepeth’s brief mentions these claims in passing, the

statement of the issues on appeal does not include a challenge to these rulings, and the brief

does not include any substantive argument addressing those claims. Hedgepeth has thus

abandoned any appellate challenge to the district court’s rejection of these claims. See

Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an

argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its argument—

even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.”) (cleaned up). And even if the issues were

not abandoned, Hedgepeth presented no evidence showing she was discriminated against

or treated differently because of her race or sex, and her state-law claims are foreclosed by

our conclusions that her arrest was supported by probable cause and the information

omitted by Webb was not material.

III.

Accordingly, because we find no reversible error, we hereby affirm the decision of

the district court.

AFFIRMED

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11023507. Public record. Not legal advice.