# State of Tennessee v. Jamie Paul Click

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · May 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11018208

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 7, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Kyle A. Hixson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

05/07/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
January 29, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMIE PAUL CLICK

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sevier County
No. 18116-II James L. Gass, Judge

No. E2024-00196-CCA-WR-CO

In 2014, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of alternate
counts of selling or delivering one-half gram of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public
elementary school, Class A felonies, in addition to other offenses. The trial court merged
the two drug-free zone convictions and sentenced the Defendant to forty years as a Range
II, multiple offender with mandatory one-hundred percent service of the minimum sentence
in the range. In 2022, following amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, the Defendant
filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-17-432(h), which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The
Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court’s ruling was a plain and palpable abuse of
discretion. Upon our review of the oral arguments, applicable law, and the briefs of the
parties, we deny the Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Writ of Certiorari; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Wesley D. Stone, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jamie Paul Click.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Jimmy B. Dunn, District Attorney General; and George C. Ioannides,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Trial Proceedings

A Sevier County grand jury returned a seven-count presentment against the
Defendant, charging him with alternate counts of selling or delivering heroin (0.5 grams),
a Schedule I controlled substance, on September 5, 2012, within a drug-free zone (Counts
1 and 2), Class A felonies; one count of casually exchanging marijuana (5.08 grams), a
Schedule VI controlled substance, on September 10, 2012 (Count 3), a Class A
misdemeanor; alternate counts of selling or delivering heroin (0.7 grams) on September
10, 2012 (Counts 4 and 5), Class B felonies; and alternate counts of selling or delivering
heroin (0.7 grams) on September 11, 2012 (Counts 6 and 7), likewise Class B felonies. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -418, -432. The Defendant proceeded to a jury trial in
August 2014.

The proof at trial established that multiple controlled drug purchases took place
during a one-week period in September 2012 and that those transactions were conducted
by Sevierville Police Department (“SPD”) Detective Josh Turner using a confidential
informant (“CI”). State v. Click, No. E2015-01769-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1189750, at
*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2017), abrogated by State v. Patterson, 564 S.W.3d 423,
429-34 (Tenn. 2018). According to the trial evidence, the Defendant originally solicited
the CI, with whom he was acquainted, at a Sunoco gas station in Sevierville by asking the
CI what type of drugs he was using at the time, which prompted the men to exchange
telephone numbers. Id. at *1. Thereafter, the CI contacted the Defendant for the purpose
of buying drugs, and the men established the amount of drugs, the price, and the meeting
places prior to each transaction. Id. *2-4. During these transactions occurring on
September 5, 10, and 11, 2012, the Defendant was accompanied by Heather Arwood. Id.
The CI testified that he saw additional bags of heroin in the Defendant’s lap during the
September 10 heroin transaction, that the Defendant instructed him on how to inject the
heroin, and that the Defendant tried to solicit him to help sell the Defendant’s drugs. Id. at
*4. The jury convicted the Defendant as charged of all seven offenses. 1 Id.

1
The Defendant’s activities in this case also resulted his prosecution in Knox County and
conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of heroin within
1,000 feet of a drug-free zone. The Defendant filed a resentencing motion in the Criminal Court for Knox
County, which, like the one sub judice, was denied by the trial court and is now on appeal before this court.
The court’s opinion in that case is being released concurrently herewith.

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Relative to the two drug-free zone offenses committed on September 5, 2012
(Counts 1 and 2), which are the subject of the Defendant’s resentencing motion, the proof
at trial reflected that the original meeting place was scheduled at a local Kroger, but after
some time had passed and the Defendant had not shown at that location, the CI phoned the
Defendant to inquire of his whereabouts. Id. at *2. The Defendant told the CI that he was
“parked behind the Clarion Inn [and] that he was having truck trouble.” Id. As soon as the
CI began driving towards the Clarion Inn, he received a call from Ms. Arwood, who told
him to meet the Defendant at the Taco Bell/Exxon on Winfield Dunn Parkway. Id. Once
all parties had arrived at the Taco Bell/Exxon, the men exchanged twenty-five dollars for
a small bag containing a powdery substance, which was later determined to be one-half
gram of heroin. Id.

Regarding the distance of the drug transaction from Cattlesburg Elementary School,
testimony established that the Sevier County School Board owned two tracts of land
involving the school—the initial tract of land being the school and school’s grounds, and
the second parcel being a right-of-way that was later deeded to the school board. Located
on this second parcel was the school’s sign and the main entrance road, which was the
primary method of ingress and egress from the school, including the route traveled by
school buses. Id. at *2-3. The school resource officer “routinely patrolled the school’s
grounds, including the right-of-way, and . . . the school board maintained the right-of-way.”
Id. at *3. Two certified deeds depicting the school board’s ownership of these parcels were
entered into evidence. Id. at *2. Detective Turner measured from various locations on
these two parcels to the drug transaction’s location in the Taco Bell/Exxon parking lot, and
his measurements reflected distances of 185 feet, 250 feet, 500 feet, 750 feet, and 1,000
feet. Id. at *3. According to Detective Turner, the 1,000-feet measurement was inside the
initial tract of land comprising the school and school’s grounds and the other measurements
were on the school’s right-of-way parcel. Id.

Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court classified the Defendant as a Range
II, multiple offender and merged the three delivery convictions with the corresponding sale
convictions. Id. at *18. As required by the Drug-Free Zone Act (“the Act”) in effect at the
time, the trial court sentenced the Defendant by enhancing the felony for the drug-free zone
offenses to one classification higher. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b) (Supp. 1995).
Accordingly, the Defendant’s convictions for the first heroin transaction, merged Counts 1
and 2, were enhanced one felony classification from a Class B to a Class A felony.

Ultimately, the trial court imposed an eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence
for the marijuana conviction, the maximum term of forty years for the Class A felony
heroin transaction, and twenty years for each of the Class B felony heroin transactions.

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Click, 2017 WL 1189750, at *18; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(b)(1), (2)
(establishing a Range II sentence for a Class A felony as not less than twenty-five nor more
than forty years and for a Class B felony as not less than twelve nor more than twenty
years). The trial court aligned the sentences for the three heroin transactions consecutively
and the marijuana sentence concurrently with the first heroin transaction sentence, resulting
in a total effective sentence of eighty years’ incarceration. Click, 2017 WL 1189750, at
*18. In addition, pursuant to the Act, the Defendant was mandatorily required to serve the
first twenty-five years of the drug-free-zone sentence for the first heroin transaction at one
hundred percent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(c) (Supp. 1995) (requiring the
defendant “to serve at least the minimum sentence for such defendant’s appropriate range
of sentence”). Thereafter, the remainder of the Defendant’s effective sentence, i.e., fifty-
five years, was to be served at a Range II release eligibility rate of thirty-five percent.

B. Motion for Resentencing Proceedings

Following various amendments to the Act in 2020 and 2022, the pro se Defendant,
in October 2022, moved for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-17-432(h). In the motion, the Defendant requested “an evidentiary hearing, at which
[he] and [the] district attorney general may present evidence on this motion to determine
[the Defendant’s] eligibility to receive a lower sentence and release date.” The Defendant
stated that he was “confident” he met the statutory requirements and asked the trial court
“to use its discretion to reduce his sentence.” Counsel was appointed for the indigent
Defendant, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2023.

At the hearing, the Defendant argued that his effective eighty-year sentence was
excessive. He asked the trial court to reduce his sentence by resentencing him in Counts 1
and 2 to Class B felonies as a Range II, multiple offender with a sentencing range of twelve
to twenty years. He also requested concurrent sentencing. Though the Defendant
seemingly conceded that the trial court could not resentence him under the Act on Counts
4, 5, 6, and 7, as these were not drug-free zone enhanced offenses, he maintained that it
was “all interrelated.” He later mentioned the possibility of the trial court’s imposing
concurrent sentencing on all counts. In favor of resentencing, the Defendant cited the
relatively small amount of heroin exchanged during the three transactions and that his
effective sentence was longer than those imposed for first degree murder.

The State asserted that pursuant to Code section 39-17-432(h)(1), the trial court only
had jurisdiction to resentence the Defendant on Counts 1 and 2. The State noted that the
trial court retained discretion in deciding whether to resentence the Defendant and that,
pursuant to the statute, it could consider the Defendant’s entire criminal record, the

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Defendant’s behavior while incarcerated, the circumstances of the offense, and any other
factors the court deemed relevant. The State argued that the Defendant was not a good
candidate for resentencing because, following his convictions in this case, he was
subsequently found guilty in Knox County of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell
or deliver heroin in a drug-free zone; he had an extensive history of disciplinary infractions
in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) since his convictions in this case;
and he committed the new felony offense of possession of contraband while incarcerated
in the Knox County Jail. According to the State, the interests of justice did not weigh in
favor of resentencing the Defendant.

The Defendant testified on his own behalf. The Defendant acknowledged that he
had a substance abuse problem, claiming that it began to “spiral[] out of control” after his
brother died in a car accident. He noted that he had mainly been in TDOC custody since
his incarceration in 2015 but had not been able to participate in any TDOC programs due
to the length of his sentence. According to the Defendant, he had never been given an
opportunity to pursue substance abuse treatment. After he had filed his motion for
resentencing, he participated in various classes while awaiting court proceedings in Knox
County—Substance Abuse Education, Job Readiness, Family and Community
Reunification, Anger Management, and Behavior Change.

The Defendant asked the trial court to “help [him] get some of [his] life back”
because he had been “locked up a decade for a quarter of a gram” of heroin. He asserted
that he knew he “did wrong” and could change if he were given the necessary tools to deal
with his drug addiction. He acknowledged that he had “put [his] family through hell” and
had missed seeing his children grow up.

On cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that he had multiple convictions for
various offenses as had been outlined in the State’s original notice of intent to seek
enhanced punishment as a Career Offender that had been used at trial. The Defendant
further agreed that, following the present convictions, he was convicted in Knox County
of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell or deliver heroin in a drug-free zone and
sentenced to twenty-five years in the TDOC. The Defendant insisted that these two cases
involved “the same investigation” and explained that he was a drug addict and not a drug
dealer. The Defendant had likewise filed a motion for resentencing in the Knox County
case. Regarding his pending Knox County charge for possession of contraband in a penal
institution, the Defendant indicated that it was an overdose situation.

The Defendant was then presented with his more than thirty violations of TDOC
disciplinary policies since his incarceration in 2015. The Defendant admitted that he had

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been “in trouble a bunch” while incarcerated, including guilty pleas to possession of a nine-
inch knife in 2022, defiance by blocking a door in 2021, possession of a cut mirror and a
plexiglass knife in 2020, possession of three gallons of an intoxicant and an additional five
gallons of an intoxicant in 2020, failure to attend GED class in 2019, and refusal to
participate in his program assignment in 2018. He acknowledged that there were
“weapons, razor blades, all throughout” his time incarcerated. However, the Defendant
blamed his cellmates for “at least half” of the infractions, stating that if one cellmate
committed a violation, then the entire cell received a “write-up.”

He insisted he only had the nine-inch knife for his own protection and contended
that the mirror was simply broken, that he was not “holding it or nothing.” According to
the Defendant, he “was living like [he] was never getting out.” Regarding his failure to
attend GED class, he explained that a GED was not going to help someone who would
never be released from prison and that his attendance in class kept him from working in
the kitchen. He insisted that he had not had any disciplinary infractions “in years.”

Corporal Joseph Rees of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office testified to the details
contained in the arrest warrant he had filed against the Defendant for possession of
contraband in a penal facility following an incident in the Knox County Detention Facility
on January 10, 2023. Corporal Rees stated that at approximately 3:57 p.m., he found the
Defendant lying on the floor in one of the jail’s “general population pod[s]” and that he
believed the Defendant was exhibiting signs of an overdose from narcotics because the
Defendant was “unresponsive, pale in color, [and had] blue coloration around the lips[.]”
Following the administration of chest compressions accompanied by several doses of
NARCAN, the Defendant became “somewhat responsive,” and he was taken to the hospital
for treatment.

Corporal Rees testified that as a safety precaution, he searched the Defendant’s
pockets and found a yellow piece of paper with residue on it that later tested positive for
fentanyl. According to Corporal Rees, the facility was experiencing “some issues
particularly with fentanyl,” and four others “in the same pod” suffered from overdoses that
same day. Corporal Rees confirmed that these charges were still pending.

The Defendant introduced into evidence copies of the official forensic chemistry
reports prepared by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation reflecting the different weights
of the heroin exchanged during the three drug transactions. In addition, he introduced the
jury question submitted during trial asking, “What is the definition of ‘real property’[] as
it pertains to the laws of ‘Drug-Free School Zone’[?]” and “Does ‘real property’ mean
school grounds?”; the original sentencing hearing transcript in this case with related

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exhibits; five certificates reflecting the Defendant’s completion of various classes while
incarcerated in Knox County; and his similar motion for resentencing filed in Knox County
relative to his conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of
heroin in a drug-free zone conviction.

The State introduced into evidence the addendum to the original presentence
investigation report. The addendum reflected thirty-three disciplinary infractions in the
TDOC, with corresponding guilty pleas, committed by the Defendant since his
incarceration in this case in 2015. The addendum also stated the following:

Available sources reflect the Defendant has not completed any
treatment programs and is unable to be placed into any such programs since
2018 due to the [D]efendant refusing to complete a [risk and needs
assessment]. At that time the offender admitted to being enrolled in a
treatment program previously prior to custody and voluntarily left.

The [D]efendant was previously employed until 2021 within the
prison.

The [D]efendant was confirmed to be a “State Enforcer” within the
Aryan Nation. Last assessed and updated on 6/22/2020.

The State also introduced the Defendant’s original judgments in this case, the
Defendant’s TDOC disciplinary records, the judgment form for the subsequent Knox
County conspiracy conviction, and the January 10, 2023 Knox County arrest warrant for
possession of contraband in a penal facility. Moreover, the State introduced its original
notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment as a Career Offender, which reflected the
Defendant’s convictions in Jefferson County for aggravated burglary and theft of property
more than $1,000 on January 6, 2006; in Sevier County for theft of property more than
$1,000 and four counts of aggravated burglary on January 5, 2006; in Sevier County for
aggravated assault and theft of property more than $1,000 on October 7, 2003; in Sevier
County for theft of property more than $1,000 on December 15, 2003; and in Sevier County
for sale and delivery of oxycodone on December 11, 2002. In addition, the State conceded
that it was not calling any witnesses to testify “that there were children from the school
present” at the time this transaction occurred.

The parties clarified for the trial court the various trial evidence reflecting the
distance measurements from the drug transaction’s location in the Taco Bell/Exxon parking

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lot to the different points on the school’s two parcels of land. From this, the trial court said
that it was “very clear” the transaction occurred within five hundred feet of school property.

The trial court announced that it had reviewed the evidence, the arguments
presented, and the relevant statute and case law. After reviewing the various provisions of
Code section 39-17-432(h), the trial court first found that the Defendant had an extensive
criminal record dating back to 2002 when he was about twenty-three years old, that he had
a long history of drug addiction, and that his drug addiction “more likely than not played a
role in his breaking the law.” The trial court classified the Defendant’s record as
“terrible[,]” finding that he spent “the prime of his adult life leading to his incarceration in
this case as either a drug addict or a drug dealer or, if not because of drugs, simply an
unchecked felon preying on the community[.]” The trial court also found that the
Defendant had incurred numerous disciplinary infractions while in TDOC custody on these
offenses, including a recent infraction in January 2023 while in Knox County custody that
led to his being charged with possession of contraband in a penal institution, accrediting
Corporal Rees’s testimony in that regard. The trial court mentioned that the Defendant’s
behavior while incarcerated alone convinced it that a new sentence would not be in the
interests of justice. Based on the applicable legal standards, the trial court found that
resentencing the Defendant was not in the interests of justice and denied his motion. The
trial court entered a written order to that effect on January 18, 2024.

The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. By order dated October 24, 2024,
this court denied the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal and granted the Defendant’s
motion to treat his notice of appeal document as a petition for a writ of certiorari. The case
is now before us for review.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant argues that this court should grant his writ of certiorari
petition because “the trial court reached an illogical conclusion, made a decision based
upon a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, and caused an injustice to” the
Defendant by refusing to both lower his felony classification and remove the mandatory
minimum service requirement for his drug-free zone convictions. In support of his
argument, the Defendant cites the small amount of heroin involved; the length of the overall
sentence imposed of eighty years; that there were no children present when the September
5, 2012 transaction occurred; and the unavailability of rehabilitative programs while
incarcerated in the TDOC given his extended-release date of 2092. The Defendant
emphasizes that his sentence “exceeds a life sentence for first degree murder.” The

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Defendant asks that we consider his claim and remand the case to the trial court with
instructions to resentence him on the drug-free zone offenses.

The State responds that a writ of certiorari is not warranted because the
circumstances of this case are not sufficiently extraordinary to trigger the remedy of
certiorari. According to the State, the writ should not be employed because the trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing, considered the factors for resentencing as set forth in the
amended Act, made findings consistent with the record, and correctly “denied the
[D]efendant’s request for resentencing based on its conclusion that a new sentence would
not be in the interest of justice.” In addition, the State asserts the record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that resentencing was not called for in this case, noting the Defendant’s
extensive criminal history and his behavior while incarcerated.

The common law writ of certiorari has been codified at Tennessee Code Annotated
section 27-8-101, which provides,

The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also
in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when,
in the judgment of the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy.

Certiorari lies, in part, “[w]here no appeal is given[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-102(a)(2).

The common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary judicial remedy,” State v.
Lane, 254 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. Clement, 65 S.W.3d 632,
635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)), and is limited in application such that it normally may not be
used “to inquire into the correctness of a judgment issued by a court with jurisdiction[,]”
State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 569 S.W.2d 808,
815 (Tenn. 1978)), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v.
Rowland, 520 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tenn. 2017). “A writ of certiorari is an order from a
superior court to an inferior tribunal to send up a complete record for review, so that the
reviewing court can ascertain whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or
acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily.” Lane, 254 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Hall v.
McLesky, 83 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Upon conducting this inquiry,
certiorari is appropriate to correct the following types of errors: “(1) fundamentally illegal
rulings; (2) proceedings inconsistent with essential legal requirements; (3) proceedings that
effectively deny a party his or her day in court; (4) decisions beyond the lower tribunal’s

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authority; and (5) plain and palpable abuses of discretion.” Id. at 355 (quoting Willis v.
Tennessee Dept. of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn. 2003)).

At issue in this case is the application of the Drug-Free Zone Act. The stated
purpose of the Act, at the time of its enactment in 1995, was to create drug-free school
zones to provide “all students in this State an environment in which they can learn without
the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of drug activity in or around
school facilities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(a) (Supp. 1995). In 2005, the General
Assembly amended the Act to expand the list of properties beyond schools to include a
“preschool, child care agency, or public library, recreational center or park” and changed
the name of the prohibited zone to “drug-free zone.” Id. § -432(a), (b)(1) (Supp. 2005).

The General Assembly, in 2020, again amended the Act by reducing the distance
used to determine a drug-free zone from 1,000 feet to 500 feet and by giving trial courts
discretion in imposing the one classification enhancement for properties identified as
drug-free zones. Id. § -432(b)(1). Under the 2020 amendments, minimum sentences were
no longer mandatory, but discretionary, and there was a “rebuttable presumption that a
defendant [was] not required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant’s
appropriate range of sentence.” Id. § -432(c)(2). The rebuttable presumption could be
overcome if the trial court found “that the defendant’s conduct exposed vulnerable persons
to the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of illegal drug activity.”
Id. The 2020 amendments applied only to offenses committed on or after September 1,
2020. 2020 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 803, § 12.

Effective April 29, 2022, the General Assembly once more amended Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-17-432 by adding subsection (h). Subsection (h) allowed
defendants convicted of a drug offense in a drug-free school zone before July 1, 2005, or
in a drug-free zone from July 1, 2005, to August 31, 2020, to seek resentencing if the
sentence was mandatorily enhanced based on the distance the drug offense occurred from
the drug-free zone property. State v. Ewing, No. E2023-01705-CCA-WR-CO, 2025 WL
712890, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2025).

Upon the filing of a motion for resentencing by an indigent defendant, the trial court
is required to appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the motion. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-17-432(h)(2). A trial court must also determine if it can “entertain” the motion. Id.
§ -432(h)(3). A trial court is permitted to entertain a motion for resentencing except when
one of the following circumstances is present:

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(A) A previous motion made under this subsection (h) to reduce the sentence
was denied after a review of the motion on the merits;

(B) Resentencing the defendant to a shorter period of confinement for this
offense would not reduce the defendant’s overall sentence or lead to an
earlier release; or

(C) The defendant has previously applied to the governor for a grant of
executive clemency on or after December 2, 2021, for the same offense and
has been denied.

Id.

Once counsel is appointed, and the trial court has determined it may entertain the
motion, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “at which the defendant and
district attorney general may present evidence.” Id. § -432(h)(1). At the hearing, the
defendant “bear[s] the burden of proof to show that the defendant would be sentenced to a
shorter period of confinement under this section if the defendant’s offense had occurred on
or after September 1, 2020.” Id.

Following the presentation of proof, relative to the rebuttable presumption regarding
service of the mandatory minimum sentence, the trial court should determine whether the
defendant’s conduct “exposed vulnerable persons to the distractions and dangers that are
incident to the occurrence of illegal drug activity.” Id. § -432(c)(2). If the defendant’s
conduct did not expose vulnerable persons to such dangers, the defendant is presumed not
to be “required to serve at least the minimum sentence for the defendant’s appropriate range
of sentence.” Id.

Thereafter, the trial court should determine if resentencing the defendant, including
removal of either one or both the felony classification enhancement and mandatory
minimum service requirement, is in furtherance of the “interests of justice.” Id.
§ -432(h)(1); Ewing, 2025 WL 712890, at *5-7. In determining whether a new sentence
would be in the interests of justice, a trial court may consider:

(A) The defendant’s criminal record, including subsequent criminal
convictions;

(B) The defendant’s behavior while incarcerated;

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(C) The circumstances surrounding the offense, including, but not limited to,
whether the conviction was entered into pursuant to a plea deal; and

(D) Any other factors the court deems relevant.

Id. If the trial court finds that resentencing would not be in the interests of justice, it should
deny the defendant’s motion. Additionally, the trial court “shall not resentence the
defendant if the new sentence would be greater than the sentence originally imposed.” Id.

The final provision of subsection (h) makes it clear that “subsection (h) does not
require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” Id. § -432(h)(4). The trial
court is given “very broad discretion not to reduce any sentence.” Ewing, 2025 WL
712890, at *7 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(h)(4)).

In this case, the trial court first determined that the drug-free zone offenses in this
case occurred “very clear[ly]” within five hundred feet of Cattlesburg Elementary School.
It then considered and weighed the statutory factors for resentencing, noting the
Defendant’s extensive criminal history and behavior while incarcerated. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-432(h)(1)(A), (B). Relative to the Defendant’s criminal record, the trial court
noted that the Defendant had spent “the prime of his adult life” leading up to his
incarceration in this case as a drug addict or a drug dealer or, if not due to drugs, “an
unchecked felon preying on the community.” The Defendant’s history of criminal
convictions prior to his sentence in this case was outlined in the State’s original notice to
seek enhanced punishment as a Career Offender, and the Defendant has since been
convicted in Knox County of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell or deliver 150
grams or more of heroin in a drug-free zone. The trial court found that the Defendant’s
behavior while incarcerated, which included over thirty disciplinary infractions and a new
charge for possession of contraband in a penal institution, which charge was supported by
Corporal Rees’s testimony, also convinced it that a new sentence would not be in the
interests of justice. The trial court stated that the Defendant’s behavior while incarcerated
alone was sufficient not to resentence the Defendant.

We also note that the addendum to the presentence investigation report belies the
Defendant’s assertion that he was not receiving drug treatment while in the TDOC due to
the length of his incarceration, but it was instead due to his refusal to complete the risk and
needs assessment. The addendum also contradicted the Defendant’s testimony at the
hearing that he had never received any drug treatment, stating therein that the Defendant
had “admitted to being enrolled in a treatment program previously prior to custody and

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voluntarily” leaving that program. Moreover, the addendum reflected that the Defendant
was confirmed as gang-affiliated as late as 2020.

The record does not reflect that “the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction” or that the
trial court “acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily” in denying the Defendant’s motion
for resentencing. Lane, 254 S.W.3d at 357; see also Patton, 2024 WL 634887, at *5-6
(affirming the denial of a motion for resentencing based upon the trial court’s consideration
of the defendant’s prior criminal record and the facts and circumstances of the offense);
State v. Potee, No. M2023-00179-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 748606, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Feb. 23, 2024) (affirming the denial of a motion for resentencing based upon the trial
court’s consideration of the defendant’s criminal record, subsequent conviction for
conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution, and disciplinary infractions
while incarcerated), no perm. app. filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we deny the Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the
trial court’s judgment denying the Defendant’s motion for resentencing.

s/ Kyle A. Hixson .

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11018208. Public record. Not legal advice.