# Sohrab Mehdi v. the State of Texas

> Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · April 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10976694

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
- **Decided:** April 29, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating reviewing courts presume factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of prosecution and defer to factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in testimony and conflicting inferences
- stating “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt”
- stating reviewing 16 courts defer to factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in testimony and conflicting inferences

## Opinion text

Opinion issued April 29, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00279-CR
———————————
SOHRAB MEHDI, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 240th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 23-DCR-102394

OPINION

After a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant Sohrab Mehdi guilty of the

state jail felony offense of solicitation of prostitution. The trial court sentenced

Mehdi to two years’ imprisonment but suspended the sentence and placed Mehdi on
community supervision for three years. In his sole issue on appeal, Mehdi argues

there is insufficient evidence supporting his conviction because no rational factfinder

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mehdi knowingly agreed to pay a

fee to another for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

In January 2023, Lieutenant David Hall, an investigator with the Fort Bend

County District Attorney’s office’s human trafficking division, conducted what Hall

described as a “demand suppression” operation to “arrest sex buyers” at an “illicit

massage spa.” Appellant Sohrab Mehdi was arrested during the undercover

operation and charged with solicitation of prostition. Mehdi waived his right to a

jury trial.

Trial Testimony

During the bench trial, Hall testified that he conducted an undercover

operation at #1 Foot Massage, a massage parlor in Sugar Land, Texas on January

27, 2023. According to Hall, #1 Foot Massage had been shut down after the Fort

Bend County District Attorney’s office learned the “massage business was operating

as an illicit sex spa.” Hall contacted the management company of the shopping

center where #1 Foot Massage was located and the management company allowed

Hall to use the storefront to conduct undercover “demand suppression” operations.

2
Hall testified that he chose #1 Foot Massage for the January 2023 undercover

operation because a previous operation at the same location had been successful and

resulted in a prostitution case.

When asked how he prepared the location for the undercover operation, Hall

testified he put an “open” sign on the door to indicate to prospective clients that the

business was open, moved in furniture, and assisted with the decoration of the

business. According to Hall, they tried to replicate the same decor as other illicit

massage spas. Hall testified that the massage room had a massage table, blankets, a

towel, a chair, lotions, and oils. There was also a photograph hanging on the wall

showing a nude women in a sexual pose, and lingerie hanging from hooks inside the

massage room. The massage room, hallway, and reception area were all equipped

with audio/video recording devices. Hall testified that they hung sexually explicit

photographs and artwork on the walls to set the mood and convey the sexual nature

of the business to prospective clients. Photographs of the explicit photographs and

art work were admitted into evidence. Hall testified it was “not normal if you go to

a reputable massage spa to see photos like that.”

Hall testified that the front door to the business was kept locked and they

installed a doorbell so people would not walk in without the officers being prepared.

One undercover officer posed as a receptionist and greeted prospective clients as

they walked in the front door and took them back to the massage room where they

3
were greeted by another undercover officer. The undercover officers wore nighttime

clothing or lingerie to convey to suspects that the business was an illicit spa because,

according to Hall, a massuse in a legitimate massage parlor does not give massages

dressed in lingerie.

Hall testified that Mehdi was arrested during the January 27, 2023 demand

suppression operation.

Detective Kiki Wang with the Houston Police Department’s Human

Trafficking Unit testified that she participated in the January 27, 2023 undercover

operation by posing as the spa’s female manager. Detective Melanie Jones with the

Houston Police Department and Officer Tiffany Juarez with the Missouri City Police

Department were the operation’s “decoy officers.” Wang testified that as the spa’s

manager, her role in the operation was to make initial contact with the client, find

out what kind of girl he wanted, and then arrange for one of the decoy officers to

meet Mehdi in the massage room. Wang testified that unlike a legitimate massage

spa client, an illicit massage parlor client typically requests a specific type of woman

or girl, based on race or the color of hair.

On January 27, 2023, Mehdi visited #1 Foot Massage at approximately 1:40

p.m. and again at 6:30 p.m. When Mehdi arrived at the massage spa the first time,

Jones unlocked the front door for Mehdi. Wang met Mehdi in the reception area and

escorted him to the massage room. Mehdi asked Wang if there were any black

4
ladies, and Wang told him there were and she walked out of the massage room to

get Juarez. Wang had no further interactions with Mehdi until he left the spa at 1:43

p.m. As he left, Mehdi told Wang that he would be back later. Wang testified that

illicit massage parlors lock their doors, but legitimate businesses in Harris County

cannot lock their doors during regular business hours. She did not know if

businesses in Fort Bend County, where #1 Foot Massage was located, were also

prohibited from locking their doors.

When Mehdi arrived at the spa around 6:30 p.m. that evening, Wang and Jones

greeted Mehdi in the reception area and Jones escorted Mehdi to a massage room.

Wang had no further interactions with Mehdi. On cross-examination, Wang testified

that if a prospective client asks what services the massage spa provides, she lists

them for the client. Mehdi did not ask Wang what services #1 Foot Massage offered

or request any sexual services.

Detective Melanie Jones with the Houston Police Department’s vice division

testified that she works undercover investigating mostly “prostitution-related

crimes.” Jones also created and taught classes for female undercover officers

investigating such offenses, including an “advanced decoy school” focused on

preparing officers to work undercover in “hotel, spas, and pimp cases.” Jones

testified that clients who frequent illicit spas generally prefer “a quieter approach, a

more simple approach” than those who approach sex workers on the street, and the

5
women who work in illicit spas tend to communicate with clients using gestures or

other nonverbal communication.

Jones testified that Mehdi visited the spa twice on January 27, 2023. Although

she opened the front door for Mehdi the first time he visited the spa, she did not have

any further interaction with Mehdi during his visit. According to Jones, Mehdi left

the spa “on his own” and returned later that day. When Mehdi arrived at the spa the

second time, he asked for Jones, and she agreed to accompany him to a massage

room. A video and a transcript of the video recording of Jones’ encounter with

Mehdi in the massage room were admitted into evidence.

In the video, Jones is wearing a robe that is tied around her waist. The robe

come downs to her mid-thigh and her robe is open, showing a low-cut top that

reveals cleavage. Jones and Mehdi are standing next to the massage table facing

each other. Jones asks Mehdi if he has been to the spa before, and he responds he

was there some time ago. After making small talk, Jones gestures to the small table

in the corner of the room and asks Mehdi, “Do you want to put your. . .?” Mehdi

moves closer to Jones and answers, “Tell me.” The following exchange followed:

Jones: Well what did you do last time?

Mehdi: 100.

Jones: 100?

Mehdi: For like 20 minutes.

6
Jones: For 20 minutes. Okay and what do you need in your 20
minutes?

Mehdi: What do you provide?

Jones: Umm, for 100? Um, well, we could do everything for 20
minutes.

Mehdi: [inaudible].

Jones: What is it that you like, baby? Sit down.

Jones touches Mehdi’s arm and guides him to a nearby chair. Instead of

sitting, Mehdi puts his right hand on Jones’ left side above her waist, grabs Jones’

breasts with his left hand, and tells her, “You tell me.” Jones guides Mehdi’s hands

away from her body and helps him take off his jacket. As she hangs Mehdi’s jacket

on a wall hook, Jones asks Mehdi what he received for his previous twenty-minute

session. Mehdi, whose response is inaudible, shrugs and gestures at Jones. Jones

points towards the small table in the corner of the room and asks Mehdi if he wants

to put his $100 on the table. Mehdi puts the money on the table and Jones walks

over to the table, counts the money, and places it back down on the table. As she

removes a condom from a small jar on the table, Jones tells Mehdi, “Ok and then we

gotta use a condom for the fuck and the suck, okay?” Mehdi nods his head up and

down twice in apparent agreement. Jones testified that in this context, “fuck”

referred to straight sexual intercourse and “suck” referred to deviate sexual

intercourse. Jones testified that a legitimate massage spa does not have condoms on

7
display. Jones asked Mehdi if he was going to leave his mask on. Mehdi walks up

behind Jones, extends his right arm behind Jones, and leans towards her stating, “I

don’t know. Maybe not.” Jones testified that when Mehdi approached her, he

“actually reached and grabbed [her] buttocks during the conversation.” Jones then

places the condom on the table and tells Mehdi she is going to talk to Wang and

brush her teeth. She then walks out of the room. Mehdi leans back on the massage

table. After a few seconds, he picks up his money, picks up a condom on the floor,

and put the money and condom in his pocket. As he is doing this, the police enter

the room to arrest him. Mehdi tells the police that he was leaving.

Jones testified that she tried to give Mehdi an opportunity to tell her what

services he wanted when they were in the massage room, but she was having a hard

time hearing him because he was mumbling and wearing a mask. She testified that

“when [Mehdi] grabbed [her] breast, it was evident what he was there for,” and based

on his conduct, Jones understood that when Mehdi grabbed her breast, he Mehdi

“wanted to have a conversation about something that was sexual in nature.” Jones

testified that when she asked Mehdi to use a condom for the “f*** and suck,” Mehdi

nodded “his head up and down indicating yes.” The State asked:

State: Okay. So at this point he has – he’s grabbed your breast
and touched your behind and he’s nodded his head in
agreement when you said there would need to be the use
of a condom for the f*** and the suck?

Jones: Yes, ma’am.

8
State: Did you interpret this to mean that he was agreeing to pay
you U.S. currency for the sex acts you described?

Jones: Yes, ma’am.

On cross-examination, Jones testified that Mehdi did not request a specific

service. After Mehdi’s counsel showed Jones a photograph of the exterior of the

business to refresh her memory, Jones agreed that the business was “advertised as a

massage entity” and she stated it would be reasonable for someone who had not

negotiated a specific service to believe they would be receiving a massage. When

asked if Mehdi could have thought he would only be receiving a massage for the

$100 he placed on the table, Jones answered, “I don’t know what he would have

thought.”

Jones testified that although Mehdi did not verbally request anything sexual,

she knew he was asking for something sexual when he grabbed her breasts and

buttocks. Although she touched Mehdi first when she reached out and touched his

arm, Jones denied that her gesture could be interpreted as an “invitation” because

she was merely directing him towards the chair and asking him to sit down. She

testified that Mehdi saw the condom when she took it out of the container, and she

did not know if he had noticed the condoms beforehand.

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial judge found Mehdi guilty of the

state jail felony offense of solicitation of prostitution. After a punishment hearing,

9
the trial court sentenced Mehdi to two years’ imprisonment, but the trial court

suspended the sentence and placed Mehdi on community supervision for three years.

This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole issue on appeal, Mehdi argues there is insufficient evidence

supporting his conviction for solicitation of prostitution because the record reflects

that he agreed to pay Jones $100 for a massage, not sexual conduct. According to

Mehdi, Jones did not offer to engage in any sexual conduct with him until after he

agreed to pay her $100 for a massage and handed her the money. Mehdi argues that

based on this evidence, no rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that he knowingly agreed to pay money to Jones for the purpose of engaging

in sexual conduct.

The State argues that evidence of Mehdi’s and Jones’ statements and

non-verbal communications—including evidence that Mehdi grabbed Jones’ breasts

after she asked him what he wanted for his $100, Mehdi nodding in agreement when

Jones informed him that he would have to wear a condom for the “f*** and suck,”

and Mehdi grabbing her buttocks after he placed the $100 on the table—is sufficient

to support the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mehdi agreed to

pay Jones $100 to engage in sexual conduct with him.

10
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We apply the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (1979) in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each

element of a criminal offense that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We review the

legal sufficiency of the evidence by determining “whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sanders

v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Under a legal sufficiency

review, “our role is not to become a thirteenth juror.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). “This Court may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility

of the record evidence and thereby substitute our judgment for that of the fact-

finder.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750 (quoting Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740). Our

role is to act as a “due process safeguard,” requiring us to “ensure that the evidence

presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the offense

of which he is accused. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. We may consider both direct

and circumstantial evidence in our legal sufficiency analysis, as well as any

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id.

11
We examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to

determine whether any “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Williams, 235

S.W.3d at 750. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in

establishing the guilt of an actor” and “the standard of review on appeal is the same

for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.” Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d

460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004)); see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007) (stating “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt”).

The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.

See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We thus defer

to the jury to fairly “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319. A reviewing court, faced with a record of historical facts supporting conflicting

inferences, must presume the factfinder resolved any such conflict in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. Id. at 326.

Texas Penal Code Section 43.021 states that a person commits solicitation of

prostitution if “the person knowingly offers or agrees to pay a fee to another person

for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with that person or another.” TEX.

PENAL CODE 43.021(a).

12
B. Analysis

Mehdi argues that no rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that he knowingly agreed to pay a fee to Jones for the purpose of engaging in

sexual conduct because the evidence demonstrates he only agreed to pay Jones $100

for massage services. According to Mehdi, it was reasonable for him to believe that

he was agreeing to pay Jones for a non-sexual massage because the spa was

advertised as a foot massage business and he and Jones negotiated and agreed upon

a price for unspecified services before anything sexual was discussed. Mehdi argues

that although Jones asked if he would wear a condom for a “f*** and suck” and he

nodded his head up and down, he did not agree to pay an additional fee for that

service and Jones’ offer to engage in this sexual conduct was not included in the

$100 he already had agreed paid to pay Jones for a massage. He argues that although

he nodded his head after Jones mentioned the “f*** and suck,” the record reflects

that he merely nodded that he understood Jones’ comment, and “in response to this

material change to the offer for services — [he] reclaimed his money and began to

exit the massage room.”

The State argues there is sufficient evidence supporting Mehdi’s conviction

for solicitation of prostitution based on Mehdi’s and Jones’ statements and non-

verbal communications. According to the State, Mehdi visited #1 Foot Massage

twice on January 27, 2023. He thus had ample opportunity to note that the business’

13
front door was kept locked and to see the sexual photos on the wall, the jar of

condoms inside the massage room, and the undercover officers dressed in lingerie,

all of which indicate that the business is an illicit massage parlor, as opposed to a

legitimate spa. The State argues that the record reflects also that Mehdi offered to

pay Jones $100 for twenty minutes of services, which Jones told him would include

“everything,” and when she asked Mehdi what he wanted for those twenty minutes,

Mehdi grabbed her breasts and told her, “You tell me.” Mehdi also nodded in

agreement when Jones told him he had to wear a condom for a “f*** and suck” and

when Jones asked Mehdi if he planned to leave his mask on, Mehdi leaned towards

Jones and grabbed her buttocks. The State argues that based on this evidence, the

trial court, as the sole factfinder, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mehdi agreed to pay a fee to Jones for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct.

The opinion in Willis v. State, No. 14-09-00041-CR, 2010 WL 1957031 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) is instructive with respect to the sufficiency evidence in Mehdi’s case.

In Willis, the defendant was charged with committing prostitution by soliciting an

undercover female officer in a public place to engage with him in sexual conduct for

hire. See id. at *1.1 At trial, Officer Thomas, the undercover female officer, testified

1
Solicitation of prostitution was not a separate offense under the Texas Penal Code
when Willis v. State was issued. Rather, solicitation of prostitution was identified
as a manner and means of committing the offense of prostitution pursuant to the
14
that she was standing on a public street when Willis pulled up beside her in his truck

and asked if he could give her a ride. Id. at *2. Officer Thomas replied, “It’s going

to cost you,” and Willis asked, “How much?” According to Officer Thomas, she

told Willis it would be “10 for head,” referring to oral sex, and “20 for sex,” referring

to “straight sex,” and he replied, “Okay.” Officer Thomas testified that she told

Willis to drive around the block and she would meet him on the opposite corner, and

he complied. Id. Willis, who took the stand in his defense, testified that he

approached Thomas because he thought she may have had car problems, or some

other distress, and he asked her if she needed help. Id. He became scared after she

quoted the prices for sexual acts, and he sped away. Id. He denied asking Officer

Thomas “how much,” agreeing to engage in any sexual acts with Officer Thomas,

or attempting to engage her services as a prostitute. Id. The court of appeals

observed that the case “essentially turned on the credibility of witnesses,” and

although Willis denied attempting to or agreeing to engage in sexual acts with

version of Section 43.02 of the Penal Code then in effect. The relevant version of
Section 43.02(a) stated that a person commits the offense of prostitution “if he
knowingly: (1) offers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages in sexual conduct for
a fee; or (2) solicits another in a public place to engage with him in sexual conduct
for hire.” Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883
(amended 2023) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.02(a)). Willis was
charged with committing prostitution by the second manner and means—
“solicit[ing] another in a public place to engage with him in sexual conduct for hire.”
See id.; see also Willis v. State, No. 14-09-00041-CR, 2010 WL 1957031, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 18, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication).

15
Officer Thomas, the jury, as the sole factfinder, was free to credit Officer Thomas’

testimony over Willis’ testimony. Id.; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326 (stating

reviewing courts presume factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of

prosecution and defer to factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in testimony and

conflicting inferences). The court held that based on Officer Thomas’ testimony,

the jury “could have rationally concluded that [Willis] offered to hire Officer

Thomas for the sexual acts she mentioned by initiating the contact with her, inquiring

about costs, responding ‘okay’ when she quoted the sexual acts and prices, and

complying with her instruction to meet her on the opposite corner.” Willis, 2010

WL 1957031, at *2.

Like the defendant in Willis, the record reflects Mehdi initiated contact with

Jones by requesting her as his service provider when he visited #1 Foot Massage for

the second time on January 27, 2023, offering to pay Jones $100 for twenty minutes

of unspecified services, and nodding his head in agreement when she asked him to

wear a condom for the “f*** and suck.” Although Mehdi argues he was conveying

only that he understood Jones’ comment when he nodded his head, as opposed to

agreeing to wear a condom, it was the trial court’s role as factfinder to resolve any

conflicting inferences in the evidence, and as the reviewing court, we presume the

trial court resolved any conflict in favor of its judgment and we defer to the trial

court’s resolution of this issue. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 (stating reviewing

16
courts defer to factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in testimony and conflicting

inferences).

Although Mehdi did not verbalize his agreement to engage in sexual acts with

Jones, Jones testified that Mehdi grabbed her breast, touched her buttocks, and

nodded his head in agreement when she told him he needed to wear a condom for

the “f*** and the suck” and she understood Mehdi’s actions to mean that he was

agreeing to engage in sexual conduct with her for a fee. In addition to Jones’

testimony, the trial court also had the benefit of the audio and visual recording of

Jones’ and Mehdi’s interactions in the massage room, and the transcript of their

conversation, both of which were admitted into evidence. See Brown v. State, No.

01-10-00791-CR, 2012 WL 1649852, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May

10, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding evidence

sufficient to support Brown’s conviction for prostitution because “jury could

reasonably infer that Brown agreed to participate in sexual conduct for a fee” based

on officer’s testimony and audio recording of Brown’s conversation with officer);

see also Morris v. State, 565 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding

evidence sufficient to support conviction for prostitution based on officer’s

testimony Morris approached him, non-verbally offered to have sexual intercourse

with him, and when Morris asked how much money he had, officer told Morris he

had $20 and she replied, “That would get it”); Willis, 2010 WL 1957031, at *2

17
(holding evidence sufficient to support conviction for prostitution based on officer’s

testimony).

Mehdi argues that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Trippell v. State, 535

S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) and Roper v. State, 652 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1983) “seem to stand for the proposition that where a stated price is agreed

upon in exchange for services that are not explicitly sexual in nature (such as

massage), some additional fee must be agreed upon in order to render any subsequent

agreement for sexual services prostitution because engaged in for a fee.” According

to Mehdi, the record reflects he agreed to pay Jones $100 only for massage services,

and although he nodded his head in agreement when Jones asked him to wear a

condom for the “f*** and suck,” he did not agree to pay an additional fee for the

sexual services which were not included in the initial agreement. The State argues

that Trippell and Roper are distinguishable from the facts in this case and the opinion

in Austin v. State, 794 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) is more on

point. We agree with the State.

In Trippell v. State, a spa owner was convicted of the offense of promotion of

prostitution after a woman working in Trippell’s spa performed a sexual act on a

private citizen who was cooperating with the police’s investigation of the spa.

18
Trippell, 535 S.W.2d at 178–79.2 At trial, Smith, the private citizen who cooperated

with the police investigation, testified that when he “indicated [to Trippell that] he

wanted a massage,” Trippell told him it would cost $20. See id. at 179. After Smith

chose Welsh as his masseuse, Welsh took Smith to a room, collected $20 from

Smith, and left the room. When Welsh returned to the room a few minutes later, she

massaged Smith’s back while she was fully clothed. Welsh asked Smith what he

wanted and after he told her he wanted a “local,” Welsh performed a specific sexual

act on Smith, and then continued to massage his back.

Trippell argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in denying her the right

to effective confrontation and cross-examination of Smith. Id. After reversing

Trippell’s conviction on this basis, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in dicta:

Although this case is reversed on appellant’s fourth ground of error only
there is a serious question as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith
testified that he paid twenty dollars for a massage and that no further
money was exchanged. Smith stated that it was only after the massage
had begun that Welsh asked him what he wanted. The witness testified

2
Although Trippell was charged with committing the third-degree felony offense of
aggravated promotion of prostitution, and the jury found her guilty of the offense,
the trial court set aside the guilty verdict and entered a judgment of guilty of the
Class A misdemeanor offense of promotion of prostitution. See Trippell v. State,
535 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.03
(stating person commits Class A misdemeanor offense of promotion of prostitution
if person knowingly “receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement to
participate in the proceeds of prostitution” or “solicits another to engage in sexual
conduct with another person for compensation”) with id. § 43.04 (stating person
commits third-degree felony offense of promotion of prostitution if person
knowingly “owns, invests in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages a
prostitution enterprise that uses two or more prostitutes”).

19
that he asked for a local. Having already paid for the massage it is
difficult to characterize Welsh’s actions as prostitution under V.T.C.A.
Penal Code, Sec. 43.02. It is even more difficult to then impute Welsh’s
actions if they be an offense to [Trippell] herein, or to rely on Smith’s
testimony to show that the Spa was a ‘prostitution enterprise’ as
required by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 43.04.

Id. at 181. Unlike in Trippell, Mehdi did not request a “massage” and Jones did not

provide any non-sexual services to Mehdi before he grabbed her breasts and buttocks

and nodded his head in agreement when Jones asked him to use a condom.

Mehdi’s reliance on Roper v. State is similarly misplaced. In Roper, the

defendants Roper and Pierre were convicted of prostitution after they engaged in

sexual conduct with two undercover officers. When two undercover male officers

went to the massage business where Roper and Pierre worked, the officers were

greeted by Brownwell who told the officers they could have “contact” sessions or

“no contact” sessions. Roper, 652 S.W.2d at 398. Both undercover officers

requested “contact” sessions and they each paid Brownwell $35. Id. One officer

went to a room with Roper and the other officer went to another room with the Pierre,

where both officers engaged in sexual conduct with the respective defendant. Id. at

398–99. Although a jury found Roper and Pierre guilty of prostitution, the Court of

Criminal Appeals reversed their convictions based on insufficient evidence. The

court held there was insufficient evidence Roper and Pierre engaged in sexual

conduct “for a fee” because (1) the officers paid Brownwell, not Roper and Pierre

personally, (2) the court interpreted the officers’ payment for two “contact sessions”

20
as payment for massages, and not for the sexual conduct the defendants engaged in

later, and (3) there was no evidence that either Roper or Pierre “negotiated a price

for her sexual favors” or “received money for her sexual favors.” Id. at 399. Unlike

in Roper, Mehdi and Jones negotiated a price for Jones’ services and Mehdi paid the

$100 to Jones personally.

As the State argues, this case is more like Austin. In that case, the undercover

officer testified that he visited the massage parlor where Austin was working and

Austin took him to a private room where he agreed to pay $130 for a “Swedish Deep

Muscle Rub,” a term the officer testified was “a catch phrase” or “key words” for

prostitution. Austin, 794 S.W.2d at 411. After massaging the officer for twenty

minutes, Austin asked him if he would “like to end the session.” Id. When the

officer asked if he would “get more than just a rub” if they ended the session, Austin

answered yes and told him that he did not need to pay an additional fee. Id. After

this conversation, Austin and the officer discussed which specific sex acts would be

included in his original payment and they agreed on sexual intercourse. Id. On

appeal, Austin argued there was insufficient evidence supporting her conviction

because the $130 “session” the officer paid for ended before she agreed to engage in

sexual intercourse with the officer, and thus she “was no longer being compensated

for her personal services,” and “she made no effort to obtain compensation for any

sexual activity.” Id. at 412.

21
Relying on Young Sun Lee v. State, 681 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d), the court of appeals held there was sufficient evidence

supporting the jury’s finding Austin offered or agreed to perform sexual conduct for

a fee because Austin “negotiated the arrangements herself and personally handled

the money” and her “later response that no further money was necessary because it

is ‘all taken care of’ is similar to that of Lee’s response to the vice squad officer.”

Austin, 794 S.W.2d at 413 (citing Lee and noting “there is no requirement under

[Section 43.02(a)] for the defendant to negotiate a price . . . nor is there a need for

money to exchange hands”); Lee, 681 S.W.2d at 661 (holding evidence was

sufficient to show Lee offered or agreed to sexual conduct for fee because record

reflected Lee was present when other woman told officer that price was $60 and

officer gave other woman money, and later, when officer told Lee that he wanted

specific sexual act, Lee told him it was “covered in the other money you gave”).3

3
When Austin v. State, 794 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) was
issued in 1990, Section 43.02(a) stated:
(a) A person commits [prostitution] if he knowingly:
(1) offers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages in sexual conduct for a
fee; or
(2) solicits another in a public place to engage with him in sexual conduct
for hire.
Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883 (amended
2023) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.02(a)).

22
Although Austin was not relying on either opinion, the court questioned the

“continued viability” of Trippell and Roper, and held that, even if the opinions were

still good law, they were “distinguishable on their facts from the instant case.”

Discussing Trippell and Roper, the court of appeals stated:

Interestingly enough, there is no requirement under the statute for the
defendant to negotiate a price, see Lee, 681 S.W.2d 656, nor is there a
need for money to exchange hands. In fact, in West, the officer paid the
defendant for the massage and then again for her to undress, but the
opinion does not show he paid her the later quoted prices for sexual
conduct as Roper would indicate. Neither Trippell (pre-Jackson v.
Virginia) nor Roper (post-Jackson v. Virginia) applied any standard of
review to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. Assuming their
continued viability, they are distinguishable on their facts from the
instant case.

Austin, 794 S.W.2d at 413. Like our sister court in Austin, we question the continued

viability of Trippell and Roper. And even assuming their continued viability, the

facts in those cases are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

that a rational factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt

that Mehdi knowingly agreed to pay a fee to Jones for the purpose of engaging in

sexual conduct. See Jackson at 319. We thus hold there is legally sufficient evidence

supporting Medhi’s conviction for solicitation of prostitution. See id. We overrule

Mehdi’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

23
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10976694. Public record. Not legal advice.