# RIYAZ v. INTEGRA LIFE SCIENCES

> District Court, D. New Jersey · May 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920700

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** May 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920700

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a plaintiff may not recover in a failure to accommodate claim “without showing that a reasonable accommodation was possible”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ZAFAR RIYAZ,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No. 24-9861 (MAS) (JTQ)
INTEGRA LIFE SCIENCES, MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Zafar Riyaz’s (“Plaintiff’)
Complaint (ECF No. 1), and application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP’”) pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 1-2). Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established
indigence and grants the IFP Application. Having granted Plaintiff IFP status, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must screen his Complaint. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
1. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a discharged employee, alleges that Integra Life Sciences (“Defendant”),
particularly his supervisor, Iris Rodriguez, terminated his employment and failed to accommodate
his disability on November 3, 2023.! (See Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that he

' Although the Complaint names Iris Rodriguez as the defendant on page three, the caption names
Integra Life Sciences as the defendant on page two; accordingly, the Court evaluates the Complaint
with Integra Life Sciences as Defendant. (Compl. 3.) If Plaintiff wishes to bring claims against Iris
Rodriguez instead of, or in addition to Integra Life Sciences, he may indicate such by amending
the caption of the Complaint.

injured his neck and shoulder while lifting boxes and that Defendant discriminated against him
based on said disability. Ud.) Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the “EEOC”) on April 29, 2024. (/d. at 7.) Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to
Sue from the EEOC on July 20, 2024. (/d.) Plaintiff filed the instant suit on October 15, 2024,
alleging discrimination in employment pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991
(the “ADA”) and seeking reinstatement of his job. (/d. at 5, 8.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
An IFP application “is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to
the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Court, accordingly, must
carefully review an application and “if convinced that [the applicant] is unable to pay the court
costs and filing fees, the [Court will grant leave to proceed [IFP].” Douris v. Middletown
Township, 293 F. App’x 130, 132 (Gd Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss a case at any time if the court determines that “the
action ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)G)-(iii).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)[ ] is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to [Rule]
12(b)(6).” Conner v. Reed, No. 21-14193, 2020 WL 138100, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2022) (quoting
Schreane vy. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss but must
contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it
provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” /d. (quoting Beil □□□□
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court construes
pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than those
filed by attorneys, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2019).
Il. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application.
The Court must carefully review Plaintiff's IFP Application, and “if convinced that [the
applicant] is unable to pay the courts cost and filing fees, the [C]Jourt will grant leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.” Douris, 293 F. App’x at 132 (citing Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1084 n.5 (Gd Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff's IFP Application is complete and indicates that he is
unemployed and possesses no savings or assets aside from $800 in cash. (See IFP Appl., ECF No.
1-2.) Plaintiff states neither he nor his spouse had an income source during the past twelve months,
that his son is supporting them financially, and that he does not expect changes in the near future.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has established indigence and grants the IFP Application. See

Hickson vy. Mauro, No. 11-6304, 2011 WL 6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (“The decision
to grant or deny an IFP application is based solely on the economic eligibility of the [plaintiff].”
(citing Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 Gd Cir. 1976)).
B. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Plaintiff's Complaint in the instant litigation asserts claims solely based on the ADA.
(Compl. 5-6.) The District Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’ s
ADA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The ADA “prohibits a range of discriminatory employment
practices, including termination of a qualified individual on the basis of disability and failure to
provide reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.” Meggiolaro vy. Lagniappe
Pharmacy Servs., Transaction Data Sys., Inc., No. 16-3407, 2016 WL 5660432, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.
29, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)).
L. Discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must adequately
allege that: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations
by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gaul
v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege—and a liberal
reading of his Complaint does not suggest—that Defendant violated the ADA. (See Compl.)
The first prong of a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to establish himself as a disabled
person within the meaning of the ADA. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306. A person is “disabled” under the
ADA if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” has “a record of such impairment,” or was “regarded as having such an impairment.”

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if “the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited . . . because of an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity.” /d. § 12102(3)(A). Here, the Complaint contains only a bald assertion
that Plaintiff has a “disability,” presumably as a result of the unspecified injury Plaintiff suffered
“TwIhile lifting boxes.” (Compl. 6-7.) Without more, the factual allegations in the Complaint are
insufficient to meet the first prong of the ADA analysis because Plaintiff has failed to provide
sufficient facts that would allow the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is a disabled person
within the meaning of the ADA, as described above. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Quick Check Store No.
129, No. 12-3300, 2013 WL 6623923, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2013) (finding general allegations of
pain in hands and back and “permanent injuries,” without more, insufficient to support the first
prong of an ADA claim).
The second element of a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to adequately allege that
“he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306 (quoting Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Complaint, however, does not contain any factual allegations
regarding the essential functions of Plaintiffs former position, let alone whether he could perform
those functions with or without accommodation. (See generally Compl.) As such, the Complaint
does not satisfy the second prong of an ADA claim.
Lastly, the third requirement to state a discrimination claim requires Plaintiff to adequately
allege that he “suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306 (citing Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580). The Complaint does not include any factual
allegations that link Plaintiff's termination with his alleged disability. (See generally Compl.)

Indeed, the Complaint does not include any factual allegations about the circumstances or timing
of Plaintiffs termination. (See generally Compl.) At this juncture, the Court, without more, cannot
infer a plausible, causal connection between Plaintiff's alleged disability and the termination of
his employment. See Gist v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 14-6449, 2015 WL 4619518, at *3
(D.N.J. July 31, 2105) (finding the facts in the complaint so sparse that the Court “cannot even
determine what temporal relationship existed between Plaintiffs request for accommodations and
his termination in order to possibly infer a causal connection’’).
Since Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to adequately allege any prong of his ADA
discrimination claim, it is accordingly dismissed.
2. Failure to Accommodate
To adequately plead a prima facie failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Plaintiff
must allege that: “(1) he was disabled and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an
accommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he
could have been reasonably accommodated.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir.
2006).
Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the first requirement—that he was disabled and his
employer knew it—and the second requirement—that he requested an accommodation or
assistance. (See generally Compl.) The employee, to trigger the employer’s obligations, must “give
notice that ‘make[s] clear that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability.”” Honauer
v. N. Jersey Truck Ctr., No 19-8947, 2020 WL 5422824, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2020) (alteration
in original) (quoting Taylor, 185 F.3d at 311). The key to the request is “whether the employee
‘provides the employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can

&

be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.’” Jd. (quoting
Taylor, 185 F.3d at 313). There are no facts in the Complaint to indicate that Plaintiff made such
an accommodation request. See Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 Gd Cir.
2003) (“[E]ither by direct communication or other appropriate means, the employee ‘must make
clear that [he] wants assistance for [his] disability.’””) (quoting Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214
F.3d 402, 408 Gd Cir. 2000)).
The third requirement—his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist—and fourth
requirement—he could have been reasonably accommodated—are also not satisfied for the same
reasons stated above. There is neither an indication that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's
disability nor any request from Plaintiff for an accommodation. It follows that the Court cannot
infer whether Defendant failed to make good faith efforts to assist. By extension, the Court cannot
determine whether Plaintiff could have reasonably been accommodated because the Complaint
lacks any facts concerning what accommodation Plaintiff allegedly requested, let alone what could
be reasonably accommodated. See Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir.
2000) (explaining that a plaintiff may not recover in a failure to accommodate claim “without
showing that a reasonable accommodation was possible”).
While the Court remains sympathetic to Plaintiffs circumstances, Plaintiff fails to state a
failure to accommodate claim under the ADA. The Court, therefore, dismisses the Complaint.
Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file an amended complaint to fix the deficiencies that the Court
has identified in this Memorandum Opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint. The Court will issue an order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAEL A. Gripe
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920700. Public record. Not legal advice.