# Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC

> District Court, C.D. California · May 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920618

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** May 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC

Present: The Honorable © PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kamilla Sali-Suleyman Not Reported N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None None
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS —- ORDER

Before the Court are two motions, including a Motion to Remand filed by plaintiff
Nwamaka C. Oh (“Plaintiff’) (Docket No. 20), and a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant
Navient Solution, LLC (“Navient” or “Defendant’’) (Docket No. 16). Both Motions are fully
briefed. (Docket Nos. 18, 24—26.)}" Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that these matters are appropriate for decision without oral
argument. The hearings calendared for April 14 and April 28, 2025, have been vacated, and the
matters taken off calendar.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This action arises out of two student loans serviced by Defendant (the “Loans’’). In 2002,
when Plaintiff was 20 years old, she executed promissory notes for two private Signature
Student Loans (the “Loan Promissory Notes”). (Compl. at pg. 6.)” The Complaint alleges that

u Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Docket No. 24.)
Plaintiff's reply, if any, was due no later than April 7, 2025. See L.R. 7-10. On April 6, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a Notice indicating that she had not been served with Defendant’s Opposition.
(Docket No. 26.) The Court then extended the time for Plaintiff to file her reply until April 21,
2025. (Docket No. 27.) To date, however, Plaintiff has not filed a reply.
2 The Complaint alleges initially that Plaintiff signed one promissory note for the two
Loans (see id. at pg. 6) but later clarifies that there were was a promissory note with respect to
each Loan (see id. at pgs. 11-12). The Complaint includes screenshots of portions of the Loan
Promissory Notes but does not attach full copies of them. In order to allow the Court to properly
consider the claims in this action, the Court ordered the parties to file a copy of all loan
documents referenced in the Complaint. (Docket No. 27.) In response to the Court’s Order,
Defendant filed copies of the two Loan Promissory Notes. (Docket No. 29.) The screenshots
included in the Complaint match the contents of these Loan Promissory Notes. In ruling ona

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
“at all relevant times, Navient was responsible for servicing Plaintiff's loans and managing her
online loan account ....” (Id. at pg. 3.)”
A section in each Loan Promissory Note asks the applicant to indicate whether the
applicant has a co-borrower; Plaintiff selected “No” on one of the Loan Promissory Notes. (Id.
at pg. 6; Docket No. 29 at pg. 6.) Despite this, Navient processed the Loans to reflect Plaintiff's
mother as the co-borrower. (Compl. at pgs. 6-7.) The Complaint also alleges that the signatures
on the Loan Promissory Notes are inconsistent, “leading to suspicion of possible forgery” and
“calling into question the authenticity of at least one of the documents.” (Id. at pg. 7, 11-12.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff's mother “consistently opposed and contested the
legitimacy of the loan for many years” and “expressed serious concerns regarding her alleged
participation in the loan and its legitimacy.” (Id. at pg. 7.)
At the top of each Loan Promissory Note, there is text stating, “Application and
Promissory Note valid through May 2003.” (Id. at pgs. 7, 9; see also Docket No. 29 at pgs. 6,
12.) Plaintiff claims that this language means the Loans themselves were only valid through
May 2003 and that because the parties did not agree to extend the Loans, the Loans’ “validity
expired in May 2003.” (Compl. at pgs. 7-8.) The Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff
made several payments toward the Loans after May 2003. (See id. at pg. 8.) Specifically, the
Complaint alleges that “starting in the early 2000s when the loan would have become due,”
Navient “engaged in a consistent pattern of aggressive and intimidating calls and
communications” regarding collection of the Loans, and that Plaintiff made payments on the
Loans “‘in the face of threats to Plaintiff's credit score and the risk of aggressive collection
actions.” (Id. at pgs. 7-8.) Plaintiff alleges that Navient’s calls caused her to “feel overwhelmed
and discouraged from questioning the legitimacy of the loan or seeking legal counsel to
investigate the matter sooner.” (Id. at pg. 7.)
In 2024, Plaintiff recetved an email notifying her that the Loans would be transferred to
MOHELA, a third-party loan servicer. (Id. at pg. 10.) Plaintiff claims that the Loan Promissory
Notes “do[] not explicitly provide consent for such a transfer, either from the Plaintiff or from

motion to dismiss, the Court may take judicial notice of documents incorporated by reference
into the pleadings. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the Loan Promissory Notes filed by Defendant.
2 The Loan Promissory Notes identify the lender as Sallie Mae. (See Compl. Ex. 1; Docket
No. 29.) Defendant represents that it is a subsidiary of Sallie Mae and that Sallie Mae assigned
the processing of the Loans to it. (See Motion to Dismiss at pg. 1.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
the cosigner,” and that “[t]here is no clause in the [Loan Promissory Notes] that clearly
authorizes the transfer of the loan to MOHELA.” (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant’s
transfer of the Loans to MOHELA was improper because Defendant “failed to provide adequate
notice or obtain explicit consent from Plaintiff’ before transferring the loan, and because the
“transfer was done without proper validation of the [co-borrower’s] agreement” (Id. at pg. 15.)
Plaintiff alleges that the transfer hindered her ability to challenge the enforceability of the Loans.
(See id. at pg. 17.)
Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) breach of
contract; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) “violation of consumer protection laws,”
(specifically citing the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.);
(4) negligence; and (5) unfair business practices, in violation of California Business &
Professional Code § 17200 (“UCL”). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages totaling $1.5
million and punitive damages of $1 million. (See id. at pg. 18.)
Plaintiff initiated this action in the Los Angeles Superior Court on January 22, 2025.
Defendant removed the case to federal court on March 5, 2025, alleging that the Court possesses
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. Defendant filed its Motion
to Dismiss on March 12, 2025. Plaintiff filed her Motion to Remand on March 19, 2025. On the
same date, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Stay Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Scheduling
Conference Pending Resolution of Jurisdiction,” in which Plaintiff sought, among other things,
to stay proceedings on the Motion to Dismiss pending a ruling on her Motion to Remand. The
Court issued an order on March 20, 2025, in which it confirmed that it would rule on Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand before ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 23.) The
Court now considers each motion in turn.
IL. Motion to Remand
A. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” having subject matter jurisdiction only
over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if
the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The

4 According to the Complaint, prior to filing the instant action, Plaintiff initiated arbitration
in JAMS in September 2024, and the arbitration concluded in January 2025, when the arbitrator
eranted Navient’s motion to dismiss. (See id. at pgs. 4-6.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy,
Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (citing Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.
1988)), amended by 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there
is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,
566 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising
under” federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987).
Under the rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face
of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.” Id. at 392. If the complaint does not specify
whether a claim is based on federal or state law, it is a claim “arising under” federal law only if
it is “clear” that it raises a federal question. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.
1996). Thus, the plaintiff is generally the “master of the claim.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
There is no federal question jurisdiction simply because there is a federal defense to the claim.
Id. The only exception to this rule is where a plaintiffs federal claim has been disguised by
“artful pleading,” such as where the only claim is a federal one or is a state claim preempted by
federal law. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions where there
is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000 both at the time of the filing of the action and at time of removal. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Academy of Country Music v. Continental Cas. Co., 991 F.3d 1059,
1068 (9th Cir. 2021). To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a natural person must be a
citizen of the United States and be domiciled in a particular state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries,
Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). Persons are domiciled in the place they reside with
the intent to remain or to which they intend to return. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265
F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a
citizen of any state where it 1s incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); see also Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090,
1092 (9th Cir. 1990). The citizenship of an LLC is the citizenship of its members. See Johnson
v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[L]ike a partnership, an
LLC 1s a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.”).
B. Discussion
Defendant alleges in its Notice of Removal (“NOR”) that the Court possesses both
diversity and federal question jurisdiction over this action. First, Defendant alleges that the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Court has diversity jurisdiction over the action because there is complete diversity between
Plaintiff and Defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Specifically,
Defendant alleges that it is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia because it is an LLC whose sole
member is Navient Corporation, which Defendant alleges is a Delaware corporation with
principal place of business in Virginia. (See NOR 4 2.) Defendant affirmatively alleges that
“Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of California.” (Id.) With respect to the amount in controversy,
Defendant points to the Complaint’s demand for$2.5 million in compensatory and punitive
damages. (See id.; see also Compl. at pg. 18.) Second, Defendant alleges that the Court has
federal question jurisdiction because the Complaint asserts a claim for relief under TILA. (See
NOR 3.)
Plaintiff appears to argue that the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over this case based
on Defendant’s business activities in California. Plaintiff argues that Defendant conducts
significant business in California, servicing at least 1.5 million student borrowers in California
and is actively litigating multiple lawsuits in California state court. (See id. at pgs. 4-5.)
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is a forum defendant within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) and is therefore barred from removing this action. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that
Defendant is a citizen of California because it is registered with the California Secretary of State
as an out-of-state LLC. (See id. at pg. 5; Ex. C.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that removal is
improper because Defendant previously consented to arbitration in California in connection with
Plaintiffs claims. (See id. at pgs. 5—6.)
Each of Plaintiff's arguments is misplaced. As explained above, for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, an LLC is a citizen of each state of which its members are citizens, and a
corporation is a citizen of any state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its
principal place of business. Here, Defendant alleges that it is an LLC and that its sole member is
a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Virginia. (NOR 4 2.) Thus,
Defendant has adequately alleged that it is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia. None of
Plaintiff's assertions call into question Defendant’s citizenship. That Defendant conducts
business in California does not suffice to show that its principal place of business is in
California, and neither Defendant’s registration with the California Secretary of State as an out-
of-state LLC nor its prior consent to arbitrate in California have any bearing on its citizenship.
Further, Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s allegation regarding her California citizenship.
Thus, because Defendant plausibly alleges complete diversity between the parties, and because
Plaintiff fails to offer any sufficient argument or evidence to the contrary, Plaintiff is not entitled
to remand on this basis.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over this action
because “the majority of Plaintiff's claims are based on California state law,” because “the TILA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
claim is not even the core of the case,” and because her “state law claims do not depend on TILA
for resolution.” (Motion to Remand at pgs. 6-7.) The Complaint in this action repeatedly
alleges violations of TILA, and TILA is the only law specifically identified in support of
Plaintiff's third claim for “violation of consumer protection laws.” (See, e.g., Compl. at pgs. 9,
13.) Further, regardless of whether Plaintiff's TILA claim is at the “core” of this case, Plaintiff
does not dispute that the Complaint asserts a claim under TILA, a federal statute. Because the
Complaint appears to assert a federal claim for relief, and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, the
Court appears to have federal question jurisdiction over the action. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at
392. Finally, even if Plaintiff were to withdraw her TILA claim, the Court would still possess
diversity jurisdiction over this action for the reasons discussed above.
Accordingly, because the NOR adequately alleges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
and because Plaintiff's Motion to Remand fails to raise any doubt as to Defendant’s right of
removal, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand must be denied.
III. Motion to Dismiss
A. Legal Standard
Generally, plaintiffs in federal court are required to give only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While the
Federal Rules allow a court to dismiss a cause of action for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” they also require all pleadings to be “construed so as to do justice.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 8(e). The purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is to “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
USS. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)).
However, in Twombly, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that ‘ta wholly conclusory
statement of [a] claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
recovery.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 (internal quotation omitted). Instead,
the Court adopted a “plausibility standard,” in which the complaint must “raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged infraction].” Id. at 556, 127 S. Ct.
at 1965. For a complaint to meet this standard, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (citing 5 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading
must contain something more... than... . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action’) (alteration in original)); Daniel v. County of Santa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002) (“All allegations of material fact are taken as true
and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”’) (quoting Burgert v. Lokelani
Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000)). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (internal quotations omitted). In construing the Twombly standard,
the Supreme Court has advised that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009).
B. Discussion
Defendant moves to dismiss each claim in the Complaint on the grounds that (1) the claim
is time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations; and (11) the Complaint fails to state a
viable claim for relief. (See Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) at pgs. 4-15.)
1. Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiffs first claim for breach of contract is based on her allegations that Defendant
sought repayment of the Loans from her even though the Loans were purportedly no longer
enforceable after May 2003. (See Compl. at pgs. 8, 10.) Under California law, the statute of
limitations for breach of a written contract 1s four years from the date of the alleged breach. Cal.
Code Civ. P. § 337(a). While the Complaint does not make clear when Defendant first sought to
collect payment on the Loans from Plaintiff, it alleges that the Loans “would have become due”
at some point in the “early 2000s” and that Plaintiff made payments on the Loans. (Compl. at
pgs. 7-8.) Thus, any purported breach by Defendant appears to have occurred at least twenty
years before Plaintiff filed the instant action. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff's claim has expired.
Plaintiff appears to argue in Opposition that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls
the statute of limitations on this claim because Defendant “deliberately concealed the contract’s
expiration, misleading Plaintiff into making payments for 20 years.” (See Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss (“Opp’n’) at pgs. 2-3.) The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of
limitations where the defendant, “through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow stale.”
Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (2013). Here, however, Plaintiff fails to

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
identify any deceptive conduct by Defendant that would have caused her claim to expire. In fact,
Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant “concealed” the Loans’ purported expiration date from her is
directly contrary to her own allegations in the Complaint. The Complaint alleges that the Loans
expired after May 2003 based on a statement written across the top of each Loan Promissory
Note, but the Complaint makes clear that in 2002, Plaintiff herself completed and signed the
Loan Promissory Notes displaying that statement. (See Compl. at pgs. 6, 10.) Thus, Plaintiff’s
claim that Defendant concealed that statement from her is unfounded. Accordingly, because the
statute of limitations has expired for this claim, and because Plaintiff fails to show that she is
entitled to tolling of the limitations period, this claim is time-barred.
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claim
Plaintiff's second claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is based on her allegations that
Defendant improperly processed the Loans to include a co-borrower and failed to address
inconsistencies in the signatures across the Loan Promissory Notes. (See Compl. at pgs. □□□□□□□
Under California law, the statute of limitations for claims sounding in fraud is three years. Cal.
Code Civ. P. § 338(d). “The limitations period .. . runs from the moment a claim accrues.”
Aryeh, 55 Cal. 4th at 1191. A case based on fraud “is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 338(d); see also Britton v. Girardi, 235 Cal. App. 4th 721, 733, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 518
(2015) (“The date a complaining party learns, or at least is put on notice, that a representation
was false is the date the statute starts running.”’) (citation somitted).
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff had constructive notice of any purported fraudulent
misrepresentation claim from the time the Loans were processed in 2002. (See Motion at pgs.
Defendant also argues that the Complaint fails to allege any fraudulent misrepresentation
by Defendant. (See id. at pgs. 9-10.) Plaintiff argues in Opposition that the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations on this claim because Plaintiff “discovered
the fraud in 2024” and because Defendant “deliberately concealed the contract’s expiration,
misleading Plaintiff into making payments for 20 years.” (See Opp’n at pgs. 2-3.)
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint does not
plausibly allege any underlying fraudulent misrepresentation by Defendant to support this claim.
First, although Plaintiff indicated on one of the Loan Promissory Notes that she did not have a
co-borrower, it is unclear how Defendant’s incorrect processing of this Loan constituted fraud.
Second while Plaintiff vaguely alleges that discrepancies in the signatures on the Loan
Promissory Notes “lead[] to suspicion of possible forgery” and “call[] into question the
authenticity of at least one of the documents” (Compl. at pgs. 7, 11), the Complaint does not
allege that any signature was actually forged, nor does the Complaint allege facts to explain how

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Defendant’s efforts to enforce the Loans despite the alleged discrepancies in the signatures
amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation.
Further, even if the Complaint adequately alleged a fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
the facts alleged in the Complaint show that Plaintiff would have had actual or constructive
notice of such a claim when the Loans were processed in 2002, and Plaintiff offers no plausible
basis for tolling the statute of limitations. Plaintiff's sole argument in support of her fraudulent
concealment theory is that Defendant “concealed the contract’s expiration from her.” (Opp’n at
pg. 3.) As discussed above, however, this assertion is undermined by Plaintiff's own allegations
in the Complaint. Moreover, this assertion is unrelated to the allegations that form the basis for
Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Accordingly, because the statute of limitations
has expired for this claim, and because Plaintiff fails to show that she is entitled to tolling of the
limitations period under the fraudulent concealment doctrine or on any other basis, this claim is
time-barred.
3. Violation of Consumer Protection Law Claim
Plaintiff's third claim for “violation of consumer protection laws” is based on alleged
violations of TILA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide her with a
required disclosure statement. (Compl. at pg. 13.)° The statute of limitations for a TILA claim
on a private education loan is “1 year from the date on which the first regular payment of
principal is due under the loan.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). The Complaint alleges that the Loans
came due at some point in the early 2000s. (Compl. at pg. 7.) Thus, the statute of limitations for
this claim expired several years ago. Because the statute of limitations has expired for this

In the Complaint, Plaintiff also points to a sentence in one of the Loan Promissory Notes
stating, “If you, the co-borrower, reside in the state of... New York you are required to sign the
attached ‘Notice to Co-Borrower, Supplement to Application and Promissory Note’ [“Notice’’]
Document. The Student’s loan—if approved—will not be disbursed unless this requirement is
met.” (Compl. at pg. 14; see also Docket No. 29 at pg. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that the co-borrower
resides in New York and that Defendant failed to obtain a signed Notice from the co-borrower.
(See Compl. at pg. 14.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated New
York state law and that this Loan is “obviously rendered unenforceable under applicable New
York law.” (Id.) However, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim under any New
York consumer protection law, the Complaint fails to identify the applicable law, to establish
that Plaintiff has a private right of action under any such law, or to plausibly allege how
Defendant’s failure to obtained a signed Notice from the co-borrower constituted a violation of
said law. Accordingly, the Court construes this claim as being asserted under TILA only.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
claim, and because Plaintiff offers no basis for statutory or equitable tolling of the limitations
period, this claim is time-barred.
4. Negligence Claim
Plaintiff's fourth claim for negligence appears to be based on the following alleged
misconduct by Defendant: (i) processing the Loans with a co-borrower; (11) failing to “ensure
accurate record-keeping” and address discrepancies in the signatures on the Loan Promissory
Notes; (111) failing to provide disclosures alleged required under TILA and “failing to inform the
Plaintiff adequately about her rights and obligations under the loan agreement”; and (iv) failing
to provide adequate notice to, or obtain consent from, Plaintiff before transferring the Loans to
MOHELA. (See Compl. at pg. 15.)
The statute of limitations in California for personal injuries, including negligence, 1s two
years. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 335.1; Deuschel v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 3d
985, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2023). The accrual date is the date on which the plaintiff suffers actual and
appreciable harm, or the date on which the plaintiff discovers or could have discovered the
injury and the cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1326, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305 (1995). Here, with the
exception of Defendant’s alleged transfer of the Loans to MOHELA in 2024, all allegations in
the Complaint relate to alleged injuries that occurred at or around the time of the Loan’s
inception. As such, to the extent Plaintiffs negligence claim is based on those alleged events,
her claim expired years ago. Because Plaintiff offers no basis for statutory or equitable tolling,
any negligence claim based on those allegations is time-barred.
With respect to the transfer of the Loans to MOHELA, the Complaint fails to allege facts
to support a viable negligence claim. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege:
“(1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate or
legal cause of the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach of the
duty of care.” Black v. City of Blythe, 562 F. Supp. 3d 820, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting
Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 534 (2009)). “Duty is not universal; not every
defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if the plaintiff's interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct... .” Gray v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 661 F. Supp. 3d 991, 995 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 12
Cal. Sth 905, 920, 290 Cal. Rptr. 3d 834, 505 P.3d 625 (2022)).
Here, although the Complaint alleges in a conclusory manner that Defendant “owed the
Plaintiff a duty of care to act in good faith and reasonable diligence in all loan-servicing matters”
(Compl. at pg. 14), the Complaint does not adequately allege a legal duty of care in connection

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
with the transfer of the Loans to MOHELA. On the contrary, the facts alleged in the Complaint
suggest that no such duty existed. “Under California law, ‘as a general rule, a financial
institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan
transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.’”
Anderson v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. Americas, 649 F. App’x 550, 552 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095, 283 Cal. Rptr.
53, 56 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also Sheen, 12 Cal. 5th at 927 (holding that lender did not owe any
duty to borrower to process, review, and respond carefully and completely to borrower’s loan
modification application). Here, because there are no facts alleged in the Complaint to suggest
that Defendant’s role in the Loans exceeded the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender
of money, there is no basis on which to conclude that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care in
connection with the Loans. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not barred by the
statue of limitations, her claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a viable claim for
negligence.
5. UCL Claim
Plaintiffs fifth claim for violation of California’s UCL is based on four alleged acts of
misconduct by Defendant, including: (1) processing the Loans with a co-borrower, (11) failing to
provide disclosures allegedly required under TILA; (111) transferring her Loans to MOHELA
“under ambiguous and invalid circumstances”; and (iv) “[e]ngaging in predatory lending
practices that intentionally obscure loan terms and obligations, depriving Plaintiff... of [her]
legal rights to clarity and transparency...” (Compl. at pg 17.)
“Any action to enforce any cause of action pursuant to [the UCL] shall be commenced
within four years after the cause of action accrued.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. Here,
with the exception of the alleged transfer of the Loans to MOHELA in 2024, all allegations in
the Complaint relate to events that occurred at or around the time of the Loan’s inception in
2002. As such, to the extent Plaintiff's UCL claim is based on those alleged events, her claim
expired years ago. Because Plaintiff offers no basis for statutory or equitable tolling, any UCL
claim based on those allegations is time-barred.
With respect to the transfer of the Loans to MOHELA, the Complaint does not allege
facts to support a viable claim. To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show either (1) an
“unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,” or (2) “unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 22, 2003) (quoting” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). The UCL
“borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the [UCL] makes
independently actionable.” Cel-Tech Comme’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Ath 163, 180, 973 P.2d 527, 539-40 (1999) (citation and internal quotations omitted). To have
standing to assert a UCL claim, a plaintiff must alleged facts to show that she “suffered injury in
fact” and “lost money or property” as the result of the alleged unfair practice. Johnson v.
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1513, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 621 (2008) (citing
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 14, 2008).
Here, nothing alleged in the Complaint shows an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business
practice by Defendant. In fact, although Plaintiff claims that Defendant was not authorized to
transfer the Loans to MOHELA without Plaintiff's consent, her assertion is undercut by the
terms of the Loans themselves, each of which requires the borrower to agree to the following: “If
this Note is assigned, the assignee will become the owner of this Note and as my creditor will
have all your rights to enforce this Note against me.” (Docket No. 29 at pgs. 9, 14.) Moreover,
the Complaint fails to allege facts to adequately explain how the transfer of the Loans caused
Plaintiff to lose money or property and thus fails to establish Plaintiffs standing to assert a UCL
claim. As such, to the extent Plaintiff's UCL claim is not barred by the statue of limitations, her
claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
C. Leave to Amend
When assessing whether leave to amend is proper, courts consider “the presence or
absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed
amendment.” U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.
2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff did not request leave to amend, and nothing in Plaintiff's Opposition
suggests that she could provide additional facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Broam
v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Each of the claims asserted in the Complaint
is barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitations, and amendment of claims
barred by the statute of limitations would be futile. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec.,
Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). While Plaintiff's negligence and UCL claims appear
to be based in part on alleged events that occurred within the applicable limitations periods, the
Complaint fails to allege facts to establish the elements of either claim. Moreover, Plaintiff
offered no argument in support of either of those claims in her Opposition, suggesting Plaintiff
cannot state a viable negligence or UCL claim. See Tatum v. Schwartz, No. Civ. S-06-01440-
DFL-EFB, 2007 WL 419463, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb.5, 2007) (concluding plaintiff “tacitly
concede[d]” a claim “by failing to address defendants’ argument in her opposition’).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 25-1945 PA (SKx) Date May 1, 2025
Title Nwamaka C. Oh v. Navient Solutions, LLC
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in the Complaint
and that any amendment would be futile. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293,
1298 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although there is a general rule that parties are allowed to amend their
pleadings, it does not extend to cases in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility or
where the amended complaint would also be subject to dismissal.”’) (citation omitted); see
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. The
Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend and
dismisses this action with prejudice. The Scheduling Conference on calendar for May 5, 2025 is
vacated. The Court will enter a Judgment consistent with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920618. Public record. Not legal advice.