# Kelly v. Montgomery Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board (MAG+)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · May 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920391

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** May 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920391

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the necessity of tailoring methods to prevent vexatious in forma pauperis litigation while “minimizing the exclusion of valid claims” and avoiding “shutting the courthouse door” by placing an absolute bar on a litigant’s future filings

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

GREGORY KELLY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-cv-348-RAH-JTA
)
THE WATER WORKS AND ) (WO)
SANITARY SEWER BOARD OF THE )
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This action has been referred to the undersigned “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 for
further proceedings and determination or recommendation as may be appropriate.” (Doc.
No. 4.) Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Gregory Kelly’s second amended complaint.
(Doc. No. 43.)
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends Kelly’s second amended
complaint (Doc. No. 43) and this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply
with court orders and Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the
undersigned recommends Kelly be declared a vexatious litigant and future actions in which
he files shotgun complaints be summarily dismissed without prejudice.
I. JURISDICTION
This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action based on federal question
jurisdiction because some of Kelly’s causes of action arise under the Constitution and laws
of the United States.1 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court also may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b) [of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure], or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’”
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “All
shotgun pleadings share two characteristics in common.” Dorman v. Palm Beach Cnty.,
No. 19-81538-CIV, 2020 WL 2078527, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020). First, shotgun

complaints “‘fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.’”
Id. (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323). Second, shotgun complaints “‘waste scarce
judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate
court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.’” Id. (quoting Vibe Micro,

878 F.3d at 1295). As the court has previously explained to Kelly, the Eleventh Circuit has
defined shotgun pleadings as follows:
Though the groupings cannot be too finely drawn, we have identified four
rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings. The most common type—by
a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count

1 Though Kelly’s second amended complaint is not a model of clarity, it is possible to discern that
he seeks relief for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and a number of federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1983. (Doc. No. 43 at 19, 30.) He also seeks relief under several federal
nondiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(f)(1). (Id. at 28.) Although this is not an exhaustive list of the provisions of the United States
Constitution and federal laws under which Kelly asserts his claims, it is sufficient to establish the
existence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count
to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the
entire complaint. The next most common type, at least as far as our published
opinions on the subject reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal
sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being
replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun pleading is one
that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of
action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin
of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying
which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which
of the defendants the claim is brought against.

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (footnotes omitted).
“Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and precisely, issues are not
joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes unmanageable, the
litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s ability to administer justice.”
Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir.
1996). Therefore, the court has a duty to sua sponte order repleader where necessary so
that the claims are adequately defined for litigation, and where less drastic alternatives are
unavailing. Sullivan v. City of Dadeville, No. 3:22-cv-653-ECM-JTA, 2024 WL 3297677,
at *3 (M.D. Ala. July 3, 2024) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:22-cv-653-ECM, 2024 WL 4236298 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 2024); see also Magluta v.
Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (directing the district court on remand to
strike the shotgun complaint “and require a repleading of all claims in a complaint that
respects the requirements” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
If the plaintiff fails to comply with an order to cure the shotgun pleading issues, the
case may be dismissed with or without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s inherent powers to ensure compliance with its
orders. See Sullivan v. Prattville Health & Rehab., LLC, No. 3:22-cv-702-RAH-JTA, 2024

WL 2755683, at **10-11 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2024) (Order and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge) (collecting cases and recommending dismissal with prejudice for failure
to comply with the court’s prior orders to cure a shotgun complaint), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 943453 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2024). Whether to dismiss
a complaint under Rule 41(b) “is a matter committed to the district court’s discretion.”
Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240

n.14 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th
Cir. 1999)). “The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there is a ‘clear
record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”
Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Jones, 709 F.2d at 1458).
If a court finds a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, dismissal

for failure to comply with court orders may be a dismissal with prejudice. See McKinley v.
F.D.I.C., 645 F. App’x 910, 911 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing McKelvey v. AT & T Techs.,
Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). Dismissal with prejudice “is a sanction of last
resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances, and generally proper only where less
drastic sanctions are unavailable.” McKelvey, 789 F.2d at 1520.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal of Kelly’s Claims
Between March 14, 2024, and March 13, 2025, Kelly filed nine separate pro se
actions in the Middle District of Alabama against numerous Defendants. Throughout his
conglomeration of civil actions, Kelly alleges numerous discriminatory acts and
constellations of conspiracies by various entities, individuals, and state governmental
agencies.2 Four of those actions were3 referred to the undersigned. This is one of those

actions.
On January 2, 2025, the court entered an Order striking Kelly’s amended complaint
as a shotgun pleading and requiring him to amend his complaint not later than January 16,
2025. (Doc. No. 42.)4 The court noted that, prior to filing his amended complaint, Kelly
had already been warned about shotgun pleadings “in at least one other case,” but the court

nonetheless provided him “one . . . opportunity to amend his complaint to state what claims
he can with sufficient specificity.” (Doc. No. 42 at 9 (emphasis in original).) The court
provided Kelly instructions to enable him to file an adequately stated complaint. (Id. at 12-

2 See Kelly v. Ret. Sys. of Ala., Case No. 2:25-cv-202-MHT-CWB; Kelly v. Ala. Alcohol Control
Bd., et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00575-ECM-CWB; Kelly v. Elite Roofing, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:24-
cv-00388-MHT-JTA; Kelly v. Montgomery County and City Board, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-
00362-ECM-KFP; Kelly v. Montgomery Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd., et al., Case No. 2:24-
cv-00348-RAH-JTA; Kelly v. Ala. Dept. of Rehab. Servs., et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00343-ECM-
SMD; Kelly v. Montgomery Real Estate Buyers LLC, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00297-RAH-KFP;
Kelly v. Montgomery Reg’l Airport, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00266-RAH-SMD; Kelly v.
Montgomery Hous. Auth., et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00166-MHT-JTA.
3 Of the four cases originally assigned to the undersigned, one was reassigned to another Magistrate
Judge as referral judge on December 3, 2024: Kelly v. Alabama Department of Rehabilitation
Services, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-00343-ECM-SMD.
4 The relevant procedural history of this action prior to the entry of the January 2, 2025 Order is
adequately set forth in that Order and will not be repeated here. (See Doc. No. 42 at 6-7. 9.) Since
filing his amended complaint, Kelly filed a collection of motions seeking a hearing and show cause
orders, which the court resolved by an order entered March 10, 2025. (Docs. No. 45, 46.) In
addition, by separate order entered on today, the undersigned denied Kelly’s motion to amend and
motion for hearing filed March 18, 2025. It is unnecessary to further discuss the resolution of those
motions in this Recommendation.
15.) The court specifically “ADVISED [Kelly] that failure to timely file a second amended
complaint that complies with this Order may constitute grounds for dismissal for failure

to prosecute this case and for failure to comply with the Court’s orders.” (Id. at 13
(emphasis in original).) He was further advised that the undersigned would recommend
dismissal with prejudice. (Id.)
On January 14, 2025, Kelly filed a second amended complaint (Doc. No. 43.) Like
every other pleading Kelly has filed in this and other cases before the undersigned, Kelly’s
second amended complaint is a shotgun pleading. Many times, the undersigned has

explained to Kelly in this and other cases why his pleadings are shotgun pleadings. (See
Doc. No. 42 (explaining why Kelly’s amended complaint in this action constituted a
shotgun pleading).) See also, e.g., Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., No. 2:24-cv-166-
MHT-JTA, 2024 WL 1837195, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2024) (ordering Kelly to
amend a shotgun complaint), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-166-MHT,

2024 WL 3290734 (M.D. Ala. July 2, 2024). The court declines to provide Kelly another
detailed explanation.
Suffice it to say, the second amended complaint repeats many of the shotgun
pleading errors Kelly was specifically ordered to cure.5 “While Plaintiff sprinkles
throughout his pleading legal phrases and buzz words, there are no meaningful allegations

5 In fact, the second amended complaint, which is sixty-five pages long without exhibits and one
hundred eleven pages long including exhibits, doubles down on the shotgun pleading errors in the
amended complaint. (Docs. No. 21, 43.) By contrast, the amended complaint was forty-nine pages
long and had no exhibits. (Doc. No. 21.) Although extensive length alone is not necessarily a
defining characteristic of a shotgun pleading, in this case, the overabundant length of the second
amended complaint is directly attributable to shotgun pleading errors.
or plausible causes of action stated anywhere in the [c]omplaint; rather, it teems with
conclusory allegations, including many that are nonsensical.” Kelly v. Montgomery Real

Est., LLC, No. 2:24-cv-297-RAH-KFP, 2025 WL 648645, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Kelly v. Montgomery Real Est. Buyers LLC,
No. 2:24-cv-00297-RAH, 2025 WL 445252 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2025). In sum, the second
amended complaint “shares the ‘unifying characteristic of’ shotgun complaints: ‘it is
virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which
claim(s) for relief,’ or the grounds upon which each of Kelly’s claims rest.” Kelly v. Elite

Roofing, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-388-MHT-JTA, 2024 WL 5264873, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 31,
2024) (quoting Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., No. 2:24-cv-166-MHT-JTA, 2024 WL
1837195, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No.
2:24-cv-166-MHT, 2024 WL 3290734 (M.D. Ala. July 2, 2024)), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-388-MHT, 2025 WL 361163 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31,

2025).
Kelly’s second amended complaint violates the January 2, 2025 Order because it is
a shotgun complaint. The undersigned finds a record of delay and noncompliance with
court orders directing Kelly to file a pleading that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In all his pending cases before the undersigned, where he was ordered to amend

in compliance with Rule 8, Kelly has yet to file a complaint that is not a shotgun pleading.
The undersigned has considered consequences short of dismissal with prejudice and
concludes that none will suffice to protect judicial resources from an infinite loop of
striking shotgun complaints and allowing amendments. See Kelly v. Elite Roofing, LLC,
2024 WL 5264873, at *3 (“[T]he court cannot allow itself to be caught in an infinite loop
of striking shotgun complaints and allowing amendments.”). In this and all other actions

pending before the undersigned, Kelly has uniformly demonstrated that he cannot or will
not file a complaint that is not a shotgun pleading. Based on Kelly’s record, the undersigned
holds no hope either monetary sanctions or dismissal without prejudice can yield a proper
complaint. Simply put, no lesser sanctions than dismissal with prejudice would suffice
here.
Accordingly, this action is due to be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply

with court orders and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Johnson v.
Georgia, 661 F. App’x 578, 581 (11th Cir. 2016) (“In the light of [the pro se p]laintiff’s
continued failure to comply with federal pleading requirements, the district court
committed no error in dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.”).
B. Designation as a Vexatious Litigant and Consequences

In the January 2, 2025 Order, the undersigned provided Kelly the following
warning:
Kelly has been informed many times in multiple cases by the undersigned
and other judges in this district that shotgun complaints are not permitted. He
has been subjected to multiple orders in multiple cases instructing him to file
amended complaints that satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
those orders provided him with the information necessary to enable him to
comply. See, e.g., Kelly v. Elite Roofing, 2:24-CV-388-MHT-JTA, 2024 WL
4993858, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2024); Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth.,
2024 WL 1837195; see also, e.g., Kelly v. Ala. Dept. of Rehab. Servs., et al.,
Case No. 2:24-cv-00343-ECM-SMD (Doc. No. 31, December 20, 2024
Order). Nevertheless, he has yet to file a complaint that complies with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in any case before the undersigned.
Repeatedly filing documents that make the same errors after the court has
previously explained those errors to Kelly is “frivolous, waste[s] the court’s
limited resources, and unnecessarily delay[s] the resolution of the case on the
merits.” Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., No. 2:24-CV-166-MHT-JTA,
2024 WL 3240637, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 28, 2024). Further, as Kelly has
previously been advised on numerous occasions, his filings are subject to the
requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., 2024 WL 3240637 (explaining Kelly’s
obligations under Rule 11). Pleadings and motions must not be filed
frivolously or with cavalier disregard for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Lawsuits are serious matters, not “cheap lottery tickets to be
amassed in the vain hope that, on the improbable off chance, one may yield
a cash windfall.” Lietzke v. City of Montgomery, AL, No. 2:20-cv-1032-
WKW-JTA, 2023 WL 3937423, at *4 (M.D. Ala. June 9, 2023).

Therefore, Kelly is specifically warned that continuing to file shotgun
complaints in this or other actions—or the repeated filing of arguments or
motions the court has already explained are frivolous—may result in
further sanctions, including monetary sanctions and restrictions on his
filing privileges upon a finding that he is a vexatious litigant. See Kelly v.
Elite Roofing, LLC, Case No. 2:24-CV-388-MHT-JTA, 2024 WL 4994508,
at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2024) (“Plaintiff is ADVISED that he will be
subject to sanctions if he continues to clutter the dockets with motions and
other filings containing repeat attempts at raising the same frivolous
arguments.” (emphasis in original)). This warning applies to filings in future
lawsuits as well as in Kelly’s currently-pending actions.

(Doc. No. 42 at 11-12 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).)
In addition, the January 2, 2025 Order concluded with the following paragraph:
Kelly is ADVISED that filing another shotgun complaint will result in a
recommendation that this case be dismissed with prejudice, that he be
deemed a vexatious litigant, and that his filing privileges be appropriately
restricted.

(Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).)
At least one other judge in this District in at least two other cases has noted the
vexatious nature of Kelly’s shotgun complaints. Kelly v. Montgomery Real Est., LLC, 2025
WL 648645, at *6 (United States Magistrate Judge Kelly Fitzgerald Pate’s
recommendation of dismissal, noting “[t]he vexatious nature of this suit is further
evidenced by” Kelly’s shotgun pleadings in other actions)); Kelly v. Montgomery Cnty. &

City Bd., No. 2:24-cv-362-ECM-KFP, 2025 WL 430890, at *4 & n.4 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16,
2025) (same).
If, in each of Kelly’s many cases, he is not held to the same standard as other
litigants and required to comply with the basic rules of pleading, he will negatively impact
the efficiency of administration of justice and the allocation of limited court resources. See
Dorman, No. 2020 WL 2078527, at *1 (noting “[a]ll shotgun pleadings” inevitably “‘waste

. . . judicial resources’” (quoting Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2018)). “[J]udicial resources are far too scarce to be exploited by litigants who, after
being specifically advised about how to correct their errors and warned that failing to do
so will result in dismissal with prejudice, continue in their recalcitrance.” Nurse v. Sheraton
Atlanta Hotel, 618 F. App’x 987, 991 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Wagner v. First Horizon

Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly, the undersigned concludes it is time to declare Kelly a vexatious
litigant and impose consequences narrowly designed to address the vexatious conduct
without entirely closing the courthouse doors to him. See Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091,
1096–97 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the necessity of tailoring methods to prevent

vexatious in forma pauperis litigation while “minimizing the exclusion of valid claims”
and avoiding “shutting the courthouse door” by placing an absolute bar on a litigant’s
future filings). To accomplish that goal, the undersigned recommends that, for any shotgun
pleading Kelly files in the future, the court, after appropriate review, summarily dismiss
the pleading and the action without prejudice.6

The proposed consequences are narrowly tailored to preclude the court from
unnecessarily expending judicial resources fruitlessly repeating the process of explaining
to Kelly the rules of pleading, striking his shotgun pleadings, and allowing amendment
before ultimately dismissing the action. See Kelly v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., No. 2:24-
cv-166-MHT-JTA, 2025 WL 221796, at *7 n.2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2025) (explaining
Kelly’s pervasive pattern of “avoiding (or attempting to avoid) complying with orders to

address the merits of the motions to dismiss by mooting them with amended pleadings that
do not cure the deficiencies raised in the motions to dismiss or the shotgun pleading issues,”
and warning that the court will not allow itself to be caught in an “infinite loop” of
addressing successive shotgun pleadings). Further, in general,7 the proposed approach
would not shut the courthouse door to Kelly where he seeks judicial relief for legally

cognizable civil wrongs by filing a properly-pleaded complaint. Nor would it deprive Kelly

6 Stated plainly, the court will review Kelly’s complaint to determine if it is a shotgun pleading. If
the court deems the complaint a shotgun pleading, it will be summarily dismissed without
prejudice by the court. The court will not afford Kelly an opportunity to amend his complaint.
7 It is not inconceivable that the running of a statute of limitations at an inopportune time could
functionally deprive Kelly of the ability to seek relief in the event of dismissal without prejudice.
See Solis v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 700 F. App’x 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Where a dismissal has
the effect of precluding an appellant from refiling h[is] claim because the statute of limitations has
run, the dismissal is tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). That is a risk Kelly will take if he files a shotgun pleading.
of the opportunity to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the event of dismissal of a shotgun pleading.8

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the following:
1. Kelly’s second amended complaint (Doc. No. 43) be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to comply with court orders and Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. This action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with court

orders and Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Kelly be DECLARED a vexatious litigant.
4. As a consequence of Kelly’s vexatious filing of shotgun pleadings, in the
event Kelly files a shotgun complaint in the future, after appropriate review,
the court summarily dismiss the pleading and the action without prejudice.

Further, it is ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this
Recommendation on or before May 15, 2025. A party must specifically identify the factual
findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made;
frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that
this Recommendation is not a final order of the Court; therefore, it is not appealable.

8 The undersigned notes Kelly’s prior history of paying the $405.00 filing fee in his cases.
Hopefully, the prospect of paying another filing fee to initiate a new action will deter Kelly from
filing a shotgun pleading in the first instance. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir.
2008) (“As the Supreme Court has noted, filing fees in theory discourage frivolous lawsuits and
thus help allocate judicial resources to more meritorious cases.”).
Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a
party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered
in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district
court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by
the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (Sth Cir. 1982); 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning
Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
DONE this Ist day of May, 2025.

Mths
aig ADAMS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920391. Public record. Not legal advice.
