# Davis v. Muskogee, City of

> District Court, E.D. Oklahoma · May 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920332

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** May 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SHAKAYLA DAVIS, as Personal Representative )
of the Estate of RICKY DAVIS, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 22-CV-320-DES
)
CITY OF MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA; )
ROBERT “BOB” LYNCH; )
and JEREMY JENKINS, )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Jeremy Jenkins’ (“Defendant Jenkins”
or “Sergeant Jenkins”) Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Docket No. 42). On
April 10, 2025, a Hearing on this Motion was held where both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant
Jenkins were given the opportunity to present oral argument. (Docket No. 72). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendant Jenkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff’s allegations stem from an incident where Ricky Davis (“Mr. Davis”), following
a call to him accusing his minor daughter, Shalayna Davis, of stealing money and threatening
imminent harm to her, drove to his daughter’s location, called 9-1-1, and told the dispatcher that
two women were assaulting his daughter. (Docket No. 2 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that when Mr. Davis
arrived at the scene, his daughter was running down the street and got into his car. Id. at 5. Although
Mr. Davis initially drove away, he returned to the scene to retrieve his daughter’s purse and phone.
Id. It was upon this return that Plaintiff alleges the same individuals who assaulted Mr. Davis’
daughter began assaulting Mr. Davis and threatened to kill him and his family. Id. Plaintiff alleges
Mr. Davis had a concealed carry license, was carrying a firearm, and loudly told these individuals
that he had a gun and warned them to get back. Id. It was at this point that Officer Robert Lynch
(“Officer Lynch”) from Muskogee Police Department arrived1 and told Mr. Davis to “drop the
gun!”, which Mr. Davis did. Id. Officer Lynch then told Mr. Davis to “get on the ground!” Id.

Plaintiff alleges, this order to “get on the ground” caused Mr. Davis to pause. In September
2017, Plaintiff alleges Mr. Davis underwent a kidney transplant procedure that required extended
hospitalization. Id. at 3. In October 2017, Plaintiff further alleges Mr. Davis was injured in a car
accident that caused a kidney infection and required another surgery. Id. Plaintiff alleges, due to
his “history of dialysis, injections and IVs in his left forearm” an AV fistula and shunt was placed
in Mr. Davis’s forearm in March 2018. Id at 4. Once Officer Lynch ordered Mr. Davis to “get on
the ground,” Plaintiff alleges Mr. Davis said he could not get on the ground “due to his kidney
transplant,” to which Officer Lynch responded he did not care and repeated his command for Mr.
Davis to get on the ground. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Davis was fearful of being shot so he
got on the ground. Id. at 6. At this point, Sergeant Jenkins arrived on the scene and he and Officer

Lynch proceeded to handcuff Mr. Davis. Id. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Davis told the officers that he
could not have his left arm cuffed behind his back because it was restricted with medical devices
and because he had a kidney transplant. Id. Plaintiff alleges Sergeant Jenkins placed Mr. Davis
inside a squad car with his arms cuffed behind his back, which caused more pain and pressure on
the AV fistula and shunt. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Davis had difficulty breathing because the
squad car had no air conditioning. Id. After approximately forty-five (45) minutes, Plaintiff alleges
Mr. Davis was allowed to get out of the squad car and his handcuffs were removed. Id. Plaintiff
alleges Mr. Davis’s AV fistula was “visibly swollen, disfigured and protruding from his arm” and

1 Plaintiff disputes that Mr. Davis was pointing or waiving his gun at anyone on the scene, however, the body camera
footage shows Mr. Davis was waiving his gun around as Officer Lynch arrived on the scene.
that an EMT spoke to Mr. Davis about his medical history and looked at his left arm. Id. Plaintiff
alleges Mr. Davis returned home but presented to the hospital later that evening due to arm
swelling and significant pain. Id. Plaintiff claims, it was later determined that the AV fistula in his
left arm had “burst . . . . requiring[ing] additional invasive surgical intervention to repair the

damaged fistula and further hospitalization.” Id.
Plaintiff, Shakayla Davis, daughter of Mr. Davis and Personal Representative of the Estate
of Ricky Davis, filed this action on November 15, 2022 alleging: (1) excessive use of force in
violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all
Defendants, (2) negligence against Defendant City of Muskogee (“Defendant City”), (3) violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against all Defendants, and (4) deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against all Defendants. (Docket No. 2).
II. Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts and Plaintiff’s Responses
On September 19, 2024, Officer Lynch filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”)

including a list of forty-one (41) material undisputed facts (“MUFS”) pursuant to LCvR 56.1(b).
(Docket No. 41). On the same day, Defendant Jenkins filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment
and adopted all the MUFS included in Officer Lynch’s MSJ. (Docket No. 42 at 7). Defendants’
MUFS No. 4 indicates, Officer Lynch was dispatched to a disturbance where he encountered “a
chaotic scene with a crowd of people yelling and screaming at each other with someone holding a
stick and swinging it about as a weapon.” (Docket No. 41 at 13). Officer Lynch drew his taser and
stated, “hey, hey, drop it, drop it right now.” Id. The crowd continued to yell and scream at each
other, so Officer Lynch ordered them to “shut up! be quiet, be quiet.” Id. But despite his orders,
the crowd continued to yell and scream at each other.” Id. While Plaintiff admits Defendants’
MUFS No. 4, she provides her own additional facts regarding the activities that occurred prior to
police arriving on the scene. (Docket No. 50 at 5).
Defendants’ MUFS No. 5 indicates Officer Lynch then saw Mr. Davis with a gun in his
right hand, which he moved in an upward motion at a woman standing inches from him. (Docket

No. 41 at 13). He instructed Mr. Davis to “Hey! Hey! put that – drop that gun! drop the gun now!”
Id. Mr. Davis did not comply right away, so Officer Lynch again stated “drop the gun now! Drop
the gun now!” Id. Plaintiff denies that Mr. Davis “ever pointed his gun at anyone.” (Docket No.
50 at 5). Plaintiff further disputes that Mr. Davis did not comply with Officer Lynch’s order to drop
the gun, claiming that he complied within 3 seconds of such order. Id. Plaintiff further claims that
prior to dropping the gun, Mr. Davis “removed the magazine or clip.” Id. Defendants’ MUFS No.
6 states Officer Lynch additionally ordered Mr. Davis to “Get on the ground! Get on the ground!
Get on the ground now.” (Docket No. 41 at 13). “Mr. Davis then got on the ground, flat on his
stomach with his upper body off the ground supported by the weight of his arms as he laid there
without saying anything as Officer Lynch was trying to get control of the situation.” Id.

Defendants’ MUFS Nos. 7-9 indicate, while officer Lynch was dealing with the other individuals
on the scene, additional officers including Sergeant Jenkins arrived. Id. at 14. Defendants’ MUFS
No. 10 stated, Mr. Davis, while still laying on the ground, shifted his weight on his left side and
leaned up with his right side to speak with the officers who were standing next to him. Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff disputes this recitation of facts and claims instead that Mr. Davis was “holding his head
up and evenly balancing himself with both elbows.” (Docket No. 50 at 6). Mr. Davis only raised
his right hand for “approximately 2 seconds, while putting weight on his left elbow.” Id.
Defendants’ MUFS No. 11 states that Sergeant Jenkins approached Mr. Davis who rolled
flat on his stomach while Sergeant Jenkins “calmly ordered him, ‘put your hands behind your
back.’” (Docket No. 41 at 15). Mr. Davis then “shift[ed] his weight to his right side and put his left
arm behind his back to be handcuffed and then put his right arm behind his back and rolled to his
right side while Sergeant Jenkins handcuffed him.” Id. Plaintiff disputes the suggestions that
Sergeant Jenkins was clam or professional in his dealings with Mr. Davis. (Docket No. 50 at 6).

She further argues (even though Defendants’ MUFS No. 11 did not address this) that from Sergeant
Jenkins’ body camera footage, a mass on Mr. Davis’s wrist is seen while Sergeant Jenkins places
handcuffs, and while there is no audio on Sergeant Jenkins’ body camera footage, Sergeant Jenkins
can be seen “touch[ing] the mass on Mr. Davis’s left wrist and pull[ing] back on it.” Id. Plaintiff
argues this is proof that Sergeant Jenkins was aware of Mr. Davis’s AV fistula. Id. Defendants’
MUFS No. 14 states, “[o]nce the handcuffs were on Mr. Davis, Sergeant Jenkins allowed him to
continue to lay on his right side, although the others on the ground were lying flat, while Sergeant
Jenkins put his fingers in between the handcuffs to make sure they were loose on Mr. Davis and
then he double locked them to ensure they would not tighten up on him. Although Mr. Davis had
a fistula in his arm due to his kidney transplant, this was unknown to Sergeant Jenkins as you could

not see it from the back of his arm and Mr. Davis said nothing about having a fistula in his arm
that needed to be protected. He only informed Sergeant Jenkins, ‘Man, I got a kidney transplant’.
Sergeant Jenkins did notice something on Mr. Davis’s left forearm but he believed it to be a cyst,
or a deformity of some kind, or a growth, or an abnormality between his elbow and forearm. Mr.
Davis said nothing to him or anyone else around that it was a fistula that needed to be protected.”
(Docket No. 41 at 15-16). Plaintiff disputes all of Defendants’ MUFS No. 14 other than the fact
that Mr. Davis told Sergeant Jenkins that he had a kidney transplant to which Sergeant Jenkins
replied, “I don’t care, I’m not touching your damn kidney.” (Docket No. 50 at 7).
Defendants’ MUFS No. 18 indicates, Officer Lynch then assisted Sergeant Jenkins in lifting
Mr. Davis from the ground into a standing position. (Docket No. 41 at 17). While not overtly stated
in Defendants’ MUFS No. 18, Plaintiff denies “the suggestion that Sergeant Jenkins and Officer
Lynch caused no damage to Mr. Davis when they lifted him up off the pavement.” (Docket No. 50

at 7). Defendants’ MUFS No. 19 states, Mr. Davis told Sergeant Jenkins he could not sit on his
back in the car due to his “kidney transplant,” to which Sergeant Jenkins responded, “well you can
sit in there sideways or something.” (Docket No. 41 at 17). Defendants’ MUFS No. 21 indicates,
Mr. Davis requested his handcuffs be moved from behind him to his front, to which Sergeant
Jenkins responded, “[w]e can’t do that.” Id. at 17-18. Defendants’ MUFS No. 23 indicates, while
Mr. Davis did tell Sergeant Jenkins that he could not put his arms behind his back, he did not tell
Sergeant Jenkins why. Id. at 18. Plaintiff, in response, “denies the suggestion that Mr. Davis was
required, under the circumstances, to explain why he couldn’t have his arms behind him.” (Docket
No. 50 at 8). She also argues that Sergeant Jenkins “already knew that Mr. Davis: (A) had kidney
transplant; and (B) had a fistula in his wrist or forearm.” Id. Defendants’ MUFS No. 25 states, after

sitting in a patrol car for approximately seven minutes Mr. Davis told another officer on scene,
Officer Bemo, that he “had renal failure, had a kidney transplant, and that he needed some water.”
(Docket No. 41 at 18). Officer Bemo requested an ambulance to come check on Mr. Davis. Id.
Plaintiff admits the facts contained in Defendants’ MUFS No. 25 but adds that while asking for
water, Mr. Davis was in obvious distress and “had genuine panic in [his] voice” to which “Officer
Bemo2 was utterly dismissive.” (Docket No. 50 at 8).
Defendants’ MUFS No. 26 states, “[a]t approximately eight minutes after having been put
into the patrol car, Mr. Davis (for the first time) announced only to Officer Bemo, ‘I’ve got that

2 Officer Bemo is not a named Defendant. Plaintiff does not allege any claims against him.
fistula on my arm and you ain’t supposed to have nothing on there. You ain’t supposed to have
nothing restricting it . . .’” (Docket No. 41 at 19). Plaintiff only “disputes the assertion that Bemo
was the first officer who Mr. Davis notified of his fistula.” (Docket No. 50 at 9). Defendants’
MUFS No. 27 indicates that Officer Bemo explained to Mr. Davis why he had to be handcuffed,

which Mr. Davis seemed to understand, stating, “I know, give me water, I’m fine with the
handcuffs, just give me some water.” (Docket No. 41 at 19). Plaintiff admits this MUFS but
indicates that it omits pertinent facts. (Docket No. 50 at 9).
Defendants’ MUFS No. 32 indicates “Mr. Davis then stated to Officer Bemo regarding his
handcuffs, ‘I need this thing off my wrist.’” (Docket No. 41 at 20). Officer Bemo, having
determined what had happened and being assured that Mr. Davis was not a threat, responded, “can
– can you sit down if I take them off?” Id. Mr. Davis agreed, and Officer Bemo patted him down
for officer safety and removed the handcuffs. Id. Mr. Davis stated, “I need water more than
anything, sir.” Id. Officer Bemo then asked another officer to get Mr. Davis’s bottled water out of
his car, although he did ask Mr. Davis, “ain’t nothing crazy in it, is there?” Mr. Davis responded

that he “can’t take no crazy stuff. I got a kidney transplant.” Id. The other officer brought Mr. Davis
his bottled water and Mr. Davis continued to explain what happened at the scene. Id. Officer Bemo
informed dispatch that Mr. Davis has “some kidney issues. He said he just needed some water
. . .” Id. Again, Plaintiff admits this MUFS is factually correct but indicates that it omits pertinent
facts. (Docket No. 50 at 9).
Defendants’ MUFS No. 34 states that EMS personnel asked Mr. Davis if he wanted to go
to the hospital multiple times and he responded, “I’m okay. I just had ten minutes to release this
arm.” “I’m okay man. I just had to sit here for a few minutes. I’m okay.” (Docket No. 41 at 21).
When EMS asked Mr. Davis if he was hurt, Mr. Davis responded, “I just need – I just got too
sweaty and I told him I can’t (unintelligible). . . . I said, you can’t put no cuffs on me. I’m not – no
threat. And he kept on putting them behind my back anyway.” Id. Plaintiff “vehemently disputes”
the assertion that Mr. Davis did not tell Sergeant Jenkins that he had a fistula on his arm and only
told him he was “not a threat.” (Docket No. 50 at 10). Plaintiff further disputes that Mr. Davis

made no medical complaints to EMS, and notes that body camera footage shows the “fistula on
Mr. Davis’s left arm was obviously and extremely swollen.” Id. Defendants’ MUFS No. 35
indicates that while Mr. Davis refused medical treatment or to be taken to the hospital at the scene,
he did present at Wagoner Community Hospital emergency room later that evening. Id. Medical
records indicate he had “minor abrasions to his knee and wrists and soft tissue swelling at his
fistula.” (Docket No. 41 at 21). Defendants’ MUFS No. 35 further states that “Mr. Davis’s past
medical records show that Plaintiff’s fistula was inserted in 2014. [S]ix months before this incident
Mr. Davis had undergone a fistulagram to widen the artery due to stenosis . . . . The medical
records reflect that at that time he was ‘not using the fistula now due to his renal transplant one
year ago.’ Following the incident, on September 24, 2018, Plaintiff underwent the same procedure

again due to the stenosis in his artery. Thereafter, he had several fistulagrams and eventually had
the fistula removed since it was not necessary, due to his functioning kidneys.” Id. Plaintiff
“disputes any suggestion that Mr. Davis’s subsequent procedures on the fistula were unrelated to
the use[ ] of police force on September 18, 2018”; however, rather than citing to any medical
records, Plaintiff references Mr. Davis’s own verified answers to interrogatories and photographs
as evidence. (Docket No. 51 at 10). Plaintiff does reference Mr. Davis’s medical records in her
“Additional Facts Precluding Summary Judgment” where she notes, “Mr. Davis presented to
Wagoner County Community Hospital complaining that ‘he was handcuffed by Muskogee Police
and handcuff to left wrist caused fistula to swell and become painful.’. . . A physical examination
at the hospital showed that Mr. Davis’s left forearm was ‘tender with fistula in place obvious thrill’3
and ‘left knee with multiple abrasions . . .’” Id. at 12.
Defendants’ MUFS No. 39 indicates that Mr. Davis never told Sergeant Jenkins he had an
arm fistula or medical device that could not be restricted, and Sergeant Jenkins “believed that Mr.

Davis had a cyst or other abnormality or deformity on his arm.” (Docket No. 41 at 22). Plaintiff
specifically disputes this assertion. (Docket No. 50 at 10). Defendants’ MUFS No. 40 states, “Mr.
Davis was in handcuffs for a total of fifteen minutes and fifteen seconds.” (Docket No. 41 at 22).
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ MUFS No. 40. (Docket No. 50 at 11).
III. Analysis
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party
demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact, and the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmovant. Georgelas v. Desert Hill Ventures, Inc., 45 F.4th 1193, 1197 (10th Cir. 2022). The
nonmovant must then make a showing sufficient to establish an inference of the existence of each
element essential to his case. Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1994). “If a party
that would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not come forward with sufficient evidence
on an essential element of its prima facie case, all issues concerning all other elements of the claim

3 A correctly functioning fistula has a bruit (a pulse that you can hear) and a thrill (a pulse that can be felt). A bruit
and thrill are normal findings in a healthy fistula and indicate blood flow. Patients are instructed to consult a
physician immediately if either the bruit or thrill appear reduced or absent. See
https://www.azuravascularcare.com/infodialysisaccess/what-is-a-dialysis-fistula-bruit/ (last visited April 25, 2025).
and any defenses become immaterial,” and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671(10th Cir. 1998).
A. Claim of Excessive Force
Both parties agree, excessive force claims arising under the Fourth Amendment must be

analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–
95 (1989). The question to be asked is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.” Id. at 397. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance
for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount
of force necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 387. The use of force at issue here is the
handcuffing performed by Sergeant Jenkins, and the question for the Court is whether Sergeant
Jenkins’ handcuffing of Mr. Davis was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances. In determining whether Sergeant Jenkins’ use of force was reasonable, the facts the

Court should consider are: 1) the severity of the crime at issue, 2) whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of officers and others, and 3) whether he is actively resisting arrest.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Under this test, the Court must analyze the totality of the circumstances.
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 2020 (2014).
Under the facts presented, Sergeant Jenkins arrived at a chaotic scene where Officer Lynch
had his gun drawn and was ordering individuals to “get on the ground!” (Docket No. 41 at 14).
Officer Lynch then directed the arriving officers to a gun on the ground and indicated that it was
Mr. Davis’s gun. Id. Factor number one under Graham is the severity of the crime at issue. Mr.
Davis was armed and pointing his weapon at individuals during an altercation, id. at 13, 16, 17, 19
and 20, see also Docket No. 50 at 11; Docket No. 41-10 at 3, 8, 14, 28; and Docket No. 41-21,
which, as Defendants argue, is a felony in Oklahoma.4 Plaintiff does not dispute that Mr. Davis
arrived on the scene with a gun. (Docket No. 50 at 11). Plaintiff initially disputes that Mr. Davis
pointed his gun at anyone, id. at 5; however, in her additional facts Plaintiff indicates that Mr.

Davis told 911 dispatch that he was “holding a weapon on the assailants.” Id. at 11. Despite the
fact Mr. Davis had a license to carry a firearm, waiving a gun, or pointing it at individuals during
an altercation is severe and weighs in favor of Defendant Jenkins.
The second factor under Graham “is undoubtedly the most important and fact intensive
factor in determining the objective reasonableness of an officer's use of force.” Pauly v. White, 874
F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th Cir. 2017). This factor looks at the immediate threat the suspect poses to
officers and others. Plaintiff argues the evidence shows that Mr. Davis posed no immediate threat
to Sergeant Jenkins or anyone else, (Docket No. 50 at 15), which is true when viewing this case in
hindsight. However, reasonableness is analyzed from the perspective of the officer on the scene
rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight. Plumhoff , 572 U.S. at 775. While Mr. Davis was on

the ground when he was handcuffed, officers on the scene still had to complete their investigation
of a brawl in the street in which at least one individual had a gun. (Docket No. 41 at 19). The
Supreme Court has determined that handcuffing during an investigation does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005) (handcuffing was an appropriate
response to officer-safety concerns even during investigative detentions). Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit has held “[u]nder the second factor, an officer may use increased force when a suspect is

4 See Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.16 - Felony Pointing Firearms, which makes it unlawful to point a firearm “at any
person . . . for the purpose of threatening . . . or with any malice or for any purpose of injuring, either through physical
injury or mental or emotional intimidation or for purposes of whimsy, humor or prank, or in anger or otherwise . . . .”;
and Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 645 - Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon, which provides in pertinent part: “every
person who, with intent to do bodily harm and without justifiable or excusable cause, commits any assault, battery, or
assault and battery upon the person of another with any sharp or dangerous weapon . . . upon conviction is guilty of a
felony . . . .”
armed, repeatedly ignores police commands, or makes hostile motions towards the officer or
others.” Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2020). Once the chaotic scene was
clear and officers concluded their investigation, Mr. Davis’s handcuffs were removed. (Docket
No. 41 at 20). Accordingly, the second factor also weighs in favor of Defendant Jenkins.

The third Graham factor is whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest. The Court
agrees that Mr. Davis was mostly compliant and cooperative with officers on the scene and that
there was no indication he was resisting. Although Defendants argue that Mr. Davis may have
been less than compliant when initially ordered to drop his gun, they concede that he did comply.
In viewing the evidence, even in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Sergeant Jenkins arrived
to a highly chaotic scene where Officer Lynch had his weapon drawn and was still ordering various
individuals to comply. Officer Lynch directed Sergeant Jenkins to Mr. Davis and informed him
that Mr. Davis had a gun. Sergeant Jenkins then applied handcuffs to Mr. Davis while an
investigation into the altercation was undertaken. All of this is reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances present here.

Finally, the question turns to whether the handcuffing of Mr. Davis was reasonable given
his medical condition. Plaintiff argues “[h]andcuffing Mr. Davis behind his back, tightly and
directly around the fistula . . . posed a serious risk of exacerbating his pre-existing condition, and
was objectively unreasonable.” (Docket No. 50 at 16). However, the facts presented indicate that
the handcuffs were not excessively tight nor where they directly around the fistula. (Docket No.
41 at 15 and Docket No. 42 at 13). Furthermore, there is no indication in the records that establishes
Sergeant Jenkins knew that handcuffing Mr. Davis with a fistula posed a serious risk of
exacerbating his condition. Plaintiff alleges in her Response as well as at the oral hearing that this
case is analogous to the case of Fisher v. City of Las Curces, 584 F. 3d. 888 (10th Cir. 2009). In
Fisher, Robert Fisher accidently shot himself in the stomach and in the bicep prior to officers
arriving on the scene. Id. at 891-92. When officers arrived, they assessed Mr. Fisher and his injuries
with one officer doing his best to staunch the bleeding coming from Mr. Fisher’s stomach and
bicep, noting that Mr. Fisher’s bicep was “quickly swelling” and indicating to the other officer that

a bullet might still be lodged there. Id. at 892. Despite these obvious injuries, officers still ordered
Mr. Fisher to “lay flat on his wounded stomach and spread his arms over his head.” Id. When Mr.
Fisher did not comply because he physically could not do so, officers proceed to handcuff him
behind his back, which took force to do as Mr. Fisher’s swollen bicep would not allow for the
movement. Id. The manner of handcuffing, combined with his wounds, caused Mr. Fisher
excruciating pain. Id. While the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that “the initial decision
to handcuff Fisher was not unreasonable . . . the manner in which the officers handcuffed Fisher
. . . constituted excessive force.” Id. at 893. The Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that a
reasonable jury could find that the officers employed greater force than reasonably necessary under
the circumstances; however, the Tenth Circuit also noted “[w]e hasten to add this might be a very

different case if the officers had no knowledge of Fisher's injuries . . . .” Id at 896. The facts in
Fisher are clearly distinguishable from the present case.
In this case, the record indicates that Sergeant Jenkins definitely knew that Mr. Davis had
a kidney transplant. Despite this, Mr. Davis did not appear in distress, and he was physically
capable of standing, sitting, and getting on the ground when instructed to. There is nothing in the
record indicating that Mr. Davis’s kidney transplant caused him to need immediate medical
assistance for which handcuffing posed a serious risk of exacerbating his condition. Nonetheless,
the record does show that Sergeant Jenkins allowed Mr. Davis to lay on his side while handcuffed,
assisted him in getting up from the ground, helped him into the patrol car, and told him he could
sit sideways for his comfort. (Docket No. 42 at 13). This demonstrates that Sergeant Jenkins
allowed some accommodations to prevent possible injury based on Mr. Davis’s kidney issues.
Whether Sergeant Jenkins knew Mr. Davis had an AV fistula is debated, but he was aware
Mr. Davis had something protruding on his arm. (Docket No. 41 at 22). Based on this knowledge,

Sergeant Jenkins’ used minimal force to place handcuffs on Mr. Davis, checked that they were not
too tight by placing his fingers between the cuffs and Mr. Davis’s wrist, and then double locked
the cuffs to assure they would not tighten up. (Docket No. 42 at 13). Furthermore, Sergeant Jenkins
placed the handcuffs very low on Mr. Davis’s wrists “essentially on his hands” away from the
protrusion on Mr. Davis’s wrists. Id. Based on the evidence presented, Sergeant Jenkins did make
accommodations to Mr. Davis based on the health concerns he was aware of. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that Sergeant Jenkins knew that handcuffing Mr. Davis posed a serious risk
of exacerbating Mr. Davis’s medical condition. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that Sergeant Jenkins even knew what an AV fistula was. While a fistula is not an
uncommon medical device, it is not common enough that the general population would know what

it is and its implications. Accordingly, Sergeant Jenkins is entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.
B. Claim of Deliberate Indifference as to Serious Medical Need
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees the same degree of medical
attention as the Eighth Amendment provides to inmates. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-
37, (1979). This means, that the Fourteenth Amendment may be violated in instances where an
officer is deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs. See, e.g., Olsen v.
Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315-17 (10th Cir. 2002); Prado v. Lane, 98 F. App'x 757, 759-
60 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Est of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 433-34 (10th Cir. 2014).
To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must
satisfy “both an objective and a subjective component.” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted). “First, the detainee must produce objective evidence that the
deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious . . . . A medical need is sufficiently serious if it

is one . . . that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor's attention.” Est. of Booker, 745 F.3d at 430 (quotations omitted); see also Sealock v.
Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). “Second, under the subjective component,
the detainee must establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by presenting
evidence of the [officer’s] culpable state of mind.” Est. of Booker, 754 F.3d at 430 (quotation
omitted). He must show that the officer “acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). “The Supreme Court [has]
cautioned that ‘an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care’ does not rise to a
constitutional violation.” Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976)).

For purposes of his MSJ, “Sergeant Jenkins concedes that Mr. Davis had a serious medical
condition, therefore Plaintiff has satisfied the first component.” (Docket No. 42 at 18). Defendant
Jenkins, however, argues that Plaintiff cannot meet her burden as to the subjective component. Id.
To satisfy the subjective component, Plaintiff must show Sergeant Jenkins knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Davis’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Sergeant
Jenkins ‘“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227,
1231 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Here, the evidence shows that Mr. Davis
did not complain of pain to Sergeant Jenkins, nor did he display signs or symptoms that he was
suffering any medical condition. Mr. Davis did affirmatively state that he had a kidney transplant,
which Sergeant Jenkins made accommodations for, as discussed above. Mr. Davis did not request
medical attention from Sergeant Jenkins and appeared to tolerate the handcuffs behind his back
when he was told that they would not be removed or placed in front of him. Sergeant Jenkins

testified that he saw something on Mr. Davis’s arm that he believed to be a cyst, a deformity of
some kind, or a growth or other abnormality. (Docket No. 41 at 15-16 and 41-8 at 3). From the
evidence produced by the Defendants, Sergeant Jenkins testified that he was not aware that Mr.
Davis would need emergent medical care, it was his understanding that Mr. Davis refused medical
treatment at the scene, and when he was handcuffing Mr. Davis he noticed a “cyst, growth, some
sort of abnormality” which caused him to place the handcuffs down below it “enough to where it
wasn’t on [it].” (Docket 41-8 at 3, 5, and 6). Plaintiff does not present any evidence that Sergeant
Jenkins knew Mr. Davis had an AV fistula, or that Sergeant Jenkins knew that an AV fistula was
a serious medical condition that required medical attention. Plaintiff points to Mr. Davis’s “Citizen
Complaint” as evidence that he told Sergeant Jenkins of his AV fistula, however, the Citizen

Complaint does not specify Sergeant Jenkins as the individual Mr. Davis informed. (See Docket
No. 50-5). We know from the record that Mr. Davis told Officer Bemo he had an AV fistula that
could not be restricted, but there is no evidence that Sergeant Jenkins knew this. (Docket No. 50-
6 at 42-43). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Sergeant Jenkins was aware that Mr.
Davis had an AV fistula on his arm and simply disregarded it, or that Sergeant Jenkins even knew
what an AV fistula was. There is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that Sergeant
Jenkins knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Davis’s health or safety as it related to
his AV fistula. As to Mr. Davis’s kidney issues, there is evidence that Sergeant Jenkins made
accommodations to Mr. Davis for his kidney issues, and therefore was not deliberately indifferent
to this medical condition.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that shows Mr. Davis suffered a substantial
harm as a result of the Defendants’ interactions with him. The medical records presented by
Defendants show prior to the incident at issue, Mr. Davis underwent a fistulagram5 due to stenosis6

on March 8, 2018. (Docket No. 41-12). Furthermore, he was seen on June 1, 2018, at Cherokee
Three Rivers HC to follow up on his fistula. (Docket No. 41-13). These records note that Mr. Davis
was not using his fistula due to renal transplant and was told he may be able to have the fistula
removed. Id. Medical records from the date of incident at issue show that Mr. Davis was seen at
Wagoner Community Hospital on September 18, 2018, complaining of pain and swelling to fistula
due to handcuffing. (Docket Nos. 41-11 at 4). He told the staff at Wagoner Community Hospital
that he has not been on dialysis since having a kidney transplant and that he was supposed to get
a referral soon to have the fistula removed. Id. at 5. Soft tissue swelling was noted in his left wrist
and Tylenol and ice were recommended for pain. Id. Mr. Davis was told to follow up with his

primary care provider “this week to discuss options for fistula.” Id. On September 24, 2018, Mr.
Davis underwent a second fistulagram due to stenosis. (Docket No. 41-14). There was no
indication from the records that this subsequent fistulagram was related to the incident at issue.7

5 A fistulagram is a minimally invasive procedure used to identify problems with blood flow through an arteriovenous
fistula or graft. “It involves the placement of a tiny needle into the fistula/graft and injection of contrast dye which
enables visualization within the fistula/graft.” A fistulagram may reveal “that the blood flow is not high enough,
pressures in the vein are too high or the graft is clotting frequently.” https://www.emoryhealthcare.org/centers-
programs/radiology/diagnosis/fistulagram (last visited April 28, 2025).

6 Stenosis is “the narrowing of a passageway in [the] body that prevents a certain substance or structure (like blood
or nerves from passing through as easily as it should.” https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/stenosis-
stricture (last visited April 28, 2025).

7 Plaintiff argues that Mr. Davis’s verified responses to Interrogatories, which indicate that as a result of the incident
at issue he was “forced to undergo multiple surgeries to repair damage to his AV fistula” support his claim that his
subsequent procedures were necessitated by Defendants’ actions; however, Plaintiff also indicates that he is not a
physician and therefore not qualified identify the damages caused by Defendants. (Docket No. 50-4 at 7). Plaintiff’s
Id. On March 11, 2019, Mr. Davis underwent a third fistulagram due to stenosis. (Docket Nos. 41-
16 and 50-3 at 1). There is no indication from the records that this subsequent fistulagram was
related to the incident at issue. Id. On June 21, 2019, Mr. Davis underwent a ligation of his AV
fistula due to an aneurysm located on his fistula.8 (Docket Nos. 41-17 and 50-3 at 4-7). There is

no indication from the records that this fistula aneurysm was related to the incident at issue. Id.
Moreover, on October 12, 2018, Mr. Davis was seen for a renal sonogram as a follow up from his
kidney transplant. (Docket No. 41-15). The results of this sonogram showed there was no change
in his transplanted kidney. Id. There is no evidence presented in the record indicating Mr. Davis
suffered substantial harm as a result of Sergeant Jenkins’ handcuffing. While he was seen at an ER
following the handcuffing and complaining of pain and swelling to his fistula, the records do not
indicate the fistula was damaged or not functioning properly.9 Therefore, any injury Mr. Davis
may have had as a result of his detention by officers would be considered de minimis. Accordingly,
Sergeant Jenkins is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference.
C. Qualified Immunity

Additionally, Defendant Jenkins contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This doctrine is intended “to shield officials from

counsel admitted at the oral hearing, that apart from this Interrogatory, there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim
that Mr. Davis had to undergo additional surgeries as a result of being handcuffed on September 18, 2018.

8 An aneurysm is a “weak spot in the wall” of an AV fistula that “can expand and eventually burst if not treated.”
https://www.azuravascularcare.com/infodialysisaccess/aneurysms-and-pseudoaneurysms-in-dialysis-access/ (last
visited April 28, 2025).

9 The evidence of “obvious thrill” in the medical records suggests there was adequate blood flow through the fistula.
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably,” while also
ensuring that officials who “exercise power irresponsibly” are held accountable. Id. Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their conduct violated clearly
established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known.

Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999)). Qualified immunity protection
applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of
fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567
(2004) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).
“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the
constitutional right was clearly established.” Baca v. Casper, 128 F.4th 1319, 1324-25 (10th Cir.
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). A constitutional right is clearly established if it is
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). A Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit

decision on point or the weight of authority from other courts can clearly establish a constitutional
right. Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018).
The Court agrees that alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were
clearly established by law at the time of Mr. Davis’s alleged injury. Claims for excessive force and
deliberate indifference are not novel within this Court. However, to secure the denial of qualified
immunity, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both prongs. Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584
F.3d 888, 893 (10th Cir. 2009).
As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to present evidence that Sergeant Jenkins’ actions
violated a constitutional right by failing to show that Sergeant Jenkins’ use of force was
unreasonable. As set forth above, Sergeant Jenkins used minimal force to handcuff Mr. Davis, and
the handcuffing was not unreasonable or excessive based on the totality of the circumstances. Even
though Mr. Davis informed Sergeant Jenkins he had a kidney transplant, this medical condition
was not so serious that handcuffing Mr. Davis behind his back posed a serious risk of exacerbating

his preexisting condition. Furthermore, Sergeant Jenkins did provide Mr. Davis accommodations
to account for his kidney condition by allowing Mr. Davis to lay on his side rather than his stomach,
and to sit sideways in the patrol car for comfort. There is no evidence to suggest that Sergeant
Jenkins applied any pressure or force to Mr. Davis’s back or kidney area, nor was he denied
medical treatment. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to establish that Sergeant Jenkins knew that Mr.
Davis had an AV fistula on his wrist and knew what that meant with regards to handcuffing.
Sergeant Jenkins testified that he saw a “cyst, growth, some sort of abnormality” on Mr. Davis’s
wrist which caused him to place the handcuffs down below it “enough to where it wasn’t on [it],”
but there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Sergeant Jenkins was aware of any medical
condition in which handcuffing Mr. Davis would pose a serious risk of exacerbating a preexisting

condition. (Docket 41-8 at 3, 5, and 6). As such, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment
and Sergeant Jenkins is entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim.
Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiff fails to show that Sergeant Jenkins was
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need or caused serious medical harm. As such, there
is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Sergeant Jenkins is entitled to summary
judgment and qualified immunity as to this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Sergeant Jenkins is entitled to summary
judgment on all claims. The undisputed material facts, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, do not establish a violation of Mr. Davis’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment

rights. The use of force, consisting solely of handcuffing Mr. Davis during an ongoing
investigation, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, the record fails to
show that Sergeant Jenkins was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need or that Mr. Davis
suffered substantial harm as a result of the handcuffing. Plaintiff has not met her burden to
demonstrate that Sergeant Jenkins violated clearly established law, and therefore, he is also entitled
to qualified immunity. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Sergeant Jenkins
on all claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of April, 2025.

____________________________________
D. Edward Snow
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10920332. Public record. Not legal advice.