# O'Driscoll v. Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900733

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

WILLIAM O’DRISCOLL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1984-VMC-LSG

ARBOR GROVE CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida
not for profit corporation and
RESOURCE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
Defendants.
_______________________________/

Order

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendants Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc. (“Arbor
Grove”) and Resource Property Management’s (“RPM”) Motion for
Costs (Doc. # 72), and Plaintiff William O’Driscoll’s
Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs and for
Multiplier (Doc. # 73), both filed on November 18, 2024. For
the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted in
part and denied in part, and Mr. O’Driscoll’s Motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
Mr. O’Driscoll initiated this action against Arbor Grove
and RPM on August 29, 2022. (Doc. # 1). On November 14, 2022,
Mr. O’Driscoll filed an amended complaint, which is the
operative complaint. (Doc. # 9). Count One of the complaint
alleged a violation by both RPM and Arbor Grove of the Florida
Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), and Count Two
alleged a violation by RPM of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”). (Id. at 6-7). Given the extensive
litigation history of this case and the parties’ familiarity

with the same, the Court will only recite the facts relevant
to this Motion.
On February 7, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied
in part Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.
(Doc. # 49). The Court ordered that “[s]ummary judgment is
granted in favor of Arbor Grove and RPM and against Plaintiff
William O’Driscoll as to whether Arbor Grove and RPM properly
imposed the $300 and $200 fines, and whether O’Driscoll can
recover attorney’s fees for his defense during the state court
action seeking an injunction against him. The case will
proceed to trial on all other issues.” (Id. at 37).

Before trial, RPM and Arbor Grove stipulated that they
violated the FCCPA, and RPM stipulated that it violated the
FDCPA. (Doc. # 50 at 1-2). The two-day jury trial concluded
with a verdict of $2,000 in statutory damages against RPM —
$1,000 for violating the FDCPA and $1,000 for violating the
FCCPA — and $0 in statutory damages against Arbor Grove. (Doc.
# 60). The jury awarded no actual damages to Mr. O’Driscoll.
(Id.). On April 30, 2024, the Court accordingly entered
judgment in favor of Mr. O’Driscoll and against Arbor Grove
and RPM for $2,000. (Doc. # 68).
Mr. O’Driscoll and Defendants filed cross-motions for
entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. ## 65, 67).

On November 4, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in
part each of the motions. (Doc. # 71). The Court determined
that “Mr. O’Driscoll is entitled to recover reasonable
attorney’s fees from RPM incurred during the entirety of this
action . . . [and] reasonable costs from RPM incurred up until
the point of the service of the Offer of Judgment on March 9,
2023.” (Id. at 18). The Court further concluded that “RPM and
Arbor Grove are entitled to recover reasonable costs incurred
after the service of the Offer of Judgment on March 9, 2023.”
(Id.).
Defendants also move for costs (Doc. # 72), and Mr.

O’Driscoll moves for attorney’s fees, costs, and a
multiplier. (Doc. # 73). Mr. O’Driscoll filed two notices of
supplemental authority in support of his Motion. (Doc. ## 77,
78). The Motions are fully briefed (Doc. ## 72, 73, 74, 75,
77, 78), and now ripe for review.
II. Discussion
A. Defendants’ Motion for Costs
In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits the Court to
tax the following as costs: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses; and (4) fees for

exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use
in the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(4). This includes
depositions. See United States v. Kolesar, 313 F.2d 835, 837–
38 (5th Cir.1963) (“Though 1920(2) does not specifically
mention a deposition, . . . depositions are included by
implication in the phrase ‘stenographic transcript.’”).
Defendants seek to recover $2,388.35 in costs incurred
after March 9, 2023. (Doc. # 72 at 4). Specifically, the
following itemized costs: (1) $434.75 for a transcript of the
deposition of Ed Evans, Defendants’ corporate representative,

taken on May 18, 2023; (2) $1,726.60 for costs associated
with Mr. O’Driscoll’s deposition, including a Court Reporter
and transcript, taken on April 25, 2023; (3) $130.00 in costs,
including an $85.00 rush fee, for a private process server to
subpoena records from Dr. Harshadkumar Patel, Mr.
O’Driscoll’s treating psychiatrist and expert witness; and
(4) $97.00 for the costs of production of Mr. O’Driscoll’s
records from Dr. Patel. (Id. at 3); see also (Doc. ## 72-1,
72-2, 72-3, 72-4).
Mr. O’Driscoll does not oppose $1,420.60 of the costs
sought – namely, $1,375.60 of the costs incurred for a court
reporter for Mr. O’Driscoll’s deposition, and $45.00 of the

fees associated with serving the subpoena upon Dr. Patel.
(Doc. # 75 at 3). However, Mr. O’Driscoll opposes the
remainder of the costs.
Upon review, the Court finds that Defendants’ proposed
costs are recoverable and reasonable, with one exception.
Defendants did not explain why a rush fee was necessary to
subpoena Dr. Patel, particularly as Mr. O’Driscoll points
out, the invoice indicates that the process server took nearly
two weeks to even attempt service. Therefore, the Court finds
the $85.00 rush fee unreasonable.
The Court, however, is not persuaded by Mr. O’Driscoll’s

remaining objections. He provides no legal basis for his
arguments. Although Mr. Evans’ was not called to testify at
trial, which Mr. O’Driscoll submits should bar recovery of
the costs associated with his deposition transcript, his
deposition was used at the summary judgment stage and the
costs are recoverable. See EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600,
621 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A district court may tax costs
‘associated with the depositions submitted by the parties in
support of their summary judgment motions.’” (citation
omitted)). The subpoenaed medical records used at summary
judgment are recoverable as well.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and

denied in part. Defendants are entitled to recover costs in
the amount of $2,303.35.
B. Mr. O’Driscoll’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
and for Multiplier
Next, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel moves for an award of
$92,033.75 in attorney’s fees and partial costs, which
reflects a 2.15 multiplier of counsel’s proposed lodestar.
(Doc. # 73 at 1-2). Defendant RPM opposes counsel’s hourly
rate, hours expended, and entitlement to a multiplier. (Doc.
# 74).
In determining a reasonable attorney’s fees award,
courts engage in a three-step process: (1) determine whether
the party prevailed in the litigation; (2) calculate the
lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended in litigating the case by a reasonable hourly rate;
and (3) adjust the lodestar to account for the results
obtained by the prevailing party, if needed. Atlanta J. &
Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep’t of Aviation, 442 F.3d 1283,
1289 (11th Cir. 2006). “The fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate
hours and hourly rates.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).
Courts are afforded broad discretion in addressing

attorney’s fees issues. See Villano v. City of Boynton Beach,
254 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Ultimately, the
computation of a fee award is necessarily an exercise of
judgment because there is no precise rule or formula for
making these determinations.” (internal citation omitted)).
Indeed, the Court, being “itself an expert,” may rely on its
own knowledge and experience in determining reasonable and
proper fees. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.
The Court has already determined that Mr. O’Driscoll is
the prevailing party and thus entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees and partial costs. (Doc. # 71). Accordingly,

the Court turns to calculating the lodestar and evaluating
whether any further adjustment is needed.
1. Reasonableness of Counsel’s Hourly Rate
To calculate the lodestar here, the first step is to
determine the reasonable hourly rate for the work performed
by Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel. “A reasonable hourly rate is the
prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303
(citation omitted). The fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing that the requested hourly rate aligns with
prevailing market rates. Id. at 1299.

Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel is a solo practitioner billing
at a rate of $450.00 per hour. (Doc. # 73). In support of his
hourly rate, counsel offers his declaration and CV, as well
as the United States Consumer Law Survey, 2017-2018, and the
2023 Fitzpatrick Matrix (formerly, the Laffey Matrix),
published by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Columbia. (Doc. ## 73-1, 73-2, 73-3, 73-5). Notably, “this
district has repeatedly found that the surveys [that Mr.
O’Driscoll’s counsel] relies upon are not persuasive for
purposes of determining a reasonable rate.” Raimondi v.
Zakheim & Lavrar, P.A., No. 6:11-cv-480-GAP-DAB, 2012 WL

1382255, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (rejecting the United
States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report, 2010–2011,
and the Laffey Matrix, prepared by the United States
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 6:11-CV-480-GAP-DAB, 2012 WL
1382221 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2012).
Indeed, the relevant community here is Tampa, and
counsel provides no case in this district that has awarded an
hourly rate of $450.00 for similar services. Furthermore,
while counsel asks the Court to adjust rates awarded by other
courts for inflation in order to justify his $450.00 hourly

rate, he has not provided any case in this district — or even
within this circuit — where a court has done so. Accordingly,
counsel has not met his burden of establishing that his hourly
rate is the prevailing market rate for similar services
performed by comparably skilled attorneys in this community.
Based on a careful review of the documentation submitted
by Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel and the Court’s own expertise,
the Court finds it appropriate to reduce counsel’s hourly
rate to $325.00 per hour. See Johnson v. Critical Resol.
Mediation LLC, No. 3:16-cv-632-MMH-MCR, 2017 WL 2590007, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2017) (collecting cases and reducing

Mr. Smith’s hourly rate from $450.00 to $325.00 and Mr.
Marco’s hourly rate from $385.00 to $325.00), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-cv-632-MMH-MCR, 2017 WL
2578705 (M.D. Fla. June 14, 2017); LoBello v. HSNi, LLC; No.
8:24-cv-00026-VMC-SPF, Doc. # 63 at 8-9 (M.D. Fla. March 25,
2025) (approving hourly rate of $325 for attorney who had
been practicing for seventeen years).
2. Reasonableness of Compensable Hours
The next step in calculating the lodestar is to determine
the reasonable number of hours counsel expended on this case.
The applicant must establish its hours worked. Hours that are
“excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary” should be

excluded from the amount claimed. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.
Furthermore, “[a] court may deduct hours from the time billed
if it finds that the billing entries are either unacceptably
vague or so heavily redacted that it cannot discern the legal
services provided.” Arnold v. Source Sols. Mgmt., LLC, No.
8:20-cv-2519-SCB-SPF, 2021 WL 2515204, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
27, 2021) (citation omitted).
Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel submits that 95.20 hours were
expended litigating this case. According to the submitted
billing invoice, 95.10 hours were billed by counsel himself,
while .10 hours were billed by his assistant. (Doc. # 73 at

6; Doc. # 73-4).
RPM argues that most entries in the submitted invoice
“are so vague it is impossible to determine whether the task
was one that required an attorney, was an administrative task,
or involved a legal service.” (Doc. # 74 at 18). The Court
agrees with RPM. “[A] fee applicant is not entitled to
compensation at an attorney's rate simply because an attorney
undertook tasks which were mundane, clerical or which did not
require the full exercise of an attorney's education and
judgment.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306. Even though Mr.
O’Driscoll’s counsel is a solo practitioner, “costs
associated with solely clerical tasks are overhead expenses

which are not compensable in the attorneys' fee award.” Rynd
v. Nat'l Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:09-cv-1556-JDW-TGW, 2012
WL 939387, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 8:09-cv-1556-JDW-TGW, 2012 WL
939247 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2012).
The Court has reviewed counsel’s billing records and
finds multiple entries which are clearly clerical. (Doc. #
73-4). These entries include checking the case status,
emailing with opposing counsel to schedule events like the
mediation conference, reviewing invoices, and calendaring
dates. (Id.). The Court concludes that these hours devoted to

clerical tasks should be reduced. There are also dozens of
entries which vaguely refer to calls and emails with Mr.
O’Driscoll. (Id.). While the Court of course understands the
importance of keeping the client informed on the status of
the case, the Court also infers that some of these
communications could have been handled by a legal assistant.
For example, a legal assistant could handle tasks like
scheduling dates with Mr. O’Driscoll for holding the
mediation. A legal assistant could also handle providing
basic updates on the status of the case. Accordingly, the
Court finds that a portion of these entries dedicated to
communicating with the client should be reduced.

Given the vagueness of counsel’s entries, the Court is
unable to determine exactly how many hours were dedicated to
clerical tasks. Thus, the Court must deduct the overall hours
by a certain percentage. See Rynd, 2012 WL 939387, at *5
(“[I]n determining the hours to be reduced, the court ‘may
conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the
requested hours with an across-the-board cut.’” (quoting
Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th
Cir.2008)). The Court finds that reducing counsel’s overall
hours by 25% across-the-board appropriately reflects the
amount of time that counsel likely devoted to clerical

matters. See Freedom Med., Inc. v. Sewpersaud, No. 6:20-cv-
771-RBD-GJK, 2021 WL 252213, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2021)
(applying 25% across-the-board reduction because “some, but
not all, of the entries included clerical work”); St. Fleur
v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 149 F. App'x 849, 853 (11th Cir.
2005) (approving 30% reduction because “Plaintiff's lawyers
had included time spent on . . . duplicated efforts, excessive
meetings between attorneys, billing for administrative tasks,
senior counsel's billing for legal research that could have
been assigned to an associate or paralegal, and billing at
full rates for non-legal tasks like travel and clerical
functions”); Miller v. Heritage Manor Assisted Living

Facility, Corp., No. 8:19-cv-2500-WFJ-AAS, 2020 WL 6363883,
at *2 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2020) (“The alternate method of
an across-the-board reduction of fees typically ranges from
10 to 35 percent but may be higher.”).
Accordingly, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel may recover for
68.85 hours, reflecting his hours expended reduced by 25%, at
an hourly rate of $325.00. Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel may also
recover the .10 hours billed by his assistant at a rate of
$125.00 per hour, as the parties do not dispute her billing
or hourly rate. Upon review of the Motion, billing invoice,
and counsel’s additional submissions, the Court finds that

$22,388.75 is a reasonable award of attorney’s fees under the
circumstances of this case.
3. Adjustment of the Lodestar
Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel contends that the Court should
apply a 2.15 contingency multiplier to his lodestar. The Court
finds no justification to do so. “[T]here is a ‘strong’
presumption that the lodestar reflects a reasonable statutory
fee.” Ottaviano v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1272 (M.D. Fla. 2010). “If the results obtained were
exceptional, then some enhancement of the lodestar might be
called for.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Here, the results
obtained were not exceptional. Mr. O’Driscoll only obtained

statutory damages and failed to obtain actual damages. (Doc.
# 60). Thus, Mr. O’Driscoll’s counsel is not entitled to any
adjustment of the lodestar.
Therefore, the Motion is granted in part and denied in
part as set forth in this Order.
Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendants Arbor Grove Condominium Association, Inc. and
Resource Property Management’s Motion for Costs (Doc. #
72) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment for costs in favor of
Defendants and against Plaintiff William O’Driscoll in
the amount of $2,303.35.
(2) Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees and
Costs and for Multiplier (Doc. # 73) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. The Clerk is directed to enter
judgment for attorney’s fees in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendants in the amount of $22,388.75.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
30th day of April, 2025.

fai Or. Hecrvaply
VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900733. Public record. Not legal advice.