# Walton v. CORVI

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900729

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900729

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “where the probable cause determination rests on credibility conflicts,” it is “particularly true” that it should be resolved by a jury
- holding that “a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRELL WALTON CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1318
Plaintiff,
v.

JOSEPH CORVI; NICOLE WILSON;
PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS; and MARC SCHADE
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
BAYLSON, J. April 30, 2025
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrell Walton (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Marc Schade prepared an affidavit of
probable cause containing false statements and/or omissions which led to Plaintiff’s arrest and
subsequent prosecution. Plaintiff brings two claims against Defendant Schade for state common
law malicious prosecution (Count IV) and for malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Count VII).
Defendants Joseph Corvi, Nicole Wilson, and Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals have each answered the Amended Complaint. Defendant Schade moved to
dismiss the two claims asserted against him. ECF 4. For the following reasons, Defendant
Schade’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant
Schade under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
common law malicious prosecution claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is drawn from the allegations in the Amended Complaint. The
Court takes the facts alleged by Plaintiff as true and construes them in his favor, as is required at
the motion to dismiss stage. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
A. Plaintiff Removes Pitbull From Patrol Car
On August 4, 2021, Philadelphia police officers conducted a traffic stop and arrested Mr.
Bryan Landis from his car. Am. Compl. (ECF 1-2) at ¶ 13. Officers commanded Mr. Landis to
load his Pitbull dog into the rear seating area of the patrol car, and Defendant Joseph Corvi was
assigned to transport the Pitbull to the Philadelphia Animal Care and Control Team for
safekeeping. Id., ¶¶ 16, 19–21.
The Amended Complaint alleges that when Defendant Corvi arrived at the facility, the

Pitbull began barking and became aggressive. Id., ¶¶ 27–28. Defendant Corvi requested assistance
from an animal control professional to escort the Pitbull from the car and into the animal control
facility. Id., ¶ 30. The facility’s upper management assigned Plaintiff the responsibility of
removing the Pitbull from the patrol car. Id., ¶ 39.
The Amended Complaint alleges that as Plaintiff approached the driver’s side rear door of
the patrol car, the Pitbull displayed “dangerous, threatening, and aggressive tendencies towards
the plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 40. As a result, Plaintiff determined that he could only safely remove the
Pitbull from the patrol car from a distance by using a catch pole, which is a tool used primarily by
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animal control officers to safely capture and restrain potentially aggressive or dangerous animals
from a distance. Id., ¶¶ 38, 42. Plaintiff inserted the catch pole into the rear seating area of the
patrol car from a distance and laid the loop at the end of the catch pole around the Pitbull’s neck
using only his right hand. Id., ¶¶ 45, 50. In response, the Pitbull latched its teeth onto the pole

and clenched its jaws on the pole. Id., ¶ 51.
B. Pitbull is Examined at Animal Control
Plaintiff then led the Pitbull out of the patrol car using the catch pole and escorted the
Pitbull to the animal control emergency room. Id., ¶ 52. The Amended Complaint alleges that
while inside the building, the Pitbull demonstrated dangerous, threatening, and aggressive
tendencies. Id., ¶ 53. Dr. Roxanne Borrok, a doctor of veterinary medicine, examined the Pitbull
and allegedly determined that as a result of the Pitbull’s display of aggression, it was unsafe to
manage the Pitbull without sedation. Id., ¶ 59.
After the Pitbull was sedated, Dr. Borrok examined the Pitbull and diagnosed the Pitbull
as having suffered a bi-lateral distal mandibular fracture. Id., ¶¶ 60–62. Dr. Borrok allegedly
determined that the fracture could have arisen as a result of a mishandling of the catch pole or by

the sheer force of the Pitbull’s bite of the catch pole. Id., ¶ 63. The Amended Complaint further
alleges that Dr. Borrok reviewed video surveillance footage capturing images of Plaintiff’s
interaction with the Pitbull and Plaintiff’s handling of the catch pole, and allegedly determined
that Plaintiff did not mishandle the catch pole. Id., ¶ 64. The Pitball was euthanized at the animal
control center on August 4, 2021 due to the severity of the injury. Id., ¶¶ 65–66.
C. Defendant Schade Prepares Affidavit of Probable Cause
The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Marc Schade, a detective in the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (id., ¶ 11), investigated the events of August 4, 2021 and
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prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) dated May 10, 2022. Id., ¶ 93.
Defendant Schade, according to the Amended Complaint, knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, included false statements and omitted facts in the Affidavit which
were inconsistent with the video surveillance footage of Plaintiff’s handling of the Pitbull with the

catch pole. Id., ¶¶ 94–95. The Amended Complaint alleges that as a “direct result” of the Affidavit
allegedly containing false and fabricated information, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
criminally charged Plaintiff with violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5534 (relating to Aggravated Cruelty
to Animals Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533 (relating to Cruelty
to Animals). Id., ¶¶ 97–103.
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
County on December 2, 2024, asserting state law malicious prosecution claims. ECF 1-1. On
February 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, bringing
seven claims against all Defendants:

1. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Joseph Corvi;
2. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Nicole Wilson;
3. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution – vicarious liability, against Defendant
Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“PSPCA”);
4. Common law state claim for malicious prosecution, against Defendant Marc Schade;
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against
Defendant Joseph Corvi;
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against
Defendant Nicole Wilson; and
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7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, against
Defendant Marc Schade.
ECF 1-2. On March 12, 2025, Defendant Joseph Corvi removed the case to this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1441, with the consent of all other Defendants. ECF 1 at ¶ 9.

Defendants Joseph Corvi (on March 19, 2025), Nicole Wilson (on March 21, 2025), and
the PSPCA (on March 25, 2025) each answered the Amended Complaint. See ECF 6–8. On
March 18, 2025, Defendant Marc Schade filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 4. Plaintiff responded to the Motion on
April 1, 2025. ECF 11.
V. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Defendant Schade argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for malicious
prosecution, either under Federal or State law, because Defendant Schade had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff and there are no colorable allegations of malice in the Amended Complaint. ECF
4 at 8–13. Defendant Schade further contends that he is immune from liability. As to the § 1983

claim, Defendant Schade argues probable cause existed on the misdemeanor charge of animal
cruelty even if not for the felony charge, so he is entitled to qualified immunity because Third
Circuit law was not clearly established whether probable cause for one charge defeats a malicious
prosecution claim. Id. at 13–15. Defendant Schade also asserts that the State common law claim
is barred by Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). Id. at 15–17.
In response, Plaintiff counters that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that
Defendant Schade knew statements he made in the Affidavit to be false, he omitted other pertinent
facts, that no reasonable person could infer probable cause existed, and that the Amended
Complaint sufficiently pleads malice. ECF 11-1 at 6–13. As to qualified immunity, Plaintiff
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argues that Defendant Schade should have known that his conduct would violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.1 Id. at 13–15. Lastly, Plaintiff responds that the PSTCA does not bar a
malicious prosecution claim which is an intentional tort that constitutes willful misconduct, an
exemption to the PSTCA’s grant of immunity. Id. at 15–16.

VI. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include
sufficient facts in the complaint that, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it
suggests only the “mere possibility of misconduct” or is a “[t]hreadbare recital[ ] of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and so it will not suffice if it is “devoid of
further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Thus, in considering a
motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and views them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, Doe v. University of Sciences, 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020), but

may not “assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged[,]” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 563 n.8 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983)).

1 Plaintiff’s response to the qualified immunity argument misses the crux of Defendant Schade’s argument, as this
Court understands it – Plaintiff argues that Defendant Schade should have known that including false information in
an affidavit of probable cause is unlawful. However, Defendant Schade’s qualified immunity argument specifically
addresses the Third Circuit’s “any crime” rule and whether it was clearly established at the time that probable cause
for one charge does not defeat a malicious prosecution claim alleging absence of probable cause for another charge.

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VII. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges two causes of action against Defendant Marc Schade for malicious
prosecution; one count is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant Schade violated
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights and the second count arises under Pennsylvania State

common law.
A. Malicious Prosecution (Federal and State)
A claim for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires Plaintiff to
establish that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended
in [Plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of
a legal proceeding.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296–297 (3d Cir. 2014). The legal standard
is the same for State common law malicious prosecution except Plaintiff does not need to show he
suffered a deprivation of liberty. Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Loc. Union
249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988). An officer can be liable for malicious prosecution “[i]f the

officer[] influenced or participated in the decision to institute criminal proceedings[.]” Halsey,
750 F.3d at 297.
Defendant Schade disputes factors three and four, arguing that the claims for malicious
prosecution fail because probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff, and the Amended Complaint
does not allege Defendant Schade acted maliciously. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. Probable Cause
In evaluating probable cause to initiate a legal proceeding, the Court considers whether
“the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves
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to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the
person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
Because this inquiry requires evaluating the facts available to the officer, the Third Circuit has
stated that “[t]he question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.”

Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998).
The thrust of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Schade are that Defendant Schade
prepared an Affidavit of Probable Cause (the “Affidavit”) in which he knowingly, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, included statements of fact or omitted facts that were inconsistent
with video footage capturing Plaintiff’s alleged handling of the Pitbull outside the animal control
facility. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 92–96. Where, as here, Plaintiff alleges “that an accurate affidavit would
not establish probable cause,” Plaintiff must show (1) “that the officer, with at least a reckless
disregard for the truth, ‘made statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a
warrant,’” and (2) “that those assertions or omissions were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding
of probable cause.’” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468–69 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting

Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000)). While a factor to consider, “an arrest
warrant issued by a magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability[.]”2
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786.

2 Defendant Schade argues that there is a rebuttable presumption probable cause exists to defeat a malicious
prosecution claim where the Philadelphia Municipal Court Judge determined at the preliminary hearing that there was
a prima facie criminal case against Plaintiff on all charges. ECF 4 at 9 n.3 (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 352
(3d Cir. 1989)). However, Rose addressed a prima facie case in the context of grand jury indictments or presentments,
not necessarily a state court preliminary hearing. Further, the Third Circuit in Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d
120, 125 (3d Cir. 1998) limited Rose’s application, holding that a presumption of probable cause does not apply to a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution action where the plaintiff’s conviction in municipal court was overturned.
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Defendant Schade attaches the Affidavit to his Motion and argues that the Affidavit shows
probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff.3 The Court declines to reach such a conclusion at this
stage.
a. False Statements or Omissions
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Affidavit contains both false statements and omits

certain pertinent facts. “[A]ssertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer
has obvious reasons to doubt the truth of what he or she is asserting” and “omissions are made
with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would
have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.’” Wilson, 212 F.3d at
783, 787–88 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)). The Court
“look[s] only to the information available to the officer at the time of the swearing of the affidavit
of probable cause.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 471.
According to the Amended Complaint, the Affidavit allegedly contained the following
false statements:
• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff jabbed at the Pitbull with a 6-
8-foot-long catch pole while the Pitbull was confined in the rear of a radio patrol car;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff moved his hands up and all
around using the catch pole;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff moved his hands up and all
around using the catch pole;

• Defendant Joseph Corvi’s false accusation the plaintiff used two (2) hands when laying
the loop or snare mechanism at the end the catch pole around the Pitbull’s neck;

3 The Court considered the Affidavit attached to Defendant Schade’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF 4-1; Pension Ben.
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “a court may consider an
undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims
are based on the document.”). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Schade stem from the Affidavit and Plaintiff does
not dispute the Affidavit’s authenticity.
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• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff stuck the control stick inside
the police vehicle and violently moved the stick;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff used two (2) hands to shift and
twist the pole in an attempt to catch the dog;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation plaintiff improperly used the catch pole;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff struggled with the catch pole
for several minutes;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff forcefully removed the Pitbull
from the rear of the radio patrol car;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff forcefully dragged the Pitbull
into the Animal Care and Control Team of Philadelphia’s building;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly illtreated the
Pitbull;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff abused the Pitbull;

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly caused the Pitbull
to suffer bodily injury; and

• Defendant Nicole Wilson’s false accusation the plaintiff recklessly created a risk the
Pitbull would suffer serious bodily injury.
Am. Compl., ¶ 95(a)–(n). The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Schade had reasons to
doubt the truth of these statements because they were allegedly “patently inconsistent with video
surveillance footage.” Id. The Court reasonably infers from the Amended Complaint’s allegation
that Defendant Schade “undertook an investigation of the events occurring August 4, 2021” that
Defendant Schade would have considered that video surveillance footage at the time he signed the
Affidavit. Id., ¶ 92.
The Amended Complaint additionally alleges that Defendant Schade omitted several facts
in the Affidavit, including:
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• Veterinary Dr. Roxanne Borrok maintained the opinion plaintiff did not mishandle the
catch pole securing the Pitbull from the inside of the radio patrol car;

• Veterinary Dr. Roxanne Borrok maintained the opinion injury to the Pitbull’s mandible
arose from the sheer force of the dog’s bite upon the catch pole;
Id., ¶ 95(o)–(p). Such information—the opinion of the treating veterinarian—can plausibly be
considered information that a judge evaluating an affidavit of probable cause would wish to know.
See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787–88. Defendant Schade’s position that “it is not clear on the record
whether HSPO Wilson—much less Detective Schade—even knew of Dr. Borrok’s conflicting
opinion” when preparing the Affidavit is unavailing; the record is not yet developed, and all
inferences must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. ECF 4 at 12. The Court reasonably infers from the
Amended Complaint’s allegations that Defendant Schade knew of Dr. Borrok’s conflicting
opinion and did not state it in the Affidavit.
b. Materiality
“To be constitutionally suspect, the misstatements and omissions must have been ‘material,
or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th
743, 748–49 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789)). In assessing materiality, the Court
reconstructs the affidavit of probable cause by “excis[ing] the offending inaccuracies and
insert[ing] the facts recklessly omitted,” and then determining whether the revised affidavit would
have “suffic[ed] in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe” that Plaintiff had
committed animal cruelty offenses. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789 (quoting Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483).
The Amended Complaint alleges facts contrary to many of the critical allegations
supporting probable cause in the Affidavit and alleges that video surveillance footage—which
Defendant Schade was allegedly aware of—discredits the Affidavit’s version. Whether or not
probable cause existed here thus relies, in part, on a credibility determination between Plaintiff
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and Defendants Wilson and Corvi as to what the video depicts. Cf. Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch.
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “where the probable cause determination rests
on credibility conflicts,” it is “particularly true” that it should be resolved by a jury). At this
juncture, the Court will not undertake a factual inquiry to resolve these disputes. Groman v. Twp.

Of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Generally, the existence of probable cause is a
factual issue.”). All that is relevant here is that without all of the alleged false statements and with
the alleged omissions inserted into the Affidavit, the Amended Complaint plausibly pleads the
absence of probable cause.
2. Malice
Defendant Schade next argues that the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that
Defendant Schade acted against Plaintiff with malice. “Actual malice in the context of malicious
prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by the actor himself in
the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper purpose.” Lee v. Mihalich,
847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266
(1994). An officer’s decision to “omit crucial exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of

probable cause” can show malice. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020). The
Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant Schade omitted Dr. Borrok’s opinion that
the Pitbull’s injuries may not have been caused by Plaintiff’s handling of the catch pole. This is
sufficient at this stage to plausibly plead malice.
B. Immunity Defenses
The Court declines to rule at this stage whether Defendant Schade is entitled to qualified
immunity on the § 1983 claim or immunity under the PSTCA, as each of those defenses requires
a more complete record and additional factual development.
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Defendant Schade asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim because
probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with a misdemeanor even if not the felony.4 Under the
Third Circuit’s “any crime” jurisprudence as it existed at the time of arrest, “probable cause need[s]
only [to] exist as to ‘any offense that could be charged under the circumstances’ to defeat false

arrest and malicious prosecution claims.” ECF 4 at 14 (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d
595, 604 (3d Cir. 2005)). But Defendant Schade’s qualified immunity argument requires this
Court to make inferential leaps in Defendant’s favor that it cannot make on a motion to dismiss.
Defendant assumes probable cause existed on the misdemeanor charge because “[a]t the very least,
Detective Schade had reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff had recklessly ill-treated the dog,
sufficient to sustain a probable cause determination for the misdemeanor offense.”5 ECF 4 at 10.
However, the Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true, alleges that Dr. Borrok
“determined there was no mishandling of the catch pole.” Am. Compl., ¶¶ 63–64, 95(o). And
while Defendant Schade contends he reasonably based his Affidavit on the accounts of Defendants
Wilson and Corvi, the Amended Complaint alleges that their accounts are patently inconsistent

with video surveillance footage. Id. ¶¶ 92–95.
Defendant Schade also asserts he is immune from liability on the State claim under the
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), which limits recovery against an employee of
a local agency. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8545. However, the PSTCA’s limitations do not apply where it

4 Plaintiff was criminally charged with violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5534 (a felony) and 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533 (a
misdemeanor). A person commits cruelty to animals (misdemeanor) “if the person intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly illtreats, overloads, beats, abandons or abuses an animal.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5533.

5 Pennsylvania law provides that “[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct
and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).

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is judicially determined that the act of the employee “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice or willful misconduct.” Id. at § 8550. As the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads
malicious prosecution, the Court cannot apply PSTCA immunity at this stage. See Russoli v.
Salisbury Twp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 870 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (Van Antwerpen, J.) (“Malicious

prosecution is an intentional tort that falls within 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8550.”).
Defendant Schade may raise these defenses at summary judgment after discovery and a
more developed factual record.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Schade’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An
appropriate order follows.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900729. Public record. Not legal advice.