# Shaw-Stearns v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

> District Court, D. Oregon · April 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900480

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** April 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900480

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the five-step evaluation in detail

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

ERIC, S-S., Ca se No. 3:24-cv-01394-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.
_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge

In this judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Social Security
benefits, Eric S-S. (last name omitted for privacy) challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s
findings regarding the medical opinion evidence and his subjective symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br.
at 1-2.) As explained below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.1

1 This court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), and the parties
have consented to jurisdiction by magistrate judge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges disability based on major depressive disorder with anxious distress,
lumbosacral strain with IVDS, plantar fasciitis of the right foot, right knee patellofemoral pain
syndrome, femoral radiculopathy left lower extremity, and right hip tendonitis. (Tr. 250.)
Plaintiff’s impairments interfere with his ability to walk, stand, and sit, and cause sleep
disturbances. (Tr. 39.)
On March 18, 2021, plaintiff applied for Title II benefits alleging disability beginning
April 26, 2019. (Tr. 247.) His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff
appeared at a hearing before ALJ Linda Thomasson, on March 22, 2024. (Tr. 31.) The ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision on April 26, 2024. (Tr. 12-30.) The Appeals Council denied
plaintiff’s request for review and plaintiff appealed. (Tr. 1-6.)
ALJ’S DECISION
In denying plaintiff’s application for DIB, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential
evaluation process.2 At step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA) during the period from his alleged onset date of April 26, 2019, through
his date last insured of September 30, 2023. (Tr. 17.) At step two, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depression, anxiety, left shoulder disorder, spine
disorder, hip disorder, and right knee disorder. (Tr. 17.) At step three, the ALJ determined that

2 To determine a claimant’s disability, the ALJ must apply a five-step evaluation. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ finds that a claimant is either disabled or not disabled at any
step, the ALJ does not continue to the next step. Id.; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746-
47 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the five-step evaluation in detail).

Page 2 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
plaintiff’s impairments, singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of
any listed impairment. (Tr. 18.)
As for the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC), 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the ability to perform light work with these
limitations: he can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, stairs, and ramps, and he can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He can frequently reach with the left, non-
dominant upper extremity. He is limited to occasional public interaction. (Tr. 19.) At step four,
the ALJ determined that plaintiff cannot perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 23.) Considering
his RFC, the ALJ found at step five that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that plaintiff can perform, including the representative occupations of routing clerk,
marker, and production assembler. (Tr. 24.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has not been
under a disability within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 25.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the Commissioner applied
proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is “more
than a mere scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quotation and
citation omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court must weigh all the

evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Garrison v. Colvin,
759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014).

Page 3 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
DISCUSSION
A. Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of the medical opinions of Jessica Bentura-
Jimenez, a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner; and Sarah Borquist and Sarah Macember,
both physical therapists. (Pl.’s Op. Br. at 1.) The regulations require ALJs to evaluate the
supportability and consistency of a medical opinion when assessing its persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c. ALJs must “articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions”
and “explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors.” Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). Supportability

is determined by assessing whether the medical source provides explanations and objective
medical evidence to support their opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency is
determined by evaluating how consistent the opinion is with evidence from other medical and
nonmedical sources in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
1. Jessica Bentura-Jimenez
At the agency’s request, Bentura-Jimenez conducted a psychiatric consultative
examination of plaintiff. (Tr. 1010-16.) The ALJ found Bentura-Jimenez’s opinion partially
persuasive, noting her findings about plaintiff’s social interactions and adaptation to usual
stresses in the workplace were inconsistent with records showing “unremarkable exams and
conservative treatment.” (Tr. 22.) The ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Bentura-Jimenez opined that plaintiff is “not able to interact with coworkers and
superiors and the public” and cannot “adapt to the usual stresses encountered in the workplace.”
(Tr. 1016.) Yet the ALJ noted that Bentura-Jimenez’s mental status exam of plaintiff yielded

Page 4 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
fairly mild findings. (Tr. 22.) During the exam, plaintiff’s attitude was cooperative, with good
eye contact and good interpersonal confidence; his thought processes were linear and goal
directed, he had good insight, and unremarkable thought content. (Tr. 1013.) Although his affect
was described as irritable and flat, his behavior before and after the examination was described
as unremarkable. (Tr. 1010, 1013.) When he talked about his employment history to Bentura-
Jimenez, plaintiff said that while he worked for a semester for a construction agency he “didn’t
get along with the laborers” but that he was “fine with the supervisors.” (Tr. 1013.) Plaintiff also
explained that he worked for his university for four years while attending college, and that his
job ended because he was done with school. (Tr. 1013.)

Additionally, the ALJ found that Bentura-Jimenez’s opinion was inconsistent with other
mental status exams in the record, which showed largely normal results and a history of
conservative treatment. (Tr. 22, citing Tr. 501, 544, 1016.) The record supports the ALJ’s
conclusions—plaintiff often had normal mental status exams, was often described as pleasant
and cooperative, and regularly declined mental health referrals. (Tr. 503, 522, 524, 528, 544, 546,
596, 626, 654-55, 681, 696, 1544.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed entirely to address the supportability of Bentura-
Jimenez’s opinion. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 6.) Although true that the ALJ’s supportability analysis
is set out with less-than-ideal clarity, because the ALJ’s consideration of the supportability factor
is “clear from context,” the court concludes there is no error on this ground. Jarrett v. O'Malley,

No. 23-3565, 2024 WL 4707890, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024); see also Woods, 32 F.4th 785, 793
n.4 (“Although the ALJ’s meaning here is clear from context, to avoid confusion in future cases,

Page 5 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
ALJs should endeavor to use these two terms of art—‘consistent’ and ‘supported’—with
precision.”)
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ’s consistency analysis is flawed, first because the
ALJ did not “specify which treatment was considered conservative” and second because the ALJ
failed to explain “how opinions on Plaintiff’s abilities to interact with others and adapt to usual
stresses in the workplace are contradicted by a history of conservative treatment.” (Pl.’s Op. Br.
at 6.) Yet plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ’s conclusions as to conservative treatment is
discussed elsewhere in the decision. (Id.) That is, the decision identifies conservative treatment
for plaintiff’s mental impairments, citing his lack of mental health treatment, including no mental

health counseling “since at least 2015” and “no treatment for depression or other mental
impairments from 2017 through 2022.” (Tr. 21, citing 544, 678, 683, 695-96, 1549-50.) Plaintiff
argues that there is “evidence that Plaintiff attended mental health consultations in October of
2019 and was in counseling during his time in the military.” (Pl.’s Op. Br. at 6, citing Tr. 543-
546, 695.) Plaintiff is essentially asking the court to reweigh the medical evidence, but the court
“may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s where the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Schmitz v. Saul, No. 20-35723, 2021 WL
2029187 (9th Cir. May 21, 2021) (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Even so, plaintiff’s record citations do not detract from the ALJ’s ultimate conclusions.
Plaintiff attended a mental health consultation in 2019 to address complaints of chronic pain and

said that he “overdoes things due to ignoring his symptoms causing more injury” but that he was
functioning well. (Tr. 543, 544.) The mental health consultant noted that plaintiff declined
additional mental health counseling or treatment, concluding that plaintiff would benefit from

Page 6 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
“some brief treatment for chronic pain with an emphasis on mindfulness/acceptance.” (Tr. 543.)
Although a single chart note states that plaintiff received counseling while in the military, that
same chart note comments that plaintiff has received no treatment for any mental health
conditions since 2017, and also states that plaintiff is not interested in any reengagement with
mental health treatment. (Tr. 695, 696.)
In sum, the ALJ’s conclusions as to the supportability and consistency of Bentura-
Jimenez’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence and will thus remain undisturbed by the
court.
2. Sarah Borquist

Borquist completed a physical functional capacity questionnaire in support of plaintiff’s
disability benefits application. (Tr. 1237-43.) The ALJ was unpersuaded by Borquist’s opinion,
noting that it was often vague, unsupported by her treatment notes or objective findings, and
inconsistent with treatment records showing normal objective findings and conservative
treatment. (Tr. 22-23.) The ALJ’s conclusions are reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.
Borquist opined extreme limitations in plaintiff’s ability to work but fails to provide any
explanation or support for her opinion. When asked to “characterize [plaintiff’s] experience with
stamina and/or fatigue” on a scale of one to ten, Borquist marked four but without context or
explanation for that rating; nor is the fatigue rating described in a way that an ALJ could translate

into a functional limitation. (Tr. 1238.) Borquist wrote that plaintiff would be able to stand and
walk for a maximum of “about two hours” and sit for a maximum of “about two hours” but noted
elsewhere on the form that plaintiff could only sit for 30 minutes and stand for 30 minutes before

Page 7 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
changing position. (Tr. 1239.) She also stated that plaintiff would need to walk around for 10
minutes every 30 minutes. (Tr. 1240.) She wrote that plaintiff’s ability to reach, handle, push,
and pull were affected by his impairments, but failed to explain in any way how these abilities
were affected and to what degree. (Tr. 1240-41.) She indicated that plaintiff could occasionally
lift 10 pounds, could rarely lift 30 pounds, and never lift 50 pounds, citing “pain” and “torn
labrum and lumbar disc pathology” as the reasons for this limitation. (Tr 1241.) But even
Borquist’s own records do not support these limitations, as plaintiff saw regular improvements
with physical therapy and reported doing yardwork. (Tr. 963-67.) Nor are the limitations
assessed by Borquist consistent with the overall record, which shows that plaintiff maintained an

active lifestyle with conservative treatment and fairly normal objective examination results. (Tr.
809, 889-90, 895, 1324, 1344.)
3. Sarah Macember
Macember, in a statement on plaintiff’s physical capacity that supported his VA disability
petition, wrote that plaintiff’s “plantar fasciitis, [left] hip pain, and lumbar pain” were related to
service-connected conditions that ultimately led to his VA medical retirement decision. (Tr. 217.)
The ALJ did not address Macember’s statement, other than noting that the regulations do not
require an ALJ to provide an analysis of disability decisions by another governmental agency.
(Tr. 23.) The court agrees that the ALJ is not required to address Macember’s opinion. See 20 §
C.F.R. 404.1507 (stating that an ALJ will not provide any analysis in their disability decision

about a decision made by any other governmental agency including decision made by the VA).
And as the Commissioner points out, Macember’s statement does not meet the SSA regulation’s
requirements for a medical opinion. A medical opinion is defined as “a statement from a medial

Page 8 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
source about what you can still do despite your impairments.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2).
Macember’s statement neither offers guidance as to what plaintiff can still do despite his
impairments nor provides any functional limitations that the ALJ could translate into RFC
restrictions. Thus, the ALJ did not err in failing to provide an analysis of Macember’s statement.
B. Subjective Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear and convincing reasons for
disregarding his subjective symptom testimony. (Pl. Br. at 15-21.) Determining the credibility of
a claimant’s symptom testimony requires from the ALJ two steps. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. At the first step, the claimant must produce

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to
produce the alleged symptoms. Treichler v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2014); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). At the second step, if there
is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing
reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89
(9th Cir. 2015); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The specific, clear and convincing standard is “the most
demanding required in Social Security cases” and is “not an easy requirement to meet.”
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015; Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678-79. The “clear and convincing” standard
requires an ALJ to “show [their] work” but, ultimately, the question is not whether ALJ’s
rationale convinces the court, but whether the ALJ’s rationale “is clear enough that it has the

power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022).
Here plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on cherry-picked medical records
showing fairly normal results and improperly relied solely on objective records in discounting

Page 9 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
his testimony. (Pl. Br. at 19-20.) Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s conclusions that plaintiff
received conservative treatment lack substantial evidence. (Pl. Br. at 20-21.) The court disagrees.
The ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s testimony about the limiting effects of his mental
and physical impairments. As the ALJ noted, objective findings upon examination were often
normal and were inconsistent with plaintiff’s symptom allegations. The ALJ noted that x-rays of
plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed normal results with minimal levoscoliosis, which is inconsistent
with plaintiff’s claims of debilitating pain. (Tr. 20, citing Tr. 487, 498.) Plaintiff also had
inconsistent reports of altered gait and reduced joint functionality. (Tr. 20-21, citing Tr. 395, 414,
429, 457, 471, 522, 528, 532, 538, 621, 768, 891, 895.) The citations provided by the ALJ are

substantial evidence that the objective medical findings are inconsistent with the severity of
plaintiff’s symptom allegations.
As to plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ’s conclusions that he received conservative
treatment and examination findings were mild are similarly supported by substantial evidence. In
2022, plaintiff’s primary care doctor noted that he alleged “100% [disability] for PTSD,
depression” but had received no treatment for any such condition since 2017. (Tr. 696.) His
doctor at that check-in noted plaintiff was not interested in reengaging with mental services. (Tr.
696.) At a medical consultation in September 2023, plaintiff was described as having no
indication of significant depression and no indication of a current mood disorder or adjustment
disorder. (Tr. 1549-50.) Plaintiff continued to deny taking prescribed psychotropic medications

and offers of counseling and mental health care, noting his mother is a psychologist, which
makes him “well informed.” (Tr. 544, 546.) During a consultative examination, he reported no
psychological impairments to his ability to perform his activities of daily living. (Tr. 682-83.)

Page 10 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR
Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were fairly normal, including normal memory and thought
processes and normal mood and affect. (Tr. 501, 522, 544, 1517.)
Considering plaintiff’s limited and conservative treatment, as well as the objective
evidence in the record, the ALJ’s reasonably could conclude that plaintiff was not as limited as
alleged and discount his testimony on that basis. And the ALJ’s reasoning for those conclusions
are sufficiently specific, clear and convincing.
In summary, the ALJ’s conclusion as to the medical opinions and plaintiff’s symptom
testimony are based on substantial evidence and supported by reasonable references drawn from
the record. The ALJ did not err.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
DATED: April 30, 2025.

_________/s/ Jeff Armistead
JEFF ARMISTEAD
United States Magistrate Judge

Page 11 – OPINION AND ORDER
Eric S-S. v. SSA, 3:24-cv-01394-AR

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10900480. Public record. Not legal advice.