# Raulerson v. State of Florida

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · April 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10884876

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** April 30, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10884876

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting well-settled rule of Florida jurisprudence that “the common law may be modified indirectly as well as directly, by a statute which is ‘inconsistent’ with the common law in a particular instance”
- explaining how “a statute may expressly or by implication supersede the common law,” in turn becoming “the controlling law within its proper sphere of operation” (emphasis supplied)

## Opinion text

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

No. 1D2022-2798
_____________________________

ROGER DALE RAULERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.
_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.
Phillip A. Pena, Judge.

April 30, 2025

ROWE, J.

Roger Dale Raulerson petitions for a writ of prohibition,
following the circuit court’s order denying his motion to dismiss.
Raulerson claimed immunity from criminal prosecution under
section 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2019), asserting that he was
acting in self-defense and also seeking to prevent escape while
making a citizen’s arrest when he twice shot into the victims’ car.
We deny the petition.

Facts

Based on events that occurred on May 3, 2020, the State
charged Raulerson with (1) aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon, (2) shooting or throwing a deadly missile into an occupied

1
vehicle, (3) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and
(4) criminal mischief. Raulerson moved to dismiss counts one, two,
and four, asserting self-defense immunity under section
776.032(1). He claimed that he was immune from prosecution
because he was making a citizen’s arrest, the victims resisted him,
and were trying to prevent escape, and, in the alternative, because
he reasonably believed that using deadly force was necessary to
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself under
section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes.

At the evidentiary hearing, the State and defense counsel
presented testimony from the victims, the defendant,
eyewitnesses, police officers, and experts. The facts below were
developed from this testimony.

In April 2020, the victims (Husband and Wife), who had been
married for over twenty-seven years, had recently moved in with
Husband’s half-brother, Richard Hunt. Hunt inherited a portion of
the home and land located on North Raulerson Road when his
mother died. Husband also inherited a portion of the home now
jointly owned with his stepfather and siblings. Raulerson lived in
a home about one hundred yards down from and across the road
from Hunt.

On the morning of the shooting, Husband and Wife drove to
Dollar General to buy groceries to make breakfast. When they
arrived back at Hunt’s house, the couple realized they had
forgotten a few items, and they began to argue. They drove back to
the store, arguing on the way there and back.

Raulerson claimed that from his home down the road, he saw
the couple driving to and from the store. He asserted that Husband
and Wife drove separate cars. Raulerson maintained that the two
raced up and down the road and tried to run each other off the
road. Raulerson reported what he saw to the Baker County Sheriff.
The Sheriff directed Lt. James Marker to contact Raulerson about
the complaint.

Husband and Wife refuted Raulerson’s version of the story
about their driving. Wife explained that after she and Husband
discovered they needed to return to the store for the items they

2
forgot to buy, they were arguing and decided to drive back to the
store in separate cars. Wife said that during the drive, she and
Husband pulled up next to each other so they could talk to each
other through the car windows—Wife did not have a cell phone.
Wife denied that she and Husband tried to run each other off the
road. She owned both cars and would not try to hit her own car.

There was also a factual dispute about what happened when
Husband and Wife returned to Hunt’s home after the second trip
to the store. By the time Lt. Marker returned Raulerson’s call
about his complaint, Husband and Wife were back at Hunt’s house.
Raulerson reported to Marker his claims about Husband and Wife
trying to run each other off the road. And then, while he was on
the phone with Marker, Raulerson reported that he saw Husband
strike Wife in the face. Raulerson told Marker that it looked like
Husband was killing Wife and that Raulerson “was going to have
to go over there and shoot the guy.” Marker responded
immediately, making it clear that Marker was on the way to deal
with the situation and that Raulerson should not leave his
residence. Raulerson later admitted that he heard Marker say that
he was twelve minutes away, but Raulerson denied hearing the
instruction to remain at his residence. Instead, Raulerson drove
over to Hunt’s property.

Meanwhile, Raulerson’s live-in girlfriend called 911. She told
the 911 operator that Husband and Wife were engaged in a fight
and that the police needed to be dispatched.

Husband and Wife testified that after they put the groceries
away, they returned to Wife’s car to avoid arguing in front of Hunt.
Husband admitted that he shoved Wife as they were walking back
to the car and that she fell to the ground.

When Raulerson arrived at Hunt’s house, he stated that he
saw Husband and Wife sitting inside the car. The car was parked
facing the house. The driveway to leave the property was located
to the right of the car. Wife was seated in the driver’s seat, and
Husband was seated in the passenger’s seat. Raulerson claimed
that he saw Husband with his hands around Wife’s neck.
Raulerson armed himself with an AR-15 platform pistol that he
kept in his truck.

3
After arming himself, Raulerson walked to the driver’s side of
the car, where Wife was sitting. Raulerson was about four steps
away from the car when he aimed his gun through the driver’s side
window and said, “get out of the car,” and “get on the ground”
several times. Raulerson did not specify whether he was referring
to Husband or Wife when he gave those instructions.

Husband and Wife testified that with Raulerson yelling and
pointing a gun at them, they exited the car. Raulerson pointed his
gun at Wife when she tried to talk to him. Raulerson then pointed
his gun at Husband when he tried to talk. Raulerson ordered
Husband to lie on his stomach on the ground. Husband instead
walked around the back of the car and toward Raulerson. Husband
told Raulerson to fight him like a man. Raulerson then took a step
back. But as Raulerson pointed the gun at Wife, Husband got back
into the car to drive away. At that point, Raulerson stood about
five feet from the front of Hunt’s front porch. Wife was standing
close to Raulerson on the driver’s side of the car. Hunt was
standing a few feet behind Raulerson. Husband explained that if
he turned the car to the left, he would have hit Raulerson, Wife,
and Hunt’s home.

Instead, Husband turned the car all the way to the right to
exit the property. Raulerson then yelled that Husband was under
citizen’s arrest. As he was driving away, Husband heard two
gunshots. Raulerson fired at Husband about two or three seconds
after the car started to move. It took Husband a few moments to
realize that he had been shot twice in his left upper thigh. The
forensic evidence showed that two bullets pierced the driver’s side
door, with the first bullet entering the middle of the door and the
second bullet entering near the door handle.

Raulerson disputed that Husband was trying to leave the
property. Raulerson claimed that Husband drove straight at him
and that he was “dead square center” with the front bumper of the
car. Raulerson maintained that he heard the thump of the
accelerator hitting the floor. He then screamed for Husband to stop
and jumped to the side. He claimed that Husband compensated for
his movement, which caused him to fear for his life. When he

4
jumped a second time, Raulerson claimed that he fired two bullets
in mid-air. He stated that he saw both bullets strike Husband.

But forensic evidence contradicted Raulerson’s claims about
his position and the movement of the vehicle when he fired the AR-
15 into the car. The tire track evidence showed that the car
immediately began turning as it began to move. The State’s expert
determined that Raulerson was standing to the side of the car
when he fired the first shot and that the second shot was fired as
the car was moving away from Raulerson. Even Raulerson’s own
expert concluded that Raulerson was seven to nine feet away from
the car when Raulerson fired his gun at the car. Raulerson’s expert
also concluded that Raulerson was near the left-front wheel well,
left-front fender area—not standing directly in front of the car—
when he discharged his weapon and that the car was turning right
when the shots were fired.

After Husband was shot, Raulerson would not let Wife leave
the area. When Lt. Marker arrived, Raulerson told him that he
fired two shots in the car. But Raulerson never reported to the
officer that Husband was trying to run him over.

After weighing the testimony and making credibility
determinations, the trial court denied Raulerson’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that even if Raulerson had the authority
to make a citizen’s arrest, he was not entitled to self-defense
immunity because Raulerson did not have an objectively
reasonable belief that use of deadly force was necessary to defend
himself from Husband and also that force was not reasonably
necessary to prevent Husband’s escape.

Analysis

Raulerson argues that this Court should grant his petition for
a writ of prohibition because he is entitled to self-defense
immunity. He claims that he was making a citizen’s arrest when,
while armed with an AR-15 platform pistol, he detained Husband
and Wife in their car. Raulerson contends that he had the
authority to make the arrest and detain Husband because
Husband was committing an aggravated battery, and he was
justified in using force to prevent Husband’s escape. Then when

5
Husband tried to run him over with his car and Raulerson shot at
the car, Raulerson claims that he had an objectively reasonable
fear that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm.

To begin with, this is not an appeal from a nonfinal order in
which this Court reviews the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of
discretion or for legal error. Rather, Raulerson seeks to invoke the
writ authority of this Court, asking for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of prohibition. 1 Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Int’l Bonded

1 Several district courts questioned whether prohibition is an

appropriate vehicle for an appellate court to address a trial court’s
ruling on a self-defense immunity motion. See Nadell v. Hursey,
363 So. 3d 1135, 1138–39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); Snow v. State, 352
So. 3d 529, 532–34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); Edwards, 351 So. 3d 1142,
1146 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). The Third District certified this
question to the Florida Supreme Court: “Is prohibition the
appropriate remedy for a civil defendant to challenge a nonfinal
order denying the defendant’s motion for statutory immunity
under Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law?” Nadell, 363 So. 3d at
1140. But the supreme court declined review. Nadell v. Hursey, No.
SC2023-1079, 2023 WL 8948388 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2023). The Third
District also referred to the Florida Bar’s Appellate Rules
Committee “the issue of whether rule 9.130’s list of appealable
nonfinal orders should be amended to include appeals from
nonfinal orders denying a civil defendant’s motion for statutory
immunity under SYG.” Nadell, 363 So. 3d at 1138–39. The
supreme court ultimately amended Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to allow “civil defendants to appeal nonfinal
orders that deny claims of immunity brought under section
776.032, Florida Statutes (2024).” See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules
of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL 715788 at *1 (Fla. Mar.
6, 2025). Even so, the Court declined the invitation to amend the
rule to allow criminal defendants to appeal nonfinal orders
denying immunity motions. Id. at *2. The Court explained that the
writ of prohibition provides an adequate means to challenge such
an order:

We do not suggest that a criminal defendant who hopes
to challenge a nonfinal order denying a claim of Stand

6
Couriers, Inc., 356 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“[T]he writ
of prohibition will not be invoked for slight reasons, but only in
emergency cases to forestall an impending, present injury.”
(quoting Joughin v. Parks, 147 So. 273, 274 (1933))).

On the facts before us, we decline to exercise our prerogative
to grant Raulerson’s petition. See English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d
293, 297 (Fla. 1977) (“[O]nly when damage is likely to follow the
inferior court’s acting without authority of law or in excess of
jurisdiction will the writ issue.”); Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Miami-
Dade Cnty. Expressway Auth., 298 So. 3d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020) (“The ‘writ is very narrow in scope and operation and must
be employed with caution and utilized only in emergency cases to
prevent impending injury where there is no other appropriate and
adequate legal remedy.’” (quoting Mandico v. Taos Constr. Inc.,
605 So. 2d 840, 854 (Fla. 1992))).

Raulerson claimed that he was making a citizen’s arrest when
he detained Husband and Wife and held them at gunpoint. No
doubt citizen’s arrests were permissible under the common law.
Edwards v. State, 462 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“At
common law, a private citizen may arrest a person who in the
citizen’s presence commits a felony or breach of the peace.”).
Florida adopted the common law of England as of July 4, 1776. See
§ 2.01, Fla. Stat. Even so, as explained in the concurring opinion,

Your Ground immunity will have no avenue for relief. We
have stated previously that the constitutional writ of
prohibition may be invoked in such circumstances. See
Boston v. State, 326 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021) (declaring
that “a defendant who avails him or herself to a pretrial
immunity hearing and who believes legal error was
committed at the pretrial immunity hearing may still
seek relief by filing a petition for a writ of prohibition
before invoking his or her right to a trial”) (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted). We reiterate the availability
of that remedy now.

Id.

7
Raulerson’s claim of authority to effect a citizen’s arrest is dubious
on the law and on the facts.

But this case need not turn on Raulerson’s assertion of
authority to make a citizen’s arrest. Raulerson has failed to show
clearly and conclusively, without a good faith dispute, that when
Husband was driving away from the scene and Raulerson twice
fired his weapon into Husband’s car, Raulerson had an objectively
reasonable belief that he faced an imminent threat of great bodily
harm or death.

To raise a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity under
section 776.032(1), Raulerson had to show that the elements of
justifiable force were met. See Edwards v. State, 351 So. 3d 1142,
1148–49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes
(2019), provides:

A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly
force if he or she reasonably believes that using or
threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself
or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a
forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use
deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not
have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or
her ground if the person using or threatening to use the
deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is
in a place where he or she has a right to be.

To demonstrate that his use of deadly force was justifiable,
Raulerson had to allege specific facts that show or tended to show
that he (1) used deadly force, (2) reasonably believed deadly force
was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to
himself or another, (3) used such deadly force while resisting the
victim’s attempt to murder him or to commit a forcible felony on
him, and (4) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and
was in place he had a right to be. 2

2 As stated above, the majority’s
decision does not address
whether Raulerson had the authority to make a citizen’s arrest

8
In reviewing Raulerson’s claim of using deadly force in self-
defense, the trial court had to determine whether a reasonable
person in Raulerson’s position would have used the same force as
Raulerson. See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Craven v. State, 285 So. 3d
992, 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “[T]he appearance of danger must
have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person
under the same circumstances would have believed that the
danger could be avoided only through the use of force.” Garrett v.
State, 148 So. 3d 466, 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The trial court
concluded that Raulerson did not have an objectively reasonable
belief that he needed to use deadly force to prevent imminent death
or great bodily harm.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court made these factual
findings. On the morning of the shooting, Husband and Wife were
arguing in Hunt’s front yard. Husband struck Wife, knocking her
to the ground. The two entered Wife’s car, where Husband choked
Wife. When Raulerson observed these actions, his immediate
reaction was to report to a law enforcement officer that he might
have to go to over there to shoot Husband. He had this reaction
even though he had no reason to believe that Husband or Wife
were armed. Even after Lt. Marker said he was minutes away,
Raulerson decided to drive over to Hunt’s house to confront
Husband and Wife, armed with an AR-15 pistol. The trial court
found credible the testimony of Lt. Marker—that Raulerson
approached Husband “ready to shoot him.”

when he detained Husband and Wife at gunpoint and against their
will. But if Raulerson lacked authority to make a citizen’s arrest,
the unlawful detention of Husband and Wife by force and against
their will would amount to the commission of the felony offense of
false imprisonment. See § 787.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The term
‘false imprisonment’ means forcibly, by threat, or secretly
confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person
without lawful authority and against her or his will.”). And if
Raulerson were committing the crime of false imprisonment, his
use of deadly force would not have been justified under section
776.012(2).

9
The trial court found that Raulerson then confronted the two
unarmed individuals, pointed the AR-15 pistol at them, ordered
them out of their own car, and instructed them to lie on the ground.
When they would not obey his orders after exiting the car,
Raulerson continued to aim his loaded gun at them.

The trial court found incredible Raulerson’s claim that, while
in mid-air and jumping out of the way of an oncoming car, he fired
two rounds at Husband who was driving directly toward him and
accelerating. Rather, the trial court found that there was clear and
convincing evidence to show that Raulerson was standing to the
left of the car and that Husband was attempting to leave the
property. It also concluded that Raulerson could have shot at the
car’s tires or engine compartment instead of directly at Husband.

Raulerson has failed to show that there is no dispute that he
is entitled to immunity. As the trial court found, the testimonial
and physical evidence conflict with Raulerson’s version of events.
Wife and Hunt were standing a few feet from Raulerson when
Husband allegedly accelerated toward Raulerson. But neither
reported jumping out of the way to avoid being hit. And Wife
testified that Raulerson was standing to the left of the car when he
fired his gun.

The physical evidence also conflicted with Raulerson’s version
of events. The tire tracks showed that Husband immediately
turned right as the car moved forward—not left where Raulerson
was standing. Raulerson fired two shots; both rounds pierced the
driver’s side door. The first hole was in the middle of the driver’s
side door, and the second hole was near the door handle. Both
forensic experts examined the entry paths of the bullets and
concluded that Raulerson could not have been standing directly in
front of the car when he fired his AR-15.

On these facts, Raulerson has failed to show clearly and
conclusively that he is immune from prosecution and that the trial
court is acting beyond its jurisdiction. For these reasons, we deny
Raulerson’s petition for a writ of prohibition.

DENIED.

10
KELSEY, J., concurs in result only; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with
opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

The record fails to demonstrate clearly and conclusively that
the petitioner is immune from prosecution, so I agree that he is not
entitled to the extraordinary relief being sought. There is no need,
however, to assess the trial court’s fact determinations for evidence
sufficiency. Even though our court and other district courts
repeatedly have treated petitions like this one like appeals, the
Florida Constitution does not provide that type of review
authority. Moreover, the supreme court has expressly foreclosed
such use of the writ of prohibition for over 120 years. We should
hew to the supreme court’s consistent directive over the years that
the writ’s scope remain narrow—reserved for emergencies when a
trial court proposes to act beyond its jurisdiction; never to be used
for direct appellate review. Under this mandated approach, I am
not convinced by the petition and the record that the trial court
indisputably will exceed its jurisdiction if prosecution of the
petitioner is allowed to continue.

I

A

The supreme court continues to follow the ancient English
view on the writ of prohibition:

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ, a prerogative writ,
extremely narrow in scope and operation, by which a
superior court, having appellate and supervisory
jurisdiction over an inferior court or tribunal possessing
judicial or quasi-judicial power, may prevent such inferior

11
court or tribunal from exceeding jurisdiction or usurping
jurisdiction over matters not within its jurisdiction.

English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977). It is “employed
with great caution and utilized only in emergencies.” Id.; see also
id. at 297 (“Prohibition will be invoked only in emergency cases to
forestall an impending present injury where person seeking writ
has no other appropriate and adequate legal remedy.”). The
supreme court determined that one such emergency is the need to
enforce a defendant’s statutory immunity against continued
criminal prosecution based on evidence he was compelled to give.
See State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 164 So. 872, 874 (Fla. 1935);
State ex rel. Byer v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 179, 182–83 (Fla. 1951).

The district courts of appeal later extended this scope to also
include enforcing a criminal defendant’s claimed justified-use-of-
force immunity against continued prosecution; an extension to
which the supreme court has given its implicit imprimatur. See
Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 778 (Fla. 2015); Boston v. State,
326 So. 3d 673, 677 (Fla. 2021); see also In re Amends. to Fla. Rules
of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL 715788, at *2 (Fla. Mar.
6, 2025). Oddly, though, this court stated that review of a trial
court’s denial of immunity in prohibition “is governed by the same
standard which applies in an appeal from an order denying a
motion to suppress”; it cited no authority and provided no analysis
to support such an imprecise observation. Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d
804, 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (emphasis supplied). Other district
courts nevertheless followed suit. So instead of properly treating
these petitions as invoking their limited writ authority under
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the district
courts have been handling prohibition in this context as if their
appellate jurisdiction under Article V, section 4(b)(1)—specifically,
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order as authorized by
supreme court rule—had been invoked. 1 In doing so, the courts

1 A district court of appeal has only appellate jurisdiction. See

Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (recognizing that the district court has
“jurisdiction to hear appeals” (emphasis supplied)). While the
district court has authority to issue enumerated extraordinary
writs and other writs, that authority does not equate with original

12
have failed to understand a threshold proposition: that a district
court cannot both apply an appellate standard of review in an
extraordinary writ proceeding and not obliterate the constitutional
distinction between the court’s appellate jurisdiction and its writ
authority as a supervisory court.

There ought to be no “struggling” with this point. Cf. Nadell
v. Hursey, 363 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (noting how
district courts are “struggling” with how prohibition should be
utilized in these immunity matters). The district courts’ approach
to prohibition regarding self-defense immunity (i.e., engaging
essentially in direct review)—never used or approved by the
supreme court—runs afoul of both the Florida Constitution and
the categorical limitations expressly imposed on the writ by the
supreme court as far back as 1898.

The constitution provides a district court of appeal jurisdiction
to review final judgments and orders of the trial courts, and that
review may be sought as a matter of right. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1),
Fla. Const. The district court, however, does not have jurisdiction
to consider a non-final order appeal unless authorized by supreme
court rule. See id. (authorizing district court review of
“interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules
adopted by the supreme court”); Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen
O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 2022) (“Florida’s district
courts may review only those interlocutory orders allowed by the
rules of this Court.”); cf. Vericker v. Powell, No. SC2022-1042, 2025
WL 922413, at *2 (Fla. Mar. 27, 2025) (“It is well established that
district courts of appeal generally lack authority to review nonfinal
orders until after the trial court issues a final judgment.”). Only
the supreme court—not the district courts and not the
Legislature—has the “power to define the scope of interlocutory
appeals.” State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 2000); cf.

jurisdiction—except, perhaps, for habeas authority. Rather, the
district court may issue those writs to aid the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Cf. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. The
constitution expressly gives “original jurisdiction” only to the
circuit court, which also is the only court to possess both original
and appellate jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.

13
State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1972) (explaining that the
constitution “does not authorize the legislature to provide for
interlocutory review,” so “any statute purporting to grant
interlocutory appeals is clearly a declaration of legislative policy
and no more” and is void “unless the Supreme Court of Florida
adopts such statute as its own”).

Whether a non-final order is subject to direct appellate review
(instead of indirectly, through an assessment of the record to
determine entitlement to extraordinary-writ relief against a trial
judge) is purely a policy call the supreme court gets to make for the
courts. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla.
1984) (explaining that “[t]he thrust of rule 9.130 is to restrict the
number of appealable nonfinal orders,” the theory being “that
appellate review of nonfinal judgments serves to waste court
resources and needlessly delays final judgment”); Jaye v. Royal
Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998) (“The judicial policy in
favor of limited certiorari review is based on the notion that
piecemeal review of nonfinal trial court orders will impede the
orderly administration of justice and serve only to delay and
harass.”); cf. Mandico v. Taos Const., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla.
1992) (adding a non-final order to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130 “[b]ecause we are sensitive to the concern for an
early resolution of controlling issues”); Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v.
Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 255 (Fla. 2023) (“And it is within our
constitutional authority to ensure that Florida’s procedural rules
of court manifest the substantive legal enactments of the
Legislature.”); Vericker, No. SC2022-1042, 2025 WL 922413, at *5
(agreeing that adoption of new rule allowing for “immediate review
of nonfinal orders denying qualifying Anti-SLAPP motions” is
warranted “to conform[] to” legislative policy).

Indeed, the supreme court recently considered a rule-
amendment proposal to authorize direct appellate review of self-
defense immunity interlocutory orders in criminal cases. The court
made a policy assessment leading to its rejecting the proposal in
favor of prohibition as the avenue for any immediate relief. See In
re Amends. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc., No. SC2024-0317, 2025 WL
715788, at *1–2 (noting “there are very few circumstances where
interlocutory appeals are authorized in criminal proceedings,”
which “do not include challenges against nonfinal orders denying

14
statutory immunity”; so declining to adopt the rule change out of
concern for “unique problems” that might arise in the context of
those proceedings). 2 The district courts of appeal, then, still lack
the constitutional authority to directly review a denial of self-
defense immunity as if the order is on appeal—by writ or
otherwise. While the writ of prohibition obviously is available as a
remedy in this context, considerations on whether to grant it must
be commensurate with the extraordinary remedy that the writ is.
A petition for the writ is not the same as an appeal, and it cannot
be handled as if it is—which the supreme court has been saying for
most of the State’s jurisprudential history.

B

The writ of prohibition being extraordinary and lying outside
the established constitutional pathways for appellate review; the
supreme court has “strictly enforced” the “fundamental principle”
that prohibition “is never allowed to usurp the functions of a writ
of error or certiorari, and can never be employed as a process for
the correction of errors of inferior tribunals.” State v. Malone, 23
So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1898) (emphases supplied); 3 id. (noting that the
writ “is never allowed to usurp the office of a writ of error, or an
appeal” (emphasis supplied)); see State ex rel. B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
Trammell, 192 So. 175, 176–77 (Fla. 1939) (“The writ of prohibition
is never allowed to usurp the functions of an appeal, writ of error
or certiorari.”); Mintz Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 580 (warning

2 Even though the proposed rule change would have given a

criminal defendant the more favorable review parameters that
accompany direct appellate review—instead of an extraordinary,
prerogative writ’s more stringent parameters—the Florida Public
Defender Association vigorously opposed it.
3 This decision may be old—found primarily in those “dusty

books”—but it is still good law. See Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d
901, 905 (Fla. 2002) (expressly stating that the supreme court
“does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio,” so when faced
with “an express holding . . . on a specific issue and a subsequent
contrary dicta statement on the same specific issue,” a lower court
must “apply [the] express holding in the former decision until such
time as [the supreme court] recedes from the express holding”).

15
against use of the writ of prohibition “to end-run our rules on
appeals generally and interlocutory appeals in particular”).

So when the supreme court says a writ of prohibition is “an
appropriate remedy,” it does not mean the writ can be “deployed to
reverse a trial court’s order on the merits of a case.” Mintz
Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 581 (emphasis supplied); see English, 348
So. 2d at 296–97 (explaining that prohibition is “preventive and
not corrective,” its purpose being “to prevent the doing of
something, not to compel the undoing of something already done,”
not “to revoke an order already entered” (emphases supplied)). To
this day, the office of prohibition is reserved for when “a [lower]
court has proposed to act in excess of its subject matter
jurisdiction.” Mintz Truppman, 346 So. 3d at 581. It should be clear
from all this that prohibition is not a review writ.

In turn, the trial court’s order on self-defense immunity is not
what is being reviewed in a prohibition proceeding. The supreme
court—once again, for over 120 years—has distinguished “between
the assumption of a jurisdiction to which the court has no legal
claim, and the mere erroneous exercise of a jurisdiction with which
the court is invested.” Malone, 23 So. at 576; see State ex rel.
Schwarz v. Heffernan, 194 So. 313, 314 (Fla. 1940) (“It is
fundamental that prohibition does not lie to correct errors of a
court which is acting within its jurisdiction, although proceeding
improperly in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”); Mintz Truppman,
346 So. 3d at 580 (“We have consistently said that the purpose of
the writ is to prevent a court’s action beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction, not to correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.”).

Naturally, “[e]very court has judicial power to hear and
determine the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties
and as to subject matter, and necessarily does so by proceeding in
the cause.” B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 So. at 177 (quotation and
citation omitted). When there is a good-faith representation to the
court that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court “will examine the
grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further,” and it “may
receive testimony on a preliminary question to” make that

16
determination. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 4 The trial
court “having jurisdiction to decide as to its own jurisdiction in any
particular case, it follows that its decision will have the same effect
and conclusiveness as would its decision on any other matter
within its jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The
court’s adjudication of a jurisdictional fact that “it is required to
ascertain . . . is conclusive on the question of jurisdiction, until set
aside or reversed by direct proceedings.” Id. (emphasis supplied)
(quotation and citation omitted). “If the existence of jurisdiction
depends on controverted facts which the inferior court has the
jurisdiction to determine, and the court errs in the exercise thereof,
prohibition is not available.” English, 348 So. 2d at 298 (emphasis
supplied).

In prohibition, then, how the trial court weighed the evidence
or whether there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s
determination of self-defense immunity is not for our
consideration. See Schwarz, 194 So. at 314 (precluding use of
prohibition to consider whether a lower court erred in determining
“controverted facts which the [] court has the jurisdiction to
determine”); State ex rel. Hendricks v. Hunt, 70 So. 2d 301, 306
(Fla. 1954) (noting that it is “settled that the sufficiency of the
evidence to support any particular order made by the respondent
judge in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute is
not a matter that may be determined in a prohibition proceeding
but can be decided only by an appeal from the order” (emphasis
supplied)); Mandico, 605 So. 2d at 854 (noting that prohibition may
not “be used to test the correctness of a lower tribunal’s ruling on
jurisdiction where the existence of jurisdiction depends on
controverted facts that the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to
determine” (citing English, 348 So. 2d at 298) (emphasis
supplied)); cf. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1977)
(noting in seminal immunity-from-prosecution case that review of

4 Section 776.032(4), Florida Statutes, in fact expressly gives

the trial court this jurisdiction, requiring it to hold a “pretrial
immunity hearing,” where the defendant must raise a “prima facie
claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution”; after
which the state must present “clear and convincing evidence” that
“overcome[s]” the claimed immunity.

17
an order on a motion to suppress, had one been filed, “would not be
appropriate” in prohibition).

The only question that could be before us in prohibition is
whether, as a matter of law and on the face of the record, the lower
court clearly and indisputably is acting or proposing to act beyond
its jurisdiction. See B.F. Goodrich, 192 So. at 176 (denying
prohibition because the “questions presented here are to such a
large extent questions of fact (alleged but not yet proven), as well
as of law, that lack of jurisdiction is not made conclusively to
appear” (emphasis supplied)); id. at 177 (explaining that “where
the question of jurisdiction is one of law, a court cannot by an
erroneous decision acquire jurisdiction which it has not, or divest
itself of jurisdiction which it has” (quotation and citation omitted));
id. (determining there were “not sufficient grounds shown upon
the face of the record” to warrant relief through prohibition);
English, 348 So. at 298 (requiring that request for prohibition
“affirmatively show lack of jurisdiction in the lower court”); cf.
State v. White, 24 So. 160, 167 (Fla. 1898) (looking to whether
court’s acting in excess of jurisdiction “is apparent upon the face of
the proceedings” to determine whether “prohibition will lie”); State
ex rel. Jacksonville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Gray, 177 So. 849,
850 (Fla. 1937) (suggesting that prohibition lies only where there
“is a question of law and no discretion involved, and the ruling was
one affecting the exercise of jurisdiction”); State ex rel. Byer v.
Willard, 54 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 1951) (looking to “material facts
shown by the record” to determine whether to grant writ). The
supreme court’s unmistakably consistent position on prohibition
over more than a century controls how we handle these prohibition
petitions regarding self-defense immunity, notwithstanding what
the practice has been among the district courts of appeal—
seemingly based on a single unsupported and unelucidated
sentence in one decision of this court.

C

Thus, there is only one question for me in this case: whether
the record before us demonstrates clearly and conclusively, without
a bona-fide factual dispute, that the petitioner is immune from
prosecution and the trial court is proposing to proceed without the

18
constitutional or statutory power to do so. My answer is a firm no,
as I explain next.

II

A

A person has immunity when his use of force is legally
justified. See § 776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (providing immunity “from
criminal prosecution” to a person “who uses force as permitted in
s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031,” except when force is used
against a law enforcement officer). Under section 776.012(2),
Florida Statutes,

[a] person is justified in using or threatening to use
deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or
threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself
or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a
forcible felony.

This immunity, however, is not available if the person “[i]s
attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the
commission of, a forcible felony.” § 776.041(1), Fla. Stat. Moreover,
a person “engaged in a criminal activity” or located “in a place
where he [] [does not have] a right to be” has “a duty to retreat”
rather than an entitlement to stand his ground and face the threat
with force. § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. 5

As already discussed, this immunity’s availability bears on a
trial court’s jurisdiction to allow a criminal prosecution to proceed,
and the court has statutory jurisdiction to resolve a factual dispute
bearing on that availability. See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. (providing
for a “pretrial immunity hearing” at which the State must
overcome a defendant’s prima facie case of immunity with “clear
and convincing evidence”). In this case, the State called several

5 Ancillary to my analysis is the separate observation that the

petitioner did not have the right to be on the property, only a
license or privilege to be there—at the property owner’s invitation.
This is another reason the petitioner is not entitled to immunity.

19
witnesses at the pre-trial hearing on the petitioner’s claim under
this provision, and those witnesses’ testimony, according to the
trial court, constituted clear and convincing evidence that
overcame the petitioner’s immunity claim. See id. The petitioner
having testified as well, there necessarily was a conflict in the
evidence, a conflict the trial court resolved with credibility
determinations—including a conclusion that the petitioner’s
testimony was not credible. In the context of this prohibition
petition, the trial court’s resolution of the evidentiary conflict is
conclusive and not reviewable. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 192 So. at
177. 6 The question for us is whether, when applying the law to
those facts, the petitioner is clearly immune. Cf. Smith v. State,
387 So. 3d 495, 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (granting writ of
prohibition after applying law to undisputed facts found by the
trial court and concluding the petitioner was entitled to
immunity). 7

There does not appear to be a dispute basically about one
threshold fact leading to the events for which the petitioner was
charged: He approached the two victims (a husband and wife) in
their car while they were fighting and ordered them, at gunpoint,
to exit and lie face-down on the ground. This means the petitioner
arguably was committing at least two forcible felonies by the time
the husband hopped into a car and supposedly took off in the
petitioner’s direction: aggravated assault and false imprisonment.
See § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (defining “forcible felony” to include
“aggravated assault” and “any other felony which involves the use
or threat of physical force or violence against any individual”);
§ 787.02(1)(a), (2), Fla. Stat. (making it a third-degree felony to
“forcibly, by threat . . . restrain[] another person without lawful
authority and against her or his will” (emphasis supplied));

6 The petitioner does not contend that the trial court failed to

properly afford him the evidentiary hearing to which he is
statutorily entitled. If he had, it would have been a claim to be
addressed in certiorari, not prohibition. See Edwards v. State, 351
So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
7 In appellate standard-of-review parlance, this would be akin

to de novo consideration.

20
§§ 784.011(1), 784.021(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (establishing a third-
degree felony for the “intentional, unlawful threat by word or act
to do violence to the person of another,” while using a deadly
weapon, coupled with the “doing some act which creates a well-
founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent”
(emphasis supplied)).

The petitioner contends he was acting lawfully because he was
making a common-law “citizen’s arrest,” rendering the highlighted
text above inapplicable. The trial court accepted that there was
such a thing and considered only whether the petitioner acted
reasonably in shooting to prevent an escape. See § 776.07(1), Fla.
Stat. (providing for justified use of force when a “law enforcement
officer or other person who has an arrested person in his or her
custody” and he “reasonably believes” the force “to be necessary to
prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody”). Though
the citizen’s arrest was an ancient common-law concept—one
initially imported into Florida’s substantive law—extensive
statutory law enacted since then is not consistent with its
continued operation with respect to private persons acting alone.
If there no longer is a common-law “citizen’s arrest” in Florida for
private persons, then the petitioner was not acting with lawful
authority when he held the victims under threat of a deadly
weapon, and immunity is not available to him under chapter 776,
Florida Statutes.

B

At English common law, the citizen’s arrest was required of
any person present when a felony was committed. See WILLIAM
HAWKINS, 2 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN Bk. 2, ch. 2,
114–16, §§ 1–7 (8th ed. 1824); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *191–92 (Oxford Press 2016). Citizens also were
required to heed a summons by a sheriff or constable to pursue and
arrest a person suspected of having committed a felony—known as
hue and cry—and all citizens present at the commission of a felony
were required to organize pursuit of the suspect. See 3 Edw. 1, ch.
9 (First Statute of Westminster (1275)); 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, ch. 1
(Second Statute of Winchester (1285)); EDWARD COKE, 3
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 116–17 (1644). These
concepts came into Florida’s substantive law when the Legislature

21
adopted “[t]he common and statute laws of England . . . down to
the 4th day of July, 1776.” § 2.01, Fla. Stat.

Preservation of the ancient English law as Florida’s
substantive law goes only so far: as long that it is “not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of
the Legislature of this state.” Id. (emphasis supplied); see also
§ 775.01, Fla. Stat. (putting into effect English common law “in
relation to crimes . . . where there is no existing provision by
statute on the subject”). Relevant here, the Legislature
undoubtedly has adopted “general and comprehensive statutes
that are designed to regulate” the “entire subject” regarding law
enforcement officers, peace officers, arrests, and detention
(including by private persons), so those statutes “supersede all
common-law rules in the premises, and the valid provisions of the
statutes are the controlling law.” See Broward v. Broward, 117 So.
691, 693 (Fla. 1928); see also id. (explaining how “a statute may
expressly or by implication supersede the common law,” in turn
becoming “the controlling law within its proper sphere of operation”
(emphasis supplied)); Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893, 899 (Fla.
1932) (noting well-settled rule of Florida jurisprudence that “the
common law may be modified indirectly as well as directly, by a
statute which is ‘inconsistent’ with the common law in a particular
instance”); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1952), overruled
on other grounds by Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971)
(explaining that section 2.01, Florida Statutes, “preserves the
common law only in those cases where it is ‘not inconsistent’ with
the acts of the Legislature,” so “[i]t is not necessary that a statute
be in direct conflict with the common law before the latter may be
superseded, inconsistency being sufficient” (second emphasis
supplied)). 8

8 But cf. Cullen v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 58 So. 182, 183

(Fla. 1912) (requiring a clear legislative intent to statutorily
abrogate a common-law right of action); City of Hialeah v. State ex
rel. Morris, 183 So. 745, 747–48 (Fla. 1938) (requiring “explicit and
clear” statutory abrogation of common-law rules relating to rights
of action, such abrogation not being inferred or implied); Thornber
v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990) (stating

22
The abrogation in this space started early in Florida’s history.
Indeed, the Legislature in 1845 directed a compilation of English
statute law still in effect in Florida, which was prepared by Leslie
Thompson in 1853 but officially published years later, upon being
revised and summarized, as a supplementary third volume of the
1941 Florida Statutes (titled “Helpful and Useful Matter”) under a
subsequent legislative directive. See § 16.44(2), (11), Fla Stat.
(1941) (Supp. 1945). The compilation determined, even then, at
least one aspect of the common-law’s “method of apprehending
criminals [by citizens]”—hue and cry—“[was] not consistent with
our police and law enforcement procedures.” Florida Statutes vol.
3 at 34 (1941). It also observed that, by statute, a Florida sheriff
already had authority to “raise the power of the county and
command any person to assist him, when necessary, in the
execution of the duties of his office.” § 144.02, Fla. Stat. (1941); see
§ 30.15(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (setting out the same authority in
successor statute, and providing for punishment of someone who
“refuses or neglects to render such assistance”); cf. South v. State
of Maryland for use of Pottle, 59 U.S. 396, 402 (1855) (describing
how, as a “conservator of the peace,” the English sheriff “may
command the posse comitatus or power of the country” to pursue
and arrest felons on the run).

A close look at the Florida Statutes reveals further evidence
the Legislature has opted to give law-enforcement officers and
other peace officers 9 the authority to arrest without a warrant,

that when it comes to common-law rights of action, the
“presumption is that no change . . . is intended unless the statute
is explicit and clear in that regard”); State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d
338, 341 (Fla. 1997) (requiring unequivocal statutory statement for
abrogation of common-law immunity from prosecution).
9 A peace officer is synonymous with a “conservator of the
peace,” which is an officer of the government vested by the
sovereign with authority to stop breaches of the peace (including
riots and mayhem) as they are happening, rather than pursuing
arrest after the breach as part of the law’s enforcement. See State
of Maryland for use of Pottle, 59 U.S. at 402–03 (explaining how
historically, the “conservator of the peace in his county or bailiwick

23
rather than persist in leaving to every citizen the duty and
authority to keep the public peace. First, there are the demanding
requirements for someone to be certified as a law enforcement
officer, an officer having the power to both bear arms and arrest.
See § 943.09, Fla. Stat. (establishing Criminal Justice
Professionalism Program); § 943.13, Fla. Stat. (setting out
minimum qualifications, including a certified training
requirement, for any person to be employed as a law enforcement
officer by an “employing agency,” defined by section 943.10(4),
Florida Statutes, to be a governmental entity with constitutional

. . . is the representative of the king, or sovereign power of the
State” who may “upon view, without writ or process, commit to
prison all persons who break the peace or attempt to break it” and
“command the posse comitatus or power of the country” to pursue
felons and traitors; ultimately “wielding the executive power for
the preservation of the public peace”); City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 106–08 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referencing
how the “criminal law deals with offenses after they have been
committed,” while “the police power aims to prevent them,” so “the
idea that the police are also peace officers [is not] simply a quaint
anachronism”); see also Art. V, § 19, Fla. Const. (providing that “all
judicial officers in this state shall be conservators of the peace”);
compare § 35.26, Fla. Stat. (making the marshal and deputy
marshals for the district court of appeal “conservators of the peace”
where the court “is sitting”; authorizing apprehension of, “without
warrant, any person disturbing the peace”; and requiring delivery
of that person “to the appropriate law enforcement officer”), with
§ 25.251(3), Fla. Stat. (making the supreme court marshal and
deputy marshals “law enforcement officers . . . with full powers to
bear arms and make arrests”); § 379.3311(1), Fla. Stat.
(constituting members of the Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission (“FWC”), its executive director, and its
officers as “peace officers with the power to make arrests for
violations of the law . . . committed in the presence of the officer”);
§ 870.04, Fla. Stat. (listing various law enforcement officers
together with a mayor, city commissioner, city council member,
alderman, and city police officer, as “peace officers”). Law
enforcement officers typically are also peace officers, but not every
peace officer is a law enforcement officer.

24
or statutory authority to employ or appoint such an officer);
§ 943.10(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (defining “law enforcement officer” as
someone “elected, appointed, or employed full time by any
municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof; who
is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests” and has
as his primary responsibility “the prevention and detection of
crime” or enforcement of the state’s “penal, criminal, traffic, or
highway laws”); § 943.133, Fla. Stat. (setting out employing agency
responsibilities regarding management of its law enforcement
officers); § 943.135, Fla. Stat. (setting out continuing education
requirements as a condition for a law enforcement officer’s
“continued employment or appointment” as an officer); § 943.139,
Fla. Stat. (requiring an employing agency to “immediately notify”
the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission “of the
employment or appointment, or separation . . . of any” law
enforcement officer); § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (setting out
certification requirements for employment or appointment of
someone as a law enforcement officer); § 943.1397(1), Fla. Stat.
(precluding certification of anyone as a law enforcement officer
“until the person has achieved an acceptable score on the officer
certification examination for the applicable criminal justice
discipline”).

Next, having established certification standards for law-
enforcement officers, the Legislature enumerates a variety of
circumstances when a “law enforcement officer may arrest a
person without a warrant.” § 901.15, Fla. Stat.; see also § 901.1505,
Fla. Stat. (giving a “federal law enforcement officer” the authority
to make warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, to use
force when reasonably necessary, and to conduct a warrantless
search incident to arrest); cf. § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (specifying when
a law enforcement officer may “temporarily detain” someone
suspected of committing or being about to commit a law violation).
A law enforcement officer, together with any other peace officer,
must “inform the person to be arrested of the officer’s authority
and the cause for arrest” when arresting without a warrant.
§ 901.17, Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). There is no similar

25
authorization or regulation for a private person to make a
warrantless arrest. 10

The Legislature also meticulously specifies who is a law
enforcement or peace officer and who else has the authority to
detain or arrest. See, e.g., § 27.255, Fla. Stat. (declaring
investigators with a state attorney’s office to be both law
enforcement officers and conservators of the peace, with “full
powers to arrest” and to bear arms, and providing them “the same
rights, protections, and immunities afforded other peace or law
enforcement officers”); § 321.05, Fla. Stat. (declaring Florida
Highway Patrol members as “conservators of the peace and law
enforcement officers of the state, with the common-law right to
arrest a person who, in the presence of the arresting officer,
commits a felony” or breach of the peace; and giving them “full
power to bear arms”); § 379.3311(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (giving peace
officers of FWC the power to arrest without a warrant); § 493.631,
Fla. Stat. (authorizing a security officer to temporarily detain a
person, until arrival of a law enforcement officer, if there is
probable cause to believe the person is committing a crime against
a “critical infrastructure facility,” authority that terminates upon
arrival of a law enforcement officer); § 648.30(3), Fla. Stat.
(prohibiting anyone, “other than a certified law enforcement
officer” from “apprehend[ing], detain[ing], or arrest[ing] a
principal on a bond, wherever issued, unless that person is
qualified, licensed, and appointed as provided in this chapter or
licensed as a bail bond agent or bail bond enforcement agent”);
§ 810.08(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his
designee to detain a person, until a law enforcement officer arrives,
if he “reasonably believes” the person is engaged in felonious
armed trespass in one of his structures or conveyances);

10 Warrantless arrests are highlighted here because the
Legislature appears to contemplate at least one situation in which
an arrest warrant may issue to someone beside a peace officer to
execute. See § 941.07, Fla. Stat. (authorizing the Governor, under
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, to “sign a warrant of
arrest” for an out-of-state fugitive that may “be directed to any
peace officer or other person whom the Governor may think fit to
entrust with the execution thereof” (emphasis supplied)).

26
§ 810.09(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his
designee to detain a person he believes is engaged in felonious
armed trespass until a law enforcement officer arrives); § 810.097,
Fla. Stat. (authorizing the chief administrative officer of a school,
or his designee, to temporarily detain a person until a law
enforcement officer arrives, if there is probable cause to believe the
person is trespassing on school property); § 812.015(3)(a), Fla.
Stat. (authorizing “a merchant, a farmer, or a transit agency’s
employee or agent” to detain someone temporarily—and
immediately contact a law enforcement officer—if there is probable
cause to believe the person engaged in “retail theft, farm theft, a
transit fare evasion, or trespass”); § 870.04, Fla. Stat. (authorizing
peace officers to order dispersal of riotous crowd and “to command
the assistance” from others in seizing and arresting anyone who
fails to comply); § 876.44, Fla. Stat. (authorizing “any peace officer
or any other person employed” as a watchman or guard on a
specified premises to detain for questioning and to arrest without
a warrant under specified conditions); § 901.252, Fla. Stat.
(allowing a municipal law enforcement officer to patrol municipal
property outside city limits and to detain a person if there is
probable cause to believe the person violated the law on that
property); § 947.22, Fla. Stat. (providing for the authority of a
parole or probation officer to arrest a parolee without a warrant);
§ 1012.97(2), Fla. Stat. (declaring that state university police
officers are “law enforcement officers of the state and conservators
of the peace” with “the right to arrest” and “full authority to bear
arms in the performance of their duties”).

Note that the only private persons the Legislature authorizes
to detain someone without a warrant—in addition to government
officers—are either those for whom the detaining would be part of
their employment, or property owners where there is armed
trespass. And when the Legislature does authorize a private
person to temporarily detain someone as part of his employment
or to stop a trespass on his property, it also typically gives
immunity from criminal and civil liability for “false arrest, false
imprisonment, or unlawful detention,” provided the citizen
complies with the statutory requirements for detention. See, e.g.,
§§ 493.631(9), 810.08, 810.09, 810.097(3), 812.015(3)(c), Fla. Stat.

27
Missing from the catalog of statutes authorizing warrantless
detentions and arrests, under specified procedures, is
authorization for simply any private person to detain—without a
warrant, without any procedures or restrictions, without any
connection with employment or one’s own property—anyone who
commits a felony in his presence. It frankly is silly to assume the
Legislature would go through all this trouble enacting statutes
regulating detentions and arrests if just anyone—off his own
property, off the clock, on the street—still could make his own
arrest without any regulation or supervision at all. In fact, the
Legislature specifies—by my count—only three other situations
(beside the property owner’s preventing armed trespass) in which
a private person can detain or arrest independent of his
employment: warrantless arrest by a “private person” upon
“reasonable information” that the accused has been charged with
a felony in another State (section 941.14, Florida Statutes); when
directed by a peace officer to render assistance with an arrest
(sections 843.06, 901.18, and 941.09, Florida Statutes); and when
directed by a peace officer to assist with dispersing a riotous
assembly (section 870.04, Florida Statutes). The “general and
comprehensive” statutory scheme providing detailed regulations
in this subject area—together with specific statutory references to
warrantless arrests by private persons—highlights clear
legislative intent to abrogate the common-law citizen’s arrest. 11

11 The supreme court has not directly held to the contrary. The

one time it did mention citizen’s arrest in the last forty years, it
came in the context of determining whether a search incident to
an arrest by law enforcement officers—following surveillance of a
possible drug offense, pursuit, and arrest outside their
jurisdiction—could still be valid for evidentiary suppression
purposes, even though they improperly made the arrest, ostensibly
“under color of office.” See Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d 1024, 1025
(Fla. 1984). The question that the court answered in the
affirmative is whether the arrest by the uniformed officers could
“be validated as a ‘citizen’s arrest’” when the arrest followed
surveillance outside the officers’ jurisdiction and occurred while
the officers were using a “marked police car and asserted their
official position in stopping the arrestees.” Id. The court’s analysis

28
This said, we also should not lose sight of the fact that the
petitioner did not just try to arrest the victims but instead seized
and held them while pointing a firearm at them. Only law
enforcement and peace officers are exempt from Florida’s firearm-
use controls, and then only while acting “within the scope or course
of their official duties or when acting at any time in the line of or
performance of a duty.” § 790.051, Fla. Stat.; see also § 790.25(2),

and holding appear limited to the contours of the special status
that a law enforcement officer holds—the officer seemingly being
always on duty. See § 790.052(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (giving a law
enforcement officer “the right to carry . . . concealed firearms,
during off-duty hours, at the discretion of their superior officers”
and allowing off-duty officers to “perform those law enforcement
functions that they normally perform during duty hours, utilizing
their weapons in a manner which is reasonably expected of on-duty
officers in similar situations”).

A law enforcement officer has extensive statutory powers of
arrest, including outside his jurisdiction in certain instances. See
§ 901.15, Fla. Stat (detailing when a warrantless arrest by a law
enforcement officer is lawful, but not mentioning an out-of-
jurisdiction arrest as being unlawful); § 901.25(2), Fla. Stat.
(authorizing arrests “outside the officer’s jurisdiction when”
pursuing someone he suspects to have committed a felony); cf.
§ 893.09(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring “all peace officers of the state” to
enforce the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act). A law enforcement officer, then, is not like a private
person in this respect. The court applied the common-law, citizen’s
arrest principle in Phoenix to guard against a government officer’s
abusing the arrest power to conduct unreasonable searches and
seizures outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Allowing a law
enforcement officer the common-law arrest power under certain
circumstances is still consistent with the Legislature’s overall
statutory scheme in a way that allowing the same power to an
untrained, unregulated private person is not. Simply put, the
continued availability of the common-law citizen’s arrest for
private persons like the petitioner—in the face of the “general and
comprehensive scheme” discussed above—was not a necessary
component of the Phoenix decision.

29
Fla. Stat. (authorizing law enforcement and peace officers to
“lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and
supplies for lawful purposes” while “carrying out official duties,”
notwithstanding general statutory restrictions on the display or
use of a firearm to threaten others). Private persons, like the
petitioner, are prohibited from “openly carry[ing]” a firearm,
including intentionally displaying it in a “threatening manner, not
in necessary self-defense.” § 790.053(1), Fla. Stat.; see also
§ 790.10, Fla. Stat. (prohibiting a person with a firearm from
exhibiting it in a “threatening manner” while others are present).
Reinforcing the distinction between use of force in connection with
arrest by a law enforcement officer and that of a private person is
section 776.05, Florida Statutes. Under that provision, a “law
enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or desist from efforts to
make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened
resistance.” § 776.05(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). The officer
in turn “is justified in the use of any force” that he “reasonably
believes to be necessary to defend himself . . . from bodily harm
while making the arrest.” Id.

Recall there are very limited circumstances where a private
person—like the petitioner—has express statutory authority to
make a warrantless arrest: when faced with an out-of-state
fugitive and when under the direction of a peace officer. See
§§ 901.18, 941.14, Fla. Stat. Section 776.05(1) reflects this
statutory carve-out for authorized, warrantless arrests by private
persons, allowing for the use of force only when the person has
been “summoned or directed” by a law enforcement officer “to
assist him” with the arrest. It must be, then, that a private person
similarly can use deadly force to prevent an escape only if he is
holding someone in custody at the direction of law enforcement,
not to prevent someone from escaping from the private person’s
own unlawful detention. See § 776.07(1), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a
“law enforcement officer or other person who has an arrested
person in his or her custody” use any force reasonably believed to
be necessary to prevent escape).

Here, the petitioner did not just act without direction from a law
enforcement officer—but instead acted directly contrary to an
officer’s clear instruction: to wait and do nothing until law
enforcement was on the scene. The petitioner chose to go at it

30
alone, recklessly and unlawfully, creating a highly dangerous
situation that easily could have ended with a tragic outcome for
one of the victims or the petitioner. The petitioner cannot conduct
an unauthorized arrest, while using the threat of deadly force, and
claim immunity from prosecution for the unfortunate
consequences that ensue. There being no clear case of immunity
here, no basis exists to grant the extraordinary relief requested. I
join the denial of the petition.

_____________________________

Elizabeth L. White, Matthew R. Kachergus, Bryan E. DeMaggio,
and Camille E. Sheppard of Sheppard, White, Kachergus &
DeMaggio, P.A., Jacksonville, for Petitioner.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Michael Schaub,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

31

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10884876. Public record. Not legal advice.
