# Hankins v. Wheeler

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10881669

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BILAL HANKINS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-1129
KEVIN WHEELER ET AL SECTION "L"(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Bifurcate Trial filed Plaintiff Bilal Hankins. R.
Doc. 240. The Housing Authority of New Orleans, Tyrone Martin, Demetrius Jackson, Tommy
Mercadal, and Leontine Mullins (the “HANO Defendants”) oppose the motion. R. Doc. 242.
Defendants Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District, Officer Kevin Wheeler,
Officer Ramon Pierre, and Carl Perilloux (the “Hurstville Defendants”); and Southeast Louisiana
Flood Protection Authority-East, Orleans Levee District Police, Kerry Najolia, Michael Brenckle,
Darnell Laurent, Thaddeus Petit, and Jamel Brown (the “SLFPA-E Defendants”) also oppose the

motion. R. Doc. 243. After considering the record, briefing, and applicable law, the Court now
rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
This civil rights case arises out of a traffic stop whereby law enforcement officers working
a part-time private security detail in Uptown New Orleans allegedly committed constitutional
violations against the Plaintiff. R. Doc. 1. Plaintiff brought federal constitutional claims against
Officer Kevin Wheeler and Officer Ramon Pierre who conducted the stop; Monell claims against
the private security company that the officers were working for at the time of the stop as well as
each officer’s full-time employers; and supervisory claims against each of the officers’
supervisors. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleged various state law claims, such as negligent infliction
of emotional distress and negligent hiring. Id. After limiting discovery to the issue of qualified
immunity, this Court found that there was no question of material fact as to whether there was an
underlying constitutional violation of either Plaintiff’s right to be free from an unlawful seizure or
his right to be free from excessive, unlawful force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

R. Doc. 176. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all federal
constitutional claims because each relied upon an underlying constitutional violation and
dismissed all state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
However, the Fifth Circuit reversed this Court’s ruling on appeal and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Hankins v. Wheeler, 109 F.4th 839 (5th Cir. 2024). The Circuit held that
“material fact disputes” existed as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, which precluded a summary judgment finding on both Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure
and excessive force claims. Id. at 846. Effectively, the Circuit’s holding requires a jury to
determine whether an underlying constitutional violation occurred and whether Officer Wheeler
and Officer Pierre are protected by a defense of qualified immunity. Since the Circuit’s decision

was issued, this Court granted the HANO Defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of Plaintiff’s supervisory claims against them. R. Doc. 218. Plaintiff has now appealed
that order as well, which remains pending before the Circuit. R. Doc. 232.
In the present motion, Plaintiff requests that this Court: (1) “allow the claims against
Officer Wheeler and Officer Pierre to proceed on the currently set July 14, 2025 trial date,” and
(2)“stay the trial against the Supervisor Defendants and Entity Defendants pending the resolution
of the Fifth Circuit appeal.” R. Doc. 240-1. The Defendants oppose the motion. R. Doc. 241; R.
Doc. 242. They argue such a bifurcation of the trial would carry a significant risk of inconsistent
results and unduly prejudice the Supervisor Defendants and Entity Defendants. Id.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
“For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order
a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party
claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The decision to bifurcate is a matter within the sole discretion of

the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See First Texas Sav.
Ass’n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, the Hurstville and
SLFPA-E Defendants have already moved the Court to bifurcate this matter, which Plaintiff
opposed. R. Doc. 210. Notably, Plaintiff has now changed his position and submits a similar
request for bifurcation in order to proceed with his claims against Officer Wheeler and Officer
Pierre. R. Doc. 240. This Court, however, has already expressly declined the invitation to bifurcate
this matter, noting:
[W]hether an underlying constitutional violation occurred in the
present case is dependent upon whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion to make the stop, which the Fifth Circuit has concluded is
shrouded in facts and must be decided by a jury. If the Court were
to bifurcate Plaintiff’s claims into two separate trials, the trial
against the officers present at the scene would proceed first, and the
jury would necessarily have to make a finding as to the existence of
a constitutional violation to reach a verdict. The first jury’s finding
on the existence of a constitutional violation would then presumably
inform the second jury’s decision in the trial against the supervisors
and entities. However, this approach becomes problematic when one
considers how inextricably intertwined Plaintiff’s claims are with
one another. For instance, bifurcation will require the parties here to
put forth the same evidence establishing a constitutional violation at
both trials: at the first to assess the reasonableness of the officers’
actions and at the second to assess the supervisors’ and entities’
culpability for the actions taken by those same officers.
The duplication of this evidence required at both trials indicates the
inefficiency of this approach and militates in favor of trying these
claims together. Additionally, the Court is concerned that
bifurcation in this case may result in undue prejudice. Two different
juries analyzing essentially the same evidence in slightly different
contexts could breed confusion and result in key differences of
interpretation regarding the facts of the case. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the more prudent approach 1s to try these issues all at once
before a single jury to avoid the waste of judicial resources and
prejudice to the parties.
R. Doc. 213.
Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's concerns regarding a further delay of trial
due to his own appeal, it will not depart from its prior reasoning noted above. The potential for
undue prejudice to the Supervisor and Entity Defendants as well as the duplication of evidence is
simply far too great to allow bifurcation of Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the Court has already
considered Plaintiffs suggestion that the parties could stipulate to relevant, binding determinations
from the first trial in order to avoid prejudice and duplicity. Such an approach, however, inheres
too much risk because the exact language of these stipulations will likely be heavily debated
between the parties and subject to interpretation, which the Court finds could cause further delay
and inefficiency during the second trial.
I. CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate, R. Doc. 240, is DENIED
with prejudice. This Court will not bifurcate Plaintiffs claims against Officer Wheeler and Pierre
from his Monell and supervisory claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of April, 2024.

fell

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10881669. Public record. Not legal advice.
