# Jackson v. Labosky

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · April 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10864204

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10864204

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that failure by nonmedical prison officials to respond to medical complaints from otisoner- plaintiff “already being treated by the prison doctor" does not establish deliberate indifference

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM P. JACKSON, | Civil No. 3:24-cv-1469
Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

Do FILED
DR. LABOSKY, ef ai., SCRANTON
Defendants APR 28 2075
PER sv
_ MEMORANDUM DEPUTY CLERk
Plaintf William Jackson (“Jackson”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Dentist Labosky, Dentist Ehgartner, Dental
Assistant Diehl, Dental Assistant Hess, Superintendent Rivello, Deputy Superintendent
Spyker, and Corrections Health Care Administrator (“CHCA”) McCorkle. (d.).
Before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on behalf of
Defendants Rivello, Spyker, and McCorkle. (Doc. 33). For the reasons that follow, the
motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

[. Allegations of the Complaint
The gravamen of Jackson’s lawsuit is alleged deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment related to his dental care from March
2024 to August 2024, while he was incarcerated at SCl-Smithfield, SCl-Camp Hill, SCI-.
Fayette, and SCl-Huntingdon. (Doc. 1).

Jackson alleges that he arrived at SCl-Smithfield on March 12, 2024. (Id. FIV, 1).
Upon intake at SCI-Smithfield, Jackson allegedly reported to medical staff that he had
cavities, no back teeth, and experienced pain and difficulty chewing. (/d. IV, 2). Between
March 12, 2024 and April 2, 2024, Jackson asserts that he submitted several sick call slips
complaining about cavities and pain. (Id. { lV, 3). On April 2, 2024, Dentist Ehgartner
treated Jackson and repaired his tooth. (/d. J IV, 4). During this appointment, Jackson
alleges that Dental Assistant Diehl broke a crown. (/d.). Dentist Ehgartner informed
Jackson that he would cement the crown, but he needed a new post which could be done at
Jackson’s home prison. (/d. {¥IV, 5-6). The complaint does not contain any factual
allegations against Defendants Rivello, Spyker, and McCorkle with respect to the alleged
events at SCl-Smithfield. (Id. {ff IV, 1-12).
Jackson was then transferred to SCl-Camp Hill for classification. (/d. J lV, 7).
During intake at SCl-Camp Hill, Jackson was informed that he should wait until he was
transferred to his home prison to address his needs. (Id. { IV, 8). On May 8, 2024, Jackson
was transferred to SCl-Fayette. (Id. J IV, 9), At SCl-Fayette, Jackson submitted sick call
slips related to his dental condition but was again informed that he should wait until he was
transferred to his home prison to address his needs. (/d. J lV, 10-11). The complaint does
not contain any factual allegations against Defendants Rivello, Spyker, and McCorkle with
respect to the alleged events at SCI-Camp Hill or SCl-Fayette. (/d. IV, 7-11).

On June 20, 2024, Jackson was transferred to SCl-Huntingdon, his home prison.
(Id. J IV, 12). During intake, Jackson claims that he reported to medical staff that he had
several cavities, severe pain, bleeding gums, difficulty chewing, and no back teeth to chew
with. (Id. FIV, 13). A few days later, on June 26, 2024, Jackson's crown fell out—the same
day he sent a sick call slip regarding his broken crown and cavities. (Id. TV, 14). Between
June 30, 2024 and July 2, 2024, Jackson submitted sick call slips due to pain and bleeding
gums. (Id. J lV, 16). On July 3, 2024, Jackson was called to the dental office when Dental
Assistant Hess allegedly informed him that there was a line for dental services, and he was
“not jumping the line.” (/d. J IV, 17). That same day, Dentist Labosky examined Jackson
and informed him that he needed a new post. (Id. J IV, 19). Dentist Labosky allegedly
stated that the DOC does not put in posts, and that Jackson would have to get the post
implanted when he was released from prison. (/d.). Jackson alleges that Dental Assistant
Hess confiscated the crown that had fallen out of Jackson's mouth as contraband because it
contained metal. (/d. IV, 20). Dental Assistant Hess again informed Jackson that he had
to wait for care regarding his cavities, pain, and bleeding gums because there were several
inmates waiting in line for treatment before him. (Id. 19 IV, 20-22).
Between June 29, 2024, and July 26, 2024, Jackson claims that he sent eight Inmate
Request to Staff Member forms to CHCA McCorkle. (ld. 27). CHCA McCorkle
allegedly responded that “Tilt was explained to you, there is a waiting list and you can’t jump
the line.” (Id.).

Between June 29, 2024, and August 8, 2024, Jackson claims that he sent eight.
Inmate Request to Staff Member forms to Superintendent Rivello. (Id. J lV, 28).
Superintendent Rivello allegedly did not intercede on Jackson's behalf. (/d.).
Between June 30, 2024, and August 8, 2024, Jackson claims that he sent ten Inmate
Request to Staff Member forms to Deputy Superintendent Spyker. (Id. { (IV)(29). Deputy
Superintendent Spyker allegedly did not intercede on Jackson's behalf. (/d.). □
On July 11, 2024, Jackson submitted a sick call slip concerning his pain and
bleeding gums and indicated that he had to miss meals due to his dental condition. (Id. J
IV, 30). The complaint does not indicate who Jackson sent this slip to. (See id).
On July 11, 2024, Dentist Labosky treated Jackson and drilled down two of his teeth.
(Id. IV, 31). Jackson alleges that Dentist Labosky did not address his pain, cavities,
broken crown, bleeding gums, or need for a bridge. (/d.). .
Between July 24; 2024 and August 8, 2024, Jackson claims that he submitted ten
sick call slips complaining about his pain and bleeding gums. (ld. J Vv, 32). The complaint
does not indicate who these slips were sent to. (See id.).
On July 31, 2024, Jackson met with Dentist Labosky and Dental Assistant Hess and
informed them that he intended to file a civil complaint for denial of medical care. (/d. J lV,
33). In response to this statement, Jackson alleges that Dentist Labosky and Dental
Assistant Hess failed to provide medical care on that date. (/d.). Jackson does not allege

that Defendants Rivello, Spyker, or McCorkle were present or were aware of the July 31,
2024 alleged events. (See id.). . .
Il. Legal Standards
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the procedural hybrid of a motion to
dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Westport Ins. Corp. v. Black, Davis & Shue
Agency, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 157, 162 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides: “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Feb. R. Civ. P. 12(c). To succeed

ona Rule 12(c) motion, the movant must clearly establish that no material issue of fact

remains to be resolved and that the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005); see 5C Charles Alan
Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (3d ed.).
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under a standard
similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, A17
(3d Cir. 2017). That is, judgment on the pleadings should be granted only when, accepting
as true the facts alleged by the nonmovant and drawing “all reasonable inferences’ in that
party's favor, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Zimmerman, 873
F.3d at 417-418 (citation omitted). In deciding motions for judgment on the pleadings,
courts may only consider “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of -

public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are
based upon these documents.” Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC,
935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.
2010)).
B. 42U.8.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of
action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: __ .
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
_ the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress...
Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Thus, § 1983 limits liability to persons who
violate constitutional rights.

lll. Discussion
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that they had a serious medical need; and (2) that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to that need. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). A serious medical need exists when a “failure to treat can be expected to lead to
substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or death.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946
F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by an
intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons,
denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that
results in suffering or risk of injury, see Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993),
or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury,” White v.
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
At the same time, “[iJt is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice,
without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.”
Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. “[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his
behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of
Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Kennedy v. S.C.I. Rockview
Emps., 2010 WL 4853959, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2010) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny
Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)) (“[Cjourts give prison medical
personnel wide latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of inmates [and] should ‘disavow any

attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment...which remains a question of sound professional judgment.”). An inmate's
disagreement with the nature of the medical treatment-they receive is therefore not enough
to establish deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice
does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a-prisoner.”). □
Further, “lif a prisoner is under the care of medical experts...a non-medical prison official
will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
Assuming that Jackson has stated a serious medical need with respect to his dental
condition, he has not plausibly alleged that Superintendent Rivello and Deputy
Superintendent Spyker were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. However, with
respect to Corrections Health Care Administrator McCorkle, the complaint alleges facts to
support a plausible inference that McCorkle acted with deliberate indifference to Jackon's
medical needs, and the Eighth Amendment claim against McCorkle shall proceed.
First, Defendants Rivello, Spyker, and McCorkle are not medical professionals.
Based on the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that Jackson was under the care of
medical professionals. “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison
Official...will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of
deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (finding

that failure by nonmedical prison officials to respond to medical complaints from otisoner-
plaintiff “already being treated by the prison doctor" does not establish deliberate
indifference). Defendants Rivello and Spyker are entitled to dismissal on this ground.
Regarding Defendant McCorkle, the Court acknowledges that Health Care Administrators
“are undisputably administrators, not doctors.” Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 F. App’x 33, 39
(3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential). However, Jackson obviously had problems with the dental
treatment he was receiving and allegedly submitted eight Inmate Request to Staff Member
forms to McCorkle, and McCorkle responded on at least one occasion. (Doc. 1 IV, 27).
Jackson further alleges that Defendant McCorkle is responsible for overseeing the medical

care of inmates at SCl-Huntingdon. (/d. { Ill, 3). Based on the allegations, Jackson has
indicated that McCorkle knew or had a reason to believe that medical staff were mistreating
or not treating him at all.
Next, Jackson's allegation that he sent Inmate Request to Staff Member forms and
grievances to Rivello and Spyker, and that they failed to intercede, s insufficient, alone, to
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, especially since Jackson was receiving medical
and dental treatment from professionals. (Doc. 1 {J IV, 26, 28-30). It has long been
recognized that a state prisoner’s allegation that prison officials and administrators
responded inappropriately or failed to respond to a prisoner's complaint or grievance, is
insufficient to establish personal involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct.
See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (nonmedical prison officials’ failure to respond to inmate letters

complaining of underlying conduct is not unconstitutional); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that after-the-fact review of a grievance is □
insufficient to demonstrate the actual knowledge necessary to establish personal
involvement); Simonton v. Tennis, 437 F. App’x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) □□□□□
prison official's secondary review of an inmate's grievance or appeal is not sufficient to
demonstrate the personal involvement required to establish the deprivation of a
constitutional right’); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006)
(nonprecedential) (holding that allegations that prison officials and administrators responded
inappropriately, or failed to respond to a prison grievance, did not establish that the officials
and administrators were involved in the underlying allegedly unconstitutional conduct).
Finally, to the extent that Jackson attempts to hold Superintendent Rivello and
Deputy Superintendent Spyker liable based on their supervisory roles, this claim also fails. □
It is well-established that officials may not be held liable for unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Accordingly, insofar as Jackson’s claims against Defendants Rivello and Spyker rely ona
respondeat superior theory of liability, they are entitled to dismissal on this ground. See
Dooley v. Weitzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that “[p]ersonal involvement
requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)); Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d

10

Cir. 2020) (explaining that, in order for a plaintiff to orevail under Section 1983, he-must

make “a showing that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing’).
Because the complaint is devoid of allegations from which the Court can plausibly
infer that Defendants Rivello and Spyker were deliberately indifferent to Jackson’s serious
medical needs or were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, their
motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted. However, the Court will deny
Defendants’ motion with respect to the claims against McCorkle. It is necessary to obtain a
factual record as to the responsibilities, if any, of CHCA McCorkle in determining when and
how an inmate receives medical and/or dental care.
IV. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for
failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v, Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to
grant leave to amend.” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F.
App’x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373
(3d Cir. 2000)). The claims against Defendants Rivello and Spyker are factually and legally
flawed and thus incurable. Therefore, the Court concludes that curative amendment would
be a futile endeavor.

4

V. Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing, the motion (Doc. 33) for judgment on the pleadings by
Defendants Rivello, Spyker, and McCorkle will be granted in part and denied in part.
A separate Order shall issue.

[e477 □ oreee
Robert D.\Mariant
United States District Judge
Dated: April OY) 2005

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10864204. Public record. Not legal advice.