# Buzz Seating, Inc. v. DCI, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · April 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10851212

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

BUZZ SEATING, INC., :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:24-cv-00555-JPH
:
vs. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
:
DCI, INC.,
:
:
Defendant.
:

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Buzz Seating, Inc.’s (hereinafter, “Buzz
Seating” or “Plaintiff”) Motion for Default Judgment (the “Motion”). Doc. 11. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Since October 8, 2012, Buzz Seating has engaged in various business transactions with
DCI, Inc. (hereinafter, “DCI” or “Defendant”). Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 12. The parties entered
into numerous contracts whereby Buzz Seating provided DCI with office furniture, chairs,
and a sundry of other products predicated on purchase orders generated by DCI. Id. ¶¶ 12,
13. Since the working relationship between the two companies began, DCI purchased
products from Buzz Seating in amounts totaling more than $1,900,000.00. Id. ¶ 16.
Under the terms and conditions of each purchase order, DCI was required to pay the
outstanding invoices Buzz Seating submitted on all products produced within 30 days of
purchase. Id. ¶ 17. For over ten years, Buzz Seating filled multiple purchase orders for
products it produced, and DCI timely paid all outstanding invoices on those orders without
incident. Id. ¶ 19. Buzz Seating alleges, however, that beginning in March 2023, DCI began
to place product orders, accept and retain shipments, but fail to pay invoices within the
contracted 30-day window. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Currently, DCI owes Buzz Seating on eight overdue
and outstanding invoices for products delivered in the total amount of $230,927.21. Id. ¶ 21.
On October 3, 2024, Buzz Seating sued DCI, asserting claims for breach of contract,

an accounting, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. See generally Doc. 1. To date,
Defendant has failed to appear or otherwise defend against this action.1 An entry of default
was entered in this case on February 12, 2025. See Doc. 10.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
There is a two-step sequential process for obtaining default judgment. See Allied Consol.
Enters. v. Aladwan, No. 2:20-cv-4561, 2021 WL 1572291, *2 (S.D. Ohio April 22, 2021). First,
a party must apply for an entry of default from the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a
party against whom a judgment is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). Then,

after a party obtains an entry of default, that party may request that default judgment be
entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This can happen two ways: by the clerk or by the court.
If the party’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that may be ascertained by
computation, the clerk may enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). In any other case,
the party must seek default judgment from the court. Id. When considering an application for
default judgment, the court will accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true but must
assess whether the factual allegations are legally sufficient to state the alleged cause of action.
The moving party may prove the existence of damages through detailed affidavits or

1 A summons issued to the Defendant was returned executed on December 26, 2025. See Doc. 7.
documentary evidence, or at an evidentiary hearing. Arthur v. Robert James Assocs. Asset Mgmt.,
No. 3:11-cv-460, 2012 WL 1122892, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2012).
For default judgment to be entered by a district court, the court must be satisfied that
it possesses both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the nonresponsive party.

Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every
case.”); Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Personal jurisdiction
over a defendant is a threshold issue that must be present to support any subsequent order of
the district court, including entry of the default judgment.”); Kuhlman v. McDonnell, No. 1:20-
cv-510, 2022 WL 407240, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2022). If the jurisdictional prerequisite is
met, then the court must weigh the factors articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Russell v. City of
Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002). Those factors are:
(1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the claims; (3) the
sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake; (5) possible
disputed material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect;
and (7) the preference for decisions on the merits.

See also Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986).
A. Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint properly invokes this Court’s jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete
diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiff and Defendant and because the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 8.
Furthermore, personal jurisdiction is proper here because DCI engaged in business with Buzz
Seating, a citizen of the state of Ohio, and has sufficient business contacts in Ohio. Id. ¶ 9.
DCI negotiated various contracts with Buzz Seating in Ohio, and Buzz Seating supplied
products to DCI for over a decade in amounts totaling nearly two million dollars. Id. DCI has
also allegedly failed to remit payment for numerous outstanding invoices to Buzz Seating,
thereby causing harm to Buzz Seating in Ohio. Id. Finally, venue is proper in this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)–(c) because a substantial part of the events and omissions

giving rise to Buzz Seating’s claims herein occurred in this District. Id. ¶ 11.
Having established that this Court has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over the parties, the Court will now weigh the factors set forth in Russell—starting
first with the second and third Russell factors regarding whether Plaintiff has asserted sufficient
and meritorious claims—and saving for later discussion the possible prejudice to Plaintiff.
1. Sufficient and Meritorious Claims
The second and third factors in Russell relate to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Like other courts, this Court will consider these factors
together. Plaintiff alleges four claims in the Complaint: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust

enrichment; (3) promissory estoppel; and (4) action on account. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages in excess of $230,927.21—DCI’s outstanding account balance—as
well as prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and expenses, and costs.
Id. at PageID 8. Taking the factual allegations as true, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s
Complaint states sufficient and meritorious claims against Defendant. However, as explained
below, certain of Plaintiff’s claims—those for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel—
would fail as a matter of law.
i. Breach of Contract and “On Account” Claims
Plaintiff alleges a claim for breach of contract and “on account” for Defendant’s failure

to pay for the products. Doc. 1, ¶ 33–36. An action “on account” claim “simplifies pleadings
by allowing a party to advance, as one claim, claims for separate breaches of contract based
on a series of transactions.” Kwikcolor Sand v. Fairmount Minerals Ltd., 2011-Ohio-6646, ¶ 13
(8th Dist.) (citation omitted). The Court proceeds to review these claims together. See Oberer
v. Specialty Med. Care LLC, 2023-Ohio-2610, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Under Ohio law,2 a party has

stated a breach of contract claim where there is: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) performance
by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damage or loss to the plaintiff because of
the breach. Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-363, 2022 WL 836424, *8 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 21, 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Delphi Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (S.D. Ohio 2003)).
It is well established that there are three categories of contracts under Ohio law:
express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law. Legros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 (1989). Express
and implied-in-fact contracts differ from contracts implied-in-law in that contracts implied-in-
law are not true contracts. Sabin v. Graves, 86 Ohio App.3d 628, 633 (6th Dist. 1993). The
existence of express or implied-in-fact contracts hinges upon proof of all of the elements of a

2 “Before considering the substance of the claims, the Court must first determine the applicable law.” Cabatech,
LLC v. Nextlight, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-59, 2024 WL 3740593, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024). In a diversity action
such as the instant case, a district court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 963 F.2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff did not attach an agreement or written
contract between the parties, nor did Plaintiff indicate whether the agreement or written contract had a choice
of law provision. See generally Doc. 4; Doc. 11. “Ohio choice of law rules mandate that the law of the state
with the more significant relationship to the contract should govern disputes arising from it.” N. River Ins. Co.
v. Emps. Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (S.D. Ohio 2002). In determining the “more significant
relationship,” Ohio has adopted the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188, which
includes consideration of: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of negotiating the contract; (3) the place of
performance; (4) the location of the contract subject matter; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. N. River Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (citing National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 963 F.2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1992)).

These factors weigh in favor of applying Ohio law here. The Complaint does not identify how or where the
parties negotiated and signed a written agreement. See Doc. 4. Defendant is a New Hampshire corporation,
and Plaintiff is an Ohio corporation. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. It is not clear where the products were shipped to, but DCI
“remitted payments for its purchase of products to Buzz Seating via payments (e.g., checks) sent to and
delivered in Ohio. Id. ¶ 9. As multiple states may be appropriate, this Court will apply Ohio law. See Dodge
Data & Analytics LLC v. iSqFt, 183 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (“If [] either state would be
appropriate, the court should apply the law of the forum state.”).
contract. Lucas v. Costantini, 13 Ohio App.3d 367, 368 (12th Dist. 1983). Express contracts
diverge from implied-in-fact contracts in the form of proof that is needed to establish each
contractual element. Penwell v. Amherst Hosp., 84 Ohio App.3d 16, 21 (9th Dist. 1992). In
express contracts, assent to the terms of the contract is actually expressed in the form of an

offer and an acceptance. Lucas at 368. On the other hand, an “implied contract is a contract
inferred by a court from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, making a reasonable
or necessary assumption that a contract exists between the parties by tacit understanding.”
Hollis Towing v. Greene, 2003-Ohio-5962, ¶ 8.
The “[e]ssential elements of a contract include an offer, acceptance, consideration,
[and] a manifestation of mutual assent. A meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of
the contract is a requirement to enforcing the contract.” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985,
¶ 16 (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff alleges that that the “terms and conditions governing orders
of product from Buzz Seating along with numerous purchase orders . . . between the parties

constitute valid and binding [c]ontracts.” Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 32. In support of its claim,
Plaintiff makes certain statements of facts in the Complaint but only attaches Defendant’s
account statement as Exhibit A—liberally referring to it as a “contract.” Id. Not so. All Exhibit
A expresses is a document on Buzz Seating letterhead purporting to show Defendant’s
outstanding account statement balance as of August 31, 2024. See Doc. 1-1, PageID 10–11.
There are no terms in the account statement, nor is there any offer or acceptance. Exhibit A
is simply an accounting of the amounts allegedly owed by Defendant to Plaintiff. Id. The
Court is therefore hard-pressed to conclude that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a breach of
an express contract because the account statement upon which Plaintiff relies for its breach-of-
contract claim has no explicit indication that there was “an offer, acceptance, consideration,
[and] a manifestation of mutual assent.” Kostelnik at ¶ 16.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently and meritoriously alleged a
breach of an implied contract between the parties. “To establish a contract implied-in-fact, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction make
it reasonably certain that an agreement was intended.” Stepp v. Freeman, 119 Ohio App.3d 68,
74 (2d Dist. 1997). One of the “most obvious example[s]” of an implied contract occurs where
“recovery is sought for services rendered or materials furnished[,] and the circumstances are
such that people expect to be paid and pay for such conduct.” Lucas at 369. Here, Plaintiff
alleges that over the course of the ten-year working relationship between the parties, DCI
“purchased products from Buzz Seating for over $1,900,000, including the unpaid invoices”
currently in dispute. Doc. 1, ¶ 16. Plaintiff claims that it “fulfilled multiple purchase orders
from DCI for products and [that] DCI paid its outstanding invoices for such orders without

issue.” Id. ¶ 19. Only in March 2023 did DCI begin to “accept delivery of the products” but
“fail[] to pay for such products.” Id. ¶ 20. Exhibit A supports this assertion by indicating,
beginning in March 2023, the “overdue and outstanding invoices for products ordered from
Buzz Seating and delivered by Buzz Seating [to DCI] in the total amount of $230,927.21.” Id.
¶ 21.
By failing to appear or otherwise defend this action, Defendant “has not denied that
the invoices were not paid[,] nor has it disputed the amounts billed.” Gen. Produce LLC v. Farm
Fresh Fruits & Vegetables, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00246, 2019 WL 2537655, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Apr.
30, 2019). Even if Defendant was to argue that the account statement does not reflect a

contract between the parties, the existence of an enforceable contract here may still be proven
“in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of a contract.” Hocking Valley Community Hosp. v. Community Health
Plan of Ohio, 2003-Ohio-4243, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). Defendant’s previous timely payments of at
least $1.6 million for Plaintiff’s delivered goods is conduct indicating that Defendant sought

products from Plaintiff and expected to pay for such products. This past performance
demonstrates “circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction [that] make it reasonably
certain that an agreement was intended.” Freeman at 74.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has therefore stated sufficient and meritorious claims for
breach of contract and “on account” for Defendant’s failure to pay for the products currently
in dispute.
ii. Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiff also pursues an unjust enrichment claim, appearing to plead this count in the
alternative to the first breach of contract claim in the event that there was no enforceable

contract established between the parties. Doc. 1, ¶ 37–46. Unjust enrichment is an equitable
claim based on a contract implied-in-law, see Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 525–28
(1938), the purpose of which “is not to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or damage
suffered by him but to compensate him for the benefit he has conferred on the defendant.”
Hughes v. Oberholtzer, 162 Ohio St. 330, 335 (1954). Importantly, “[u]njust enrichment is an
alternative theory of recovery, which ‘operates in the absence of an express contract or a contract
implied in fact to prevent a party from retaining money or benefits that in justice and equity
belong to another.’” Cantlin v. Smythe Cramer Co., 2018-Ohio-4607, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (quoting
Gallo v. Westfield Natl. Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.)) (emphasis added).
Because Plaintiff has adequately alleged the existence of a contract implied-in-fact, it
cannot simultaneously succeed on an unjust enrichment claim based on the exact same set of
facts and circumstances. See Ryan v. Rival Mfg. Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-810032, 1981
WL 10160, *1 (Dec. 16, 1981) (“It is clearly the law in Ohio that an equitable action in quasi-

contract for unjust enrichment will not lie when the subject matter of that claim is covered by
an express contract or a contract implied in fact.”). Having established that Plaintiff has set
forth a sufficient and meritorious claim for breach of contract implied-in-fact, this Court
declines to enter default judgment on Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because these claims
are now impermissibility duplicative.
iii. Promissory Estoppel
Plaintiff also pursues a claim for promissory estoppel. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 47–56. “The equitable
doctrine of promissory estoppel is an alternative theory of recovery for a breach of contract
claim.” Waltherr-Willard v. Mariemont City Sch., No. 1:12-cv-476, 2013 WL 121970, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 9, 2013), aff’d, 601 F. App’x 385 (6th Cir. 2015). “In other words, promissory

estoppel is not available as a remedy where the legal relationship between the parties is
governed by a valid and enforceable contract,” as is the case here. Id.
“Because . . . there was an implied contract here,” this Court declines to enter default
judgment on Plaintiff’s “alternative theory of promissory estoppel.” Truax v. Arora, No. 2758,
1993 WL 99893, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1993); see also Harwood v. Avaya Corp., No. C2-
05-828, 2007 WL 1574116, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 2007) (“[T]he doctrine of unjust
enrichment does not apply where a valid, enforceable contract exists.”).
2. Prejudice to the Plaintiff
Having found that Plaintiff has stated sufficient and meritorious claims, the Court
must next determine whether Plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the Motion was denied.
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in October 2024, and the alleged breaches specified in the

Complaint began to occur in March 2023. Taking the allegations as true, Defendant has been
in breach of the contract between the parties for more than two years. Defendant has made
no effort to appear or defend this lawsuit. To deny Plaintiff’s Motion would “render Plaintiff’s
effort at a civil resolution futile, while rewarding Defendant’s avoidance of this litigation.”
Evans Adhesive Corp. v. Golden State Adhesives, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-1801, 2023 WL 7130676, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2023). For these reasons, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor
of default judgment.
3. Amount of Money at Stake
Next, the Court considers the amount of money at stake. Plaintiff claims “damages in

excess of $230,927.21,” as well as “prejudgment interest, post-judgement interest, attorney’s
fees and expenses, [and] costs.” Doc. 1, PageID 8. This is an award appropriate to place
Plaintiff “in as good a position as [it] would have been but for the breach.” Walters v. Goddard,
127 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). Additionally, Plaintiff’s total award is likely to be
on the lower end of the range of awards in federal cases. See e.g., Iron Workers Dist. Council of
S. Ohio & Vicinity Ben. Tr. v. Hoosier Steel, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-458, 2012 WL 1122809, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 3, 2012) (awarding over $300,000); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio Laborers Bens. v.
Olive Leaf Landscaping, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-2799, 2023 WL 8031493, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20,
2023) (collecting cases). This factor therefore weighs in favor of default judgment.
4. Possible Disputed Material Facts
As for the next factor, Defendant has not placed any material facts in dispute because
it has failed to appear or otherwise defend against this action. See Doc. 7. Additionally,
because Defendant has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion, Defendant has

forfeited the right to dispute the allegations set forth therein. See Evans Adhesive Corp., 2023
WL 7130676, at *3. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
5. Excusable Neglect
Like the previous factor, this Court is unable to attribute Defendant’s default to
excusable neglect because Defendant has failed to appear or otherwise defend in this action
despite proper service of process. See Doc. 7. This fact is indicative of actual disregard rather
than excusable neglect. United States v. Intelligent Perimeter Sys., No. 2:21-cv-1913, 2022 WL
3348653, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2022). This factor therefore favors default judgment.
6. Preference for Decision on the Merits

As a final consideration, the Court must account for “the strong policy underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472.
By its nature, default judgment conflicts with merits-based decisions. But in cases such as this,
where Defendant has shown no interest in pursuing a decision on the merits, it is appropriate
to consider the need for judicial efficiency and the needs of the litigants that have actually
appeared before the Court. There are no mitigating factors that Defendant has articulated in
this case that weigh against default judgment. Thus, the Court is compelled to resolve this
case through default judgment. Accordingly, default judgment shall be issued against
Defendant.
III. DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
Having found Plaintiff entitled to default judgment, this Court now considers
Plaintiff’s request for damages. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 8. “Even when a default judgment is
warranted based on a party’s failure to defend, the allegations in the complaint with respect

to the amount of the damages are not deemed true.” Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x. 351,
355 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “The district court must instead conduct an inquiry
in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Id. (quotations
omitted). While “the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine damages, an
evidentiary hearing is not a prerequisite to the entry of default judgment if damages are
contained in documentary evidence or detailed affidavits and can be ascertained on the record
before the court.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. RPM Mgmt. Co. LLC, No. 2:11-cv-377, 2011 WL
5389425, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011) (citation omitted). Based on the evidence presented
in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, including the at-issue invoices and

outstanding account statement (Doc. 1-1), the affidavit of president and owner of Buzz
Seating Daniel O’Hara (Doc. 11-1), and the declaration of counsel Theresa L. Nelson (Doc.
11-2), the Court finds a hearing on damages to be unnecessary at this juncture.
Plaintiff requests an award of damages in the amount of $230,927.21, an award of
“interest at a rate of 1.5% per month as provided in the Contracts, as well as attorney[’s] fees
in the amount of $4,050.00 and costs in the amount of $405.00.” Doc. 11, PageID 40. The
Court will address each request in turn.
A. Monetary Damages
Plaintiff seeks compensatory “damages in the amount of at least $230,927.21 for DCI’s

outstanding account balance.” Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 60. The Court will review this request for
damages solely in the context of Plaintiff's breach of contract and “on account” claims
(Counts One and Four), to which Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment. As stated above,
“[t]he damages awarded for a breach of contract [under Ohio law] should place the injured
party in as good a position as he would have been but for the breach.” Walters v. Goddard, 127

N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has properly established that $230,927.21 is warranted because of DCI’s
breaches. See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 11-1; Doc. 11-2. As of August 31, 2024, Defendant has an
outstanding balance of $230,927.21 owed to Plaintiff, as demonstrated by the invoices sent to
and ignored by Defendant, Defendant’s statement balance, as well as an affidavit by Plaintiff’s
president attesting to the same. Doc. 1-1; Doc. 11-1; Doc. 11-2. Thus, an award of
$230,927.21 in monetary damages is appropriate to place Plaintiff “in as good a position as
[it] would have been but for the breach.” Walters, 127 N.E.3d at 326.
B. Interest

Plaintiff also seeks prejudgment and postjudgment interest on its request for damages.
Doc. 11, PageID 39. In diversity cases such as here, “federal law controls postjudgment
interest but state law governs awards of prejudgment interest.” Est. of Riddle ex rel. Riddle v. S.
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Court
will proceed to address each request for interest on damages in turn.
1. Prejudgment Interest
“Ohio law provides for prejudgment interest to the party that obtains a judgment on a
contract claim or counterclaim.” Cabatech, LLC v. Nextlight, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-59, 2024 WL
3740593, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 1343.03(A)); see also Landis

v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 339, 341 (1998). “The award of prejudgment interest is
intended to compensate the plaintiff for the period of time between accrual of the claim and
judgment.” Persello v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011-Ohio-3230, ¶ 15. Under § 1343.03(A), “when
money becomes due and payable . . . upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial
tribunal for the payment of money arising out of . . . a contract or other transaction, . . . the

creditor is entitled to interest at the rate per annum determined pursuant to section 5703.47
of the Revised Code,” unless some other contractual rate applies. Ohio Rev. Code §
1343.03(A).
Here, because Plaintiff “has been granted judgment on an underlying contract claim
for money that is due and payable, [Plaintiff] is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of
law.” Kott Enterprises, LTD. v. Brady, 2004-Ohio-7160, ¶ 73. Although not attaching any
agreement or written contract, Plaintiff indicated that an interest rate of 1.5% per month is
“provided [for] in the [c]ontracts” between the parties. Doc. 11, PageID 39. Plaintiff shall file
a proposed judgment entry in which it calculates the amount of prejudgment interest that has
accrued from each breach to the date of this Order.3

2. Postjudgment Interest
Plaintiff is also entitled to postjudgment interest at the applicable statutory rate from
the date of this Order until the entire judgment is satisfied. As is relevant here, “28 U.S.C. §
1961(a) requires postjudgment interest to be paid on money awarded by district courts in civil
actions.” CAPSA Sols., LLC v. Concord Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-594, 2019 WL
4894038, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2019) (citations omitted). “The district court has no
discretion to deny postjudgment interest, as it is mandatory.” Id. (citing Caffey v. UNUM Life

3 This filing should also include as an attachment the written agreement or contract between the parties
purporting to reflect the agreed-upon 1.5% interest rate provision. See Doc. 11, PageID 39. If Plaintiff cannot
produce a document containing the 1.5% interest rate provision, “the standard rate set out in Ohio Revised
Code § 5703.47” would apply. See Cabatech, LLC, 2024 WL 3740593, at *4.
Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Such interest shall be calculated from the date
of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity
Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for
the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Lastly, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs totaling $4,455.00. Doc. 11, PageID 39.
However, “[i]t has long been the general rule in the United States that a prevailing party may
not ordinarily recover attorney’s fees in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract
providing for a fee award.” Williams v. ABX Air, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-833, 2007 WL 2886283, at
*7, (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007) (citing Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 18, 744
F.2d 1226, 1229 (6th Cir. 1984)). Because Plaintiff did not provide a copy of a written contract
between the parties or direct the Court to a statute providing for a fee award, Plaintiff is not
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 11) is
GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s requests for (1) default judgment on
its breach of contract and “on accounts” claims (Counts One and Four), (2) monetary
damages, and (3) pre- and postjudgment interest are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s requests for (1)
default judgment on its unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims (Counts Two and
Three); (2) attorney’s fees, and (3) costs are DENIED.
As such, default judgment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff on its breach of contract

and “on account” claims. Plaintiff is hereby AWARDED against Defendant $230,927.21 in
damages, plus postjudgment interest at the applicable statutory rate commencing on the date
of this Order. Plaintiff SHALL FILE a proposed judgment entry reflecting the amount of
prejudgment interest that has accrued from the date of Defendant’s breaches to the date this
Order is entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 24, 2025
ery P. ins
United States District Judge

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10851212. Public record. Not legal advice.