# State v. Richins

> Utah Supreme Court · April 24, 2025 · 2025 UT 10

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10850861

## Case

- **Court:** Utah Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 24, 2025
- **Citations:** 2025 UT 10
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 6 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 10

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
KOURI DARDEN RICHINS,
Appellant.

No. 20241329
Heard February 11, 2025
Filed April 24, 2025

On Appeal of Interlocutory Orders

Third District Court, Summit County
The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik
The Honorable Laura S. Scott
No. 231500139

Attorneys ∗:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Marian Decker, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for appellant
Freyja Johnson, Emily Adams, Hannah Leavitt-Howell, Bountiful,
for appellant

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the
Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.

__________________________________________________________
∗
Additional attorneys: Bryson King, Salt Lake City, for amicus
curiae Third District Court Presiding Judge Laura S. Scott.
STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The State of Utah has charged Kouri Darden Richins with,
among other things, aggravated murder. When we heard
argument, Richins’s trial was set to begin in April 2025 in Summit
County.
¶2 The State and Richins (together, the Parties) jointly appeal
two district court decisions. First, the Presiding Judge of the Third
District Court, Laura Scott (Presiding Judge), denied the Parties’
stipulated request to hold jury selection for Richins’s trial in person.
The Third District Court (Third District) has adopted a standing
order that requires jury selection to occur virtually unless the
Presiding Judge concludes that “extraordinary circumstances”
exist to vary from the rule. The Presiding Judge concluded that the
intense media attention surrounding the proceedings did not
constitute extraordinary circumstances. Next, Judge Richard
Mrazik (Trial Judge), who is, at the time this opinion is to publish,
slated to preside over Richins’s trial, denied the Parties’ stipulated
request to expand the jury venire to include prospective jurors from
Summit and Salt Lake counties. The Trial Judge originally granted
that request before reversing course.
¶3 The Parties contend that the Presiding Judge and the Trial
Judge erred when they denied the pair of stipulated requests. The
Parties argue that the Presiding Judge applied the wrong legal
standard and that her decision was outside the bounds of her
discretion. With respect to the request to pull jurors from two
counties, the Parties argue that the Trial Judge misinterpreted Utah
law to reach his conclusion.
¶4 On February 18, 2025, we issued an order affirming the
judges’ decisions. In that order, we promised that we would issue
an opinion more fully explaining our reasoning.
BACKGROUND
¶5 The State has charged Richins with aggravated murder,
attempted aggravated murder, insurance fraud, mortgage fraud,

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Opinion of the Court

and forgery. When we heard argument, a four-week jury trial was
set to begin in April 2025 in Summit County. 1
¶6 According to an order the Trial Judge signed, Richins’s
case has received “extreme media attention.” “Hearings in this
matter are consistently covered by a pool videographer (i.e., a TV
camera is in the courtroom), a pool photographer (typically from
the Associated Press), multiple print and radio journalists, and
multiple TV producers.” This attention “consistently yields
coverage in local, national, and international print, television, and
online media.” “Beyond legacy media, this matter is consistently
covered by ‘new media’ outlets such as multiple YouTube channels
with between 800,000 and 1.5 million subscribers each.” Moreover,
“on days on which the [trial] court holds hearings in this matter,
the courthouse appears and feels overrun.”
¶7 The Parties made two stipulated requests related to
Richins’s trial. They first requested that jury selection be held in
person, rather than over Webex, a video conferencing platform. 2
They next moved to expand the jury venire to include prospective
jurors from Summit and Salt Lake counties.
¶8 The Parties made their first request pursuant to a Third
District standing order that, since September 26, 2023, directs all
jury selections in the Third District to be conducted virtually
(Standing Order). If the Presiding Judge determines that
“extraordinary circumstances” exist, she can grant a variance and
permit in-person jury selection.
¶9 The Third District adopted the Standing Order after
considering several factors, including “the number of judges, the
volume of jury trials, the . . . backlog of jury trials, the limited
number of in-person jury selections that could be conducted each

__________________________________________________________
1 Summit County, along with Salt Lake and Tooele counties,

compose Utah’s Third Judicial District.
2 We use the term “jury selection” to include voir dire. See
generally Selected to Serve: A Guide to Jury Service, UTAH STATE CTS.,
https://www.utcourts.gov/en/about/courts/dist/jury/sel-serve
.html#SectionII (last visited Apr. 16, 2025).

3
STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

week given available . . . resources, the bailiff shortage, the way
criminal jury trials are stacked, and the impact on jurors.” 3
¶10 Although the Standing Order does not contemplate
having a trial court judge decide the jury-selection question, the
Trial Judge issued an order approving the Parties’ request for
in-person jury selection and concluding that “the extreme media
attention focused on this matter is an extraordinary circumstance.”
He then referred the “matter” to the Presiding Judge for “approval
or rejection” of the stipulated motion.
¶11 In the order, the Trial Judge also approved the Parties’
second request: to expand the jury venire to include prospective
jurors from Summit and Salt Lake counties.
¶12 The Presiding Judge then issued an order, in which she
denied the request to conduct jury selection in person. She agreed
that “this is a ‘high-profile case.’” But she concluded that the Parties
failed to “demonstrate[] that this is an extraordinary case.”
(Emphasis added.)
¶13 She reasoned that the Parties’ concerns about “cameras
and the number of people in and around the courtroom during a
trial” could be addressed “with carefully crafted jury
questionnaires, jury instructions, and decorum orders.” She
explained that the Parties failed to adequately explain why
in-person jury selection was needed “to address general concerns
about ‘extreme media attention’ or why the use of a supplemental
or case-specific questionnaire coupled with meticulous questioning
during voir dire would be insufficient for identifying those jurors
who may be uncomfortable with media attention or large crowds.”
¶14 In that order, the Presiding Judge also commented on the
Parties’ second request. She wrote that “the Parties apparently have
‘stipulated’ to ‘expanding’ the jury venire to include ‘equal
numbers of randomly selected jurors from Summit County and Salt
Lake County.’” She explained that she was not “commenting on
whether this is permissible under Utah law,” but that she was “not
persuaded that any minimal benefit from ‘exposing’ potential
__________________________________________________________
3 The Presiding Judge’s brief represents that “[t]he Standing

Order was drafted and enacted in consultation with, and the
unanimous agreement of, the administrative management
committee, which [the Trial Judge] serves on. It was also
extensively discussed with the Third District bench.”

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Opinion of the Court

jurors to the ‘palpable changes in energy in the courtroom’
outweighs the significant and unwarranted burden on dozens of
prospective jurors from Salt Lake County who otherwise would be
forced to travel to Summit County for in-person jury selection.”
Following her reference to “Utah law,” the Presiding Judge
included, without additional comment, a footnote citing Utah Code
section 78B-1-105. Subsection 78B-1-105(1) states that a “person is
competent to serve as a juror if the person is . . . a resident of the
county.” UTAH CODE § 78B-1-105(1)(c).
¶15 This prompted the Trial Judge to issue an order
reconsidering the Parties’ motion to expand the jury venire. He set
aside his previous order granting the motion and, this time, denied
it. He gave two reasons for his volte-face. He first explained that
the Presiding Judge had rejected the request. He next concluded
that Utah law did not permit jurors to be summoned from multiple
counties for one trial.
¶16 The Parties filed petitions for permission to appeal the
Presiding Judge’s order and the Trial Judge’s reconsidered order in
this court, which we granted. 4 We invited the Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC) to file an amicus curiae brief on the issues
pertaining to the Standing Order regarding in-person jury
selection. The AOC declined that invitation and instead submitted
an amicus brief on behalf of the Presiding Judge. Although this was
different from what we had authorized, the Parties did not oppose
the Presiding Judge’s participation. We accepted the amicus brief. 5
__________________________________________________________
4 The Parties also filed two joint petitions for extraordinary
relief. We denied them, concluding that an interlocutory appeal
supplied the Parties with an adequate remedy.
5 We pause to note that we see this as an anomalous situation.

We do not normally allow the judges whose decisions we review
to file briefs explaining why they ruled the way they did. We trust
Utah’s judges to explain their reasoning in the orders they issue,
and we expect appellees to defend those decisions on appeal. We
invited the AOC to submit a brief because we believed that that
administrative body might be able to explain the rationale behind
the Standing Order and the policy considerations that prompted an
exception for “extraordinary circumstances.” But here, because the
Parties were aligned in their opposition to the Presiding Judge’s
decision (leaving no one to defend it), and because the Presiding
(continued . . .)

5
STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

¶17 We heard argument on February 11, 2025. Because the
Parties stressed the need for an expeditious answer to their appeal,
we issued a brief order stating that we affirmed both decisions. This
opinion more thoroughly explains the basis for that determination.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶18 The Parties first challenge the Presiding Judge’s order
denying their stipulated request for in-person jury selection. We
review that decision for abuse of discretion. See Hi-Country Ests.
Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagley & Co., 2000 UT 27, ¶¶ 11, 14, 996 P.2d
534. A district court abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong
legal standard or if its decision is “beyond the limits of
reasonability.” State v. Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 43, 532 P.3d 930
(cleaned up). A district court’s decision is “beyond the limits of
reasonability,” id. (cleaned up), if “no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the trial court,” State v. Montiel, 2005 UT
48, ¶ 24, 122 P.3d 571 (cleaned up).
¶19 The Parties next contend that the Trial Judge erred when
he ultimately denied the stipulated motion to expand the jury
venire to include prospective jurors from Summit and Salt Lake
counties. We review decisions related to the district court’s
management of jury selection for abuse of discretion. See Boyle v.
Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 9, 251 P.3d 810 (stating that for
“challenges to the trial court’s management of jury voir dire, an
abuse of discretion standard [i]s appropriate”). “Misapplication of
the law constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Utah v. Boyden, 2019 UT
11, ¶ 19, 441 P.3d 737. “For that reason, when a legal conclusion is
embedded in a district court’s discretionary determination, we peel
back the abuse of discretion standard and look to make sure that
the court applied the correct law.” Id. ¶ 21.
ANALYSIS
I. WE HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE PRESIDING JUDGE’S ORDER
¶20 Before we turn to the Parties’ arguments, we need to
address the Presiding Judge’s assertion that it is “not clear whether
the parties are entitled to” any appellate review of her decision. She
asserts that her decision is “purely administrative,” and the parties
“are not challenging the Standing Order itself or the authority
granted to the presiding judge under it.” She argues that nothing
__________________________________________________________
Judge questioned our jurisdiction to hear the matter, we accepted
the amicus brief.

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Opinion of the Court

in Utah Code section 78A-3-102, our jurisdiction statute, “appears
to invoke jurisdiction over an administrative decision by a Presiding
Judge.” 6 (Emphasis added.) In other words, the Presiding Judge
politely suggests that this court lacks the ability to review her
administrative decision by way of an appeal. 7
¶21 This argument is pure inside baseball. 8 It speaks to a
division of authority in Utah’s judiciary that is not always apparent
to even the most experienced attorneys and judges.
¶22 Our constitution has created a “Judicial Council[,] which
. . . adopt[s] rules for the administration of the courts of the state.”

__________________________________________________________
6 Although we conclude that we need not decide whether the

Presiding Judge’s decision is administrative or procedural to
resolve this appeal, we note that the Presiding Judge has raised an
interesting point. Indeed, if her decision is purely administrative,
an appeal may not be the proper course. Rule 3-104(3)(A)(iii) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that “[a]ny judge of
the judicial district may ask the Chief Justice or Judicial Council to
review any administrative decision made by the presiding judge of
that district.” But whether that rule is better considered an
exhaustion requirement, or an exclusive remedy, is beyond the
scope of this opinion.
7 We do not read anything in the Presiding Judge’s argument to

suggest that a party could not seek an extraordinary writ to
advance an argument about her ruling.
8 William Safire described inside baseball’s “political or
professional denotation” as “minutiae savored by the cognoscenti,
delicious details, nuances discussed and dissected by aficionados.”
William Safire, On Language; Inside Baseball, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June
19, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/19/magazine/on-
language-inside-baseball.html. This is not to suggest that the
question is unimportant. To the contrary, a lot can ride on the
distinction between an administrative or procedural rule: whether
a party must exhaust administrative remedies or whether a party
can seek direct review, for example. The question also has a
constitutional dimension. The Utah Constitution gives the Utah
Legislature the ability to amend Supreme Court rules of procedure
and evidence by a supermajority vote of each house. See UTAH
CONST. art. VIII, § 4. That provision does not apply to the Judicial
Council’s administrative rules.

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STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

UTAH CONST. art VIII, § 12(1). The Utah Constitution separately
gives the Supreme Court the authority to “adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state.” Id. art. VIII, § 4.
It is not always easy to define the line that demarcates these
powers.
¶23 The Judicial Council has promulgated a Code of Judicial
Administration that contains the rules that govern the court
system’s administration. Rule 3-105(3)(A) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, for instance, gives the Judicial Council
“exclusive authority for the administration of the judiciary,
including authority to establish and manage the budget, adopt
administrative policies and rules, and oversee the Administrative
Office of the Courts.”
¶24 The Judicial Council’s administrative rules largely concern
day-to-day operations of our courts. See generally UTAH R. JUD.
ADMIN. 3-101 to -502; id. R. 4-101 to -908. Such rules, to highlight a
few, address human resource policies, procurement rules, and
court facilities planning. See id. R. 3-402; id. R. 3-412; id. R. 3-409.
¶25 The administrative rules also include a provision for jury
selection. See id. R. 4-404. Rule 4-404 mandates how courts will
compile the master jury list, establishes random selection
procedures for who will be called to jury duty, and directs how
prospective jurors are summoned to service.
¶26 Our procedural rules dictate, among other things, how
court proceedings unfold. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
for example, set standards for the appointment of counsel, outline
how a subpoena issues, and describe how a jury should be
instructed. See UTAH. R. CRIM. P. 8; id. R. 14; id. R. 19.
¶27 These rules also speak to how a jury is to be selected. They
outline different methods through which parties may examine and
challenge prospective jurors. See id. R. 18. The rules also limn the
discretion a court possesses “to set a hearing as an in-person
hearing, a remote hearing, or a hybrid hearing” and provides
factors for the court to consider to determine which format to use
for a hearing in a particular case. See id. R. 17.5(b).
¶28 While it may constitute an oversimplification that fails to
account for the cases that exist close to the line, we can at least take
note of a general observation when it comes to distinguishing
administrative from procedural rules. Administrative rules tend to
describe what occurs behind the door that separates the courtroom

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Opinion of the Court

from judges’ chambers and the administrative offices of the court.
Procedural rules tend to govern what happens in front of that door.
¶29 In her brief, the Presiding Judge relies on a provision of the
Utah Code to argue that her decision denying in-person jury
selection is administrative. Utah Code subsection 78A-5-106(5)
gives presiding judges authority to “implement[] policies of the
Judicial Council” and “exercis[e] powers and perform[]
administrative duties as authorized by the Judicial Council.” True
enough. But that does not really tell us anything about the scope of
what should be properly considered administrative.
¶30 The Presiding Judge also relies on several rules from the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Rule 3-104(3)(A)(i) charges
presiding judges “with the responsibility for the effective operation
of the court,” including the implementation and enforcement of
“statutes, rules, policies and directives of the [Judicial] Council as
they pertain to the administration of the courts.” Yet this similarly
tells us nothing about the line between administrative and
procedural rules. 9
¶31 Rule 4-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is
a little more helpful. That rule provides that the jury summons
“may direct the prospective juror to appear at a date, time, and
place certain.” UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-404(6)(C)(ii). The Presiding
Judge argues that the authority to summon a prospective juror to a
place certain includes the authority to summon them to a virtual
place. 10

__________________________________________________________
9 We would also caution against drawing too many lessons

about what is procedural and what is administrative from a review
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. That could lull a
reader into thinking that those rules were adopted with the
procedural/administrative distinction well in mind. This, to
borrow a phrase, may assume facts not in evidence.
10 The Presiding Judge additionally claims that in our
COVID-19-related orders, we amended rule 18 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure to require virtual jury selection. (Citing ORDER
FOR COURT OPERATIONS DURING PANDEMIC, UTAH SUP. CT. & UTAH
JUD. COUNCIL (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.utcourts.gov
/content/dam/alerts/docs/20200311%20-%20Pandemic%20Adm
inistrative%20Order.pdf.) We assume that the Presiding Judge is
(continued . . .)

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STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

¶32 At first blush, the question of when a party can seek
in-person jury selection resembles the topics covered in rule 17.5
and rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure much more
than the internal processes for sending out jury questionnaires and
summonses that rule 4-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration describes. This would suggest that the question of
when jury selection may be held virtually is more properly the
subject of a procedural rule.
¶33 As interesting as the question might be, we ultimately
need not resolve it to determine whether we have jurisdiction over
this appeal. This is because the Presiding Judge entered an order in
the case denying the Parties’ request. And, under our precedent,
that order secures our appellate jurisdiction.
¶34 In Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagley & Co., we
were asked to review a presiding judge’s decision to reassign a
matter to another judge. 2000 UT 27, ¶ 1, 996 P.2d 534. There, the
presiding judge issued a minute entry reassigning the case. Id. ¶ 9.
We construed the minute entry as an “order” and exercised
jurisdiction over it under Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996) even
though the decision fell within the presiding judge’s administrative
capacity under rule 3-104 of the Utah Code of Judicial

__________________________________________________________
referring to the instruction applicable to all court levels that “[i]f a
jury trial is conducted . . . the court should implement jury selection
processes that protect the health and safety of the individuals who
might be called for jury duty.” See id. She might also be referring to
our order dated December 31, 2020. In that order, issued when
COVID-19’s spread was accelerating, we instructed courts to
conduct jury selection remotely. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER FOR
COURT OPERATIONS DURING PANDEMIC, UTAH SUP. CT. & UTAH JUD.
COUNCIL (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.utcourts.gov/content/dam
/alerts/docs/20201231%20-%20Pandemic%20Administrative%20
Order.pdf.
These orders, which were promulgated in the rush and fog of
the pandemic response, were issued jointly by the Utah Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council. We acted jointly in part so we
would not have to sort out which body had the ability to do what
during such a critical time. In light of that history, these orders are
not terribly instructive on the question of how to discern
administrative from procedural rules.

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Opinion of the Court

Administration. 11 See Hi-Country, 2000 UT 27, ¶¶ 9, 11; see also id.
¶ 19 (Anderson, J., dissenting). We rejected the dissent’s argument
that we lacked jurisdiction “because such administrative acts of the
presiding judge do not constitute appealable orders.” 12 Id. ¶ 13
(majority opinion).
¶35 We similarly have jurisdiction to review the Presiding
Judge’s decision denying the Parties’ request for in-person jury
selection even if the decision is characterized as falling within her
administrative capacity. See id. ¶¶ 11, 13–14. Under the logic of
Hi-Country, once the Presiding Judge turned what might have been
an internal administrative decision into an order entered in the
case, it became appealable like any other order. We undoubtedly
have jurisdiction over “interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony.” UTAH
CODE § 78A-3-102(3)(h).
¶36 Before we move on to the substance of the Parties’
challenges, it is important to note what the Parties do not argue.
The Parties have not raised on appeal the question of whether the
__________________________________________________________
11 That rule “grants authority to the presiding judge to make

initial case assignments and to reassign cases when necessary.”
Hi-Country, 2000 UT 27, ¶ 14. At the time, rule 3-104(3)(E)
instructed that: (1) the “presiding judge shall monitor the status of
the dockets in the court and implement improved methods and
systems of managing dockets,” and (2) “[t]he presiding judge shall
assign cases and judges in accordance with supplemental court
rules to provide for an equitable distribution of the workload and
the prompt disposition of cases.” UTAH R. JUD.
ADMIN. 3-104(3)(E)(i), (ii) (2000). Similar provisions can be found in
rule 3-104 as it exists today, but presiding judge “[d]ocket
management and case and judge assignment[]” responsibilities
have since been renumbered as rule 3-104(3)(F). See id.
R. 3-104(3)(F).
12 We also explained that “this court is entrusted with the
authority to supervise and oversee the administration of the lower
courts of this state, including administrative rules or procedures
governing the transfer of a case from one judge to another.”
Hi-Country, 2000 UT 27, ¶ 13. The Presiding Judge has not
challenged this precedent, and we do not revisit it here. We note,
however, that our blurring of administrative and procedural rules
in this statement might render it less than analytically robust.

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STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

failure to allow in-person jury selection violates any right the
federal or state constitution protects. Nor do they argue that the
Presiding Judge lacked the authority to enter the Standing Order. 13
This leaves us with the questions of whether the Presiding Judge
abused her discretion when she denied the Parties’ request for
in-person jury selection and whether the Trial Judge abused his
discretion when he rejected the Parties’ entreaty to pull jurors from
more than one county.
II. THE PRESIDING JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION WHEN
SHE DENIED THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED REQUEST FOR IN-PERSON
JURY SELECTION
¶37 The Parties first contend that the Presiding Judge abused
her discretion when she failed to defer to the Trial Judge’s finding
and conclusion that “the extreme media attention focused on this
matter is an extraordinary circumstance justifying in-person jury
selection.” They maintain that the Presiding Judge should have
deferred to the Trial Judge’s findings about the media presence in
this case and its effect on jury selection, as well as the Trial Judge’s
ultimate finding of extraordinary circumstances.
¶38 This argument fundamentally misunderstands the process
the Third District has implemented to govern requests for
in-person jury selection. The Standing Order directs that all jury
selection in the Third District “will be conducted virtually” “absent
extraordinary circumstances and prior approval from the Presiding
Judge.” The requirement that the Presiding Judge approve any
request for in-person jury selection vests the authority to decide
whether any jury selection should depart from the norm in the
__________________________________________________________
13 The closest the Parties come to challenging the Presiding
Judge’s authority can be found in their reply brief. They cite rule
17.5 and rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and argue
that these rules demonstrate that jury selection is a matter of
procedure and not administration. Neither rule speaks squarely to
whether the Presiding Judge has the authority to order that jury
selection be presumptively virtual. Rule 17.5 governs hearings.
Rule 18 discusses jury selection methods but is silent on the question
of jury-selection format. And, as we have discussed, the line
between procedural and administrative rules can be difficult to
define, and the Parties have not really tried to define it. The Parties,
at bottom, have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the
Presiding Judge lacked the authority to enter the Standing Order.

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Opinion of the Court

Presiding Judge alone. Nothing in the Standing Order requires or
indeed permits a trial court judge to decide in the first instance
whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist.
¶39 The Trial Judge appeared to understand that the decision
to conduct jury selection in person rested with the Presiding Judge.
In his order, the Trial Judge referred the “matter” to the Presiding
Judge “for approval or rejection of” the stipulated motion. As such,
the Presiding Judge was not reviewing the Trial Judge’s findings or
his ultimate conclusion. She therefore owed his order no deference.
¶40 The Parties read the Standing Order differently than we
do. They claim that its plain language does not provide that the
Presiding Judge will determine whether extraordinary
circumstances exist. They point to the Standing Order’s use of the
conjunction “and” in the following pronouncement: “absent
extraordinary circumstances and prior approval from the presiding
judge, all jury selections in the Third District Court will be
conducted virtually.” (Emphasis added.) They claim that “[w]ith
that conjunction, the Standing Order identifies the approval of the
presiding judge as an additional requirement to the finding of
extraordinary circumstances” by the trial court judge.
¶41 But just as the Standing Order’s plain language does not
give the Presiding Judge explicit authority to determine whether
extraordinary circumstances exist in a particular case, it fails to give
the trial court judge that same authority. The best reading of the
Standing Order is that both determinations are vested in the
Presiding Judge, whose “prior approval” is the linchpin. In other
words, the Presiding Judge needs to be convinced that
extraordinary circumstances exist as a prerequisite to granting
approval.
¶42 The Parties also assert several reasons why a trial court
judge, rather than the Presiding Judge, should make a finding
about whether extraordinary circumstances exist in a particular
case. The Parties maintain that “to allow the presiding judge to
evaluate and make findings in an individual case to which she has
not been assigned is inconsistent” with a presiding judge’s role in
“handling district-wide policy and administrative matters” under
Utah Code subsection 78A-5-106(5) and rule 3-104(3) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration. They also point to rule 29 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 63 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which give specific authority to “the presiding
judge of the court” when parties have moved to disqualify a judge

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STATE v. RICHINS
Opinion of the Court

and note “the absence of any such authority in the rules for the
presiding judge to make factual findings regarding whether
in-person voir dire or jury selection is appropriate in another
judge’s case.” The Parties also note that a trial court judge is better
positioned to observe the atmosphere in and around the courtroom
and that these circumstances may not be adequately reflected in the
record. Additionally, the Parties claim that jury selection is a
judicial function that should be handled by a case’s assigned judge.
¶43 We completely understand the Parties’ position that it
might be good policy to leave the decision to conduct in-person
jury selection to trial court judges. But even if we were inclined to
agree that the reasons to permit a trial court judge to decide which
format is best for a particular trial are more compelling than the
Standing Order’s justifications for placing the decision with the
Presiding Judge, it would not change that, here, the Standing Order
takes that decision away from trial court judges and gives it to the
Presiding Judge. 14
¶44 The Parties next contend that the Presiding Judge abused
her discretion when she concluded that the Parties had not shown
“extraordinary circumstances” that would justify departing from
the Third District’s general practice of conducting jury selection
virtually. They argue that “it is beyond the limits of reasonability
to forbid in-person jury selection under the facts and circumstances
here.” Specifically, this is “an unusual case involving an aggravated
murder charge, with a jury trial scheduled to last a full month, and
the boots on the ground—both parties and the trial judge—all
__________________________________________________________
14 The Parties also argue that to determine what “extraordinary

circumstances” meant, the Presiding Judge “looked to case law
addressing the exceptional circumstances exception to the
appellate doctrine of preservation, which is to be used ‘sparingly’
and in cases of ‘manifest injustice.’” (Quoting State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 23, 94 P.3d 186.) They claim that
“preservation doctrines are not applicable to this preserved issue.”
We agree with the Parties that our preservation doctrine has little
bearing on what the Standing Order means when it uses the phrase
“extraordinary circumstances.” But this is ultimately of no matter
because the Standing Order vests the Presiding Judge with
discretion to determine what constitutes an extraordinary
circumstance. And the Parties have not shown an abuse of that
discretion under any plausible definition.

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agreeing that in-person voir dire and jury selection would be best,
given the intense media presence and publicity.”
¶45 While reasonable minds could differ on the benefits of
departing from the Third District’s general practice in this case, we
cannot say that the Presiding Judge’s decision fell outside the
bounds of reasonability. A judge’s decision is beyond the limits of
reasonability only if no reasonable person would take the view the
judge adopted. See State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ¶ 24, 122 P.3d 571.
¶46 In her order, the Presiding Judge acknowledged that there
was “no question this is a ‘high-profile case’ being covered by
traditional and ‘new media,’” but she explained that there were
“many such cases in Third District Court.” The Presiding Judge
reasoned that, “as has been done in several other cases, issues
regarding cameras and the number of people in and around the
courtroom during a trial can be addressed with carefully crafted
jury questionnaires, jury instructions, and decorum orders.”
¶47 The Presiding Judge concluded that the Parties failed to
“adequately explain why in-person jury selection is needed to
address general concerns about ‘extreme media attention’” or “why
the use of a supplemental or case-specific questionnaire coupled
with meticulous questioning during voir dire would be insufficient
for identifying those jurors who may be uncomfortable with media
attention or large crowds.” The Presiding Judge reasoned that the
Parties also failed to explain how they intended to “‘expose’ the
prospective jurors to the media and large crowds without
compromising privacy of the prospective jurors or the safe
environment needed to answer personal questions truthfully and
free from any pressure to conform to perceived judicial or
community standards.”
¶48 The Presiding Judge also cited an online editorial that
states that jury selection in high-profile cases is experiencing a
“significant trend” in “the shift towards virtual jury selection
processes.” (Citing Jury Selection in High-Profile Cases: An In-Depth
Analysis, LAWS LEARNED (July 8, 2024), https://lawslearned.com/
jury-selection-in-high-profile-cases/.) She cited the same editorial
for the proposition that “[r]emote voir dire sessions may enhance
accessibility and allow for a broader jury pool, thus enriching the
diversity of jurors.” Remote jury selection also “aid[s] in mitigating
public exposure, especially in high-profile cases where media
attention can influence jurors.”

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Opinion of the Court

¶49 In other words, the Presiding Judge provided multiple
reasons why she believed that this matter did not present
extraordinary circumstances. The Parties have not demonstrated
that the Presiding Judge’s decision is one that no reasonable person
would adopt. The Presiding Judge did not abuse her discretion, and
we affirm her order.
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE
DENIED THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED REQUEST TO EXPAND THE JURY
VENIRE
¶50 The Parties also contend that the Trial Judge abused his
discretion when he denied the Parties’ motion to expand the venire
to include prospective jurors from Summit and Salt Lake counties.
The Trial Judge initially issued an order granting that request. After
he entered that order, the Presiding Judge, in the order denying the
motion for in-person jury selection, acknowledged that the Parties
had stipulated to an expanded venire. She then opined, “[w]ithout
commenting on whether this is permissible under Utah law,” that
she was not persuaded that this was a reason to allow in-person
jury selection. In a footnote, the Presiding Judge cited Utah Code
section 78B-1-105, which directs, among other things, that “[a]
person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is . . . a resident
of the county.” UTAH CODE § 78B-1-105(1)(c).
¶51 The Trial Judge construed the Presiding Judge’s statement
as a rejection of the Parties’ second stipulated request. This
motivated him to reconsider his order allowing an expanded
venire. In addition to referencing the Presiding Judge’s rejection as
a reason for his reconsidered decision, the Trial Judge also
concluded that “while a district court may summon jurors from an
adjacent county,” Utah law does not allow the court to “summon
jurors from multiple counties for one trial.” (Citing State v. Nielsen,
2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645; UTAH CODE § 78B-1-103(1)(a); id.
§ 78B-1-105(1)(c); id. § 78B-1-107(2).)
¶52 The Parties argue that the Trial Judge erred for three
reasons. They first claim that it was plain error for the Trial Judge
to conclude that the Presiding Judge had the authority to
countermand his decision to expand the venire. The Parties next
assert that he misinterpreted Utah law to prohibit summoning
jurors from multiple counties when the Parties stipulated to do so.
They lastly maintain that the Trial Judge’s decision to decline to
expand the venire was outside the bounds of reasonability.

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¶53 We agree that the Trial Judge erred when he concluded
that the Presiding Judge rejected the request to call prospective
jurors from Summit County and Salt Lake County. But this error
was ultimately harmless because the Trial Judge correctly
concluded that he lacked the statutory authority to expand the
venire based on the Parties’ stipulation.
¶54 The Trial Judge incorrectly concluded that the Presiding
Judge rejected the Parties’ stipulated request to expand the jury
venire. In her order denying the Parties’ request for in-person jury
selection, the Presiding Judge observed that “the parties apparently
have ‘stipulated’ to ‘expanding’ the jury venire to include ‘equal
numbers of randomly selected jurors from Summit County and Salt
Lake County.’” She wrote, “Without commenting on whether this
is permissible under Utah law, I am not persuaded that any
minimal benefit from” in-person jury selection “outweighs the
significant and unwarranted burden on dozens of prospective
jurors from Salt Lake County who otherwise would be forced to
travel to Summit County for in-person jury selection.”
¶55 The Presiding Judge certainly expressed skepticism about
the Parties’ stipulation to expand the jury venire, but she did not
reject the request. To the extent the Trial Judge interpreted this as
the Presiding Judge overruling his decision, rather than pointing
out the precarious legal foundation on which the decision stood, he
erred.
¶56 But this error was harmless because the Trial Judge
correctly determined that Utah law—namely, the Jury and Witness
Act (the Act)—prohibits the summoning of prospective jurors from
two counties for trial. Several provisions in the Act evince a
legislative intent that jurors be called from a single county—that is,
the county in which the trial is to be held. Utah Code subsection
78B-1-102(3), for instance, defines “jury” as “a body of persons
temporarily selected from the citizens of a particular county.”
Subsection 78B-1-103(1)(a) states that it “is the policy of this state
that . . . persons selected for jury service be selected at random from
a fair cross section of the population of the county.” And subsection
78B-1-107(2) directs that prospective jurors “be randomly selected
from the county in which the trial will be held.” Such specific
references warrant one conclusion: the Legislature intended that
the jury pool for trial be composed of jurors from a single county.
¶57 The Parties urge us to conclude otherwise, first arguing
that under Utah Code subsection 68-3-12(1), the Legislature has

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Opinion of the Court

advised that when interpreting “a statute in the Utah Code, . . . [t]he
singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.”
Id. § 68-3-12(1)(a), (b). The Parties maintain that we should follow
this instruction and read the word “county” as “counties.” But this
argument omits the Legislature’s instruction that “the general
rules” in Utah Code subsection 68-3-12(1) “shall be observed,
unless the construction would be: (i) inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the Legislature; or (ii) repugnant to the context of the
statute.” Id. § 68-3-12(1)(a).
¶58 In light of the Legislature’s repeated references to a single
county, and its inclusion of qualifiers like “particular” and “in
which the trial will be held,” construing “county” as “counties” in
the relevant provisions would be “inconsistent with the manifest”
legislative intent. See id. § 68-3-12(1)(a)(i); id. § 78B-1-102(3); id.
§ 78B-1-103(1)(a); id. § 78B-1-107(2). This is especially true in the
context of Utah Code subsection 78B-1-107(2)’s requirement that
prospective jurors “be randomly selected from the county in which
the trial will be held,” as a trial cannot take place in more than one
county.
¶59 The Parties also claim that because Utah law allows a
criminal defendant to be tried by jurors from a county other than
the one in which the trial is held, prospective jurors from multiple
counties may be summoned for one trial. We disagree. Importantly,
there is a difference between summoning jurors from a county
other than the one in which the trial will be held and summoning
jurors from two counties for one trial.
¶60 The Parties first assert that Richins may “be tried by a jury
that includes jurors from Salt Lake County, which is in the same
judicial district” as Summit County. (Emphasis added.) They rely
on our state constitution, which gives a criminal defendant the
right “to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12. Even if we assume that the
constitutional reference to “district” refers to judicial districts, the
Parties do not explain why the Legislature cannot, as it appears to
have done in the Act, create a system where juries are selected from
the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed
and not from the judicial district as a whole. The constitution
describes the right to an impartial jury from the county or district.
Moreover, the Parties have not argued that the Utah Constitution

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gives Richins a right to have her jurors summoned from the entire
district.
¶61 The Parties next direct us to rule 29 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. That rule allows a party who “believes that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the court location or in the
county where the action is pending” to “move to have the trial of
the case take place with a jury from another county.” UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 29(c)(1)(A). According to the Parties, this supports the
conclusion that jurors from multiple counties may be summoned to
serve in this case. But it does not follow from the rule’s text that
summoning jurors from multiple counties for one trial is
permissible. The rule instead allows parties to have their case tried
by a jury from another county if certain circumstances are present.
At the time we issued our order in this case, no party had made
such a request.
¶62 The Parties next reference Utah Code subsection
78B-1-119(1)(b), which states that “[e]very juror and witness . . .
traveling more than 50 miles” is entitled to “$1 for each four miles
in excess of 50 miles actually and necessarily traveled in going only,
regardless of county lines.” The Parties contend that this provision
would be unnecessary if no jurors ever crossed county lines. We do
not read the statute the same way.
¶63 This section governs fees and mileage for jurors and
witnesses. See UTAH CODE § 78B-1-119. It is not difficult to envision
situations in which trial witnesses must cross county lines. Yet even
if this provision applied exclusively to jurors, we must construe it
in harmony with the statute’s other provisions. We cannot use this
general rule to set aside the more specific statutory provisions that
speak to jurors coming from a single county. After all, “where there
is an inconsistency between related statutory provisions, the
specific provision controls over the general.” In re Adoption of M.A.,
2024 UT 6, ¶ 14, 545 P.3d 241 (cleaned up).
¶64 The Parties also argue that controlling precedent supports
their view. In Nielsen, we held that a district court did not abuse its
discretion when it held a trial in one county, due to security and
logistical concerns, but convened a jury from a venire composed of
residents of a neighboring county to “minimize the risk of any
potential bias.” 2014 UT 10, ¶¶ 25–28.
¶65 There are two problems with this argument. First, nothing
in Nielsen speaks directly to a district court’s ability to do what the
Parties asked the Trial Judge to do. The jurors in Nielsen were

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Opinion of the Court

selected from a single county, not two. More importantly, however,
after we issued our decision in Nielsen, the Legislature amended the
Act to direct that prospective “jurors shall be randomly selected
from the county in which the trial will be held.” See Judiciary
Amendments, S.B. 169 § 10, 2017 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017)
(available at https://le.utah.gov/~2017/bills/static/sb0169.html)
(codified at UTAH CODE § 78B-1-107(2)). This forecloses the Parties’
argument.
¶66 Finally, the Parties argue that they can waive the statutory
requirement that jurors be selected from the county in which the
trial will be held. For support, they point to cases in which, they
contend, this court permitted parties to waive non-jurisdictional
requirements, including “the requirements of mandatory statutes.”
(Citing ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65,
¶ 14 n.3, 245 P.3d 184; In re M.H., 2014 UT 26, ¶ 32, 347 P.3d 368.)
The Parties also note that the court of appeals has held that certain
aspects of jury selection may be waived. (Citing State v. Ellifritz, 835
P.2d 170, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the trial court
did not err in utilizing a jury-selection method that deviated from
the methods set forth in our rules of criminal procedure); State v.
Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the trial
court’s decision to utilize unused jurors from other courtrooms in
a departure from the Act).) And they emphasize the general
principle that in some circumstances, a defendant can waive her
constitutional rights. (Citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
(right to counsel); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942) (right to trial by jury); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(right against self-incrimination); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972) (right to speedy trial).)
¶67 It is true that statutory and constitutional rights can be
“subject to knowing and voluntary waiver.” In re M.H., 2014 UT 26,
¶ 32; see also ASC Utah, Inc., 2010 UT 65, ¶ 14 n.3 (explaining that
“waiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a mandatory
statute” (cleaned up)); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203
(1995) (noting that there is “a background presumption that legal
rights generally . . . are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement
of the parties”). But the provisions the Parties seek to waive exist
not only to protect the Parties’ rights and interests but also to
reduce the burdens the jury-selection process can impose on
individual jurors. These provisions additionally exist to protect the
integrity of the jury-selection system and provide courts and
litigants with a fair, uniform, and predictable process. The Parties

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have not persuaded us that they can waive such statutory
requirements.
¶68 The Parties’ waiver argument additionally relies on the
Act’s exclusive-remedy provision. See UTAH CODE § 78B-1-113. That
provision sets forth an “exclusive means by which” parties in a
criminal case “may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was
not selected in conformity with th[e] [A]ct.” Id. § 78B-1-113(3).
Specifically, within
seven days after the moving party discovered, or by
the exercise of diligence could have discovered the
grounds therefore, and in any event before the trial
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay
the proceedings or to quash an indictment, or for
other appropriate relief, on the ground of substantial
failure to comply with this act in selecting a . . . trial
jury.
Id. § 78B-1-113(1).
¶69 If the court determines that in selecting a jury “there has
been a substantial failure to comply” with the Act and “it appears
that actual and substantial injustice and prejudice has resulted or
will result to a party in consequence of the failure, the court shall”
grant appropriate relief. Id. § 78B-1-113(2).
¶70 The Parties assert that these provisions “indicate a
procedure that, even if mandatory, is subject to waiver.” But this
argument is misplaced. The legal right that the Parties claim they
are waiving—compliance with the Act’s provisions—is
distinguishable from the legal right the Act extends to parties to
challenge a jury that has not been selected in conformity with the
Act. These provisions do not permit parties to waive compliance
with the Act before a jury is selected.
¶71 The Parties’ argument that their “waiver does not
constitute a substantial departure from the jury selection statute” is
similarly unconvincing. The Parties have not pointed to any
language in the Act directing or suggesting that parties can waive
compliance with the Act, so long as doing so does not amount to a
substantial departure from the Act. Nor could they, as the Act does
not give parties a legal right to waive compliance with the Act
before jury selection. Rather, if the court determines that “in
selecting . . . a trial jury there has been a substantial failure to comply
with th[e] [A]ct and it appears that actual and substantial injustice

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Opinion of the Court

and prejudice has resulted or will result to a party in consequence
of the failure, the court shall” grant appropriate relief. Id. (emphasis
added).
¶72 When we heard argument, Richins’s criminal trial was set
to be held in Summit County. The Act does not permit summoning
prospective jurors from two counties. As a result, the Trial Judge
acted within his discretion when he declined to expand the venire
to include jurors from Summit and Salt Lake counties.
CONCLUSION
¶73 The State and Richins argue that the Presiding Judge and
the Trial Judge abused their discretion when they denied the
Parties’ stipulated requests to conduct jury selection for Richins’s
trial in person and to expand the venire to include jurors from
Summit and Salt Lake counties. We disagree. The Presiding Judge
operated within the discretion the Standing Order provides her
when she concluded that this case presents no extraordinary
circumstances to justify departure from the Third District’s general
practice of virtual jury selection. And the Trial Judge correctly
interpreted Utah law to conclude that jurors must be selected from
a single county. We affirm.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10850861. Public record. Not legal advice.