# FRAZIER v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · April 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10850038

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** April 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10850038

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that courts must be careful stewards of the" 'Wlimheitne dc ornefsroounrtecde owfi tvho lau nreteqeure lsatw uynedrse

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

LEROY W. FRAZIER, III, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00391-JPH-MKK
)
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Leroy Frazier is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Putnamville
Correctional Facility. He filed this civil action alleging that Quest Diagnostics was
torturing him. Because Mr. Frazier is incarcerated, this Court must screen the
complaint before service on the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
Mr. Frazier names Quest Diagnostics as the sole defendant and seeks $3
million in damages. His complaint is as follows:
BeamFormer project, Monarch project, MK Ultra, sonnet
displacement, cerebrus ordenis modus operandi, continuous
transmission frequency modulated synthetic aperture sonar project,
submersion transponder. All being misused to torture as well as
inductance chemical imbalences deficiantays brain and blood. Bone
density issues. Dental issues. Vital organ function issues. Pain and
suffering mental angish, damage to my neuro pathways, genetic
malffreence, theft of stem cells, cancer.
Dkt. 2 at 2 (errors in original).
III. Dismissal of Complaint
Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the
complaint must be dismissed as frivolous.
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when it "lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An
allegation is frivolous when it is "clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, delusional,
irrational, or wholly incredible." Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 635 (7th
Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
Here, the allegations are not coherent and the Court has been unable
to identify a viable claim for relief against any particular defendant. The
complaint is therefore subject to dismissal.

IV. Other Pending Motions
Mr. Frazier's motion to verify, dkt. [14], motion for court assistance, dkt.
[15], and motion for further action, dkt. [16], are granted to the extent that the
Court confirms it has received his filings and denied in all other respects.
Mr. Frazier's motion to appoint counsel, dkt. [11], has been considered.
Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to
court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir.
2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request"

counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a
practical matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a
pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th
755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that courts must be careful stewards
of the" 'Wlimheitne dc ornefsroounrtecde owfi tvho lau nreteqeure lsatw uynedrse)r. § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel,
the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff
made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from
doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear

competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). These two
questions "must guide" the Court's determination whether to attempt to recruit
counsel. Id. These questions require an individualized assessment of the
plaintiff, the claims, and the stage of litigation. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655-56.
As an initial matter, Mr. Frazier has not contacted any attorneys, and his

motion could be denied on that basis. Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978
(7th Cir. 2019) (because plaintiff did not show that he tried to obtain counsel on
his own or that he was precluded from doing so, the judge's denial of these
requests was not an abuse of discretion). But proceeding to the second factor,
the Court notes that "the merit of a plaintiff's claim is another factor a district
court may consider while making an individualized determination whether to
recruit counsel based on the plaintiff and the claim in front of it." Watts, 42 F.4th
at 766. Here, because Mr. Frazier's complaint is due to be dismissed as frivolous,

it would not be in the interest of justice to use the Court's limited resources to
recruit counsel on his behalf. Id. at 764. Accordingly, the motion for counsel,
dkt. [11], is denied.
V. Conclusion and Opportunity to Show Cause
Mr. Frazier's motion to verify, dkt. [14], motion for court assistance, dkt.
[15], and motion for further action, dkt. [16], are granted to the extent that the
Court confirms it has received his filings and denied in all other respects. Mr.
Frazier's motion for counsel, dkt. [11], is denied.

Mr. Frazier's complaint must be dismissed as frivolous. He has through
May 8, 2025, in which to show cause why Judgment consistent with this Order
should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th
Cir. 2013) ("Without at least an opportunity to amend or to respond to an order
to show cause, an IFP applicant's case could be tossed out of court without giving
the applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or
simply request leave to amend."); Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, 637 F. App'x
954, 954-955 (7th Cir. 2016) ("In keeping with this court's advice in cases such
as Luevano ..., the court gave Jennings 14 days in which to show cause why
the case should not be dismissed on that basis.").
SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/22/2025 Sjamnu Patnaik Hanbore
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
LEROY W. FRAZIER, HI
296914
PUTNAMVILLE - CF
PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10850038. Public record. Not legal advice.