# Roquemore v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · April 23, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10849959

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 23, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10849959

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting “group pleading” of claim that individual defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511 by -ll- disseminating information obtained through wire taps

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY ROQUEMORE, ) CASE 1:24 CV 01434
)
Individually and as the Administratrix )
of the Estate of Maalik Roquemore, ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, ) (This Memorandum of Opinion and
) Order Relates to Documents ECF #32,
v. ) ECF #35, ECF #39, and ECF #44)
)
CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN )
HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Defendants. ) AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on three motions: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #32); (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement First
Amended Complaint (ECF #35); and (3) Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling
on Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #39).'
The third-listed motion, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion
Jor Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #39), is included here for the purposes of clarity,
completeness, and finality. The Motion to Stay Discovery itself was granted by marginal entry
order on February 27, 2025, on the same day as the filing of the motion. (ECF #40). On March
4, 2025, Plaintiff Kimberly Roquemore filed a Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition Disputing a
Materially Inaccurate Statement in the Government’s (CMHA) Motion to Stay (ECF #44). As
stated in that filing, “This Brief in Opposition for purposes of clarification does not challenge the
Court’s Marginal Entry (ECF #40) related to the government’s motion, but it does challenge the

For the reasons set forth below: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings (ECF #32) is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Supplement First Amended Complaint (ECF #35) is DENIED as MOOT; and, (3) as
indicated in note 1, supra, the issue raised in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition (ECF #44) in
connection with the previously-granted Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #39) was considered and incorporated into
the Court’s rulings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Incident/Encounter at Issue
This matter arises out of a September 5, 2022 encounter between Maalik Roquemore, a
resident of an apartment complex owned by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority
(“CMHA”), and CMHA Police Officer Desmond Ragland, whereby Officer Ragland used lethal
force against Mr. Roquemore in the course of responding to a “loud noise” complaint at the
CMHA apartment complex. The encounter resulted in Mr. Roquemore’s death. (See generally,
ECF #14, First Amended Complaint, {| 1-12).

governmental Defendants’ material misrepresentation because of the potential that the
misrepresentation will mislead the Court in its understanding when ultimately ruling on the
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.” (ECF #44, PageID #361). The issue raised in
the Brief Opposition related to a perceived discrepancy between a statement made in
Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF #16) and a statement made in the
Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF #39) that one of the individual Defendants named in the First
Amended Complaint (ECF #14) “was not involved in the incident” at issue in this case.
(Compare ECF #14, J 41, PageID #108, and ECF #16, J 41, PageID #141, with ECF #39, PageID
#337). Insofar as the Brief in Opposition raises an issue tangentially related to the Motion for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, it is included here as a matter before the Court within the
rulings made in this Memorandum of Opinion and Order. (See Part II-C, infra).
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The facts of the case, as described in the First Amended Complaint (ECF #14) and
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF #36),” are as follows:
On September 5, 2022, at approximately 12:37 am, Officer Desmond Ragland, an on-duty
police officer for the CMHA Police Department (““CMHAPD”), driving in a one-person
CMHAPD vehicle, responded to a radio dispatch complaint of loud noise at the CMHA
apartment complex where Maalik Roquemore resided, on West 174" Street, in Cleveland, Ohio.
(ECF #14, 4 59; ECF #36, p.2, PageID #314).> As Officer Ragland arrived, while still in his
police vehicle, he encountered Mr. Roquemore, who, observers reported, was “shadowboxing
and displaying internally stimulated and exaggerated behaviors.” (ECF #14, 7 60-61; ECF #36,
p.2, PageID #314). Roquemore is described in the First Amended Complaint as having “suffered
from medically documented schizophrenia and Post-Traumatic Distress Disorder.” (ECF #14,
4 3).
When Officer Ragland first arrived at the scene, Mr. Roquemore was standing in the
courtyard of the apartment complex, wearing a white T-shirt, pajama pants, and white tube socks
covering both lower legs, and no shoes. (ECF #14, J 60-62). Officer Ragland, while on a
telephone call at the time, believed that the person he saw may have been attempting to flag him
See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6 Cir. 2007) (For
purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the
pleading of the opposing party must be taken as true, . . . .”) (quoting Southern Ohio Bank v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6" Cir. 1983)).
Record references to the First Amended Complaint are identified by paragraph number
versus the ECF “PageID” number used for other papers..
-3-

down. (ECF #14, 7 61). Upon arriving to where Mr. Roquemore was located, Officer Ragland
stopped his vehicle, opened the driver’s side door, and faced Mr. Roquemore with his taser
drawn in his right hand. (ECF #14, | 65; ECF #36, p.2, PageID #314). Roquemore approached
Officer Ragland, still demonstrating his erratic behavior, initiating a physical tussle between the
two. (ECF #14, J 64; ECF #36, p.2, PageID #314). Officer Ragland, surprised by the sudden
approach, let out an expletive, while at the same time Mr. Roquemore responded repeatedly, in
an exaggerated and distressed voice, “Nope! Nope! Nope.” (ECF #14, 7 64; ECF #36, p.2,
PageID #314).
At some point in this encounter, Officer Ragland, while still sitting in the police car, fired
a single taser cartridge at Mr. Roquemore, striking Roquemore with one taser prong in the left -
chest, but also striking himself in his left hand with the other prong. (ECF #14, J 65). At some
point around this time, Officer Ragland left his police vehicle.
After the initial “tussle,” Mr. Roquemore disengaged from the confrontation, and began
to run around the police car. (ECF #14, ff 66, 69). At this point, Officer Ragland drew his
service weapon from its holster and intercepted Mr. Roquemore as he came around the vehicle.
(ECF #14, J 69). Mr. Roquemore, upon seeing Officer Ragland, then ran off toward a grassy
area some distance away. (ECF #14, 4 69). Officer Ragland then, on multiple occasions, ordered
Roquemore to stay away. (ECF #14, J 69).
According to the First Amended Complaint, Officer Ragland then fired one 9mm bullet
directly into Mr. Roquemore’s torso, striking him in the left hip, severely wounding and
disabling him. (ECF #14, J70). Shortly thereafter, Officer Ragland fired another 9mm bullet,
striking Mr. Roquemore in the left front chest, which caused Roquemore to fall to the ground.

-4.

(ECF #14, □ 71). Officer Ragland then handcuffed Mr. Roquemore’s hands behind his back, and
went to the police vehicle to get a first aid kit. (ECF #14, 72).
Officer Ragland then later brought Mr. Roquemore onto his knees, while pulling him
along the grass to the sidewalk using the handcuffs as a handle. (ECF #14, 9 73). Officer
Ragland then notified EMS of the shooting via the county dispatch system. (ECF #14, J 77).
When the EMS crew arrived, Officer Ragland noted to the EMTs and others, “He was mental.”
(ECF #14, 4 77). Officer Ragland then removed the handcuffs from Mr. Roquemore, and the
EMT medics placed Roquemore on a gurney and transported him to Fairview General Hospital.
(ECF #14, 7 78). At the hospital, after thirty minutes of attempting to resuscitate Mr.
Roquemore, Roquemore was declared dead at 1:35 am, on September 5, 2022. (ECF #14, § 79).
On August 22, 2024, Kimberly Roquemore, Maalik Roquemore’s mother, as
Administratrix of Maalik Roquemore’s estate, filed a Complaint in this Court against Officer
Ragland, the CMHA, CMHAPD, and five other individuals (related to CMHA and the
CMHAPD), asserting claims of excessive force and failure to adequately train in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (First Cause of Action), Wrongful Death under Ohio law (Second Cause of
Action), violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act under 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Third
Cause of Action), and a “State Law Claim” which generally asserted a breach of a reasonable
duty of care owed to Mr. Roquemore by negligence or “malicious purpose” (Fourth Cause of
Action). (ECF #1).
On September 24, 2024, Kimberly Roquemore filed a First Amended Complaint against
each of these same persons alleging the same four causes of action. (ECF #14). The parties are
described in more detail below.

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B. The Parties
Plaintiff Kimberly Roquemore is the duly appointed and authorized Administratrix of the
Estate of Maalik Roquemore, per entry of the Cuyahoga County Probate Court. (ECF #14, □ 19;
ECF #14-1, Copy of Court Entry).
Defendant Officer Desmond Ragland is (or was at the time of the events related to the
First Amended Complaint) a law enforcement officer employed by the CMHAPD. He has been
| sued both individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the CMHAPD. (ECF #14,
q 21).
Defendant CMHA is a federally and Cuyahoga County funded organization, whose
mission is to provide safe housing and safe police services to the residents of its housing units
and facilities. (ECF #14, { 25).
Defendant CMHAPD is a state certified police force, operating under the laws, statutes,
and codified ordinances of the State of Ohio and the United States. (ECF #14, { 29).
Defendant Andrés Gonzalez is identified as the Chief of Police for the CMHAPD. He
has been sued both individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the CMHAPD.
(ECF #14, { 22).
Defendant Victor McDowell is identified as the Deputy Chief of Police for the
CMHAPD. He has been sued both individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the
CMHAPD. (ECF #14, { 32).
Defendant Thomas Burdyshaw is identified as the Commander of Field Operations for
the CMHAPD. He has been sued both individually and in his official capacity as an employee of
the CMHAPD. (ECF #14, □ 35).
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Defendant John Smiddy is identified as the Field Training Officer Program Supervisor for
the CMHAPD. He has been sued both individually and in his official capacity as an employee of
the CMHAPD. (ECF #14, { 38).
Defendant Jeffery Patterson is identified as the Chief Executive Officer and Safety
Director of CMHA. He has been sued both individually and in his official capacity as an
employee of CMHA. (ECF #14, 41).
Plaintiff's initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint also names as Defendants
“John Does (I-X).” (ECF #14, 44).

C. The Claims Asserted in the First Amended Complaint
The First Amended Complaint asserts four claims against CMHA, the CMHAPD, and
Defendants Ragland, Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson in their official
and individual capacities. The First Cause of Action asserts excessive force and failure to train,
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, specifically alleging that each of the Defendants “under color of
law deprived Maalik Roquemore of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to him by the
United States Constitution, including the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (ECF
#14, 113-123). The Second Cause of Action asserts wrongful death under Ohio law, “resulting
in damages recoverable under [Ohio Revised Code] § 2125.02 and pre-death agony as well.”
(ECF #14, 7 125). The Third Cause of Action asserts a violation of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., specifically alleging that each of the Defendants,

with knowledge of Maalik Roquemore’s mental health disabilities,‘ “deliberately, indifferently,
and intentionally discriminated against Maalik [Roquemore] and failed to provide him a
reasonable and safe accommodation when they used unnecessary and excessive force against him
because of his disability.” (ECF #14, 127-128). The Fourth Cause of Action is identified as
“State Law Claim,” and generally asserts a negligent and/or “malicious” breach of a duty of care
owed to Maalik Roquemore by failing to “develop and implement effective safety and training
policies, customs, practices, and procedures[,] and to be in compliance with Title II of the
[Americans With Disabilities Act].” (ECF #14, ff 131-136).

D. The Motions Before the Court
There are presently three motions before the Court: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #32); (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement First
Amended Complaint (ECF #35); and (3) Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling
on Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #39). The first two are before the Court
for ruling; the third (the Motion to Stay Discovery) was previously granted, but is addressed here
insofar as certain post-ruling statements made by Plaintiff regarding the motion relate to the
pending Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. (See note 1, supra). Each will be
addressed in turn.

□□
The “knowledge” identified is that of CMHA institutionally, and not of any individual
specifically. (See ECF #14, § 127) (“Maalik had a medically documented and confirmed mental
illness (known to CMHA), was an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, and he was
being excluded from participation in, and being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to
discrimination under CMHA, CMHAPD programs and the ADA.”).
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
On January 13, 2025, Defendants CMHA, CMHAPD, Gonzalez, McDowell, Ragland,
Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson moved this Court for partial judgment on the pleadings,
asking the Court to dismiss the following claims of the First Amended Complaint (ECF #14) as
being “not viable as a matter of law”:
(1) All claims alleged against CMHAPD;
(2) All official capacity claims against the individual Defendants;
(3) The First Cause of Action excessive force and failure to train claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell,
Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson;
(4) The Second Cause of Action claims for wrongful death under Ohio law as
to CMHA, Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and
Patterson;
(5) The Third Cause of Action claims under the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., as to all Defendants; and
(6) The Fourth Cause of Action claims under Ohio law alleging “negligence”
against all Defendants.
(ECF #32, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, p.1, PageID #288).
Not included in the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings are the
First Cause of Action excessive force and failure to train claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants CMHA and Ragland, and the Second Cause of Action wrongful death claim against
Defendant Ragland. (ECF #32, Memorandum in Support of Motion, p. 1, n.2, PageID #290).°
Defendants CMHA and Ragland have expressed an intention to file a later motion for
summary judgment on these claims after the completion of discovery. (ECF #32, Memorandum
in Support of Motion, p. 1,n.2, PageID #290).
-9.

1. Standard of Review for Judgment on the Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings at any time after the pleadings have been closed. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(c). The
standard for determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Sampson v. Cleveland, No. 1:20-CV-00741, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231649, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 9, 2020). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain “sufficient factual material” which, if accepted as true, would state a valid “claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Sampson, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231649, at *4; see also
Askew v. True Hearts of Care, LLC, No. 5:19-CV-01619, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2187, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2020) (“While detailed factual allegations are not required, Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) calls for sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), in turn quoting □□□□
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[AIll well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be
taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly
entitled to judgment.” Colbert v. Cuyahoga Cnty, Ohio, No. 1:23-CV-01414, 2024 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 173672, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2024) (quoting Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6" Cir. 2011). Although a court must accept the well-
pleaded allegations of a complaint as true, it “need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual allegations will not suffice.” Willman v. Attorney General of the United States, 972 F.3d

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819, 823 (6" Cir. 2020) (quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 276 (6" Cir. 2010)).
The Court also keeps in mind that “[a] Rule 12(c) motion tests only the sufficiency of the
complaint [and] does not resolve the merits of a plaintiff's claims or any factual disputes,”
Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4" Cir. 2014) (insert supplied). As the Supreme Court
noted in Twombly, a complaint is “not require[d] [to include] heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570.
Additionally, when a Court considers either a motion to dismiss, or a motion for judgment
on the pleadings applying the same standards, the Court keeps in mind that the Sixth Circuit
generally does not permit “group pleading” — wherein a generic reference to “the Defendants” is
used without specifying which Defendant or Defendants are involved and the acts taken by them.
Robertson v. University of Akron School of Law, et al., No. 5:20-CV-01907, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 157345, at *14-*15 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2021), aff'd, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 15384 (6
Cir. June 23, 2022):
Courts within the Sixth Circuit, however, do not permit “group pleading” outside
of certain fraud claims. in Mhoon v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co.,
Tenn., No. 3:16-cv-1751, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148301, 2016 WL 6250379, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2016), the court found that excessive force and deliberate
indifference allegations failed to indicate whether and how each individual
defendant was involved in the use of excessive force. Like the present case, the
plaintiff used generic references to “defendants,” without specifying which
defendants were involved, “even where it [was] clear that not all of them could
have been involved.” 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148301, [at *8] [2026 WL 6250379]
at *3. The court concluded that this “form of group pleading [was] insufficient to
establish that any one” of the defendants acted in an unconstitutional manner. Jd.
(citing Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 773 (M.D.
Tenn. 2016) (“A complaint that fails to impute concrete acts to specific litigants,
fails to state a plausible claim.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted)); see
Gamrat v. Allard, 320 F. Supp. 3d 927, 942 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (rejecting “group
pleading” of claim that individual defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511 by
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disseminating information obtained through wire taps).
Robertson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157345, at *14-*15 (clarifying citation inserts provided).

2. The Claims on Which Judgment on the Pleadings is Sought
(a) All Claims Asserted Against Defendant CMHAPD

All four causes of action asserted in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint include
CMHAPD as a Defendant. (See ECF #14, 91 14, 118-121 [First Cause of Action, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983], | 125 [Second Cause of Action, Wrongful Death], {J 127-129 [Third Cause of Action,
Americans With Disabilities Act], and 131-134 [Fourth Cause of Action, Negligence]).
It is well-established under Ohio law that police departments, like CMHAPD, are not “sui
Juris,” in effect, they are not separate legal entities independent of the municipal entities they
serve capable of being sued. See Jackson v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Common Pleas Court, No. 1:23-
CV-02388, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53251, at *10; Nash v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth.,
No. 1:07-CV-02008, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12884, at *4-*5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2008); Fuller v.
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., No. 1:05-CV-00009, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63742, at *2-
*3 (granting CMHAPD’s motion to dismiss) (“The case law is overwhelming and clear. Police
departments are not legal entities which can be sued.”). In fact, Plaintiff now concedes this point.
(See ECF #36, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings, p. 5, n.2, PageID #317) (“Plaintiff is now currently satisfied upon additional research .

.. that a 42 USC 1983 action should not, in this case, currently embrace or support the permanent
inclusion of CMHAPD as a separate legal entity or proper Defendant”); id., at p. 19, PageID #331
(“Plaintiff concedes, . . . the inclusion of CMHAPD is currently unsupported”).
Accordingly, Defendant CMHAPD is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect
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to all claims of the First Amended Complaint asserted against Defendant CMHAPD.

(b) All “Official Capacity” Claims
Asserted Against All the Individual Defendants
All four causes of action asserted in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint also include
“official capacity” assertions against each of the individual Defendants named in the case,
Gonzalez, McDowell, Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson.®
Where there are claims against a municipal entity defendant along with “official capacity”
claims against an officer or agent of that municipal entity, the official capacity claims are
redundant and should be dismissed. See Colbert v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, No. 1:23-CV-01414,
2024 U.S. District LEXIS 173672, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2024); see also Davison v. City of
Lorain, No. 1:24-CV-00227, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99565, at *21 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2024)
(Official capacity suits “‘represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985)).
“When a § 1983 complaint asserts a claim against a government entity and a government official
in his official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity claim.” Kouider on behalf
of Y.C. v. Parma City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp. 3d 772, 780 (N.D. Ohio 2020); see
also Williams v. City of Columbus, No. 2:22-CV-01831, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5238, at *65-*66
(“Courts within the Sixth Circuit routinely dismiss official-capacity claims against municipal
officials that are duplicative of claims asserted by the plaintiff against the municipal entity
itself.””).
This is stated explicitly only as to individual Defendants Ragland and Gonzalez, (see ECF
#14, J§ 21, 24), but it is evident from the assertions of the First Amended Complaint that the
“official capacity” assertions are meant to apply to each of the individual Defendants.
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Plaintiff now concedes this point. (See ECF #36, Plaintiff’s Briefin Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, p. 12, PageID #324) (“[T]he courts
have established that a claim against an official or an employee, in their official capacity for the
entity against which a claim has also been made, is superfluous or redundant[.]’).
Accordingly, Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell, Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and
Patterson are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to the “official capacity” claims
asserted against them.

(c) The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Individual Capacity”
Claims Asserted Against Defendants Gonzalez,
McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson
The “individual capacity” claims asserted against Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell,
Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson present a closer call.’
Section 1983 individual capacity claims differ from section 1983 official capacity claims.
Colbert, 2024 U.S. District LEXIS 173672, at *8. “[A]n individual capacity claim seeks to hold
an official personally liable for the wrong alleged.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233,
241 (6" Cir. 2016). Sustaining an individual capacity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is measured
against an admittedly high bar. A plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any individual
defendant under Section 1983 absent a clear showing that the defendant was personally involved
in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Colbert, 2024 U.S.
District LEXIS 173672, at *8 (citing Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6" Cir.
As earlier noted, the “individual capacity” claims against Defendant Ragland are not a
subject of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF #32, Memorandum
in Support of Motion, p. 1, n.2, PageID #290).
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2012)) (in turn noting that “[p]ersons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held
liable based only on their own unconstitutional behavior”); Murphy v. Grenier, 406 Fed. App’x
972, 974 (6" Cir. 2011) (“Personal involvement is necessary to establish Section 1983 liability”).
Individual liability must therefore “be based on the actions of that defendant in the situation that
the defendant faced, and not based on any problems caused by the error of others, either
defendants or non-defendants.” Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6" Cir. 1991).
Supervisory officials and employees cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely on the basis
of respondeat superior, or the right to control employees, or on the basis that they failed to
remedy a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Colbert, 2024 U.S. District LEXIS 173672, at
*9 (citing Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6" Cir. 1999)).
Yet, at this milestone of the litigation, at the motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on
the pleadings stage, the Court looks to whether “the well-pleaded material allegations of the
pleadings of the opposing party,” “taken as true,” state a claim that is plausible. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
Court keeps in mind that Rule 12(b)(6), and thus Rule 12(c) as well (evaluated under the same
standards), is not evaluated based on a judge’s possible disbelief of a complaint’s allegations or
doubt that recovery seems likely, but rather whether the minimum standards of pleading under
Iqbal and Twombly are met.
Here, the allegations of the First Amended Complaint set forth some level of personal
involvement and participation in wrongfully curtailing the otherwise mandatory training
requirements applied to Officer Ragland prior to permitting him to conduct his patrol
individually, which claims meet the minimum pleading standards to be applied at a motion to

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dismiss stage. (ECF #14, 9] 22-24 [Gonzalez]; J] 33-34 [McDowell]; 4] 36-37 [Birdyshaw];
{{] 39-40 [Smiddy]; {Jj 43 [Patterson]).
Additionally, the First Amended Complaint also references, in a number of places, a July
8, 2022 memorandum, entitled “Field Training Evaluation of PO Desmond Ragland #57,” which
purports to show that individually-named Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy,
and Patterson (Smiddy and Burdyshaw directly, and the others impliedly by their alleged direct
involvement in approving what is described a wrongful early termination after only 15 weeks of
Officer Ragland’s 24-week Field Training obligations) made an individual and conscious decision
to cut short Officer Ragland’s required Field Training prior to allowing him to patrol
independently. (See ECF #14, 4 6-7, 33, 37, 40, 81).°
The individual capacity claims against these individual Defendants later may prove to be
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment; but, at present they are sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.
This document was the subject of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement First
Amended Complaint (ECF #35), which sought to have this memorandum attached to the First
Amended Complaint. While that motion to supplement is denied as moot, given the numerous
references to the memorandum in the First Amended Complaint, and there being no dispute as to
its authenticity, consideration of its substance can be taken into account in deciding a motion to
dismiss (and a motion for judgment on the pleadings following the same standards). See
Copelan v. Techtronics Indus. Co., Ltd., 95 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1236-37 (S.D. Ca. 2015)
(“Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling on a motion to
dismiss. ... However, . . . [d]ocuments specifically identified in the complaint whose
authenticity is not questioned by the parties. Such documents may be considered, so long as they
are referenced in the complaint, even if they are not physically attached to the pleading. . ..
Moreover, the court may consider the full text of those documents even when the complaint
quotes only selected portions.”) (internal citations omitted).
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(d) The Wrongful Death Claims Asserted
Against Defendant CMHA, and Defendants
Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson
Under Ohio law, political subdivisions, such as CMHA, are generally immune from
liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act for “injury, death, or loss to person or
property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of
the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” OHIO REV.
CODE § 2744.02(A)(1).
There are five exceptions to this immunity, as set forth in Ohio Revised Code section
2744.02(B), which revokes immunity for damages caused by:
(1) A municipal employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle when the
employee is engaged within the scope of their employment or authority;
(2) The negligent performance of employees with respect to proprietary
functions of a political subdivision;
(3) A municipality’s negligent failure to keep public roads in repair or
negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads;
(4) A physical defect on the grounds of public buildings used for government
functions; and
(5) When civil liability is expressly imposed by another provision of the Ohio
Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2744.02(B)(1)-(5).
There are no allegations in the First Amended Complaint that even remotely fit within the
exceptions of this section of the Ohio Revised Code. Plaintiff concedes this. (See ECF #36,
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, p.
13, PageID #325) (“Plaintiff concedes that none of the enumerated exceptions to political
subdivision immunity set forth in 2744.02(B) apply under the set of facts and circumstances

-17-

alleged.”). Plaintiff seeks to establish an Ohio wrongful death claim against CMHA based on
Ohio Revised Code section 2744.09(E), which states, “This chapter does not apply to, and shall
not be construed to apply to, the following[,] . . . Civil claims based upon alleged violations of the
constitution or statutes of the United States ...,” (ECF #36, p. 13, PageID #325). It is clear that
the “wrongful death” claim of the Second Cause of Action (as well as the “negligence” claim of
the Fourth Cause of Action) are state law claims, not claims based on “the constitution or statutes
of the United States.” Thus, Ohio Revised Code section 2744.09(E) is not applicable to proceed
against CMHA on the claim. Defendant CMHA is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with
respect to this Ohio law wrongful death claim.
With regard to the individual Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and
Patterson, “Plaintiff argues that under 2744.03(A)(6)(b) each loses the protection of statutory
immunity. With respect to these individually named Defendants, ORC 2744.03 provides that
individual political subdivision employees can be liable for (1) acts or omissions manifestly
outside the scope of the employee’s responsibilities; (2) acts or omissions [done] with malicious
purpose, in bad faith or in a wanton and reckless manner and (3) where civil liability is expressly
imposed by the Revised Code.” (See ECF #36, p. 13, PageID #325, directly quoting Plaintiff's
brief). With respect to the “wrongful death” claim, there are no allegations of actions “manifestly
outside the scope of the employee’s responsibilities” or those where “civil liability is expressly
imposed by the Revised Code.” Nor are there any factually asserted allegations in the First
Amended Complaint against the individual Defendants other than Officer Ragland that plausibly
assert “malicious purpose,” bad faith, or wanton and reckless behavior.’
The only direct allegation of “malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton or
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Plaintiff has not identified a plausible claim for wrongful death under Ohio law that falls
outside the immunity conferred by Ohio Revised Code section 2744.02(A)(1) with respect to
Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson. Accordingly, the wrongful
death claims asserted against these individual Defendants are also entitled to judgment on the
pleadings with respect to this claim.’°

(e) The Americans With Disabilities Act
Claims Asserted Against All Defendants
Title Il of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.,
provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See,
e.g., Colbert v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, No. 1:23-CV-01414, 2024 U.S. District LEXIS 173672,
at *11-*12 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2024) (quoting statute). The ADA “requires the plaintiff to

reckless manor” is made in the Fourth Cause of Action negligence claim. It is only by
“incorporation” that such might be asserted as part of this Second Cause of Action wrongful death
claim. Yet, with respect to both this claim and the general claim in the Fourth Cause of Action,
there are no plausibly supported allegations of malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton and
reckless conduct beyond the mere recitation of the words. This is not sufficient to support the
claim. See Willman v. Attorney General of the United States, 972 F.3d 819, 823 (6" Cir. 2020)
(Although a court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint as true, it “need not
accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.”) (quoting Terry v. Tyson
Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 276 (6" Cir. 2010)).
10
While Plaintiff suggests that the question of whether a political subdivision or employee
acted with malice, bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner is generally a question of fact,
(ECF #36, p. 14, PageID #326), courts in the Sixth Circuit routinely resolve this issue as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Diver v. Dobson, No. 3:12-CV-00957, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43659, at *20-
*21 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014); Surface v. Conklin, No. 1:15-CV-00040, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65865, at *14 (S.D. Ohio May 20, 2015); Kelly v. Sines, 647 Fed. App’x 572, 578 (6" Cir. 2016).
-19-

present sufficiently ‘significant’ evidence of animus towards the disabled that is a but-for cause of
the discriminatory behavior.” Colbert, 2024 U.S. District LEXIS 173672, at *12 (citing Gohl v.
Livonia Pub. Sch. Dist., 836 F.3d 672, 681 (6" Cir. 2016)).
The Court begins by noting that neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the
Sixth Circuit has found that Title II of the ADA applies to arrests. See Roell v. Hamilton Cnty.,
Ohio/Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty/ Comm’rs, 870 F.3d 471, 489 (6 Cir. 2017) (while
acknowledging that courts in other circuits have found that the ADA can in fact apply in an arrest
context, it notes that neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have done so); Daniels v.
Leslie, No. 17-10269, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109657, at *9-10 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2018)
(same)."! .
Yet, even if the Court were to adopt the position that Title II of the ADA applies to
arrests, that provision only provides for the imposition of liability upon public entities, not upon
individuals employed by such entities. See Parker v. City of Highland Park, 437 F. Supp. 3d 609,
620 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (“In [City and County of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan, 575 U.S.
600 (2015)], the Supreme Court said that “[o]nly public entities are subject to Title II [of the
ADA].”) (case name insert supplied; others in original). Thus, all of the individually-named
Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to this claim.
As to CMHA, to state a claim under Title II of the ADA against it, Plaintiff must allege “a

11
Certain district courts within the Sixth Circuit, have acknowledged the possibility of Title
II applying to arrests when presented with a case of “wrongful arrest” because of someone’s
disability. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Memphis, No. 2:13-CV-02070, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146652, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2013) “Specifically, a wrongful arrest ADA claim is
cognizable when police officers have wrongfully arrested someone with a disability because they
misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity”) (quoting Scozzari v. City of
Clare, 723 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)..
-20-

causal relationship between” Maalik Roquemore’s disability and CMHA’s “alleged
discriminatory conduct.” Parker, 437 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (quoting Daniels v. Leslie, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 109657, at *10). While a Plaintiff need not allege that Mr. Roquemore was
subjected to discrimination solely because of his disability, Plaintiff still “must show that the
Defendant took action because of the plaintiff's disability, i.e., the plaintiff must present [or
plead] evidence that animus against the protected group was a significant factor [in the
defendant’s conduct].” Daniels v. Leslie, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109657, at *11 (quoting GoAl v.
Livonia Pub. Sch., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1080 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff'd sub nom, Gohl v. Livonia
Pub. Sch. Dist., 836 F.3d 672, 681 (6 Cir. 2016)) (inserts supplied); see also Smith v. City of
Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938, 947 (6" Cir. 2017) (Title II ADA claim failed where the plaintiff failed
to establish that the defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiff because of his
disability).
Here, notwithstanding Officer Ragland’s later comment to the Emergency Medical
Technicians after they had arrived at the scene that Mr. Roquemore “was mental,” (see ECF #14,
{{ 64, 77), Plaintiff has not plead any fact that could establish that Defendant Officer Ragland
used force against Mr. Roquemore because of his disability or that his disability was a significant
factor in his decision to use force. Nor has Plaintiff plead that any of the other Defendants took
any action against Mr. Roquemore because of his disability or that his disability was a significant
factor in any decision they may have taken.
Further, while Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint suggests that CMHA was aware of
Maalik Roquemore’s mental health issues generally, (ECF #14, 4] 53-54, 80, 127), there is no
allegation indicating that Mr. Roquemore’s disability motivated any of the Defendants’ actions.

-21-

Awareness of a disability without more is insufficient to state a claim under Title II of the ADA.
See Parker, 437 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (“Parker pleads only that the Defendant officers were aware
of his condition, not that his condition motivated the officers’ conduct towards him. That is not
enough to state a claim under Title II of the ADA”) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff has also not alleged a sustainable Title II “failure to accommodate” claim. Asa
preliminary matter, an analysis of reasonable accommodation in the context of a police encounter
and arrest must include consideration of the exigent circumstances inherent in an arrest. See
Roell, 870 F.3d at 489 (as part of the discussion that neither the Supreme Court not the Sixth
Circuit has specifically found that Title II of the ADA applies to arrests). But more directly,
courts in the Sixth Circuit have rejected “failure to train” ADA claims. See, e.g., Burton v. City
of Memphis, No. 2:13-CV-02070, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146652, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 10,
2013) (quoting Scozzari v. City of Clare, 723 F. Supp. 974, 981 (E.D. Mich. 2010)) (“A plaintiff
may not, however, pursue a ‘failure to train’ ADA claim arguing that law enforcement officials
would have handled the arrest properly if they had been properly trained to ‘handle individuals
with mental health problems.””).
Thus, Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to this claim
asserted under the ADA.

(f) The Ohio Law “Negligence”
Claims Asserted Against all Defendants
Finally, Defendant CMHA is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to the
Fourth Cause of Action negligence claim for the same statutory immunity reasons applicable with
respect to the Second Cause of Action wrongful death claim — none of the exceptions to the

-22-

general immunity conferred by Ohio Revised Code section 2744.02(A), as set forth in Ohio
Revised Code section 2744.02(B), apply. See Bowman y. City of Fairview Park, No. 1:23-CV-
01406, 2024 US. Dist. LEXIS 8126, at *13-*14 (finding that City was entitled to immunity on
plaintiffs negligence claim).
As to the individual Defendants, each are entitled to statutory immunity under Ohio
Revised Code section 2744.03(A)(6), which states that a political subdivision’s employees cannot
be held liable for mere negligence. Bowman, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8126, at *14 (citing Fabrey
v.. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St. 3d 351, 356, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ohio 1994)); see
also Shevlin v. Cheatham, 211 F. Supp. 2d 963, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (“Pursuant to [Ohio
Revised Code section 2744.03(A)(6)], a police officer cannot be held personally liable for mere
negligence, but only for actions that fall into one of the . . . statutory exceptions to the
immunity.”).
Plaintiff appears to seek to avoid the Defendants’ entitlement to statutory immunity by
alleging, “[e]ach Defendant acted not only negligently but also with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, and/or in wanton or reckless manner,” (ECF #14, J 135), but nowhere in the First Amended
Complaint does Plaintiff identify specific facts that plausibly support acts taken with “malicious
purpose,” “bad faith,” or in “wantonness or recklessness” to take the claim beyond one of plain
negligence.'? Ohio’s statutory immunity provisions apply to both CMHA and the individual
Defendants with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action, and each are entitled to judgment on the
pleadings on this claim.

12
See Fabrey, 70 Ohio St. 3d at 356, 639 N.E.2d at 35 (“[W]anton misconduct was the
failure to exercise any care whatsoever’) (citing Hawkins v. Ivey, 50 Ohio St. 2d 114, 363 N.E.2d
367 (1977), syllabus).
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B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement First Amended Complaint
On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement First Amended
Complaint (ECF #35), “request[ing] that this Court allow her to supplement her First Amended
Complaint with the attached Exhibit 1,” which is a one-page document titled “Field Training
Evaluation of PO Desmond Ragland #57,” dated July 8, 2022. (ECF #35, PageID #311). This
motion was filed approximately two months after the December 6, 2024 agreed cut-off date for
amending the pleadings and/or adding additional parties, (see ECF #25, PageID #210)," and
approximately one month after the January 13, 2025 filing of Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #32). In support of the motion, Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(d), which provides:
Supplemental Pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just
terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction,
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be
supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the original
pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The court may order that the
opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading within a specified time.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
The July 8, 2022 “Field Training Evaluation of PO Desmond Ragland #57,” while cited on
a number of occasions in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings, (See, e.g., ECF #36, pp. 9-12, PageID #321-#324), was not attached
to either the initial Complaint (ECF #1) or the First Amended Complaint (ECF #14), though it
was mentioned in paragraphs 28, 31, and 33 of each of those pleadings. (See ECF #1, ff 28, 31 &

13
The December 6, 2024 agreed cut-off date included in the parties’ report of Parties’
Planning Meeting Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and LR 16.3(b), (ECF #25), was acknowledged
and accepted by the Court per its November 22, 2024 Minutes of Proceedings. (ECF #28).
-24-

33, PagelD #8-#9); ECF #14, ff 28, 31 & 33, PageID #106-#107). |
When a party seeks leave to amend a complaint after the date for amendment has passed,
two Rules of Civil Procedure come into play, Rules 15 and 16. See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d
888, 909 (6" Cir. 2003). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court
should freely give leave” to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIv. P.
15(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 directs the Court to enter a scheduling order that
includes a deadline for amending pleadings and provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only
for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(3)(A) & (b)(4). The Sixth
Circuit has held that notwithstanding Rule 15’s directive to freely give leave to amend, a party
seeking to amend after the deadline must first meet Rule 16’s good cause standard. See Leary,
349 F.3d at 909; Armatas v. Haws, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 34504, at *7-*8 (6" Cir. Nov. 17,
2021); Carrizo (Utica) LLC v. City of Girard, Ohio, 661 Fed. App’x 364, 367 (6" Cir. 2016); see
also Satterwhite v. Ashtabula County Metroparks, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1021 (N.D. Ohio 2021)
(“When the scheduling order deadline to amend without leave has passed, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) for failing to abide by the scheduling order
deadline before the court will consider whether amendment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a).”). While a party’s diligence in attempting to comply with case management deadlines is
the primary factor to consider, possible prejudice to the party opposing modification is another
relevant consideration in the good cause analysis. Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6™
Cir. 2002); Leary, 349 F.3d at 907, 909.
Here, Plaintiff does not formally seek to “amend” the First Amended Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), but rather to “supplement” it under Rule 15(d), which

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applies only to “transaction[s], occurrence[s], or event[s] that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented.” FED. R. CIv. P. 15(d). It is beyond question that the transactions, □

occurrences, and events related in the July 8, 2022 Field Training Evaluation transpired before the
filing of the initial Complaint in August 2024. Moreover, it is beyond question that Plaintiff had a
copy of this document in her possession prior to filing the initial Complaint and the First
Amended Complaint, as it is identified in each of those filings, and is a fact acknowledged by
Plaintiff in her Brief in Opposition to Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. (See ECF
#36, p. 9 & n.14, PageID #321). Thus, Rule 15(d) does not apply to Plaintiff's motion, which
alone would be grounds to deny Plaintiff’s motion.
Yet even more pertinent, particularly in light of the Court’s partial denial of Defendants’
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #32), Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement is
effectively moot. The apparent purpose of Plaintiff seeking to add the July 8, 2022 Field Training
Evaluation as a belated exhibit to the First Amended Complaint is to provide support for
Plaintiff's desire to bring a “Monell” claim for alleged deprivation of constitutional rights against
Defendant CMHA, a “municipal party,” arising out of CMHA’s “official customs or policies”
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as first described in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978). Yet, CMHA itself (unlike CMHAPD) has not moved for dismissal of the
Section 1983 claim plead against it at this stage of the case, but rather anticipates filing for
summary judgment on the claim at a later date, after all discovery has been completed, (see ECF
#32, Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, p. 2,
PageID #290 n.1), which discovery is expected to include use of the already-known and shared
July 8, 2022 Field Training Evaluation. Thus, in addition to the request to supplement not fitting

-26-

within the ambit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), the request is essentially moot as it
relates to the litigation of this case, as that document will be included among those available at the
anticipated summary judgment stage of this case.

C. Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery
On February 27, 2025, Defendant Jeffery Patterson, on behalf of himself, moved to stay all
written discovery issued to him, and on behalf of all Defendants also moved to stay all depositions
requested by Plaintiff pending this Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings. (ECF #39). The Court granted the motion by margin entry the same day. (ECF
#40). This motion is included as “before the Court” here solely for purposes of clarity,
completeness, and finality.
On March 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition Disputing a Materially
Inaccurate Statement in the Government’s (CMHA) Motion to Stay, (ECF #44), regarding a
perceived discrepancy between a statement made in Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint (ECF #16) and a statement made in the Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF #39) that one
of the individual Defendants named in the First Amended Complaint (ECF #14) “was not
involved in the incident” at issue in this case. (Compare ECF #14, 7 41, PageID #108, and ECF
#16, 7 41, PageID #141, with ECF #39, PageID #337). Specifically, Plaintiff contended:
In the INTRODUCTION to ECF #39 Defendants state that CMHA CEO
and Safety Director Jeffery Patterson “... was not involved with the incident that
occurred on September 5, 2022.” This is a material inaccuracy for the following
reasons: In Paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF #14),
Plaintiff alleged that Jeffery Patterson (“CEO Patterson”) is the Chief Executive
Officer and Safety Director for CMHA. CEO Patterson is a “person” under 42
USC 1983 and was at all times herein acting under “color of law.”
In Defendants? Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF #16)
-27-

Defendant government answered at paragraph 41 that “With regard to the
allegations contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
Defendants admit that Jeffery Patterson is a person and the Chief Executive Officer
and Safety Director for CMHA.”
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development official notice,
NOTICE PIH 95-58 (PHA) (Plaintiff's Brief in Opp. Exhibit 1) has since 1995
suggested inter alia, a course of action for Public Housing Directors, in the
employment position of Defendant Jeffery Peterson. The document is entitled
Guidelines for Creating, Implementing and Managing Public Housing Authority
Police Departments in Public Housing Authorities. Section 4[,] Guidance, A-K of
that document, directly and specifically defines the responsibilities of Public
Housing Agencies and “Public Housing Directors’ which now, thirty years later,
still applies to CMHA, and CEO/Safety Director Jeffery Patterson.
* * * Defendant Patterson is . . . a final policy maker and as the Safety
Director of all CMHA safety rules, regulations, policies, and procedures applicable
to the actions of [CMHA Police Officers].
Similarly, * * * [t]he substance of [Chapter 1.1 of CMHA’s Policy &
Procedure Manual, “ORGANIZATION” . . . is its content on “Police Department
Organizational Structure”. which specifically denotes via its own organizational
chart that the Chief Executive Officer/Safety Director, . . . by virtue of his premier
position at the top of the chart, is the ultimate supervisory authority over police
department and officer conduct. Further, this organizational chart strongly
suggests that CEO/Safety Director Patterson is a final policymaker and supervisory
authority with respect to overall operations of the police department and the field
training of officers.
* * * While obviously not at the scene of the death of Maalik Roquemore,
CEO/Safety Director Jeffery Patterson was one of the governmental individuals
intimately, officially, and personally involved in the overall management of
CMHA’s police department; the development, approval, and enforcement of the
entirety of CMHA policies and procedures; the CMHA police department
negotiated agreements with the City of Cleveland and the day to day operations of
the CMHA governmental police entity.
(ECF #44, pp. 1-4, PageID #361-#364) (first ellipses and emphasis in original; text omissions and
inserts provided by Court).”

14
Plaintiff also references Defendant CEO/Safety Director Patterson’s signing, on behalf of
CMHA, a November 30, 2018 document, titled “FIRST AMENDMENT TO POLICE-
-28-

Thus, while Plaintiff's Briefin Opposition Disputing a Materially Inaccurate Statement in
the Government’s (CMHA) Motion to Stay (ECF #44) neither requests nor requires a formal ruling
by this Court, the Court notes that, given its rulings on the other motions now before the Court,
including the fact that, at least for now, certain of the “individual capacity” claims related to
Defendant Patterson (and other individual Defendants) will remain pending anticipated later
summary judgment argument and briefing, and Defendant CMHA’s and Defendant Ragland’s
stated intention to move for summary judgment after the completion of discovery, Plaintiff will
have an opportunity to develop whatever arguments she may wish to make related to Defendant
Patterson’s alleged “involvement” in the events of September 5, 2002 as this case continues
through discovery.
Thus, for the purposes of clarity, completeness, and finality, the issues raised in connection
with Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings (ECF #39) are deemed fully addressed and closed.

Il. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #372) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, specifically:
As to ALL claims asserted against CMHAPD, in the First Cause of Action, Second Cause
of Action, Third Cause of Action, and Fourth Cause of Action, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial

AUTHORIZING AGREEMENT No. 64238 BETWEEN THE CITY OF CLEVELAND AND
THE CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY,” as indication of his
“involve[ment] with the incident that occurred on September 5, 2022.” (ECF #44, p. 3, PageID
#363).

-29-

Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.

First Cause of Action (Excessive Force/Failure to Train, 42 U.S.C. § 1983):
As to the “official capacity” claims asserted against Defendants Gonzalez, McDowell,
Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings is GRANTED.
As to the “individual capacity” claims asserted against Defendants Gonzalez,
McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment
on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Second Cause of Action (Wrongful Death Under Ohio Law):
As to the wrongful death claims asserted against Defendants CMHA, Gonzalez,
McDowell, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment
on the Pleadings is GRANTED.

Third Cause of Action (Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.):
As to the Americans With Disabilities Act claims asserted against Defendants CMHA,
Gonzalez, McDowell, Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson, the Defendants’ Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.

Fourth Cause of Action (Negligence/Malice Under Ohio Law):
As to the negligence claims asserted against Defendants CMHA, Gonzalez, McDowell,
Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings is GRANTED.

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Accordingly, (1) the First Cause of Action excessive force and failure to train claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant CMHA remain; (2) the First Cause of Action “individual
capacity” excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Ragland remain; and
(3) the First Cause of Action failure to train claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants
Gonzalez, McDowell, Ragland, Burdyshaw, Smiddy, and Patterson remain. The Second Cause of
Action wrongful death claim against Defendant Ragland also remains.

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Supplement First Amended Complaint (ECF #35) is
DENIED as MOOT.

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings (ECF #39) was earlier GRANTED, per marginal entry order dated February 27,
2025. (ECF #40). The arguments raised in Plaintiff's Brief Opposition Disputing a Materially
Inaccurate Statement in the Government's (CMHA) Motion to Stay (ECF #44) were noted and
were incorporated into the overall consideration of deciding the issues raised in Defendants’
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF #32).

IT IS SO ORDERED. Well
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge

DATED: Aus 23 LoS

-31-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10849959. Public record. Not legal advice.