# Z&R Cab, LLC v. Philadelphia Parking Authority

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · April 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10848854

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 22, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** McCullough
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., :
Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 1582 C.D. 2022
:
Philadelphia Parking Authority : Argued: March 4, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: April 22, 2025

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell (collectively,
Licensees) appeal from the October 27, 2022 judgment of the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County (trial court) entered upon the jury verdict in favor of the
Philadelphia Parking Authority (Authority) and against Licensees, and from the trial
court’s July 16, 2020 order granting the Authority’s motion for partial summary
judgment. After careful review, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Licensees are two Philadelphia taxi companies, a former Philadelphia taxi
driver, and the assignee of a Philadelphia taxi dispatch company. Prior to 1990, the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) regulated all taxicabs and limousines
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including those in Philadelphia, subject to the
provisions of the Public Utility Code (Code).1 In 1990, the General Assembly passed
the Medallion Act, which required the PUC to regulate Philadelphia taxicabs pursuant
to distinct provisions not applicable to any other public utilities in Pennsylvania. 66
Pa.C.S. § 2414.
In 2004, the General Assembly enacted Act 94,2 transferring the
regulatory responsibility for the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industries from the
PUC to the Authority. Act 94 also created a budget submission process for the
Authority to follow and it prescribed a formula that the Authority must use to ascertain
assessments imposed on Philadelphia taxi cabs. Pursuant to Section 5707(b) of Act 94,
the Authority, through its Taxicab and Limousine Division (TLD), established budget
and fee schedules under which it assessed regulatory fees on the various participants in
the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industries. The Authority would submit the
budget and fee schedule to the Appropriations Committees of the Pennsylvania Senate
and House of Representatives each year. Unless the Appropriations Committees
adopted a disapproval resolution by April 15, the Authority’s budget and fee schedule
would become effective.
Taxicab and limousine industry members were required to pay these fees
in order to maintain their certificates of public convenience and/or their ability to
operate in the Philadelphia taxicab and/or limousine industries. Failure to pay the fees
also could result in the Authority’s imposition of fines and penalties on industry
members. Certain taxicab operators refused to pay regulatory assessments and fees

1
66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316.

2
Act of December 30, 2002, P.L. 2001, No. 230, reenacted and amended by the Act of July
16, 2004, P.L. 758, No. 94, as amended, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-45.

2
imposed by the Authority and filed a petition in this Court’s original jurisdiction,
challenging the constitutionality of Section 5707 of Act 94.
In MCT Transportation Inc. v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 60 A.3d
899 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, 81 A.3d 813 and 83 A.3d 85 (Pa. 2013), this Court found in
favor of the taxicab operators, concluding that Section 5707 of Act 94 was
unconstitutional because it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution by impermissibly
delegating legislative power to the Authority by granting the Authority the power to
formulate its own budget and fee schedule without restriction or guidance from the
General Assembly. We found that the Appropriations Committee’s power to
disapprove of the Authority’s budget did not suffice to pass constitutional muster under
the non-delegation doctrine. We also found that Section 5707 of Act 94 deprived the
taxicab operators of due process because it did not provide any procedure for
challenging the Authority’s fee schedule, either before or after its adoption. Id. at 916-
17. Our decision was later upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In response to MCT Transportation, in July 2013, the General Assembly
enacted Act 643 to amend Act 94 to cure the constitutional shortcomings. Act 64
established a new process for setting the Authority’s budget and fee schedule and for
calculating the individual taxicab assessment. By enacting Act 64, the General
Assembly amended Section 5707 and added Sections 5707.1 and 5710.
Section 5707 of Act 64 now requires legislative approval of the
Authority’s proposed budgets. Regarding assessments for taxicabs, limousines, and
dispatchers, in Section 5707(c)(1)(v), the General Assembly set the taxicab assessment
for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2013, and June 30, 2014, to be $1,250.00. 53
Pa.C.S. § 5707(c)(1)(v). Section 5707.1(a) requires the Authority to serve notice of

3
Act of July 9, 2013, P.L. 455, No. 64, as amended, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5707.1, 5710.

3
assessment to each regulated party. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707.1(a). Section 5707.1(b) permits
regulated parties to file a petition with the Authority that avers that the assessment is
excessive or otherwise invalid. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707.1(b).
On October 22, 2013, Licensees filed a civil rights class action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a federal due process violation and seeking a full refund of the fees they
had paid. The District Court dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Licensees appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the case
on the ground that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction because Licensees’
claim arose under the United States Constitution and federal law. Z&R Cab, LLC v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority, 616 F. App’x 527 (3d Cir. 2015). Upon remand, the
District Court deferred to a state court.
On June 10, 2014, Licensees filed a complaint in the trial court to pursue
remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that all the putative class members are
entitled to a full refund of all fees that they paid from 2004 through 2013 (the period
when the now-declared unconstitutional Act 94 was in effect). The Authority filed a
motion for summary judgment asking the trial court to rule that the putative class
members are not entitled to a class-wide refund.
The trial court granted the motion on the ground that MCT Transportation
did not hold that the assessments and fees that Licensees paid to the Authority were
beyond the Authority’s power. The trial court further noted that MCT Transportation
held that the Authority denied Licensees the procedural due process right to challenge
assessments. The trial court ordered the Authority to provide a review procedure
regarding assessments and the fees that it charged the taxicab industry from 2004 to

4
2013 under Act 94. The trial court ruled, inter alia, that the Authority shall issue
notices of assessment to the members of the taxicab industry to whom it charged fees
in the years 2004-2013.
Licensees appealed the decision to this Court, which reversed and
remanded the case. Z&R Cab, LLC v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 187 A.3d 1025
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc). We held that the trial court lacked the authority to
impose the procedural remedy it created in its order granting the summary judgment
motion and that the order was inappropriate given the existence of genuine issues of
fact. Id. at 1037. We stated that Licensees’ available remedy should be limited in
terms of both time and amount. Regarding time, citing McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida,
496 U.S. 18 (1990), we indicated that states may avail themselves of a variety of
procedural protections against any disruptive effects of the Authority’s fee schedule’s
invalidation, such as “enforcing relatively short statutes of limitation applicable to
refund actions.” Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1037. Regarding the amount of the
refund, we made clear that basic principles of causation must govern any
consideration of money damages in the nature of a refund:

We have substantial doubt regarding Licensees’ entitlement
to the full refund they demand. In McKesson [], the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth permissible retroactive remedies for
parties burdened by unconstitutional tax statutes. The tax
statute at issue in McKesson improperly discriminated
between different groups of taxpayers in interstate
commerce. One available remedy was to refund the
difference between the tax paid and the tax that should have
been assessed had unconstitutional distinctions not been
made. Id. Stated differently, one possible remedy was a
refund “of the excess taxes paid by petitioner . . . .”
....

5
Although we will not decide this issue now, by analogy to
McKesson, and consistent with [Z&R Cab, LLC v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority, 616 F. App’x 527 (3d Cir.
2015)], Licensees could be entitled to recover only the
portion, if any, of their fees and assessments that
exceeded the amount the Authority would have assessed
had it been subject to constitutional standards, guidance,
and limits imposed by the General Assembly.
Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1036-37 (emphasis added).
Following remand, on June 20, 2019, the trial court certified the class
composed of all individuals, partnerships, corporations, limited liability companies, or
other business entities which paid to the Authority fees assessed under the provisions
of 53 Pa.C.S. § 5707(b), from July 16, 2004, until July 9, 2013. The Authority filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that Licensees’ claims for damages for any
period prior to October 22, 2011 (two years before the action was filed), were barred
by the statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Authority argued that Licensees should not be permitted to invoke the discovery rule4
by claiming they were unaware that their injury had been caused by another party’s
action because Licensees had actual knowledge of the injury and its causal relationship
to the Authority on the day each fee and assessment was issued. In support, it presented
letters to demonstrate that Licensees knew of the injury and cause. The Authority
further argued that by enacting Act 64, the General Assembly cured the constitutional
defects found in MCT Transportation, and Act 64 was ruled constitutional by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Germantown Cab Co. v. Philadelphia Parking
Authority, 206 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2019). Therefore, Licensees’ claims for refunds during

4
The discovery rule is an exception to the general principle that once a statutory period has
expired, a complaining party is barred from bringing a lawsuit. Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15
A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). The discovery rule provides that where a complaining party is reasonably
unaware that his or her injury has been caused by another party’s conduct, the rule tolls the running
of the statute of limitations. Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858-59 (Pa. 2005).

6
the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, were barred by the adoption of Act 64, which
retroactively set the fees for that fiscal year and required a partial refund, without any
discretion of the Authority.
By order and opinion dated July 16, 2020, the trial court granted the
Authority’s motion for partial summary judgment, by narrowing the scope of
Licensees’ potential claim to an approximately eight-month period from October 22,
2011 (i.e., two years before the class action was filed), to July 1, 2012 (collectively, the
damages period). The trial court agreed with the Authority that the discovery rule did
not apply because Licensees knew or should have known of both injury and cause as
soon as they found increased fees were excessive (injury), and they knew that the fees
were proposed and imposed by the Authority (cause). The trial court further agreed
with the Authority that Licensees may not claim a refund for the assessments and fees
imposed by the Authority for fiscal year 2013 on due process grounds because those
fees were set by the General Assembly, and the protections of procedural due process
do not extend to legislative action. By Order dated October 19, 2020, the trial court
specified the issue which must be addressed at trial:

The following issue of material fact remains unresolved:
whether the amount of damages can be estimated from a
comparison between what [Licensees] actually paid [the
Authority] under Act 94 and what [Licensees] would have
paid [the PUC] had they enjoyed constitutional protections.
(Trial Ct. Op., July 19, 2020, at 2, n.2.) Licensees did not appeal the trial court’s
decision.
A four-day jury trial commenced on February 14, 2022. Licensees’
economic forensics expert, Chad Staller, provided evidence by way of charts and tables
of economic loss sustained by Licensees by comparing the general revenue from the
Authority to the revenue the PUC would have generated during the damages period.

7
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 223a-25a.) The Authority’s revenue or “money gained
by” the Authority, Staller explained, represented “all the fees that were paid by” or
“expended” by Licensees. Id. at 225a-26a. With respect to the PUC’s revenues, Staller
calculated the amount the PUC would have charged based upon the historical revenue
that PUC did charge from fiscal year 1997 through 2004-2005. Id. at 227a. Staller
determined the amount the PUC would have charged in 2005 and thereafter by applying
the three-percent growth rate to the averages of the PUC’s revenue before 2005. Id. at
227a-33a. He assumed, based on the allegation of the complaint, that every cent more
the Authority charged than the PUC was the product of a due process violation. Id.
at 257a. That is because Act 94 had been deemed unconstitutional on grounds of
non-delegation and due process.
On cross-examination, Staller acknowledged that his damage calculation
included the administrative surcharge paid with every parking ticket in the City of
Philadelphia and amounts that were unrelated to Section 5707 of Act 94, the specific
statutory provision MCT Transportation declared unconstitutional. Id. at 262a-68a.
Staller also testified that he did not use the Authority’s actual daily receipts to calculate
the Authority’s revenues for the eight-month damages period. Id. at 269a.
To counter Licensees’ position that the charges were the product of a
constitutional violation, the Authority provided evidence that the Medallion Act
(pursuant to which the PUC charged fees and assessments) suffered from the same
constitutional infirmities found to exist in Act 94. Christine Kirlin, the Director of
TLD, testified that the budgeting and assessment procedures under Act 94 were not
different than those used by the PUC under the Medallion Act. Id. at 392a-93a. She
explained that neither the Medallion Act nor Act 94 set standards or limitations for the

8
regulatory budget. Id. Neither required legislative approval before the budget and fee
schedule became effective. Id. Neither provided a protest procedure for operators. Id.
Kirlin also explained that, prior to the adoption of Act 94, the taxicab and
limousine industries in Philadelphia were not clean, safe, reliable, or well regulated. Id.
at 373a. In enacting Act 94, the Legislature explicitly found that the industries would
benefit from a well-regulated local focus. Id. Complying with that mandate included,
among other things, hiring more full-time inspectors, which cost more money. Id. at
387a. In addition, the Legislature validated the same level of regulation and
assessments that the Authority charged under Act 94 when it passed Act 64 in the
aftermath of MCT Transportation. Id. at 436a. Those assessments and fees under Act
64 were the same, and in many cases higher, than they were under Act 94. Id. at 438a.
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the law and
sent the jury to deliberate with a Verdict Sheet. Licensees objected to neither. In
relevant part, the jury was tasked with answering the following:

1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the []
Authority increased its fees and fines beyond what the [PUC]
would have charged during the period of October 22, 2011
through July 1, 2012, as a result of the lack of due process
protections in Act 94?

2. Do you find that [Licensees] proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that they suffered an actual injury during the
period of October 22, 2011 through July 1, 2012, as a result
of the lack of due process protections in Act 94?
(Jury Verdict Sheet, Licensees’ Br., Ex. C.)
The jury unanimously answered “No” to both questions. The jury thus
found that Licensees failed to prove that they “suffered an actual injury . . . as a result
of the lack of due process protections in Act 94.” Id. The jury also found that the

9
Authority did not increase its fees and fines “beyond what the [PUC] would have
charged during the [damages period] as a result of the lack of due process protections
in Act 94.” Id. Licensees did not challenge the jury’s verdict before the jury was
discharged.
Licensees subsequently filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief seeking a new
trial. First, Licensees argued that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the
evidence because the only evidence of what the PUC might have charged in 2011 and
2012 was provided by their expert and that evidence showed that the Authority charged
more than what the PUC would have charged and those excess amounts necessarily
resulted from a lack of due process protections in Act 94. Second, Licensees
claimed that the trial court’s summary judgment rulings impermissibly restricted the
jury from considering whether Licensees were entitled to damages before and after the
limited damages period. They further claimed that the discovery rule was a question
that should have been submitted to the jury.
On September 26, 2022, the trial court denied Licensees’ Post-Trial
Motion. With respect to Licensees’ weight of the evidence argument, the trial court
found that the Authority, on cross-examination, had contradicted Staller’s opinions,
and, therefore, the jury’s “No” answer to Question 1 on the Verdict Sheet was not
against the weight of the evidence. Concerning Question 2 on the Verdict Sheet, the
trial court found that the jury heard ample evidence permitting it to conclude that no
portion of the fees and assessments the Authority imposed could be attributed to the
due process violations in Act 94. Regarding its summary judgment ruling, the trial
court concluded, consistent with its July 16, 2020 order, that the discovery rule did not
apply because reasonable minds would not differ in finding that Licensees knew or
should have, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of their alleged injury and

10
its cause. With respect to the damages period, the trial court concluded that Licensees
could not claim a refund for the assessments and fees the Authority imposed in fiscal
year 2013 because the protections of procedural due process do not extend to legislative
actions. This appeal followed.
II. Issues
On appeal, Licensees raise four issues:

A. Was the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence
where the parties agreed that the Authority increased its
fees and fines above what the PUC charged and that the
only authority for the increase was an unconstitutional
statute (Act 94)?

B. Was the trial court’s entry of summary judgment,
precluding the jury from considering the discovery rule
and restricting the trial’s focus to the period 2011 to 2012
an error of law?

C. Did the trial court’s entry of summary judgment preclude
jury consideration of whether Act 94 accorded a full and
adequate retroactive remedy and signal to the jury that the
legislature ratified the Authority’s past budgets?

D. Did the trial court’s entry of summary judgment
improperly remove from the jury’s consideration whether
a full refund would constitute a full and adequate remedy?
(Licensees’ Br. at 4-5.)

11
III. Analysis
1.
Licensees argue that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the
evidence5 because Question 1 on the Verdict Sheet could only have been answered
“Yes.” Licensees argue that there could be only one possible answer to Question 1
because the parties agreed that the Authority charged more than the PUC did under the
Medallion Act, and because there was only one statutory basis for the Authority to
charge anything at all, and that was Act 94, the statute that the Court declared
unconstitutional in MCT Transportation for, inter alia, violating due process. Thus,
according to Licensees, any increased fees and fines charged by the Authority over and
above those charged by the PUC (under the Medallion Act) necessarily resulted from
a lack of due process protections in Act 94. Licensees assert that the jury’s refusal to
recognize this was against the weight of the evidence.
We address first the Authority’s argument that Licensees waived their
weight of the evidence claim because they did not move for judgment as a matter of
law, never objected to either the jury instructions or the Verdict Sheet, and did not
object once the jury returned its verdict.
We do not agree that Licensees waived the weight of the evidence claim.
A claim challenging the weight of the evidence is not the type of claim that must be
raised before the jury is discharged. Such a claim is not premised upon trial court error
or some discrete and correctable event at trial. The challenge does not dispute the
power of the jury to render the verdict it rendered, nor does it even allege any facial

5
A trial court’s action in granting or refusing such a motion will not be reversed in the absence
of a manifest abuse of discretion or a clear error of law. Premises Commonly Known as Lot No. 26,
Section 36, of Official Survey of City of New Castle, Lawrence County v. Redevelopment Authority of
City of New Castle, 432 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

12
error in the verdict of the jury. Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 515 (Pa. 2003). Rather,
it is a claim which, by definition, ripens only after the verdict, and it is properly
preserved so long as it is raised in timely post-verdict motions. Id. at 513. The
Authority cites Stapas v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 198 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2018), in support of its
waiver argument. Stapas is not on point because it did not involve a weight of the
evidence claim. Instead, it involved a problematic verdict. There, Giant Eagle
challenged the jury’s ability to award damages for future lost wages. However, it failed
to object to the jury’s verdict awarding future lost wages before the trial court dismissed
the jury. The Supreme Court held that Giant Eagle waived its objection for post-trial
relief because a belated objection challenging the jury’s ability to render a verdict
deprived the trial court of the opportunity to efficiently correct a trial error.
Turning next to the merits, it has been Licensees’ position that they were
automatically entitled to a full refund of the difference between the charges the PUC
would have charged under the Medallion Act and what the Authority charged under
Act 94 – purely based on the fact that Act 94 was found to violate due process
protections because it did not provide a means for the taxicab and limousine
owners to protest the fees and assessments. It is their contention that the “only legal
basis for the [Authority] to charge fees and fines during the class period was [Section]
5707 [Act 94], and that statute was unconstitutional.” (Licensees’ Br. at 15.) However,
that is not the law.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that damages for a
Section 1983 claim should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right
in question. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Indeed, an injury for a violation of
procedural due process rights “cannot be presumed to occur, and . . . plaintiffs at least
should be put to their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions.” Id. at

13
262. Thus, a Section 1983 plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the
constitutional violation and the relief sought.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Halpern 2012, LLC v.
City of Center Line, Michigan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1121 (E.D. Mich. 2019), aff’d,
806 F. App’x 390 (6th Cir. 2020), is instructive. In Halpern, a property owner
(Halpern) brought a class action under Section 1983 against the City of Center Line,
Michigan (Center Line), challenging the constitutionality of Center Line’s ordinance
requiring owners who rented their properties to register, comply with habitability
standards, and submit to inspections. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Halpern, finding that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment on its face
because it permitted an administrative search without either a warrant or providing the
owner with an opportunity to obtain pre-compliance review before a neutral
decisionmaker. As explained by the trial court, the fundamental nature of this violation
was a deprivation of the opportunity to be heard: “the opportunity for pre-compliance
review must be such that a property owner has a chance to challenge a warrantless
search before being sanctioned for refusing entry to a city inspector.” Halpern, 404 F.
Supp. 3d at 1121. Although the trial court found the inspection ordinance
unconstitutional, it nonetheless rejected Halpern’s claim to recover a refund of all fees
it paid under the ordinance, including inspection fees.

To recover damages under § 1983, the plaintiff must bring
out facts that establish a causal connection between the
constitutional violation and the damages they seek . . . The
Court must therefore determine whether the absence of pre-
compliance review was both the cause in fact and proximate
cause of plaintiff’s payment of inspection and registration
fees.

14
“Cause in fact is typically assessed using the “but for” test,
which requires us to imagine whether the harm would have
occurred if the defendant had behaved other than it did[.]” .
. . In other words, here, [the p]laintiff must show that it and
the other property owners would not have paid the
registration and inspection fees “but for” the absence of
pre-compliance review. “[I]f the result would have
occurred without the conduct complained of, such
conduct cannot be a cause in fact of that particular
result.”

But here, the unavailability of a pre-inspection review
process or warrant procedure is not the cause in fact of these
fees or the “damages” which [the p]laintiff claims to have
incurred. To lawfully rent a property within the [c]ity, a
property owner must obtain a certificate of compliance and
pay registration and inspection fees. Municipalities are
entitled to impose inspections and certificates of compliance
to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens . . . .
Rental property inspections are therefore clearly mandated
by law and it is likewise permissible for [ the d]efendant to
charge minimal amounts to offset the costs associated with
these inspections . . . . Because registration and inspection
fees are lawful requirements and must be paid regardless of
the absence of pre-compliance review, its absence cannot be
the cause in fact of [the p]laintiff’s injuries. And because [the
p]laintiff cannot establish that the ordinance’s deficiencies
were the cause in fact of its injuries, it is unnecessary to
determine whether it was the proximate cause of those same
injuries.
Id. at 1121-22 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed:

Halpern has not shown that Center Line’s adoption or
implementation of the unconstitutional section of the prior
[ordinance] caused it to pay registration or inspection fees.
To the contrary, nothing in Halpern’s argument or in the
record suggests that if Center Line had provided an
opportunity for pre-compliance review or required a warrant

15
at the time Halpern’s property was registered as a rental and
an inspection was scheduled, Halpern would not have paid
the required fees.

Of course, causation would be established if the registration
and inspection fees were themselves unconstitutional; but
they are not. Center Line’s rental property registration and
inspection requirements are reasonable means of advancing
its governmental interests in public safety and welfare, and it
may impose reasonable fees to offset the costs of advancing
those interests.
Halpern, 806 F. Appx. at 395.
The Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the claim that since the fee
requirements fell under the same unconstitutional ordinance scheme, they were
necessarily invalid and must be refunded under McKesson:

According to Halpern, McKesson and Carpenter [v. Shaw,
280 U.S. 363 (1930)] establish that Center Line must
refund the fees Halpern paid to the city when the
unconstitutional section of the [ordinance] was in effect.
We disagree. As the district court in MS Rentals[, LLC v.
City of Detroit, 362 F. Supp. 3d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2019),]
explained in rejecting the same argument, those cases
“involved refunding payments where the underlying tax or
assessment scheme was deemed unlawful.” 362 F. Supp. 3d
at 419. As discussed above, the underlying fees in this
case were not unlawful.

Indeed, McKesson highlights the shortcomings of Halpern’s
claim for damages because, unlike the plaintiff in that case,
Halpern cannot demonstrate a difference between what it
actually paid the city and what it would have paid had the
[ordinance] been constitutional from the start. See
McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40[].

16
806 F. App’x. at 396 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Halpern Court noted that
causation might have been established if the registration fees and inspection fees were
themselves unconstitutional, but they were not. Id. at 395.
Here, Licensees’ automatic full refund theory is no different from the
theory rejected in Halpern. Licensees failed to establish that the lack of due process
(lack of means to protest the fees and fines) in Act 94 caused them to pay more fees
and fines to the Authority than were paid to the PUC under the Medallion Act. They
failed to causally connect the damages they seek to the specific underlying
constitutional violation, i.e., the procedural due process violation in Act 94 identified
in MCT Transportation. Nothing in Licensees’ argument or in the record suggests that
the fees and fines themselves were unconstitutional (e.g., they were excessive or
confiscatory or beyond the Authority’s power to impose or that Licensees were
absolutely immune from them). As the Authority’s evidence demonstrated, the
Medallion Act – the law under which the PUC regulated the Philadelphia taxicab
industry from 1991 to 2005 – suffered from the same constitutional infirmities that the
MCT Transportation Court found to exist in Act 94; namely, it required the PUC to
create a budget that included fees and assessments that went into effect without any
legislative approval or guiding standard, R.R. at 364a, and without a procedure to
challenge the PUC-imposed fees and assessments. Id. at 368a-69a. Christine Kirlin,
then-Director of the Authority’s TLD, explained:

Act 94 required us to do the exact same thing that was in the
Medallion Act to create a budget with fees and assessments
and submit it to the senate and the house committees . . . if
they didn’t act, it didn’t require legislative approval.
Id. at 393a.

17
The jury heard unrebutted testimony demonstrating that the Authority
would have lawfully imposed the same charges notwithstanding the due process flaws
in Act 94. When the Legislature enacted Act 94, it publicly announced that it intended
a more robustly regulated taxicab and limousine industry in Philadelphia, which
required greater regulatory expenses without any regard to industry members’ due
process rights. As Kirlin explained, prior to the adoption of Act 94, the taxicab and
limousine industries in Philadelphia were not clean, safe, reliable, or well regulated.
Id. at 376a. In enacting Act 94, the Legislature explicitly found that the industries
would benefit from a well-regulated local focus. Id. at 375a. Complying with that
undisputedly lawful mandate required things, such as hiring more full-time inspectors,
which cost more money, and hence higher fees. Id. at 387a.
Considering this evidence, we find it was not conscious shocking for the
jury to reject Licensees’ full refund theory that every dollar the Authority charged in
excess of the hypothetical amounts the PUC would have charged under the Medallion
Act resulted from the lack of due process protections in Act 94. Accordingly, we find
Licensees’ weight of the evidence challenge to be without merit.
2.
In their second issue, Licensees argue that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment and precluding the jury from considering the discovery rule and
restricting the trial’s focus to the period 2011 to 2012.6 They contend that the question
of when a person should know he or she has been injured is a fact issue for the jury.

6
The standard of review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo and the scope of review
is plenary. Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011). Summary judgment is
appropriate only if the record clearly demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue of any material fact
as to a necessary element of the cause of action.” Id. (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(1)). The record
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Id.

18
The trial court’s entry of summary judgment took this question away from the jury and
may have led the jury to believe that passage of the unconstitutional statute must have
occurred within two years of filing of the complaint.
Having just concluded that Licensees failed to carry their burden of proof
as to causation, we need not decide if the trial court erred in limiting the damages period
because that is now irrelevant. Nevertheless, even if we were required to decide the
issue, we would hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Licensees’ claims
for a refund of funds before October 22, 2011, were barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. The applicable statute of limitations for Licensees’ civil rights action is two
years. Lindquist v. Buckingham Township, 68 F. App’x. 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In
Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, and
thus the statute of limitations for a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is also two years.”). The statute of limitations begins to run on Licensees’ claim from
the time the cause of action accrues. S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc. v. Camden Hotel
Development Associates, 747 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Super. 2000). Accrual of a cause of
action under Section 1983 occurs “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or
her constitutional rights have been violated.” Graff v. Kohlman, 28 F. App’x. 151, 153
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a property owner’s action for excessive property taxes
accrued on the date that the property owner received the allegedly inflated property tax
assessments, rather than at some later date); see also Gordon v. Lowell, 95 F. Supp. 2d
264, 272 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[T]he claim accrues upon knowledge of the actual injury,
not that the injury constitutes a legal wrong.”).
Applying these principles and considering undisputed evidence provided
by the Authority, the trial court found that Licensees possessed all relevant facts to file

19
a lawsuit as soon as the Authority levied the assessments and fees at issue. We discern
no error.
3.
Next, Licensees argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they could
not challenge the effect of Act 647 and claim a refund for fees and assessments the
Authority imposed in fiscal year 2013. In doing so, Licensees claim that whether Act
64 provided a full and complete remedy to the class members was a fact question for
the jury to decide. This argument fails for the simple reason that the General Assembly
explicitly corrected the constitutional defects in Act 94 as found in MCT
Transportation as applied to fiscal year 2013 by setting – through duly enacted
legislation – the assessment and fee schedule. Thus, those fees were not established by
the Authority’s unfettered discretion, and Licensees could not possibly claim that they
had any basis to protest with the Authority the amounts imposed by the General
Assembly.
“[T]he protections of procedural due process do not extend to legislative
actions.” Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 615 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing
developer’s claim that township violated its procedural due process rights by enacting
zoning amendments without affording it a hearing; “to provide every person affected
by legislation the various rights encompassed by procedural due process including
hearings, opportunity for confrontation and response, clear standards, an impartial
arbiter, and possibly judicial review would be inconsistent with the structure of our
system of government”).
Thus, Licensees had no valid claim for refunds of any amounts assessed
and paid for fiscal year 2013 because the General Assembly, not the Authority,

7
To reiterate, Act 64 became effective July 9, 2013 (soon after MCT Transportation), and
established fees for the fiscal year that ran from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013.

20
explicitly adopted those fees and assessments. Any attempt to claim amounts paid in
fiscal year 2013 would be an impermissible attempt to raise a due process claim for
legislative action.
4.
In its last issue, Licensees argue that the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment improperly denied them the opportunity to seek a full refund of all the fees
and fines they had paid under the requirements of Act 94. We discern no such error.
As a matter of law, Licensees were not entitled to a full refund of all the
fees and fines they had paid under Act 94. We held in MCT Transportation that Act
94 violated procedural due process rights because it did not provide an opportunity for
operators to challenge the amount of assessments or fees. We did not hold that taxicab
operators were constitutionally immune from the assessments or fees collected under
Act 94 or that it was beyond the Authority’s power to collect them, which may have
entitled Licensees to a full refund. See, e.g., McKesson (involving unconstitutional
discriminatory taxes). Therefore, the trial court did not err by barring Licensees from
arguing to the jury that they were entitled to a full refund of all the fees paid under Act
94. See also our thorough discussion of this issue in Z&R Cab, LLC, 187 A.3d at 1037
(“Licensees could be entitled to recover only the portion, if any, of their fees and
assessments that exceeded the amount the Authority would have assessed had it been
subject to constitutional standards, guidance, and limits imposed by the General
Assembly.”).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s October 27, 2022 judgment and
its July 16, 2020 order are affirmed.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

21
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Z&R Cab, LLC, Zoro, Inc., :
Ronald Blount, and Debra Bell, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 1582 C.D. 2022
:
Philadelphia Parking Authority :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2025, the October 27, 2022
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and its July 16,
2020 order are hereby affirmed.

________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10848854. Public record. Not legal advice.