# STATEN v. THE CITY OF PHILADLPHIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847552

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847552

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the due process protection against criminal investigators’ fabrication of inculpatory evidence against a defendant . . . ha[s] long been recognized by the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal,” collecting cases

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HAROLD STATEN, :
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION
: No. 24-1380
v. :
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and :
DETECTIVE JAMES J. MCNESBY, :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

In October 1986, Harold Staten was convicted of second-degree murder, arson, and
aggravated assault. Now that his conviction and life sentence have been vacated, he seeks to hold
Defendants the City of Philadelphia (“the City”) and Detective James J. McNesby (“McNesby”)
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Defendants move to dismiss Staten’s suit. For the
reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND1
In the early morning hours of October 30, 1984, a North Philadelphia rowhome inhabited
by Robert Williams, Marian DeBose, and Charles Harris caught fire. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32, 38,
65, ECF No. 13. All three escaped by jumping from second-floor windows. Id. ¶ 21. As Harris
was being rushed to the emergency room, a firefighter saw him “hold his arms out with the skin
hanging off” and exclaim to DeBose, his girlfriend, “Look, see what you did to me!” Id. ¶ 23
(cleaned up). Though Williams and DeBose survived, Harris ultimately died due to the severe

1 The Court accepts all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true for purposes of addressing
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir.
2018).
burns he sustained on “a significant portion of his upper torso.” Id. ¶ 22.
The Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”) began an arson investigation, with McNesby
serving as “lead detective.” Id. ¶ 78. For reasons unexplained in the Amended Complaint, a
forensic investigator quickly “presumed” that the fire was caused by “‘an open flame applied to

an accelerant’” and started in the rowhome’s vestibule. Id. ¶ 28. Later testing and a separate fire
detected on the second floor, however, suggested otherwise. When the PPD’s crime laboratory
tested samples from the vestibule, those samples contained “no detectible volatile flammable
vapors.” Id. ¶ 29. Separately, though a firefighter had “also noted a separate fire in the second-
floor back bedroom” inhabited by Harris and DeBose, that fire “went uninvestigated.” Id. ¶ 32.
Despite the contradictory test results and separate second-floor fire, the PPD’s official conclusion
was that the fire was caused by “‘an open flame applied to an accelerant’” in the vestibule. Id. ¶
28.
Early on in the investigation, investigators caught wind of a “neighborhood rumor”: Harold
Staten (an exterminator) thought that Williams had stolen his pest control supplies and had

previously threatened to burn down the rowhome in retribution. Id. ¶¶ 38, 65. Investigators thus
“developed a theory”—one that dovetailed neatly with the purported cause and origin of the fire—
that Staten had acted on that threat by using his pest control supplies to start the fire. Id. ¶¶ 38-39,
65. However, when investigators interviewed Williams in October or November 1984, Williams
told them that (1) “Staten hadn’t threatened him” or “threatened to burn the house down over
missing pest control products”; and (2) he “didn’t think [] Staten started a fire.” Id. ¶¶ 64-68.
Investigators kept records of Williams’ interview but did not give those records to Staten until long
after his trial. See id.
Despite Williams denying the neighborhood rumor, investigators zeroed in on Staten.
Although Staten acknowledged that he and Williams had previously had “a dispute” over his
missing pest control supplies, he told investigators “that the dispute had been resolved.” Id. ¶¶ 40-
41. Staten also (1) gave investigators “the names of the men responsible for the theft”; (2) provided
“an alibi and [names of] witnesses to his whereabouts on the evening of the fire”; (3) explained

that “his pest control supplies were not flammable” and gave them a list of the brands he used; and
(4) agreed to a polygraph examination (the results of which revealed “‘no deception indicated’
regarding his lack of involvement in the fire”). Id. ¶¶ 41-44. Separately, unbeknownst to Staten
until 2022, a number of witnesses gave exculpatory statements that investigators either failed to
record or recorded but withheld. Id. ¶¶ 34, 57-58.
At some point during the investigation, investigators “found and interviewed a 17-year-old
girl” who lived across the street from the rowhome and claimed she was home the night of the fire.
Id. ¶ 35. When she was first interviewed, she said she had been “awakened by a resident of the
[rowhome] screaming about the fire and her broken legs” and denied seeing Staten before, during,
or after the fire. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Four months later—after McNesby and other investigators began

secretly treating her to lunch—she “abruptly changed her story” and claimed she saw Staten “at
the steps of the rowhome with a hose and can starting the fire.” Id. ¶ 46; see also id. ¶¶ 60-61
(noting that “none of these lunches were documented” or otherwise disclosed to Staten until after
he was convicted).
On or around March 20, 1986, McNesby signed and submitted an affidavit of probable
cause in support of a warrant for Staten’s arrest. Id. ¶ 31. The affidavit mentioned only that (1)
Staten believed that Williams had stolen his pest control supplies and had threatened to burn the
rowhome down in retribution; and (2) a witness had seen Staten start the fire. See id. ¶¶ 45-46,
66.2
In October 1986, Staten’s case culminated in a bench trial. Id. ¶ 50. Among those who
testified were Williams, the seventeen-year-old, and the seventeen-year-old’s boyfriend who was
with her the night of the fire. See id. ¶¶ 47-50, 65-66. Williams established Staten’s motive for

committing arson by testifying that Staten had previously threatened to burn the rowhome down
over his missing pest control supplies. See id. ¶¶ 64-66. The seventeen-year-old gave the “sole
eyewitness” account of Staten starting the fire, id. ¶ 59, testifying that she saw Staten “huddled at
the front door, using a hose to put liquid through the mail slot of the home” after which it erupted
in flames, id. ¶ 47. Her boyfriend, however, testified “that she was sleeping when they first heard
the screams for help.” Id. ¶ 49. Despite this conflicting testimony, the court convicted Staten of
second-degree murder, arson, and aggravated assault. Id. ¶ 50.
For over a year, the court delayed sentencing to hear evidence from witnesses that Staten’s
initial trial counsel failed to call at trial. Id. ¶ 51. Among these were “numerous witnesses” who
refuted the testimony of the seventeen-year-old eyewitness, including a witness who testified that

the seventeen-year-old “decided to lie” about what she saw “after investigators began treating her
to lunch.” Id. ¶¶ 52, 61; see also id. ¶ 60 (seventeen-year-old was “blacked out from a combination
of alcohol and cocaine” and had to be carried to bed by her boyfriend and her roommate the night
of the fire). After hearing all the additional testimony, the court stated “on the record” that Staten
“merit[ed] a new trial”; however, after two years of deliberation, the court entered an order denying

2 At some point before Staten was convicted, an unnamed witness told investigators that Staten had
confessed to him. See Am. Compl. ¶ 63. The Amended Complaint does not say whether this information
was included in the affidavit of probable cause and/or was introduced at trial. It does say, however, that
the unnamed witness “revealed [] he was incarcerated on the day he claimed to have had an incriminating
conversation with [] Staten” after Staten was convicted. Id.
Staten’s post-trial motions3 without any accompanying explanation, and on February 8, 1989,
sentenced Staten to life. Id. ¶¶ 54-56.
Decades later, two forensic fire investigators—one hired by Staten, the other by the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office—began reinvestigating the case. See id. ¶¶ 70-72. Both

“concluded that the cause of the fire should have been ruled ‘undetermined.’” Id. ¶ 72 (“a
misunderstanding and application of fire science principle [had] led to unsupportable conclusions
about the origin and cause of the fire”). Armed with “proof of the false fire science,” Staten filed
a PCRA petition for relief from his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 75. On February 5, 2024,
he was finally vindicated: the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ordered a new trial and the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office nolle prossed the charges against him. See id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 131.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 3, 2024, Staten sued the City and McNesby, alleging violations of his federal
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law stemming from his arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
thirty-seven-plus years of incarceration. More specifically, Staten brings: (1) a Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 against McNesby (Count I); (2) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against McNesby (Count II);4 (3) a state law malicious prosecution claim
against McNesby (Count V); (4) a Monell claim against the City (Count III); and (5) a civil rights
conspiracy claim against both Defendants (Count IV). See id.
On July 24, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss Staten’s Amended Complaint in its
entirety. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 (hereinafter “Mot. to Dismiss”);
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 42 (hereinafter “Reply”). Defendants’ arguments are threefold. First, they

3 The Amended Complaint references “post-trial motions” but does not say exactly what they were. See
Am. Compl. ¶ 55.
4 As discussed in greater detail below, Count II encompasses two claims: fabrication of evidence and
deliberate deception. See infra Sections IV.B.2-3.
argue that McNesby had probable cause and lacked malice, barring both of Staten’s malicious
prosecution claims (Counts I and V). Second, they assert that McNesby is entitled to qualified
immunity on Staten’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims (Counts I and II). Third, they
argue that Staten fails to plead his Monell and civil conspiracy claims (Counts III and IV). The

Court will address each argument in turn below.
III. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and State Law (Counts
I and V)

Staten asserts Fourth Amendment and state law malicious prosecution claims against
McNesby. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-132 (Fourth Amendment claim), 147-49 (state law claim). To
allege malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendants initiated
a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding
was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other
than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318

F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Under Pennsylvania law, “malicious prosecution has three elements. The defendant must have
instituted proceedings against the plaintiff (1) without probable cause, (2) with malice, and (3) the
proceedings must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs
& Helpers, Loc. Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988).
Defendants argue that both of Staten’s malicious prosecution claims fail because McNesby
had probable cause and nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests he acted maliciously. See
Mot. to Dismiss 9-13. The Court will address probable cause and malice in turn.
1. Probable Cause
The “proceedings” against Staten started when he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. See

Am. Compl. ¶ 31. According to the Amended Complaint, McNesby wrote and swore the affidavit
of probable cause submitted in support of Staten’s arrest warrant. Id. Therefore, to establish that
the proceedings against him were initiated without probable cause, Staten must show that (1)
McNesby, “with at least a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that
create[d] a falsehood in applying for [the] warrant,” and (2) those assertions or omissions were
“material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697
(3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Omissions are made with reckless disregard for the
truth when an officer withholds facts that “[a]ny reasonable person would have known . . . a judge
would wish to know.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)). “[A]n officer must have knowledge of the
information alleged to have been recklessly omitted” and “the information must be relevant to the
existence of probable cause,” meaning “a reasonable person would know that it could affect [a
judge’s] probable cause determination[.]” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 471, 471 n.9

(3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Assertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth
“when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.”
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Defendants’ position is that none of McNesby’s alleged omissions and assertions were
reckless or, if corrected, would otherwise “alter the probable cause determination.” Mot. to
Dismiss 11. The Court disagrees. According to the Amended Complaint, McNesby’s affidavit
only included the following: (1) Staten had threatened to burn Williams’ house down over a dispute
regarding pest control supplies; and (2) the 17-year-old’s eyewitness account of Staten starting the
fire. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-47 (discussing eyewitness account), 65-68 (discussing threat-related

allegations). However, when Williams was interviewed in the fall of 1984, long before McNesby
submitted the affidavit in March 1986, Williams said that “Staten hadn’t threatened him” or
“threatened to burn the house down over missing pest control products,” and furthermore, that he
“didn’t think [] Staten started a fire.” Id. ¶¶ 64-68.5 Williams’ statements negate Staten’s
purported motive and are exactly the kind of information that “[a]ny reasonable person would have
known . . . a judge would wish to know.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788. Furthermore, the eyewitness

5 Williams’ statements were recorded in a “Philadelphia Police Department Arson Investigation Memo”
(dated October 30, 1984) and “Activity Sheet” (dated November 17, 1984). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64, 66.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Staten’s favor, McNesby—as “the lead detective” on the case—
presumably reviewed these files before swearing the affidavit of probable cause for Staten’s arrest. Id. ¶
78.
account included in the affidavit was completely contrary to the seventeen-year-old’s first
interview and only came to light four months after investigators (including McNesby) began
treating her to lunch. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-46, 60-61. At the time he swore the affidavit, McNesby
knew that the seventeen-year-old’s eyewitness account was completely contrary to her initial

account and was also aware of other “serious concerns” that would have severely undermined her
credibility. Id. ¶¶ 60 (eyewitness was “blacked out from a combination of alcohol and cocaine”
the night of the fire), 62 (eyewitness “had a documented history of drug and alcohol abuse . . . and
a significant history of mental health problems, including short- and long-term memory loss[.]”).
McNesby would have therefore “had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy” of the eyewitness
account he included in the affidavit. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (internal citation omitted). A
corrected warrant affidavit—one that included Williams’ statements to police, and either excluded
or told the full story behind the seventeen-year-old’s eyewitness account—would not have
otherwise established probable cause for Staten’s arrest.6
2. Malice

An officer’s decision to “omit crucial exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of
probable cause” can equate to malice. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (a
reasonable juror could find that officer who “mischaracterized [] events and chose to omit crucial
exculpatory information from [an] affidavit of probable cause” acted with malice or for purposes
other than bringing defendant to justice); see also Kelley, 544 A.2d at 941 (“Malice may be inferred
from the absence of probable cause.”). According to the Amended Complaint, the affidavit failed

6 Defendants also contend that Staten’s confession to a civilian witness was (1) included in the affidavit and
(2) established probable cause for his arrest. See Mot. to Dismiss 5, 11. As Staten has not alleged that the
confession was included in the affidavit, the Court may not consider Defendants’ argument at this phase of
the case. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual
allegations as true [and] construe [them] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . .”).
to mention (1) any of the credibility issues associated with the seventeen-year-old’s version of
events; and (2) “numerous” exculpatory eyewitness accounts. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 62, 119(b)
(discussing credibility issues); id. ¶ 34 (exculpatory eyewitness accounts). Accepting these
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Staten’s favor, McNesby chose to omit

this information from the affidavit to bolster an otherwise tenuous case against Staten. Cf.
Harvard, 973 F.3d at 204.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, Staten has sufficiently pleaded that McNesby lacked
probable cause and acted with malice. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Counts I and V.
B. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 “permits suits against state government officials who deprive individuals of
‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Mack v. Yost, 63
F.4th 211, 222 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Though “the statute on its face admits
of no immunities,” the Supreme Court has held that most government employees, including police
officers, enjoy qualified immunity from § 1983 suits. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986).
Even when they violate the Constitution or a federal statute, police officers “are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
When presented with a qualified immunity defense, a court must ask two questions: (1)
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether
the right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s conduct. Dennis v. City of
Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 287 (3d Cir. 2021).7 A court may address these questions in either
order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). “The burden of establishing qualified
immunity falls to the official claiming it as a defense.” Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163,
176 (3d Cir. 2011). Because the case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court will

construe the Amended Complaint liberally and take its factual allegations as true when performing
this analysis. See Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022).
In this case, Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on each
of Staten’s constitutional claims (Counts I and II).8 The Court will address each claim in turn.
1. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim (Count I)

Defendants argue that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on Staten’s Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim because he had probable cause. See Mot. to Dismiss 16-
17. Defendants are correct that probable cause would entitle McNesby to qualified immunity.

7 The “clearly established” standard seeks to “shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably” while still “hold[ing] [them] accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly . . . .” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A right is clearly established
if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that
there is either “a closely analogous case that establishes that the Defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional”
or “that the Defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials
would know without guidance from a court.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Est. of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 780 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 232
(3d Cir. 2023) (a right can be clearly established “even without a precise factual correspondence between
the case at issue and a previous case.”).
8 Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified immunity on Staten’s § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim to the extent it relies on the Fourteenth Amendment because “there is no clearly
established procedural due process right against malicious prosecution[.]” See Mot. to Dismiss 14-15.
However, Staten expressly pleads his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim only under the Fourth
Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-132 (Count I, “Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment). He also explains that his Fourteenth Amendment “claims are . . . like those described in”
Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279 (3d Cir. 2021)—a case that dealt with claims for fabrication
of evidence and deliberate deception but not malicious prosecution. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF No.
36 (hereinafter “Resp.”). Accordingly, because it appears that the only “constitutional peg” Staten hangs
his malicious prosecution claim on is the Fourth Amendment, the Court need not address Defendants’
argument on this point. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994).
Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016). However, as discussed above, Staten has
adequately pleaded that McNesby lacked it. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count I on qualified immunity grounds.
2. Fourteenth Amendment - Fabrication of Evidence (Count II)

Staten alleges that McNesby knowingly fabricated evidence in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 133. Defendants contend that McNesby is entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim because the right underlying it—the right not to be convicted on perjured
testimony—has only ever been recognized in cases involving prosecutors and thus “simply does
not apply” to McNesby. Reply 12-13. Stated otherwise, Defendants argue that Staten fails to state
a violation of a clearly established right because McNesby was not a prosecutor. See id. at 11-12.
Defendants’ narrow construction of the right is untenable. By 1986—the year McNesby
swore and submitted the affidavit of probable cause and Staten proceeded to trial—any reasonable
state actor would have had ample fair and clear warning that fabricating inculpatory evidence
against a defendant violates due process. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2014);

Dennis, 19 F.4th at 289. By that time, there was decades-old Supreme Court precedent forbidding
prosecutors from “knowingly using perjured testimony to secure a conviction”—precedent that the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly deemed “closely analogous” to an
investigator’s fabrication of evidence to “bring about [a] prosecution or to help secure [a]
conviction.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 296 (discussing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) and
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967)); Dennis, 19 F.4th at 289 (“Halsey established that sufficiently
particularized precedent placed these detectives on notice that fabricating evidence to convict a
criminal defendant is unconstitutional, regardless of whether that evidence is inserted into a
confession to ‘bring about’ his prosecution or to help secure his conviction.”); see also Mervilus
v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 196 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that “the due process protection against
criminal investigators’ fabrication of inculpatory evidence against a defendant . . . ha[s] long been
recognized by the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal,” collecting cases). But even without this
precedent, it has always been “an axiomatic principle of our justice system that those charged with

upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals
for crimes they did not commit.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 296 (cleaned up). To put it plainly: the
“obviousness of this violation would [have been] difficult to escape” long before the investigation
began in this case. Id.
Having determined that the right at issue was clearly established, the Court now addresses
whether Staten has pleaded a violation of that right. “If a defendant has been convicted at a trial
at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under
section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 193. To succeed on his
claim against McNesby, Staten must establish “there is a reasonable likelihood” that he would not
have been convicted without the use of the allegedly fabricated evidence. Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294;

see also Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 372 (3d Cir. 2016) (plaintiff must draw “a
meaningful connection” between fabricated evidence and due process violation). Staten must also
provide “persuasive evidence” that McNesby “formulated or submitted false evidence willfully,
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth.” Mervilus, 73 F.4th at 194-95.
At this early stage of the case, Staten has made the requisite showings. According to the
Amended Complaint, McNesby and other investigators secretly coerced a seventeen-year-old into
saying she saw Staten start the fire after she initially claimed she never saw him. See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 60-62, 117-18, 119(b). As discussed in greater detail above, McNesby had ample reasons to
doubt that the seventeen-year-old’s new account was true. And because she gave the only
eyewitness account at trial, there is a reasonable likelihood that Staten would not have been
convicted without her false account. The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the fabrication of evidence claim.
3. Fourteenth Amendment - Deliberate Deception (Count II)

Staten also alleges that McNesby deliberately concealed, suppressed, and withheld relevant
and material evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 134.
Defendants argue that Staten’s “deliberate deception claim is merely a Brady claim by another
name” and contend that the right underlying it—to have exculpatory or impeachment evidence
disclosed—was not clearly established by the time Staten was convicted in 1986. Reply 9; Mot.
to Dismiss 15.
As a threshold matter, allowing Defendants to “recharacterize” Staten’s claim to their
liking “would run afoul of the longstanding principle that . . . a defendant cannot create a cause of
action from the fact pattern on behalf of the plaintiff.” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 291. To the contrary:
“[i]t is the party suing, not the party sued, who enjoys the right to frame the claims asserted in a

complaint.” Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2011)). But beyond that,
Defendants’ position misconstrues Staten’s claim and the underlying right it implicates.
“A Brady claim, in essence, is a claim by a defendant that his due process rights were
violated by the failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence to the defense.” Dennis,
19 F.4th at 291. A deliberate deception claim “go[es] beyond the failure to disclose evidence and
arises when imprisonment results from the knowing use of false testimony or other fabricated
evidence or from concealing evidence to create false testimony to secure a conviction.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). And unlike a Brady
claim, a deliberate deception claim is rooted in “the right not to be framed by the use of perjured
witness testimony at trial”—which, as discussed above, was clearly established long before the
events in question. Id. at 290 (citing Mooney, 294 U.S. at 103).
The allegations here go beyond a mere failure to disclose. To be sure, the Amended
Complaint certainly alleges that certain pieces of exculpatory and impeachment evidence were

withheld for 36 years following Staten’s trial. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57 (“numerous statements
exculpating [] Staten were withheld . . . until 2022”). However, it also alleges that McNesby and
other investigators repeatedly treated a seventeen-year-old to lunch in an effort to coerce her into
providing what would be the “sole eyewitness” account of Staten’s alleged misconduct at trial.
See id. ¶¶ 60-62, 117-18, 119(b). None of these lunches were documented and only came to light
at a post-trial hearing through a third-party witness. Id. ¶ 61. These allegations plausibly suggest
that McNesby not only fabricated the seventeen-year-old’s account, but also concealed evidence
that would have revealed it was fabricated, in an effort to secure Staten’s conviction. Dennis, 19
F.4th at 291-92. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the deliberate
deception claim.

C. Monell Claim (Count III)

Staten also brings a Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia, alleging both “policy or
custom” and “failure to train, discipline, or supervise” theories of municipal liability. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 138-43; see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (outlining two theories of
Monell liability). Defendants contend that Staten did not plead enough facts to support his claim
under either theory. See Mot. to Dismiss 18-24.
To succeed under a “policy or custom” theory, a plaintiff must point to “an official
proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal
policy on the relevant subject,” or a practice “so well-settled and permanent as to virtually
constitute law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105-06; see also Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 794
(3d Cir. 1989) (“Custom may be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence.”). In a case
involving an alleged custom, a plaintiff need not identify a decisionmaker by name; rather, the
custom can be “ascribable to municipal decisionmakers.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990). Even still, a plaintiff “must demonstrate a plausible nexus or affirmative link
between the municipality’s custom and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To succeed on a “failure to train, discipline, or supervise” theory, a plaintiff must show that
the failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This means that “(1)
municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation
involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an
employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106.
Alleging facts about “the City’s inadequate disciplinary systems and how the City was aware of

repeated constitutional violations but deliberately failed to act” is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Swainson v. City of Philadelphia, 2023 WL 144283, *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2023); Alicea
v. City of Philadelphia, 2022 WL 17477143, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2022).
Given that “Monell liability is generally not amenable to resolution at the pleading stage,
as it requires a plaintiff to plead facts outside or her knowledge,” the Court concludes that Staten
has adequately alleged a Monell claim under both theories. 3909 Realty LLC v. City of
Philadelphia, 2021 WL 2342929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2021). First, Staten sufficiently pleads
that the City had a custom of acquiescing to pervasive unconstitutional misconduct by the PPD.
Am. Compl. ¶ 79. More specifically, Staten alleges the City knew but did not stop the PPD from
coercing and inducing false witness statements, fabricating inculpatory evidence, concealing
exculpatory evidence, and omitting or deleting exculpatory evidence from charging documents
and investigative files. See id. ¶¶ 79-85. These are the same practices that led to Staten’s
constitutional injuries. To show the City had the requisite knowledge of this pervasive misconduct,

Staten cites newspaper articles, a consent decree, and a number of other cases detailing this
misconduct from the late 1970s through the present day. See id. ¶¶ 85-102, 104-11; see also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources
courts ordinarily examine . . . in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”); Est. of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 796-98 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering consent decree, newspaper article, and
press release “referenced” in complaint in assessing sufficiency of allegations regarding municipal
custom).9 Second, Staten describes the City’s deficient disciplinary system—a system that failed
to adequately investigate allegations of misconduct, timely resolve complaints, or deter repeat

offenders within the PPD—with adequate specificity. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111(b), (d), (f), 112. Staten
also alleges that at the time he was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, the PPD employed an
“unsound” definition of probable cause and included that definition in training materials and
directives that were authorized by the PPD’s Police Chief. Id.¶ 119(a); see also id. ¶ 113-16. At
the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” under either theory of municipal liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court will

9 Defendants claim that “many of the incidents” Staten cites “are not sufficiently similar in kind to the
allegations of police misconduct he raises in his suit.” Mot. to Dismiss 20. The Court agrees that “the facts
of some of the cited cases are clearly distinguishable” from Staten’s experience; nonetheless, “the breadth
of misconduct which they represent is highly relevant to the existence of the City’s custom of acquiescence
in PPD’s allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Alicea, 2022 WL 17477143, at *5(denying motion to dismiss
municipal liability claim).
therefore deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss Staten’s municipal liability claim.
D. Civil Rights Conspiracy Claim (Count IV)
Staten also asserts a § 1983 conspiracy claim against McNesby “and other City []
employees.” Am. Compl. ¶ 144. “To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

prove that persons acting under color of state law reached an understanding to deprive him of his
constitutional rights.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 207 (quoting Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904
F.3d 280, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2018)).
Defendants move to dismiss Staten’s conspiracy claim because he fails to identify any state
actors—besides McNesby—who conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Mot. to
Dismiss 24-26. However, as Staten notes in briefing, he cannot name the other actors without
discovery. Resp. 12. Given that “caution is advised in any pre-trial disposition of conspiracy
allegations in civil rights actions,” the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Staten’s §
1983 conspiracy claim. Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184-85
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted); see also Jones v. Burlington Twp., 2017 WL 6372232,

at *9 n.18 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2017) (declining to dismiss conspiracy claim)
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without
prejudice to raise McNesby’s entitlement to qualified immunity at a later stage in the proceedings,
if applicable.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847552. Public record. Not legal advice.