# Groleau v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

> District Court, D. Oregon · April 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847453

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** April 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847453

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 1999)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

WALTER G.,1 No. 6:23-cv-01694-YY

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

YOU, Magistrate Judge,

Plaintiff Walter G. seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner
(“Commissioner”)’s final decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–33. This court has
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and §
1383(c)(3). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and this
case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on February 18, 2020, alleging a disability onset
date of December 23, 2019. Tr. 211-18. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claim initially and
on reconsideration. Tr. 66-78, 80-100. Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing, and a

1 In the interest of privacy, this Opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last name
of the nongovernmental party in this case.
hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Mark Triplett in August, 2022. Tr. 32-64.
The ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 12–
31. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 18, 2023. Tr. 1–6.
Thus, the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision and subject to review by this

Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper
legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “more than a
mere scintilla,” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1150 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This court must weigh the evidence that supports and detracts from the
ALJ’s conclusion and “ ‘may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting
evidence.’ ” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v.

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)). This court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner when the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the
decision. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, where the evidence is
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld
if it is “supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035.
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS AND ALJ FINDINGS
Disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ engages in a five-step sequential inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 1999)).
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since December 23, 2019, the alleged onset date. Tr. 18. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had
the following severe, medically determinable impairments: Left Shoulder Adhesive Capsulitis;
Status-Post Stroke; Morbid Obesity; and Lower Extremity Edema (left worse than right). Tr. 18.
At step three, the ALJ found no impairment met or equaled the severity of any impairment listed
in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 19. The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant can occasionally push/pull
with the left, non-dominant upper extremity. The claimant can occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can
occasionally reach overhead with the left, non-dominant upper extremity. The
claimant can frequently, but not constantly, handle, finger, and feel with the left,
non-dominant upper extremity.

Tr. 20.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant
work. Tr. 24. At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as cashier, ticket seller, and mail clerk. Tr. 25. The ALJ
therefore found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 25.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly discounting his symptom testimony,
(2) failing to properly evaluate the medical opinions of the State agency medical consultants, and
(3) failing to identify a significant number of jobs that Plaintiff could perform at step five.

I. Subjective Symptom Testimony
When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be
expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged, and the record contains no
affirmative evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the
severity of ... symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A general assertion that
the claimant is not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must “state which ... testimony is not credible
and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,
918 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing
court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). The ALJ need not “perform
a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony” or “draft dissertations when denying
benefits.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). But Ninth Circuit law “plainly
requires” that an ALJ do more than “offer[ ] non-specific conclusions that [the claimant’s]
testimony [is] inconsistent with [certain evidence].” Id. (citations omitted). If the “ALJ’s
credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage
in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ may consider whether
it is consistent with objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)-(3), 416.929(c)(1)-
(3); SSR 16-3p, available at 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8. The lack of objective medical evidence
may not form the sole basis for discounting a claimant’s testimony. Tammy S. v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 6:17-cv-01562-HZ, 2018 WL 5924505, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2018) (citing
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Commissioner may not discredit

[a] claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by
objective medical evidence.”)). However, “[w]hen objective medical evidence in the record is
inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as
undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in
original).
Effective March 28, 2016, the Commissioner superseded Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
96-7p, governing the assessment of a claimant’s “credibility,” and replaced it with SSR 16-3p.
See SSR 16-3p, available at 2016 WL 1119029. SSR 16-3p eliminates the reference to
“credibility,” clarifies that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character,” and requires the ALJ to consider all the evidence in an individual’s

record when evaluating the intensity and persistence of symptoms. Id. at *1-2. The ALJ must
examine “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and
other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant
evidence in the individual’s case record.” Id. at *4
In considering Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms and did not
identify evidence of malingering. Tr. 21. However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Tr. 21.
Plaintiff identifies discrete parts of his testimony that he argues the ALJ either failed to
address or discounted for insufficient reasons. First, Plaintiff highlights that, at the hearing, he

testified he needs to rest an hour once a day. Tr. 338. Plaintiff also testified he is not very good at
reaching for things. Tr. 53. The ALJ acknowledged this latter testimony, noting that Plaintiff has
trouble “using his left arm to reach but says there is no issue using his left hand.” Tr. 21.
However, the ALJ otherwise erred, as discussed below.
A. Need to Rest One Hour Daily
The ALJ erred by failing to address Plaintiff’s testimony that he needs to rest one hour
per day. Social Security regulations require ALJs to consider evidence they receive from
claimants about their symptoms and limitations when evaluating a claim of disability. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(4) (defining “evidence from nonmedical sources”), 404.1520(3)(“We will
consider all evidence in your case record when we make a determination[.]”), 404.1520b (“After

we review all of the evidence relevant to your claim, we make findings about what the evidence
shows.”), 404.1529(c)(3) (“[W]e will carefully consider any other information you may submit
about your symptoms.”), 404.1545(a)(3) (“We will assess your residual functional capacity
based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.”). The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that
an ALJ may not reject “significant probative evidence” without explanation. Vincent ex rel.
Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
Here, Plaintiff testified that he needs a one-hour nap every day, Tr. 338, which (if taken
during the work day) would preclude him from performing the jobs identified by the VE at step
five. See Tr. 62 (recognizing that an individual being off task more than 15% of a workday
would not be able to perform identified jobs). Defendant acknowledges the ALJ did not address
this testimony at all, but argues that Plaintiff’s fatigue evidence is “neither significant nor
probative.” See Def. Br., ECF No. 16 at 4-5. Defendant is incorrect. First, the evidence is
significant and relevant to Plaintiff’s disability claim; if he indeed needed to rest for an hour

during each work day, he would be unable to perform the jobs identified by the VE at step five.
See Tr. 61-62. Second, Defendant’s arguments about the strength of the evidence are
impermissible post hoc rationalizations that the Court cannot consider on appeal. Bray v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009).2 Because Plaintiff’s
symptom testimony bore on his ability to work, and the ALJ failed to address it or provide a
clear and convincing reason for discounting it, the ALJ erred.
B. Plaintiff’s Left-Sided Reaching Testimony
The ALJ failed to articulate a clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s
allegations about difficulty reaching with his left arm. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he
cannot reach very well with his left arm. Tr. 53. The ALJ acknowledged this testimony, but did

not cite any portion of the medical record that directly undermined it. Tr. 20-21.
When discounting symptom testimony, an ALJ’s decision “must be sufficiently specific
to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on
permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.”
Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). In this context, that means an ALJ must

2 Defendant identifies several aspects of the medical record that might undermine this testimony.
See Def. Br. at 5 (citing treatment records where Plaintiff denied fatigue, conflicting function
reports, and lack of fatigue testimony at the hearing). Because the ALJ did not rely on any of
these bases, the Court will not consider them here.
“identify the testimony he found not credible,” and “link that testimony to the particular parts of
the record supporting his non-credibility determination.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.
The ALJ failed to do so here. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s testimony about left shoulder
limitations, but did not identify what objective medical evidence undermined it. Tr. 21-22. He

discounted State agency medical opinions about Plaintiff’s inability to reach overhead with his
left arm, but never addressed Plaintiff’s own testimony about this limitation. That leaves this
reviewing court to surmise what “particular parts of the record support[ed the ALJ’s] non-
credibility determination.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. Failure to provide such clear analysis
is error, and thus the ALJ did not provide a sufficiently clear and convincing reason for
discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony about this limitation.
II. Medical Opinion Evidence
When evaluating medical opinion evidence for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017,
ALJs must apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c for Title II claims and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c for Title
XVI claims. Under these regulations, ALJs no longer “weigh” medical opinions, but rather

determine which are most “persuasive.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b). To that
end, controlling weight is no longer given to any medical opinion. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 5867-68; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner
evaluates the persuasiveness of medical opinions based on (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3)
relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) other factors, such as “evidence
showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a), (c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(a), (c)(1)-(5).
The factors of “supportability” and “consistency” are considered to be “the most
important factors” in the evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c).
Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by
explaining the “relevant . . . objective medical evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–

92 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). Consistency means the extent to which a
medical opinion is “consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(c)(2)).
An ALJ must articulate how persuasive the ALJ finds the medical opinions and explain
how the ALJ considered the supportability and consistency factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),
(b), 416.920c(a), (b); see Tyrone W. v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-01719-IM, 2020 WL 6363839, at *7
(D. Or. Oct. 28, 2020). “The ALJ may but is not required to explain how other factors were
considered, as appropriate, including relationship with the claimant (length, purpose, and extent
of treatment relationship; frequency of examination); whether there is an examining relationship;
specialization; and other factors, such as familiarity with other evidence in the claim file or

understanding of the Social Security disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.”
Linda F. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. C20-5076-MAT, 2020 WL 6544628, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 6, 2020). However, ALJs are required to explain “how they considered other
secondary medical factors [if] they find that two or more medical opinions about the same issue
are equally supported and consistent with the record but not identical.” Tyrone W., 2020 WL
6363839, at *6 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2) and 404.1520c(b)(3)).
Furthermore, the court must continue to consider whether the ALJ’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence. See Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5852 (“Courts reviewing claims
under our current rules have focused more on whether we sufficiently articulated the weight we
gave treating source opinions, rather than on whether substantial evidence supports our final
decision.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by finding the medical opinions of State agency medical
consultants Dr. Davidson and Dr. Alberty only partially persuasive. Pl. Br. 8-15. Both doctors

opined that Plaintiff could never reach overhead or do any overhead work with his left arm. Tr.
88, 95. Both doctors also opined that due to Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, he
could only occasionally reach to the front and laterally. Tr. 88, 95.
The ALJ found these opinions unpersuasive “because they are not supported by objective
medical evidence or longitudinal treatment records.” Tr. 22. He first noted the opinion that
Plaintiff could “never” reach overhead or do overhead work was backed up by only “a single
examination suggestive of adhesive shoulder capsulitis” and Plaintiff was being treated
conservatively for it. Tr. 22, 516. With only this to go on, it was reasonable for the ALJ to
conclude that an opinion that Plaintiff should “never” reach overhead with his left arm lacked
significant support from the record.

Addressing consistency, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s primary care doctor concluded that
Plaintiff could reach in all directions either “frequently” or “constantly,” just one month after
Plaintiff’s symptoms were found to be suggestive of adhesive capsulitis. Tr. 22-23, 516-18, 764-
65. Such evidence was inconsistent with a blanket limitation on overhead reaching, and it was
reasonable for the ALJ to rely on this inconsistency to partially discount the State agency
doctors’ opinions. Because the ALJ considered both the consistency and supportability of the
State agency medical doctors’ opinions, and supported his conclusions with substantial evidence,
the ALJ did not err in finding them only partially persuasive.
III. Step Five
Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to identify a sufficient number of jobs he
could actually perform that exist in the national economy. Pl. Br. 15-16. Plaintiff’s step five
arguments depend on his testimony about difficulty reaching with his left hand and need for a

one-hour rest during the day. Id. (citing, Tr. 61-62). Because this case is being remanded with
instructions for the ALJ to reconsider this testimony, it is unnecessary to decide whether the jobs
the Commissioner identified at step five satisfied his burden.
IV. Remand
Within the Court’s discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the “decision whether to
remand for further proceedings or for an award of benefits.” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1210.
Although a court should generally remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation, a court has discretion to remand for immediate payment of benefits. Treichler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099-100 (9th Cir. 2014). The issue turns on the
utility of further proceedings. A court may not award benefits punitively and must conduct a

“credit-as-true” analysis on evidence that has been improperly rejected by the ALJ to determine
if a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. Strauss v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec.
Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011).
In the Ninth Circuit, the “credit-as-true” doctrine is “settled” and binding on this Court.
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2014). The court first determines whether the
ALJ made a legal error and then reviews the record as a whole to determine whether the record is
fully developed, the record is free from conflicts and ambiguities, and there is any useful purpose
in further proceedings. Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015). Only if the
record has been fully developed and there are no outstanding issues left to be resolved does the
district court consider whether the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on
remand if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true. Id. If so, the district court
can exercise its discretion to remand for an award of benefits. Id. The district court retains
flexibility, however, and is not required to credit statements as true merely because the ALJ

made a legal error. Id. at 408.
The ALJ committed harmful error by failing to provide specific, clear, and convincing
reasons to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, as discussed above. After reviewing
the record, however, conflicts and ambiguities remain between the medical record and testimony
regarding whether Plaintiff’s left-arm reaching limitations and need to rest during the day
rendered him totally unable to work during the relevant period. The Commissioner’s decision is
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings so that the ALJ can adequately
evaluate Plaintiff’s testimony, reformulate the RFC if necessary, and seek further VE testimony
at step five if necessary.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED April 17, 2024.
/s/ Youlee Yim You
_________________________________
Youlee Yim You
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847453. Public record. Not legal advice.