# Tindall v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · April 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847262

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** April 17, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** David A. Tapp
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847262

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that because “claim preclusion rests on a final judgment on the merits, it can quite properly and naturally be raised via a merits-based RCFC 12(b)(6) motion[.]”
- holding that courts must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice and opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction
- holding that multiple takings claims cannot be based on a single, continuous government action
- noting that because “claim preclusion rests on a final judgment on the merits, it can quite properly and naturally be raised via a merits-based RCFC 12(b)(6) motion[.]”
- stating that arguments should be “fleshed out.”

## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-122
Filed: April 17, 2025

JAMES W. TINDALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

James W. Tindall, Marietta, GA, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Bryan M. Byrd, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Elizabeth M.
Hosford, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Legal claims are singular verses, not choruses intended to be repeated. Res judicata is a
legally binding effort for courts to avoid unnecessary repetition. The United States moves to
dismiss Plaintiff James Tindall’s (“Mr. Tindall”) Complaint in accordance with the principles of
res judicata, claiming that he has asserted these same claims and failed. 1 (Def.’s Mot., ECF No.
7). This assertion is correct; Mr. Tindall’s claims are precluded. 2 Accordingly, the United States’
Motion is GRANTED. 3

1
Pursuant to RCFC 7.2(b)(2), a reply to a response may be filed within fourteen days after
service of the response. Compare RCFC 7.2(b)(1) (“a response or an objection to a written
motion must be filed within 28 days after service of the motion . . .”) (emphasis added). The
Court does not believe that supplemental briefing will assist in this matter, thus a Reply is
unnecessary.
2
Mr. Tindall’s first bite at the apple occurred in September of 2023 when he attempted the same
set of claims before the undersigned. Tindall v. United States, Case No. 23-757 (dismissed under
RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)); Tindall v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 440 (2023) (Tindall I), aff’d,
No. 2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 282 (2024).
3
While Mr. Tindall has since filed an Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl., ECF No. 8), the Court
finds that the amended pleading does not assert new facts or claims. The United States’
arguments, while specific to the initial Complaint, apply to the Amended Complaint as well.
I. Background

Following former President Biden’s declaration of a national emergency regarding
Russian activities and subsequent invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”) imposed sanctions prohibiting transactions in securities of specified
Russian entities, including a Russian majority state-owned banking and financial services
company (“Sberbank”). Exec. Order No. 14,024, 86 Fed. Reg. 20249 (Apr. 15, 2021) (“EO
14,024”). This directive affected owners of Sberbank shares, including Mr. Tindall. (See
generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 8).

Given the Executive Order, Mr. Tindall’s broker, Charles Schwab, informed him that he
had until May 25, 2022 to divest the Sberbank shares to non-U.S. persons, after which the shares
would be blocked in an escrow account accessible only with OFAC permission. (Am. Compl. at
8). In lieu of divesting the shares, Mr. Tindall vehemently protested, sending multiple letters to
President Biden, government officials, and Charles Schwab between April 2022 and February
2023. (Id. at 8–12). The overall tone of those letters was that blocking Mr. Tindall’s shares
constituted an unconstitutional taking of his property under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
(Id. at 8–9).

Unable to access his shares, Mr. Tindall’s primary desire was compensation. (Am.
Compl. at 9–11). His letters continued, initially offering the United States two purchase
options—a $25 per share (buyout) or $1 per share per week (rental). (Id. at 8–9). On the
government’s radio silence, Mr. Tindall later claimed the United States’ act of blocking the
shares constituted acceptance of his terms, and escalated his demands to $1,000,000, and then
$5,000,000 per violation, adding penalties and interest for non-payment. (Id. at 9 (“I value my
constitutional rights at $1,000,000 per violation, plus cumulative interest.”), 10 (“[T]he going
rate for each constitutional right is now $5,000,000/per violation.”)).

This is not the first time the Court is faced with these facts from Mr. Tindall. In May of
2023, Mr. Tindall came before the Court of Federal Claims with three claims. “First, he argue[d]
that the United States willfully violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Second, he
claim[ed] the United States knowingly breached an existing contract with him. And third, he
allege[d] that the United States’ actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of his property
without just compensation.” Tindall I, 167 Fed. Cl. at 444. The Court dismissed those claims in
September of 2023, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision the following March. Tindall
v. United States, No. 2024-1143, 2024 WL 960452 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari thereafter. 145 S. Ct. 282 (2024).

Undeterred from his prior failure, (Am. Compl. at 4–5 (acknowledging prior lawsuit)),
Mr. Tindall returned to this Court on January 21, 2025 and amended his Complaint on April 14.
(See Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl.). His renewed allegations, involving the same operative
facts, assert claims for: (1) breach of implied contract, (Am. Compl. at 13–18, 24); (2) 4,800
violations of the takings clause, (id. at 18–20, 25); and (3) 2,400 due process violations, (id. at
21–22, 25).

2
II. Analysis

The United States moves to dismiss Mr. Tindall’s claims under RCFC 12(b)(6) arguing
that they are barred by res judicata. (See generally Def.’s Mot. (citing Tindall I, 167 Fed. Cl.
440)). The Court agrees.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is
governed by Rule 12(b)(6). This rule requires dismissal when a complaint fails to state a “claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). At the pleading stage, the plausibility standard
does not impose a probability requirement; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations. Nalco Co. v.
Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Under Rule 12(b)(6) a claim must be
dismissed “when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay
v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

While the Court acknowledges that pro se plaintiffs are not expected to frame issues with
the precision of attorneys, Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
even pro se litigants must allege “plausible” facts sufficient to satisfy both the requirements of
subject-matter jurisdiction and the necessary elements of a claim as a matter of law for which
relief may be granted. See Stephanatos v. United States, 306 F. App’x 560, 564 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(stating that arguments should be “fleshed out.”). This standard necessarily implicates the
doctrine of res judicata. See Palafox Street Assoc., L.P. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 773, 780
(2014) (citing Chisolm v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 185, 193 (2008), aff’d, 298 Fed. Appx. 957
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that because “claim preclusion rests on a final judgment on the merits, it
can quite properly and naturally be raised via a merits-based RCFC 12(b)(6) motion[.]”)).

“Res judicata,” or “a matter already judged,” traditionally refers to two similar legal
effects: (1) claim preclusion and (2) issue preclusion, also called “collateral estoppel.” Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 n.5 (1998). “Application of both doctrines is central to
the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes
within their jurisdictions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Issue preclusion
typically pertains to a matter that was actually litigated, while claim preclusion forecloses
matters arising out of the same facts which should have been litigated but were not. See Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Here, while both doctrines
would apply, the Court only addresses the broader doctrine of claim preclusion.

“Claim preclusion applies when ‘(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the first suit
proceeded to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of
transactional facts as the first.’” Phillips/May Corp. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1264, 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (quoting Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). It is
undisputed that the parties in both suits are Mr. Tindall and the United States. (See Compl. at 3
(“This [C]omplaint . . . is directly related to [Tindall I] because it involves the same parties[.]”);
Am. Compl. at 5 (“The amended 2025 complaint is related to the 2023 Complaint, because it
involves the same parties[.])). Therefore, the first element is satisfied.

3
As to whether Tindall I proceeded to final, valid judgment on the merits, the Court finds
that it did. Mr. Tindall’s claims were dismissed in Tindall I, and those findings were affirmed in
full. 167 Fed. Cl. 440; 2024 WL 960452. Specifically, the Court dismissed Mr. Tindall’s takings
and contractual breach claims, finding that he failed to present a facially valid claim upon which
relief could be granted. 167 Fed. Cl. at 445–47 (dismissal pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6)).
“Dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted are judgments on the
merits, and, thus, entitled to res judicata effect.” eVideo Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 164,
169 (2018), aff’d 748 F. App’x 327 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). Thus, the judgment as to Mr. Tindall’s breach and takings
claims were valid, final judgments.

As to Mr. Tindall’s prior assertion of a due process violation, Tindall I dismissed that
claim based on a failure to establish jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1). 167 Fed. Cl. at 445.
Jurisdictional determinations typically have a preclusive effect. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (“It has long been the rule that
principles of [finality] apply to jurisdictional determinations—both subject matter and
personal.”). While the Rules of this Court state that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not
operate as an adjudication on the merits, the finality of the judgment still applies. See Milgroom
v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779, 794 (2015) (citing RCFC 41(b)), aff’d, 651 F. App’x 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2016). That is, a jurisdictional determination may have a preclusive effect to bar
matters previously litigated if the plaintiff fails to allege additional claims to cure the
jurisdictional defect in a subsequent court action. See Lowe v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 218, 229
(2007) (“[A] prior dismissal does preclude the same action based on the same facts unless the
jurisdictional flaw that necessitated dismissal of the first suit has been cured.”) (citing New
Jersey Institute of Tech. v. Medjet, Inc., 47 Fed. Appx. 921, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). There is no
question that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment does not mandate the payment of
money. See Tindall, 2024 WL 960452, at *2 (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025,
1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Standing alone, a due process violation claim can never satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements in this Court. Accordingly, the jurisdictional defect has not been
cured. The finality of that decision renders the Tindall I judgment final and valid in totality.

The heart of Mr. Tindall’s claims lies with the deprivation of access to his Sberbank
shares. (See generally Am. Compl.). These were the same issues central to Tindall I. 167 Fed. Cl.
at 443–44. The inquiry into whether two claims involve the same transactional facts must be
conducted “pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.”
Phillips/May Corp., 524 F.3d at 1271 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 24(2)
(1982)). In identifying which facts are transactional, courts “have defined ‘transaction’ in terms
of a ‘core of operative facts,’ the ‘same operative facts,’ or the ‘same nucleus of operative facts,’
and ‘based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.’” Barajas v. United States, 154
Fed. Cl. 318, 323 (2021) (citing Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2000). Here, using Mr. Tindall’s own original verbiage, “[t]his [C]omplaint . . . is directly related
to [Tindall I] because it . . . is based on the same claims[.]” (Compl. at 3). There can be no doubt
that this case arises out of the same transactional facts as Tindall I.

4
Mr. Tindall objects to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss in total, (Pl.’s Resp., ECF
No. 9), and submitted an Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl. at 1 (stating the document is filed
“in response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)”)). Mr. Tindall’s
primary addition is that this suit is different from Tindall I as it is intended to secure “relief from
defendant’s ongoing and continuing breaches of the implied contract between the parties for
defendant’s ongoing and continuing possession, control and use of plaintiff’s property, as well as
defendant’s numerous ongoing and continuing violations of plaintiff’s 5th Amendment
constitutional rights.” (Id. at 3–4 (emphasis in original)). Mr. Tindall attempts to distinguish
these claims as being based on the United States’ “incremental conduct” occurring separately
after his Tindall I complaint was dismissed. (Id. at 5). However, Mr. Tindall’s failure to show
that his new claims are based on new government action bars them from forming the basis of a
new lawsuit. Even if Mr. Tindall’s claims were not precluded, his Amended Complaint is not
based on new allegations and does not cure the defects contained in his original pleading.

The only “new” allegation seems to be a new theory of the United States’ acceptance to
form a contract. The Federal Circuit resoundingly affirmed Tindall I finding that the United
States’ actions did “not constitute acceptance of Mr. Tindall’s alleged offer[,]” which was fatal to
his breach of contract claim. 2024 WL 960452, at *2. He now characterizes the United States’
act of taking possession of his stocks as the moment of the United States’ acceptance. (Am.
Compl. at 14). Even were the Court to consider the merits of this argument, Mr. Tindall’s
reasoning is circular. For contract formation, acceptance must be in response to an offer. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (1981). Mr. Tindall learned of his shares being
blocked on April 26, 2022. (Am. Compl. at 8). His letters to the United States began the next
day. (Id.). The stocks were placed in escrow on May 25, 2022. (Id. at 11). Characterizing
blocking his Sberbank shares as formal acceptance from the United States ignores the
inevitability that blocking the shares would have happened with or without Mr. Tindall’s
“offers.” A plaintiff cannot assert that a pre-existing government action, which would have
occurred regardless of the plaintiff’s offer, constitutes valid acceptance necessary to form a
contract. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Tindall asserts no new governmental actions
occurred that may constitute acceptance or a separate contract.

Mr. Tindall’s entire argument hinges on a finding that the continuous holding of his
stocks occurred after dismissal of Tindall I and therefore qualify as new events. (Pl.’s Resp. at 4,
7). However, the continuous nature of Mr. Tindall’s allegations by themselves cannot constitute
a separate cause of action. In some cases, new and independent breaches by the government may
be treated as separate causes of action under the continuing claims doctrine. Westlands Water
Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 177, 212–13 (2013) (citing Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d
1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). For continuing claims, “the plaintiff’s claim must be inherently
susceptible to being broken down into a series of independent and distinct events or wrongs, each
having its own associated damages.” Wells v. United States, 420 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Brown Park Estates-Fairfield Dev. Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)). But “if there was only a single alleged wrong, even though the wrong caused later
adverse effects . . . the continuing claim doctrine is not applicable.” Id. at 1345–46 (citing Hart v.
United States, 910 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). While the continuing claims doctrine is most often
applied to instances examining a statute of limitations question, the Court finds it illuminating
for Mr. Tindall’s claims.

5
The United States’ continuous, ongoing holding of his stocks is not a series of
independent and distinct events. Because Mr. Tindall continues to suffer adverse effects from
that singular action does not give rise to these new allegations. The same logic applies to Mr.
Tindall’s takings claim—the facts alleged cannot be broken down into separate events and
therefore do not constitute a separate cause of action. 4 See Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that multiple takings claims cannot be based on a single,
continuous government action). There is one government action giving rise to both cases—
blocking Mr. Tindall’s Sberbank shares. That the United States continues the same conduct
alleged to be wrongful in Tindall I cannot field the basis for a new cause of action. Stated
differently, Tindall I’s failure necessarily cannot give rise to a second phase of litigation. As each
new day dawns, with no other changes, Mr. Tindall cannot claim a new cause of action in
perpetuity.

Mr. Tindall’s Amended Complaint does not cure the defects contained in his original
pleading and his claims do not allege new causes of action. Having satisfied the three elements
for claim preclusion, res judicata precludes Mr. Tindall’s claims. Mr. Tindall seemingly wants
this Court to revise its earlier findings, an act that would require contradicting itself and,
importantly, the Federal Circuit. While Mr. Tindall may overestimate this Court’s power, the
Court does not possess the authority, nor the desire, to take such action.

III. Conclusion

Mr. Tindall’s Complaint is a chorus to Tindall I and his claims are precluded. The United
States’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), is GRANTED. Further, the Clerk is directed to
REJECT “Plaintiff's Notice of Directly Related Case - Declaration by Plaintiff” received on
April 14, as it is a duplicate of a previously filed Notice, (ECF No. 2). The Clerk SHALL enter
judgment accordingly. The Clerk is directed to REJECT any future submissions in this case
unless they comply with this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. 5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

David A. Tapp
DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

4
Mr. Tindall’s attempt to reassert a due process violation is also futile. As the Court has said, a
due process violation claim can never satisfy the jurisdictional requirements in this Court
because it is not money-mandating—despite Mr. Tindall’s rote contention that it is. LeBlanc, 50
F.3d at 1028; (Am. Compl. at 21–23).
5
This provision does not act as an anti-filing injunction or a sanction. Allen v. United States, 88
F.4th 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that courts must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice
and opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction). Plaintiff is not enjoined
from proper post-dismissal filings in this case, nor is Plaintiff required to seek leave before filing
future actions in this Court. See id. This provision is a mechanism to reject non-compliant filings
in the above-captioned action once it is dismissed.
6

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10847262. Public record. Not legal advice.