# State v. William Stockwell > Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · December 1, 2010 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084701 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** December 1, 2010 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084701 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED AUGUST SESSION, 1998 November 4, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9709-CR-00438 ) Appellee, ) ) ) WILSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. J.O. BOND WILLIAM D. STOCKWELL, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - First Degree M urder) FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: B. F. LOWERY JOHN KNOX WALKUP Public Square, Lowery Bldg. Attorney General and Reporter Lebanon, TN.. 37087 TIMOTHY F. BEHAN Assistant Attorney General 425 5th Avenu e North Nashville, TN. 37243 TOM P. THOMPSON, JR. District Attorney General ROBERT HIBBETT Assistant District Attorney 111 Cherry Street Lebanon, TN. 37087 OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION On Decem ber 19, 1 996, a W ilson Co unty jury found Appella nt, William D. Stock well, guilty of first degree murder in the death of his newborn son. The trial court immediately imp osed a sen tence of life im prison men t. Appe llant ap peals from his conviction, raising three issues: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first degree m urder; 2) whether the trial court erred in failing to make a conclusive determination of the voluntariness and admiss ibility of Appellan t’s alleged c onfess ion prior to the submission of the statement to the jury; and 3) whether the trial court erred in allowin g the Sta te to introdu ce into evidence the involun tary statem ent of Appellant as well as the testimony of Detective David K enned y at the trial con cerning the taking of the state ment. After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt. FACTS On Thursday, May 11, 1995, Appellant received a call from his girlfriend, Lisa Murphy, at approximately 6:45 in the morning. Ms. Murphy, who Appellant knew to be pregnant with his child, called to say that her water had broken. Appellant went to Ms. Murphy’s house and picked up Ms. Murphy and her younger sister. T he co uple transported Ms. Murphy’s sister to school. Appellant then took Ms. Murphy to a farm that his parents owned on Sherrilltown Road. He left her the re in an old decrepit travel trailer, and returned home so that no one would notice that Ms. Murphy did not go to school. He returned to the farm, repor tedly around 9:00 am, to find Ms. Murphy in labor. The couple delivered the baby in the floor of the trailer. -2- Accord ing to Ms. Murph y, the baby was born alive, tho ugh A ppella nt told her the cord was around the infa nt’s neck during delivery. Ms. Mu rphy tied o ff the child’s cord with thread and cut the cord with scissors she had with her. She reported that the child cried as it was delivered and w as a purplish-red dish color. She further testified that Appellant took the child from her, wrap ped it in a jac ket, and took it to his truck, where there was a heater. He came back to the trailer and helped her to the truck where she sat and held the infant. She testified that the infant cried and slept, breathing normally. The couple discussed what to do with the child; they co nsidere d taking it so mew here an d leaving it, but de cided it would event ually be traced back to them. Ms. Murphy reported that Appellant several times mentioned the possibility of burying the child. The two discussed their dilemma for 15 to 20 minutes, and then Appellant got out of the truck, took a shove l, and we nt into the barn. When Appellant returned from the barn, he took the baby fr om M s. Mur phy an d carrie d it into the barn. Ms. Murphy testified that the baby cried as Appellant carried it. Appellant returned in a few minutes without the baby, telling Ms. Murphy that the baby had died. The couple spent the rest of the day together, acting as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred. T hey went shopping and then had dinner with Ms. Murph y’s family. According to Appellant, the baby was born with the cord around its neck. In a statement made at the time of his arrest, he stated that he thought that perhaps the child moved a little. He said that it seeme d that the baby w as alive when Ms. M urphy cut the cord, b ut it was blue in color. He testified at trial that he attempted to revive the infant by placing his finger in the baby’s mouth and trying -3- to clear its throat. He stated that both he and Ms. Murphy determined that the baby was dead, and that they jointly decided that the baby should be buried. Appe llant adm itted to digg ing a gra ve and b urying the baby. When Ms. Mu rphy return ed to sch ool the M onday fo llowing the birth, a teacher noticed th at she w as no lon ger preg nant. The teacher asked a friend of Ms. Murphy’s, Judy Williams, if Ms. Murphy had delivered the baby. Ms. Williams responded that the baby had died after being born with the cord around it’s neck. The teacher went to the school principal who called law enforcement. The detective assigned to the case wired Ms. Williams in order to tape a conversation between her and Ms. Murphy regarding what had occurred. The taped conversation was o nly par tially aud ible, bu t Ms. W illiams reported that Ms. Murphy told her that the baby boy wa s buried in a barn in Cherry Valley. O fficers determined that Appellant’s parents owned the property described and obtained permis sion to se arch the property. T he officers located th e buried infant. An autopsy performed by the County Medical Examiner revealed that the child was full term and properly developed. The child’s esophagus, trachea, and stomach containe d liquefied brown ish gre y dirt. Th e child ’s lung s floate d very w ell in water, which the medical examiner testified indicated that the chid had been born alive. The bronchi of the child’s lungs were blocked with a brown mate rial, and the alveoli contained “brown amorphous aspirated material,” which was consistent with the mate rial in the child’s s toma ch. Th e me dical examiner determined that the ca use of de ath was “mech anical airw ay obstru ction due to inhalation and ingestion of dirt.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation lab -4- determined that the soil recovered from the infant was consistent with soil from the child’s grave. Detective Kennedy observed the autopsy of the baby, after which he returned to the Sheriff’s office and re-read the statements by Ms. Murphy and Appe llant. Upon reading them, he decided to again qu estion A ppellant a s to whether the baby had been alive. At app roximately 1:00 in the morning, D etective Kennedy awoke Appellant and led him to an interrogation room for further questioning. Appella nt signed a rights wa iver. Detec tive Kenn edy testified that Appellant then told him he wished to change his statement to reflect that the baby was alive at the time he buried it. Detective Kennedy stated that he wrote out the statement for Appellant, but Appellant refused to sign the stateme nt. Detective Kennedy testified that he told Appellant that he, Detective Kenne dy, would testify as to wh at Appe llant had to ld him ev en if App ellant did n ot sign the statem ent. Appellan t’s version of that night’s eve nts differed from tha t of Detective Kennedy significantly. He testified that Detective Kennedy asked him if he wanted to change any part of his statement and that he responded that he did not. He said that Detective Kennedy wrote a statement and read it back to him , again asking if he wanted to change his statement. Appellant testified that he uneq uivoca lly told the de tective th at he d id not w ish to ch ange his statements and that he asked for an attorney. Appellant further testified that Detective Kennedy told him that he, Detective Kennedy, was studying to be an attorney and that in his opinio n Appe llant shou ld sign the statem ent. -5- I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Appe llant initially contends that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of murder in the first degree, alleging spec ifically that the S tate failed to prove the elements of premeditation and deliberation. When an ap pellan t challe nges the su fficienc y of the e videnc e, this Court is oblige d to rev iew tha t challe nge a ccord ing to c ertain w ell-settle d principles. A verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the Sta te’s witnes ses an d resolve s all conflicts in the te stimo ny in favor of the Sta te. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a presum ption of innocen ce, a jury verdict removes this presumption and replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on app eal, the bu rden of p roof rests w ith Appe llant to dem onstrate the insufficienc y of the con victing evide nce. Id. On appeal, “the [S]tate is entitled to the stro nges t legitim ate view of the e videnc e as w ell as all reasonable and legitimate inference s that ma y be draw n therefro m.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832 , 835 (T enn. 1978)) . W here th e suffic iency o f the evid ence is contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reason able do ubt. Harris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 ; Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U .S. 307, 3 19, 99 S .Ct. 2781 , 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (19 79). In conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from reweighing or recons idering the evidenc e. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 6); State v. Mathews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). More over, th is Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those drawn by the trier of fa ct from circ umsta ntial eviden ce.”Id. at 779. Finally, the -6- Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 13(e) provides, “finding s of gu ilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by th e trier of fact beyond a reasonab le doubt.” See also State v. Mathews, 805 S.W.2d at 780. In State v. Brown, 836 S.W .2d 530 (Tenn .1992) and State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144 (Tenn.1992), our Supreme Court discussed the then existing eleme nts of first degree murder. In Brown, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Tennessee courts have often blurred the distinction between the eleme nts of premeditation and deliberation. The Court relied upon the following historical definitions: "Premeditation" is the process s imply of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal condu ct; and "deliberatio n" is the proce ss of ca refully weighing such ma tters as the wisdom of going ahead with the proposed killing, the manner in which the killing will be accomplished, and the consequences which may be visited upon the killer if and when apprehended. "Deliberation" is present if the thinking, i.e., the "preme ditation," is being done in such a cool mental state, under such circumstances, and for such a period of time as to perm it a "careful weighing" of the proposed decision. Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 540-41 (quoting C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 140 (14th ed.1979) (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Gentry, 881 S.W .2d 1 (Tenn . Crim. App.1 993). Premeditation as define d by the S uprem e Cou rt requires evidenc e of a "previo usly formed design or intent to kill," and deliberation requires "some period of reflection, during which the mind is free from the influence of excitement or -7- passion ." West, 844 S.W.2d at 147. More over, to insure that the elem ents w ould be considered separately, in Brown the Court decided to aba ndon the co mm only given instruction that prem editation c ould be "formed in an insta nt." Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 543. In State v. Gentry, while holding that the jury may infer premeditation and delibe ration from the circumstances surrounding the killing, the Supreme Court, outlined the proof from which a jury might rationally infer the elements o f first degree murd er: (1) facts about how and w hat the defen dant d id prior to the actual killing which show he was engage d in activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defen dant m ust ha ve inten tionally killed accord ing to a pre conce ived des ign. State v. Gentry, 881 S.W .2d 1, 4-5 (Ten n. Crim. App . 1993) (quoting 2 W. LaFave and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.7 (198 6)); see also State v. Hall, 1997 W L 769174 ,118-119 (T enn. 1997 ). In the matter sub judice, proof w as pre sente d that A ppella nt wan ted rid of the baby “someway, anyway.” Further proof showed that Appellant refus ed to take Ms. Mu rphy to a h ospital, bu t rather too k her to a re mote location to give birth so that no one would find out about the child. Because premeditation and deliberation are elements are mens rea eleme nts, elem ents which pertain to the mental state o f the pe rpetra tor, the o nly way a jury ca n find s uch e leme nts is usua lly through circumstantial evidence, through examining Appellant’s actions -8- for evidence of what was in his mind as he acted. The evidence showed that the Appellant left Ms. Murphy at the abandoned trailer for over an hour during which her labor started. The child was born alive and Appellant took a shovel and dug a shallow grave before taking the baby from its mother. All of this evidence suppo rts the finding of preme ditation an d delibera tion. This is sue is with out me rit. II. Determination of Voluntariness and Admissibility of Statement Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to determine pretrial whether Ap pellant’s stateme nt to Detective Ke nnedy wa s voluntary. Detective Kennedy and Appellant both testified at a pretrial hearing regarding Appe llant’s motion to suppress the statement. The trial court overruled Appe llant’s motio n and allowed the State to presen t the statemen t to the jury through the testimony of Detective Kennedy. The trial court ruled that Appe llant’s contention that he never m ade the statem ent was a fact q uestion for the jury rather than a question of volu ntariness for the trial court to determine. We agree. Appellant has not contested the rights waiver which he signed. Neither has he indicated that he was mistreated or threatened into making a statement. He mere ly contests the authe nticity of the sta temen t. The qu estion of w hether Appellant actually made the statement at all is a relevant fact question to be resolved by the trier of fact, the jury. III. Introduction of Statement Appe llant further alleg es that the trial court erre d in allowin g the Sta te to present the contested statement to the jury through the testimony of Detective -9- Kenned y. W e disagree. Appellant’s argument seems to be based on the lack of verification of the stateme nt allegedly ma de by App ellant to Detective Kenned y. Appellant was allowed to cross-examine Detective Kennedy at length regarding the authenticity of the document, the conditions under which it was authored, and whether the detective was truthful in his version of the events. Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given to the evidence, and w ell as factual issues raised by the evide nce are resolved by the trier of fact and not this Cou rt. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835(Tenn. 1978). T he jury ha s spoke n. This iss ue is witho ut merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE CONCUR: ___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE ___________________________________ JOHN K. BYERS, SENIOR JUDGE -10- --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084701. Public record. Not legal advice.