# SOUILLIARD v. HAWKEE

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10846035

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10846035

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that court may take judicial notice of the record from previous court proceedings
- stating that complaints should be with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RENEE M. SOUILLIARD, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : No. 25-cv-1110
:
DISTRICT JUSTICE ROBERT :
HAWKEE,1 :
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM
Joseph F. LEESON, Jr. April 15, 2025
United States District Judge

Currently before the Court is a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Renee M. Souilliard raising
constitutional claims against District Justice Robert Hawke. (ECF No. 2.) Souilliard seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Souilliard leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Souilliard alleges that on October 20, 2023, she was arrested and “illegally removed from
her home” due to an order signed by Judge Hawke. (Compl. at 6.) She claims that “a thirteen

1 Plaintiff spells defendant’s last name incorrectly. The correct spelling is Hawke. The
correct spelling will be used throughout this memorandum.
2 The factual allegations are taken from the Complaint (“Compl”) (ECF No. 2). The Court
considers the entirety of Souilliard’s submission to constitute the Complaint and adopts the
sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court quotes from
the Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up. The Court may
consider matters of public record when conducting a screening under § 1915. Castro-Mota v.
Smithson, No. 20-940, 2020 WL 3104775, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (citing Buck v.
Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)). The Court may also take judicial
notice of prior court proceedings. See In re Ellerbe, No. 21-3003, 2022 WL 444261, at *1 (3d
Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (per curiam) citing Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848
F.2d 414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that court may take judicial notice of the record from
previous court proceedings).
month long legal battle” presided over by Judge Hawke had concluded just three days prior.3
(Id.) The police involved allegedly “laughed and ridiculed” her, “did not obtain proof of
ownership by the accuser and proceeded to take [her] to be arraigned” by Judge Hawke, who had
“a big smile on his face, standing over [her] with hatred spewing out of his eyes.” (Id.) She
claims that Judge Hawke “proceeded to threaten, coerce, and intimidate [her] into signing papers

without an attorney or reading them. He whipped them out of [her] hands until [she] complied.
He threw the papers back at [her].” (Id.) She asserts that “the higher court released [her] one
week later, and following that, all charges were dropped.” (Id.) She alleges that she had
“permission to temporarily live on 1162 Stateside Drive by the owner,” and had witnesses. (Id.)
As a result, she claims that her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated because
Judge Hawke retaliated against, intimidated, threatened, and coerced her, and he “did not recuse
himself because of a thirteen-month case between [them] that just ended three days prior.” (Id.
at 5.) She further asserts Judge Hawke’s actions resulting in a crime because it is unlawful to,
inter alia, coerce, retaliate, intimidate a person who “assisted in an investigation.” (Id. at 3.)

She suffered “severe mental and emotional trauma, was “thrown in jail for nothing,” and her cat
died as a result of being “falsely arrested and incarcerated.” (Id. at 7.) Souilliard seeks money
damages and requests the Court to dismiss Judge Hawke “from the bench.” (Id. at 7.)

3 A review of public records indicates that Judge Hawke presided over a civil case brought
by Souilliard in 2021 against Cindy Reed and Camille Wiegand, which was dismissed by the
Court. Souilliard v. Reed, at al., MJ-03301-CV-0000139-2021 (M.D. Northampton). A further
review of public records does not indicate Judge Hawke presided over any other cases involving
Souilliard, but she did bring another civil case against Reed and Wiegand that resulted in a
default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, over which a different Judge had presided. Souilliard v.
Reed, at al., MJ-31202-CV-0000005-2021 (M.D. Lehigh). Defendants appealed the default
judgment. See id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Souilliard leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
she does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage
of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally
construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th
366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth,

115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Additionally, the Court is also obligated to dismiss any claims that seek monetary relief from an
immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). As Souilliard is proceeding pro se, the
Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
The vehicle by which Souilliard brings her federal constitutional claims is pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. at 5.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). However, judges are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983
civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as
they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko

v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial
capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211
F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter
jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208
F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir.
1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without fear of incurring personal liability for their
actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally
incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are
taken as a result of a conspiracy with others. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Since it

is apparent that Souilliard’s § 1983 claims against Judge Hawke are based on acts he took in his
judicial capacity while presiding over cases for which he had jurisdiction to act,4 he is entitled to
absolute judicial immunity from Souilliard’s claims.

4 It also appears she alleges Judge Hawke committed federal crimes based on his actions
because it is unlawful to, inter alia, coerce, retaliate, intimate a person who “assisted in an
investigation.” (Compl. at 3.) Even if Judge Hawke was not entitled to absolute judicial
immunity here, which he is, any attempt to bring criminal charges against him also fails because
criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil liability. See Brown v. City of
Philadelphia Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Brown
alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most do not provide a private
cause of action.”); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a
criminal prohibition alone.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Souilliard leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court concludes that under the circumstances of this case, Souilliard
cannot cure the defects in her Complaint, so the dismissal will be with prejudice and she will not

be given leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir.
2002) (stating that complaints should be with leave to amend “unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile”). Because her Complaint will be dismissed, her request for Judge Hawke to
be “dismissed” from the bench is denied.5
An appropriate Order will be entered separately. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
58(a).

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.__________
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge

5 “‘[A] request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action. . . . An
injunction is a remedy, not a separate claim or cause of action. A pleading can . . . request
injunctive relief in connection with a substantive claim, but a separately pled claim or cause of
action for injunctive relief is inappropriate.’” Slemmer v. McGlaughlin Spray Foam Insulation,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702
F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10846035. Public record. Not legal advice.