# State v. Joe Jackson > Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · December 1, 2010 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084502 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** December 1, 2010 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084502 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON JULY, 1998 SESSION FILED November 9, 1998 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 02C01-9707-CR-00252 ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellee ) Appellate C ourt Clerk ) Shelby Coun ty vs. ) ) Honorable Joseph B. Dailey, Judge JOE E. JACKSON, ) ) (Theft of a motor vehicle) Appellant. ) FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: A.C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP Shelby County Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter DIANNE THACKERY CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Public Defender Counsel fo r the State (At trial) 425 Fifth Ave . North 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Bldg. W. MARK W ARD Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Assistant Public Defender (On appeal) Suite 2-01, 201 Poplar Ave. WILLIAM L. GIBBONS Memphis, TN 38103 District Attorney General DAVID HENRY Assistant District Attorney General 201 Poplar Ave., Suite 301 Memphis, TN 38103 OPINION FILED: ____________________ AFFIRMED CURW OOD WITT JUDGE OPINION The defendant, Joe E. Jackson, appeals from his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for unlawfu lly and knowingly obta ining a moto r vehicle valued at more than a thousand dollars but less than ten thousand dollars and for unlawfully and knowingly exercising control over the same vehicle.1 The trial court entered judgment only on the first count of the indictment and sentenced the defendant to serve twelve years in the De partment of C orrection as a ca reer offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to identify him beyond a reasonable doubt as the person who committed the offense and (2) that the jury’s dual finding s of guilt violate dou ble jeopardy princip les. W e affirm the defendant’s conviction for theft under the first count of the indictment and dismiss the second co unt. On July 31, 1996, Joyce Carter parked her automobile, a 1993 Buick Century, in the parking lot at her place of employment. At about 3:00 p.m., Rodney Jenkins, a fellow employee, who was leaving work, watched as two men left the parking lot in Carter’s vehicle . Jenkins reco gnized the autom obile as belon ging to Joyce Carter, and he knew Carter’s husband. The Buick passed within eight feet of Jenkins, and he paid particular attention because he realized that the driver was not Carter’s husband. He described the driver as a black male weighing about 165 to 185 pounds with a light brown com plexion and w earing a dark colored T-shirt and a white hat. The next day the police recove red the autom obile. Although it had been “burnt to a crisp,” the police were able to identify it through its VIN number, and Carter recognized so me of her be longings whic h had not bee n comple tely destroyed. Approxim ately one mon th later, on Augus t 30, 1996, som e of Carter’s co-workers noted that two strang e men we re walking aroun d in the parking lo t and pointing to various cars. Jenkins went to the parking lot to observe the men, and he recognized one of them as the man who drove Carter’s au tomobile out of the parking 1 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-10 3 (1997). 2 lot. When the police arrived, Jenkins positively identified the defendant as the person who had prev iously remov ed Carter’s autom obile from the lot.2 The grand jury returned a two count indictment. In the first count, the indictment charged that on July 31, 1996, the defe ndant “ did unlawf ully and knowing ly obtain property, to wit: a motor ve hicle . . . without the effec tive consent of Joyce Carter with intent to deprive the owner thereof. . . .” The second count charged the defendant with unlawfully and k nowingly exercis ing control over the same vehicle. The jury found the defe ndant guilty on both counts of the ind ictment. First we consider wh ether the eviden ce presented at trial is sufficient to prove beyond a reaso nable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the offense ch arged in the indictm ent. In Tenness ee, appellate co urts give great weigh t to the result reached by a jury in a criminal trial. A jury’s verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict of guilty removes the presum ption of innoce nce and repla ces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of dem onstrating why the ev idence is insufficient, as a matter of la w, to support the verd ict. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Our standard of review when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned on appeal is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 278 1, 2789 (1979 ). 2 The appellan t did not testify nor did he o ffer any evidenc e on his behalf. 3 The identity of the accused as the person who committed the offense for which he is on trial is a ques tion of fact for the jury. State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 188, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 81); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The record before us indic ates that Rodney Jenkins stood within eight feet of the defendant during daylight hours. He testified that he paid particular attention to the driver of the vehicle when he realized that the m an was not the o wner’s husband. He was able to describe the driver as a black male with a light brown complexion who was wearing a dark T-shirt and a white hat with some w riting on it. A month later, Jenkins again saw the defendant in the same parking lot. He was wearing the same hat and Jenkins recognized him at once. The arresting officer testified that Jenkins identified the defendant without hesitation. Jenkins also positively identified the defendant at trial. Ques tions of c redibility are f or the jury, and the jury believed Jenkin s’ testimony. W e find that the evide nce is sufficie nt for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the man who drove the stolen Buic k from the pa rking lot. See State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (victim’s testimony, by itself, is su fficient to support a conviction); State v. Livingston, 607 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (eyewitness identification suf ficient to suppo rt conviction). In his second issue, the defendant contends that his two convictions for theft violate double jeopardy principles. The state agrees that only one conviction may stand. The grand jury indicted the defendant bo th for unlawfully and k nowingly obtaining a motor vehicle belonging to Joyce Carter and for unla wfully and knowin gly exercising control over that same motor vehic le. The jury found the d efendant gu ilty on both counts. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court and both counsel agreed that one of the convictions had to be dismissed. The trial court, however, was reluctant to dismiss either charge because he was uncertain which count should be retained and which should be dismissed. The record before us contains only one judgment. According to this judgment, the defendant was convicted 4 on count one of theft of property valued at more than $1000 in violation of Tennessee Code Ann otated section 3 9-14-103. W e agree that the second count should be dismisse d. The evidenc e in the record is s ufficien t to prove b eyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “unlawfully and unknow ingly obtained a motor vehicle worth more than a $1000 but less than $10,000 without the consent of Joyce Carter, the owner,” and that he acted with the intent to deprive the owner of her au tomobile. Accord ingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000 as charged in the first count of Indictment No. 96-13935. The disposition of the second count of that indictment was never reflected in a judgme nt. The second count is dism issed. _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ CURW OOD WITT, Judge CONCUR: ______________________________ JOE G. RILEY, Judge ______________________________ ROBERT W . WEDEMEYER, Special Judge 5 --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1084502. Public record. Not legal advice.