# VELEZ-SANTIAGO v. ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10844142

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILSON JUNIOR VELEZ-SANTIAGO : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
:
v. : NO. 25-CV-0563
:
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL :
SERVICES, et al., :
Defendants :

M EMORANDUM
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. APRIL 11, 2025
Plaintiff Wilson Junior Velez-Santiago, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at Chester
County Prison (“CCP”), brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations
that Aramark, its employees, and the staff at CCP have continuously served “toxic foods.” He also
asserts claims of medical deliberate indifference against PrimeCare and one of its employees.
Velez-Santiago seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth, the Court will
grant Velez-Santiago leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss his claims against some
Defendants, and permit his remaining claims to proceed at this time.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Velez-Santiago brings his Complaint against the following Defendants: (1) Aramark
Correctional Services; (2) John or Jane Doe, the Aramark Prison Supervisor; (3) John or Jane Doe,
the Aramark Lead Worker; (4) J. Massy, Prison Kitchen Supervisor; (5) Warden Howard Holland;

1 The following allegations are taken from Velez-Santiago’s Complaint and the attachments thereto.
(ECF Nos. 2, 2-1.) The Court deems the entire submission to constitute the Complaint and adopts the
continuous pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system. Spelling, punctuation,
and capitalization errors are cleaned up where necessary.
(6) Director Morroney, Director of Prison Services; (7) PrimeCare Medical Inc., the medical
provider at CCP; and (8) Nurse Melissa. (See ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at 2-6.)
Velez-Santiago alleges that since April 22, 2024, he’s “experienced countless stomach
illnesses” that have caused him severe to extreme stomach and chest pain, nausea, constant

diarrhea, occasional vomiting. (Id. at 9.) Velez-Santiago contends that his stomach illnesses are
caused by “toxic foods” that are being served throughout CCP, and he avers that these foods have
been “causing prison wide food poison[ing].” (Id.) The “foods that cause these illnesses vary
from breakfast oatmeal, creamed wheat . . . side salads, vegetables, potatoes, noodles, and at times
depending on how it’s made, the rice.” (Id.) However, “the product that causes the most extremely
painful illnesses [are] the meat products.” (Id.) Velez-Santiago contends that many products, in
particular the meat products, are “labeled not for human consumption” and contain warnings that
they “may cause cancer.” (Id. at 9-10.) He avers that Defendant Massy, as well as the “Aramark
in house supervisor and staff members,” are aware of the food issues because “they receive
constant complaints.” (Id. at 11.)

On one occasion, an “Aramark staff member was fired for leaving food out overnight and
serving it” to the prisoners because it caused food poisoning to everyone who was served. (Id. at
9.) Although this one incident was addressed by the firing of an Aramark employee, Velez-
Santiago avers that illnesses still occur “daily, every other day, or every two days.” (Id.) He avers
that the prison has issued surveys to “investigate the food source,” but those surveys are not always
distributed properly, and everything “remains the same.” (Id. at 10.) Velez-Santiago claims that
Director Morroney and Warden Holland have “ignored requests slips” that he sent to them
regarding the toxic foods, and they “have turned [their] eye . . . on the account that it saves them
money.” (Id. at 11.)
Velez-Santiago avers that the bouts of stomach illnesses are a “constant prison wide
condition that has become so normal that nurses routinely ignore any complaints of such.” (Id. at
9.) In fact, on one occasion when Velez-Santiago spoke to Nurse Melissa during rounds about his
stomach pain, she allegedly told him, “It’s just the food, you will be fine tomorrow.” (Id. at 9;

ECF No. 2-1 at 3.) He further avers that he “had to complain of chest pains” to be prescribed
antacids. (Id. at 10.)
Velez-Santiago contends that he lives “in constant stomach pain and constant diarrhea”
because of the “toxic foods,” and he has no other option but to eat the food knowing what the result
will be. (Id.) He alleges that he “can never recover fully and it feels like an ongoing torture.” (Id.)
Velez-Santiago avers that he is “not complaining about food portions, the taste, or even quality as
far as ‘good food’ goes,” but he merely wishes to “no longer suffer from toxic food illnesses and
be subjected to food that is not for human consumption and can or may cause [him] cancer in the
future.”2 (Id. at 10-11.) He seeks an injunction ordering CCP and Aramark “to stop serving
cancerous/not for human consumption toxic foods” and monetary damages totaling $350,000. (Id.

at 8.)

2 To the extent that Velez-Santiago intends to assert claims on “behalf of all inmates” (see Compl.
at 10), he may not do so. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, parties “may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may conduct his or
her own case pro se or retain counsel to do so. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a respect for the choice of an individual citizen
to plead his or her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59,
61 (2d Cir. 1990))). Although an individual may represent himself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent
other parties in federal court. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“The rule that a non-lawyer may not represent another person in court is a venerable common law rule.”),
abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
Furthermore, “a plaintiff must assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third party” to have
standing to bring a claim. See Twp. of Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir.
2011) (quotations omitted)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Velez-Santiago is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
because it appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.3
Accordingly, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the court to dismiss the complaint if it

fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which
requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation, [the Court will] accept the facts
alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true, draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,
and ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a
plausible [] claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on
other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Perez

v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. As Velez-Santiago is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations
liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
III. DISCUSSION
Velez-Santiago brings his constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and/or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Velez-Santiago’s

3 However, as Velez-Santiago is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the $350 filing fee in
installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
claims are best characterized as Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the Defendants’ alleged
failure to provide him with a proper diet and proper medical care.4
A. Conditions of Confinement – Nutritionally Adequate Food
Prison officials have a constitutional duty to provide humane conditions of confinement,

including adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures
to guarantee the safety of the inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Constitution “require[s] that prisoners be served
nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an
immediate danger” to their health and well-being. Duran v. Merline, 923 F. Supp. 2d 702, 720
(D.N.J. 2013) (citing Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). It has been held that “prison officials may violate the
[Constitution] by serving unsanitary, spoiled or contaminated food if the prisoner also alleges that
he or she suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” See DeJesus v. Carey, No. 15-2504, 2016 WL
6134540, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2016) (citing Robles, 725 F.2d at 15); Escobar v. Mora , 496 F.

App’x 806 (10th Cir. 2012) (inmate stated a claim when he alleged that he lost thirty pounds and
suffered psychological and mental injury because an officer spit in food).
In the context of an alleged failure to provide a proper diet, “[u]nconstitutional punishment
typically includes both objective and subjective components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,
68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation
was sufficiently serious and the subjective component asks whether the officials acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Whether the
deprivation of food is objectively serious for purposes of establishing a constitutional violation

4 Because Velez-Santiago was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question, the Fourteenth
Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2005).
“depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Duran, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (internal
quotations omitted). To satisfy the subjective component of the analysis, a prisoner generally must
assert that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously
disregarded a serious risk to the detainee’s health or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

298-99 (1991); see Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[W]e agree with the District Court and find no reason to apply a different standard here
as we have applied the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases involving prisoners and
pretrial detainees.” (internal citations omitted)).
Velez-Santiago has adequately alleged an objectively serious deprivation. Since April
2024, he has experienced countless and frequent stomach illnesses because of various foods being
served by Aramark. (Compl. at 9.) He allegedly suffers constant stomach pain, nausea, and
diarrhea, as well as occasional vomiting. (Id.) He claims that the bouts of stomach illnesses are a
“constant prison wide condition, and he avers that many of the food products served are “labeled
not for human consumption” and contain warnings that they “may cause cancer.” (Id. at 9-10.)

Finally, Velez-Santiago avers that despite knowing what the likely result will be, he has no other
option but to eat the food served to him. (Id. at 10.)
Velez-Santiago has also adequately alleged facts supporting an inference of deliberate
indifference at this early stage of the litigation as to certain Defendants. Specifically, he avers that
J. Massy, as well as Aramark and its “in house supervisor and staff members,” are aware of the
food issues because “they receive constant complaints,” and he avers that the kitchen “failed a
Health and Sanitary Inspection during this time period.” (Id. at 11-12.) He also avers that surveys
have been issued to prisoners to “investigate the food source” of the stomach illnesses, but nothing
has changed. (Id. at 10.)
Construed liberally, these allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Velez-
Santiago was denied adequate nutritional food, and he will be permitted to proceed on his
deliberate indifference claims against Aramark Correctional Services, its Prison Supervisor (John
or Jane Doe)5 and Lead Worker (John or Jane Doe), and the Prison Kitchen Supervisor, J. Massy,

in their individual capacities only. See Stone v. Aramark, Inc., No. 20-428, 2022 WL 124650, at
*2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 2022) (plausible deliberate indifference claim pled against food preparer
where prisoner alleged that meals served within a period of eight months often contained spoiled
or rotten food causing him food poisoning, stomach pain, vomiting, and diarrhea); Gonzalez v.
Neal, No. 22-316, 2022 WL 3368811, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2022) (claims that prisoner was
served spoiled and contaminated meals for a period of several months, during which time he often
went hungry, stated a plausible claim for deliberate indifference); Drennon v. ABL, No. 06-126,
2006 WL 3448686, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2006) (prisoner permitted to proceed with Eighth
Amendment claims based on allegations that poor food quality caused him to experience weight
fluctuations, stomach viruses, diarrhea, and constipation).

Velez-Santiago’s allegations against Director Morroney and Warden Holland,6 however,
are insufficient to state a plausible claim against them because it appears these high-level officials

5 To the extent that Velez-Santiago seeks to assert a claim against the Aramark Prison Supervisor in
his or her official capacity (see Compl. at 3), this claim is not cognizable because Aramark is a private
entity susceptible to suit. See Kreis v. Northampton Cnty. Prison, No. 21-2360, 2022 WL 4236692, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2022) (stating that official capacity claims are “inapplicable to suits against private
parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit”) (citing Owens v. Connections Cmty. Support Programs,
Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 791, 796 (D. Del. 2012) (“Generally, a suit against a [ ] public officer in his or her
official capacity is used to compel that officer to take some official action [and that] concept . . . is
inapplicable to suits against private parties where the entity is also susceptible to suit.”)). Accordingly, any
official capacity claims against Aramark’s prison supervisor will be dismissed with prejudice.
6 Velez-Santiago checked the box to indicate that he intends to present claims against Warden
Holland and Director Morroney in their official capacities, as well as in their individual capacities. (Compl.
at 5.) Official capacity claims against county employees at CCP are indistinguishable from claims against
the Chester County. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). To state
were sued based solely on their positions at CCP, rather than any facts from which their personal
involvement, knowledge and acquiescence, or any other basis for liability could be inferred.7 Saisi
v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants
were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed merely from

defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held
liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005)). Specifically, Velez-Santiago alleges in a conclusory manner
that he wrote to Morroney and Holland, but the food issue was not addressed. (Compl. at 11, 16;
Exhibits (ECF No. 2-1) at 5.) This is not a sufficient basis for liability. See Mincy v. Chmielsewski,
508 F. App’x 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“[A]n officer’s review of, or failure to
investigate, an inmate’s grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal
involvement.”); Simonton v. Tennis, 437 F. App’x 60, 63 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“The District
Court correctly concluded that judgment on the pleadings was warranted on Simonton’s failure to

an official capacity claim/municipal liability claim against Chester County employees, Velez-Santiago
would have to allege plausibly that a county policy or custom caused a constitutional violation. See Monell,
436 U.S. at 694; Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84.

Velez-Santiago fails to allege that he suffered a constitutional violation due to a policy or custom
of Chester County. The only allegation he makes is that Director Mooney and Warden Holland have
continued to allow “toxic foods to be served” because it “saves them money.” (Compl. at 11.) However,
this conclusory allegation is too speculative to support a claim of deliberate indifference. See Sims, 635 F.
App’x at 20 (summarily affirming dismissal of Monell claims against prison medical contractor where
plaintiff’s “complaint stated that Wexford had an open practice, policy, or custom of deliberate indifference
in order to save money” and “[h]is statement of facts merely repeated this”); Winslow v. Prison Health
Services, 406 F. App’x 671, 674-75 (3d Cir. 2011) (allegation that plaintiff was harmed by “policies to save
money” is conclusory); Haar v. CFG Health Servs., LLC, No. 22-7595, 2024 WL 4880349, at *6 (D.N.J.
Nov. 25, 2024) (assertion that CFG has “a policy to provide inmates with as little medical care as possible
. . . to save money” is too speculative and conclusory to support a deliberate indifference claim). The Court
will permit Velez-Santiago to amend his pleading to reassert an official capacity claim/Monell claim against
Chester County should he be able to cure this defect.

7 “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with
appropriate particularity.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).
investigate grievances claim.”); Burnside v. Moser, 138 F. App’x 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (“Moser’s failure to process Burnside’s medical treatment, food service, and commissary
grievances, although not to be commended, does not rise to the level of a violation of a
constitutional right.”). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Velez-Santiago’s claims against

Director Morroney and Warden Holland without prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Velez-Santiago asserts constitutional claims for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the failure to provide medical
care, a pretrial detainee must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Moore v. Luffey, 767 F.
App’x 335, 340 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that the standard under the Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment for claims related to a prisoner’s medical needs is essentially the same for
purposes of the analysis). A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference is properly
alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical
reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.”
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
“A medical need is serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). A serious medical need must be more than “mere
discomfort or inconvenience.” Hill v. Aramark Corr. Servs., No. 23-406, 2025 WL 91432, at *6
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 755114 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 10, 2025) (citing Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations

omitted)). Not every complaint of inadequate prison medical care rises to the level of deliberate
indifference. Anderson v. Price, No. 22-3058, 2023 WL 5814664, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023)
(per curiam). “Where a prisoner is receiving some amount of medical treatment, [courts] presume
that the treatment is adequate absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” Id.
(affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claims on screening) (citing Brown v. Borough of
Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Hayes v. Gilmore, 802 F. App’x 84, 88
(3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment,
it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”).
Courts are reluctant to find that occasional gastrointestinal symptoms alone may constitute

a sufficiently serious medical need. See, e.g., Rains v. Wellman, No. 20-32, 2022 WL 18587783,
at *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 543075 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 27, 2023) (citing Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that his alleged stomach disorders constituted serious
medical needs); Smith v. Hepp, No. 18-669, 2022 WL 1001183 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 4, 2022)
(“Stomach distress often is not serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim”) (citing
Riley El v. Godinez, No. 13-c-5768, 2016 WL 4505038, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016)).
Velez-Santiago contends that the bouts of stomach illnesses are a “constant prison wide
condition that has become so normal that nurses routinely ignore any complaints of such.” (Id. at
9.) He avers that the “numerous staff members of PrimeCare” have been denying medical
treatment to prisoners, including himself, when prisoners complain about stomach illnesses. (Id.
at 11.) Velez-Santiago references one occasion when he spoke to Nurse Melissa during rounds,
and she allegedly “refused to put [him] down for a sick call,” telling him that “It’s just the food,

you will be fine tomorrow.” (Id.; see also ECF No. 2-1 at 3.) He also alleges that he “always
complains on sick calls” and although he has “received Tums and Pepto-Bismol on occasions,” he
sometimes does not receive any attention or sick call responses. (Compl. at 8, 10; ECF No. 2-1 at
24.)
Velez-Santiago’s allegations against Nurse Melissa raise a vague claim of failure to treat
on only one occasion. It is unclear what Velez-Santiago conveyed to Nurse Melissa during this
one instance, and whether any condition he complained of at that time could have constituted a
“serious medical need” warranting treatment. Velez-Santiago’s conclusory allegations of
deliberate indifference are also unaccompanied by any facts suggesting that Nurse Melissa
knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to his health. Moreover, Velez-Santiago’s allegation that

“staff members” or “nurses routinely ignore” complaints of stomach illnesses is too tenuous to
support a plausible claim of medical deliberate indifference. See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353 (noting
that individual liability may only be imposed under § 1983 if the state actor played an “affirmative
part” in the alleged misconduct) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Finally, it appears that Velez-
Santiago did receive medication on occasion to treat his symptoms and there are no allegations
that the medication failed to alleviate his complaints. See Davis v. Superintendent Somerset SCI,
597 F. App’x 42, 45 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some medical
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, ‘federal courts are generally
reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state
tort law.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir.
1979)). Accordingly, Velez-Santiago’s claims of medical deliberate indifference against Nurse
Melissa will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a state a claim.
With respect to his claims against PrimeCare, Velez-Santiago avers that PrimeCare “has

adopted a custom of brushing off complaints of stomach illnesses and ignoring them.” (Compl. at
11.) The claims against PrimeCare cannot proceed as currently pled. A private corporation under
contract to provide medical services at a jail or prison may be liable under § 1983 in certain
circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “a private
health company providing services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of its
employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’” Sims v. Wexford Health
Sources, 635 F. App’x 16, 20 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978) to claims against medical contractor)). Rather, [t]o plead a § 1983 claim against
a prison medical provider, a plaintiff must allege the provider had “a relevant . . . policy or custom,

and that the policy caused the constitutional violation [he] allege[s].” Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84
(citing Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).8

8 “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy
with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480
(3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct,
although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to
constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). To allege an
unconstitutional custom, a plaintiff must state facts from which it could be inferred that a decisionmaker
acquiesced in a practice that essentially constitutes “standing operating procedure.” Bielevicz, 915 F.3d at
850. In the context of a contract medical provider, the provider’s “failure to train or supervise must amount
to a policy or custom in disregard of an obvious risk that its employees or agents would commit
constitutional violations.” Ponzini v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 444, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2017),
aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Ponzini v. Monroe Cnty., 789 F. App’x 313 (3d
Cir. 2019). Velez-Santiago has not alleged that he was injured due to a failure to supervise, train, or
discipline.
“To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or
policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). It is not enough,
however, to allege the existence of a policy or a custom. “A plaintiff must also allege that the
policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914

F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). General
allegations that simply paraphrase the standard for municipal liability do not support a plausible
claim. See Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
2021) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is
insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.” ) (citing cases); see also Brown v.
Delaware Cnty. Prison Bd. of Inspectors, 741 F. App’x 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(“Brown’s vague and conclusory allegation that the defendants had a policy or custom of ‘fail[ing]
to provide an adequate level of security staffing,’ is insufficient to state a claim.”).
Velez-Santiago did not plead any official policy. Instead, he avers only that PrimeCare has
a “custom of brushing off complaints of stomach illnesses.” (Compl. at 11.) This conclusory

allegation fails to “plead knowledge [of the alleged violations] by a municipal decisionmaker.”
See Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 779 F. App’x 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (finding
that the sole allegation that the City “knows or should know of the constitutional violations” was
conclusory and insufficient to plead knowledge by a decisionmaker) (quoting McTernan, 564 F.3d
at 658). However, because the Court cannot say at this time that Velez-Santiago can never allege
a plausible Monell claim against PrimeCare, the dismissal will be without prejudice and Velez-
Santiago will be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint if he can cure the defects the
Court has identified with respect to his claims against PrimeCare.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Velez-Santiago leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, dismiss his claims against Defendants PrimeCare, Inc., Nurse Melissa, Director

Morroney, and Warden Howard Holland without prejudice, and permit his claims against
Defendants Aramark Correctional Services, the Aramark Prison Supervisor (John or Jane Doe),9
the Aramark Lead Worker (John or Jane Doe), and J. Massy to proceed at this time.
Velez-Santiago is given the option to proceed on his remaining claims or file an amended
complaint in the event he seeks to amend his claims against Defendants PrimeCare, Nurse Melissa,
Director Morroney, and Warden Holland.10 An appropriate Order follows, which provides further
guidance for proceeding.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.

9 Any official capacity claims against the Aramark Prison Supervisor will be dismissed with
prejudice.

10 If Velez-Santiago files an amended complaint, his amended complaint must be a complete
document that includes all of the bases for his claims, including claims that the Court has not yet dismissed
if he seeks to proceed on those claims. Claims that are not included in the amended complaint will not be
considered part of this case. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In general,
an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the
most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.”) (internal citations omitted).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10844142. Public record. Not legal advice.